EC225 crash near Bergen, Norway April 2016
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So the forward suspension bar pin is a larger diameter. If a smaller pin from a rear strut is inserted no one notices this quickly and possibly nappy pins it in place. That to me puts some major blame on engineering design for not making the smaller pin a longer length or different head shape or at least some obvious difference so the poor AME doesn't grab it by mistake. What a perfect fit for Murphy's law.
I am very disappointed in the way the Norwegian AAIB have conducted their recent "press conference". It would seem there is lots of room for misinterpretation of statements made by them. The BBC, for instance, is quoting the Norwegian AAIB spokesman as saying;-
"On the basis of the facts we have, this involves a technical fault; it isn't human error," the director of the board's aviation department said."
Can they already say it was not a maintenance error? I suspect he/she meant that it wasn't a piloting error.
And as to allowing the press into the hangar to view the wreckage and take photos, I find this extremely irresponsible.
I can't see the UK AAIB behaving like this.
"On the basis of the facts we have, this involves a technical fault; it isn't human error," the director of the board's aviation department said."
Can they already say it was not a maintenance error? I suspect he/she meant that it wasn't a piloting error.
And as to allowing the press into the hangar to view the wreckage and take photos, I find this extremely irresponsible.
I can't see the UK AAIB behaving like this.
So the forward suspension bar pin is a larger diameter. If a smaller pin from a rear strut is inserted no one notices this quickly and possibly nappy pins it in place. That to me puts some major blame on engineering design for not making the smaller pin a longer length or different head shape or at least some obvious difference so the poor AME doesn't grab it by mistake. What a perfect fit for Murphy's law.
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roundwego,
In Norwegian language - the term "Teknisk feil" in this context equals to something technical going wrong with the helicopter. They did not say anything else. I.e. - They said it was not a pilot error. Nothing was said about maintenance error.
I read in the Norwegian newspaper VG that there was only less than 1 second notice from fault detection until the rotor snapped.
I am only a pax on the Super Puma. I do short inspection jobs in the North Sea. I have recently gone through the repetition course for the HUET and even the EBS (emergency breathing system) wich is now mandatory on UK sector. I'm not comfortable with the Super Puma. If they would only have time to ditch it every time.... - I could at least get use of my training.......
In Norwegian language - the term "Teknisk feil" in this context equals to something technical going wrong with the helicopter. They did not say anything else. I.e. - They said it was not a pilot error. Nothing was said about maintenance error.
I read in the Norwegian newspaper VG that there was only less than 1 second notice from fault detection until the rotor snapped.
I am only a pax on the Super Puma. I do short inspection jobs in the North Sea. I have recently gone through the repetition course for the HUET and even the EBS (emergency breathing system) wich is now mandatory on UK sector. I'm not comfortable with the Super Puma. If they would only have time to ditch it every time.... - I could at least get use of my training.......
roundwego,
In Norwegian language - the term "Teknisk feil" in this context equals to something technical going wrong with the helicopter. They did not say anything else. I.e. - They said it was not a pilot error. Nothing was said about maintenance error.
I read in the Norwegian newspaper VG that there was only less than 1 second notice from fault detection until the rotor snapped.
I am only a pax on the Super Puma. I do short inspection jobs in the North Sea. I have recently gone through the repetition course for the HUET and even the EBS (emergency breathing system) wich is now mandatory on UK sector. I'm not comfortable with the Super Puma. If they would only have time to ditch it every time.... - I could at least get use of my training.......
In Norwegian language - the term "Teknisk feil" in this context equals to something technical going wrong with the helicopter. They did not say anything else. I.e. - They said it was not a pilot error. Nothing was said about maintenance error.
I read in the Norwegian newspaper VG that there was only less than 1 second notice from fault detection until the rotor snapped.
I am only a pax on the Super Puma. I do short inspection jobs in the North Sea. I have recently gone through the repetition course for the HUET and even the EBS (emergency breathing system) wich is now mandatory on UK sector. I'm not comfortable with the Super Puma. If they would only have time to ditch it every time.... - I could at least get use of my training.......
I sympathise with your situation regarding having to travel offshore under the present circumstances irrespective of the type you fly in.
Any fatal accident is horrible, most particularly for those left behind. But beneath all the hype we should perhaps try to maintain a sense of perspective. Every 3 days, 13 people die on the UK's roads. But nobody seems that bothered about it unless they are directly affected. But if 13 people die in an offshore helicopter once every 5-10 years, all hell breaks loose. Why are we so inconsistent in our attitudes?
Not saying we shouldn't strive to do much better, but flying offshore in a helicopter including an EC225 is still pretty safe by comparison to lots of other stuff we find acceptable. I survived a whole career of flying Super Puma types most working days as did nearly all my colleagues. I can understand the feelings of the passengers but I think it would help to make them feel better if they thought about the actual risk rather than the perceived one.
Not saying we shouldn't strive to do much better, but flying offshore in a helicopter including an EC225 is still pretty safe by comparison to lots of other stuff we find acceptable. I survived a whole career of flying Super Puma types most working days as did nearly all my colleagues. I can understand the feelings of the passengers but I think it would help to make them feel better if they thought about the actual risk rather than the perceived one.
Rumor is that it was the forward strut, lower pin "came loose" and no longer carried load, Remaining two not sufficient to carry loads, everything else ripped apart.
Q: same struts for 225 as previous versions?
As we earlier noted, this model is considered new, but the certification basis is clearly associated with previous models. Fatigue evaluation of structure is from amendment 20, 1980, which is not the same as today. New versions require threat assessment, which may have better predicted (and thus mitigated) issues with the struts and their attachment.
Even to the old standards, questions should be asked to ensure that the new aircraft and new loads are used to show that same or similar parts are safe.
Q: same struts for 225 as previous versions?
As we earlier noted, this model is considered new, but the certification basis is clearly associated with previous models. Fatigue evaluation of structure is from amendment 20, 1980, which is not the same as today. New versions require threat assessment, which may have better predicted (and thus mitigated) issues with the struts and their attachment.
Even to the old standards, questions should be asked to ensure that the new aircraft and new loads are used to show that same or similar parts are safe.
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Is this not a single point of failure? If one leg of the tripod breaks, it seems that the rotor will come off.
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In an interview with Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK), the head of the AIBN aviation departement Kåre Halvorsen now said this:
– We have recovered many parts of the gear box, but we know we do not have all the parts. If the ones we have are sufficient in order to conclude we are still a bit uncertain and that's why we continue the search in the sea as soon as the weather conditions improve.
– We have recovered many parts of the gear box, but we know we do not have all the parts. If the ones we have are sufficient in order to conclude we are still a bit uncertain and that's why we continue the search in the sea as soon as the weather conditions improve.
@TS Yes I know. What would be interesting would be a long term analysis of all folk who work offshore to see, for those who died prematurely, whether death by helicopter was statistically significant compared to other forms of premature death. I can't help thinking it wouldn't be.
IMO it is the fear of a catastrophe rather than the probability of that catastrophe actually happening, that is causing stress and distress to offshore workers.
IMO it is the fear of a catastrophe rather than the probability of that catastrophe actually happening, that is causing stress and distress to offshore workers.
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So the forward suspension bar pin is a larger diameter. If a smaller pin from a rear strut is inserted no one notices this quickly and possibly nappy pins it in place. That to me puts some major blame on engineering design for not making the smaller pin a longer length or different head shape or at least some obvious difference so the poor AME doesn't grab it by mistake. What a perfect fit for Murphy's law.
If a pin was replaced and the wrong pin identified in the IPC it could be possible.
Someone would have commented that the FWD servo input required a lot of adjustment post MRH change.
Some very clunky take off and landings plus a 5R vibration should raise eyebrows.
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I guess my fitting pins point is that obviously this has happened before from previous posts today.
That red flags the fact that recognizing two pin sizes are incompatible is not always easy and obvious or it would not have happened like it did on the non accident aircraft.
3 pins, 3 holes. 2 pins fit all 3 holes, one pin does not. Looks like an opportunity to make mistakes if you have extra pins on the bench and not just the 3 original.
Time for safety engineers to design more incompatibility into those pins.... shape, colour, who cares but fill the gap we are slipping through. Probably costs very little at the parts fabrication stage.
That red flags the fact that recognizing two pin sizes are incompatible is not always easy and obvious or it would not have happened like it did on the non accident aircraft.
3 pins, 3 holes. 2 pins fit all 3 holes, one pin does not. Looks like an opportunity to make mistakes if you have extra pins on the bench and not just the 3 original.
Time for safety engineers to design more incompatibility into those pins.... shape, colour, who cares but fill the gap we are slipping through. Probably costs very little at the parts fabrication stage.
Just a short down and dirty explaination of what remains of the lower gearbox. The epicyclic drive is missing. I tried to highlight with "Paint" 4 major areas. Red are the hydraulic servo lower support with the left and right rear supports showing the remains of the lower part of the hydraulic servos. The middle red circle is the forward lower hydraulic servo support. The 2 green circles are the left and right engine inputs. Lime green is the right hand transmission torque transmitter. The blue is the aft portion of transmission / fuselage "BBQ" plate. The purple is possibly the aft float support strut.
VortexRinger: I suspect you are right. I went back to Post #376 from "byeskille", thank you for posting the HD photos. The 2nd and 3rd photos zoomed in show the lower end of the "support rod" clearer. It is clearly not a transmission support rod. The clamps and what appeared to electrical wire on the strut gave me the impression that it was the rh rear trxm strut.
Marcus
VortexRinger: I suspect you are right. I went back to Post #376 from "byeskille", thank you for posting the HD photos. The 2nd and 3rd photos zoomed in show the lower end of the "support rod" clearer. It is clearly not a transmission support rod. The clamps and what appeared to electrical wire on the strut gave me the impression that it was the rh rear trxm strut.
Marcus
Last edited by HBXNE; 3rd May 2016 at 23:09. Reason: Correction of observation.
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HBXNE- The purple is the right hand rear transmission support strut.
I can see how it looks a suspension bar but Im pretty sure that's one of the Aft Float Support Struts! ��
I can see how it looks a suspension bar but Im pretty sure that's one of the Aft Float Support Struts! ��
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If a smaller pin is inserted in the forward fitting, pilots and hums will feel it as it has been written in a previous post.
If the normal pin is inserted, but not secured, as long as it stays in place, nothing could be felt, there is no play in the vertical/lift axis. but the second the pin moves out of the fitting in flight with roughly 11 tons of lift, the main rotor tilts backward and torn the epicyclic module.
If the normal pin is inserted, but not secured, as long as it stays in place, nothing could be felt, there is no play in the vertical/lift axis. but the second the pin moves out of the fitting in flight with roughly 11 tons of lift, the main rotor tilts backward and torn the epicyclic module.