Fire warnings - an intellectual debate on this contentious subject
I had an engine fire in a Bell 212 when I was working in the Middle East.
I had just departed a refuelling stop, single pilot, in the Zakum field and levelled at 2500 ft on my way to a detached rig when I heard a thump from the back end, followed by an engine chip warning for the No 1 engine. On looking at the instruments for No 1, I saw the ITT indicating around 1200 degrees. I turned back towards Abu Dhabi, and transmitted a Pan call. I closed the throttle, and as I watched the ITT fall by about 150 degrees, the No 1 Fire warning came on. I operated the the Fire Suppression system for No 1 engine and started the stopwatch. I watched 30 seconds on the clock, and with the warning still illuminated, I fired the second bottle.
A minute later, as the fire warning was still illuminated, I transmitted a Mayday call and ditched in Zakum field, about 5 miles south of Zakum west. I had 6 pax on board at the time.
By the time we had landed in the water, the fire had just gone out and the engine was still smoking, with a large hole on the top decking above the engine. It turned out that the free turbine had exploded and trashed the back of the engine plus the cowling above it. In fact, when I later saw the free turbine blade, it resembled an old circular saw blade.
Now some might say I should have waited a little longer to see if the fire had indeed been extinguished, but at the time, at 2500 ft, with a confirmed instrument indications of an engine fire and when you have followed the FRC's, I know I did the correct thing. After all, I am still here, at the end of my flying career, to talk about it. Incidentally, the aircraft was recovered and rebuilt and I did he initial ground runs on it six months later before it returned to service.
A few years later I converted onto the S61 and I, too, have carried out the simulation of the S61 fire in Bournemouth, complete with a smoke generator in the simulator to add a little realism - Thank you, Keith. Makes you think!!
I had just departed a refuelling stop, single pilot, in the Zakum field and levelled at 2500 ft on my way to a detached rig when I heard a thump from the back end, followed by an engine chip warning for the No 1 engine. On looking at the instruments for No 1, I saw the ITT indicating around 1200 degrees. I turned back towards Abu Dhabi, and transmitted a Pan call. I closed the throttle, and as I watched the ITT fall by about 150 degrees, the No 1 Fire warning came on. I operated the the Fire Suppression system for No 1 engine and started the stopwatch. I watched 30 seconds on the clock, and with the warning still illuminated, I fired the second bottle.
A minute later, as the fire warning was still illuminated, I transmitted a Mayday call and ditched in Zakum field, about 5 miles south of Zakum west. I had 6 pax on board at the time.
By the time we had landed in the water, the fire had just gone out and the engine was still smoking, with a large hole on the top decking above the engine. It turned out that the free turbine had exploded and trashed the back of the engine plus the cowling above it. In fact, when I later saw the free turbine blade, it resembled an old circular saw blade.
Now some might say I should have waited a little longer to see if the fire had indeed been extinguished, but at the time, at 2500 ft, with a confirmed instrument indications of an engine fire and when you have followed the FRC's, I know I did the correct thing. After all, I am still here, at the end of my flying career, to talk about it. Incidentally, the aircraft was recovered and rebuilt and I did he initial ground runs on it six months later before it returned to service.
A few years later I converted onto the S61 and I, too, have carried out the simulation of the S61 fire in Bournemouth, complete with a smoke generator in the simulator to add a little realism - Thank you, Keith. Makes you think!!
Helicopters are just like Metal Engine Shipping Containers.....to be used to protect the contents as required.
Sounds like you did just that!
Sounds like you did just that!
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FCOM - Fire warnings
If I were drafting the FCOM chapter on 'Engine Fire in Flight' it would probably look something like this.
As per the QRH as far as 'Confirm Engine Fire'. Then I would add a line that says;
Fire warnings may disappear after selecting EMS to 'idle'. If this occurs suspect hot gas leak. Situation may still be hazardous, LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE anywhere nearby suitable for OEI landing using lowest achievable ground speed if surface is unprepared or space limited.
If fire warnings remain illuminated then use the following as guidance. The aircraft commander may do whatever he feels appropriate to protect the lives of his crew and passengers bearing in mind the wide range of possible failure modes he may encounter.
Guidelines for dealing with continuing indications of engine fire.
If circumstances are benign (day, VMC),
1. Confirm appropriate ECL then select it to IDLE, then OFF
2. Arm appropriate fire extinguisher using the 'ARM' button taking care to select correct button.
3. Select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 1', start stopwatch.
4. After 45 seconds if fire warnings persist then select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 2'.
5. If fire warnings remain on there are other indications that a genuine fire exists then LAND IMMEDIATELY.
OR
If fire warnings persist and there are no other indications that a genuine fires exists then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Monitor the situation closely for signs that the fire was genuine after all and LAND IMMEDIATELY.
If circumstances are critical (night or IMC with no hope of achieving VMC above the MSA) then consideration must be based on a risk assessment with the commander choosing what he believes to be the course of action with the least risk. His options are;
1. Continue flight and LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.
2. Descend to achieve VMC and continue to immediate OEI landing if terrain permits or LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest available and suitable aviation facility.
If after carrying out the fire drill above there are definite signs of fire but the possibility of a safe immediate landing is remote due to the possibility of CFIT then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.
If circumstances are severe due to uncontrolled extensive on board conflagration then LAND IMMEDIATELY and attempt to use the navigation facilities available to descend into an area where it may be possible to achieve VMC.
Comments, suggestions welcome.
G.
As per the QRH as far as 'Confirm Engine Fire'. Then I would add a line that says;
Fire warnings may disappear after selecting EMS to 'idle'. If this occurs suspect hot gas leak. Situation may still be hazardous, LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE anywhere nearby suitable for OEI landing using lowest achievable ground speed if surface is unprepared or space limited.
If fire warnings remain illuminated then use the following as guidance. The aircraft commander may do whatever he feels appropriate to protect the lives of his crew and passengers bearing in mind the wide range of possible failure modes he may encounter.
Guidelines for dealing with continuing indications of engine fire.
If circumstances are benign (day, VMC),
1. Confirm appropriate ECL then select it to IDLE, then OFF
2. Arm appropriate fire extinguisher using the 'ARM' button taking care to select correct button.
3. Select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 1', start stopwatch.
4. After 45 seconds if fire warnings persist then select FIRE BOTTLE to 'BOTTLE 2'.
5. If fire warnings remain on there are other indications that a genuine fire exists then LAND IMMEDIATELY.
OR
If fire warnings persist and there are no other indications that a genuine fires exists then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Monitor the situation closely for signs that the fire was genuine after all and LAND IMMEDIATELY.
If circumstances are critical (night or IMC with no hope of achieving VMC above the MSA) then consideration must be based on a risk assessment with the commander choosing what he believes to be the course of action with the least risk. His options are;
1. Continue flight and LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.
2. Descend to achieve VMC and continue to immediate OEI landing if terrain permits or LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest available and suitable aviation facility.
If after carrying out the fire drill above there are definite signs of fire but the possibility of a safe immediate landing is remote due to the possibility of CFIT then LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at the nearest suitable IFR airport.
If circumstances are severe due to uncontrolled extensive on board conflagration then LAND IMMEDIATELY and attempt to use the navigation facilities available to descend into an area where it may be possible to achieve VMC.
Comments, suggestions welcome.
G.
Sounds great Geoff but if you're IMC with a fire, then there really aren't any rules or procedures. It's whatever it takes to walk away. It seems the hardest lesson for your SIM students is when they have to separate what matters from what doesn't matter. I couldn't care less about the aircraft, the FAA or my employer at this point. I'm doing whatever it takes to stay alive. I earn a good living from being a pilot, but if this means I have to go and drive a truck to pay the bills, then I'll do it. Took me a long to time to educate myself.
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A simple fix??
The old saying "one picture is worth a thousand words". Get manufacturers to fit CCTV in engine bays and cargo bays etc.
Get a fire warning light - have a look at what is really happening.
Get a fire warning light - have a look at what is really happening.
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on board CCTV
The 139 already has an option for a tail-mounted camera that provides a good view of the airframe and engines. An IR capability would allow hot spots to be seen too but there would need to be a demand for that from the industry before it became standard.
G.
G.
Fascinating discussion.
Real life situation some (many) years back.
Wessex returning from long winter detachment 3 days pre Xmas. Penultimate leg Valkenberg to Manston. Wx crap, low cloud, strong winds, icing (no Anti-icing). I suggest routing via short crossing Calais - Dover-ish. Capt says NO! will go Hook of Holland - N Foreland. On startup, No 1 OK but No 2 starts to overtemp as the S S lever comes up to the 'dwell'. Same result with a couple of tries, so Capt leaves lever at start of temp rise position and says we'll go as is. Leave land at H of H and proceed low level over a 'boiling' sea. Approx halfway and Capt's hands operating like one-armed paper-hanger followed by hollow thump noise and glaring red light on panel. Nothing heard on my side i/c so ask Capt 'what's up' to be told No2 eng fire indication and bottle already fired. Get out FRCs and run drill with last line "Land at nearest available" (or something similar). Too low for radio contact initially but have to 'persuade' Capt that a "Mayday" might be appropriate!! Call made eventually and Manston scrambled to find us - very embarrassing as ex-student on duty crew!! Red light remains on and we proceed, eventually sighting N Foreland. Suggest to Capt that the in-view sportsfield on the cliff top would be a good idea but had to 'forcefully' argue case for that as against proceeding to Manston. Landing in sportsfield accomplished - red light was caused by fire wire being damaged by cowling closure.
Any comments would be welcome but worth mentioning that there were other, unrelated problems. ... On the previous day's leg into Valkenberg, similar weather, and needing to bypass Schipol, I had asked for an en-route landing on an island on the east of the Zuider Zee to check navigation (Yep, I was LOST!!) All sorted , but inbound to V'berg we were told to report to Ops where we were told that we had landed at the Dutch Foot-and-Mouth Research station and were, therefore, potentially contaminated!! UK's AG and Fish were not amused and had us slated for some 6 weeks isolation on return!
As said above, comments welcome.
Real life situation some (many) years back.
Wessex returning from long winter detachment 3 days pre Xmas. Penultimate leg Valkenberg to Manston. Wx crap, low cloud, strong winds, icing (no Anti-icing). I suggest routing via short crossing Calais - Dover-ish. Capt says NO! will go Hook of Holland - N Foreland. On startup, No 1 OK but No 2 starts to overtemp as the S S lever comes up to the 'dwell'. Same result with a couple of tries, so Capt leaves lever at start of temp rise position and says we'll go as is. Leave land at H of H and proceed low level over a 'boiling' sea. Approx halfway and Capt's hands operating like one-armed paper-hanger followed by hollow thump noise and glaring red light on panel. Nothing heard on my side i/c so ask Capt 'what's up' to be told No2 eng fire indication and bottle already fired. Get out FRCs and run drill with last line "Land at nearest available" (or something similar). Too low for radio contact initially but have to 'persuade' Capt that a "Mayday" might be appropriate!! Call made eventually and Manston scrambled to find us - very embarrassing as ex-student on duty crew!! Red light remains on and we proceed, eventually sighting N Foreland. Suggest to Capt that the in-view sportsfield on the cliff top would be a good idea but had to 'forcefully' argue case for that as against proceeding to Manston. Landing in sportsfield accomplished - red light was caused by fire wire being damaged by cowling closure.
Any comments would be welcome but worth mentioning that there were other, unrelated problems. ... On the previous day's leg into Valkenberg, similar weather, and needing to bypass Schipol, I had asked for an en-route landing on an island on the east of the Zuider Zee to check navigation (Yep, I was LOST!!) All sorted , but inbound to V'berg we were told to report to Ops where we were told that we had landed at the Dutch Foot-and-Mouth Research station and were, therefore, potentially contaminated!! UK's AG and Fish were not amused and had us slated for some 6 weeks isolation on return!
As said above, comments welcome.
Cornish Jack,
You/ve a long way to catch up with some of these Old Farts who have stories far better....if not quite as "Foot in Mouth" as yours.
Good thing there was no Rabies at that place or you could have had a Six Month absence from Operations.
You/ve a long way to catch up with some of these Old Farts who have stories far better....if not quite as "Foot in Mouth" as yours.
Good thing there was no Rabies at that place or you could have had a Six Month absence from Operations.
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Great thread!
I experienced several spurious fire warnings in the Sea King - in the hover at high ambient temps, dipping down around Rosie Roads mostly. Confirming an actual fire was part of our emergency response for sure but I can't recall if it was well laid out in the checklist.
I do recall having an actual electrical fire inside the sonar dome control box at the AESOP station during a practice IFR approach in VMC. Cabin filled with smoke and we declared a mayday and landed on a nearby beach. Of course, the base went nuclear, ringing the crash bells, etc. We were fine on the beach, where the Aesops hauled the box out and tossed it out the door and we sat with the rotors turning until it stopped smoking, trying to get comms with the base...
A couple of observations though:
I have noticed that some RFMs have excellent definitions of land as soon as practicable, possible and immediately and others are quite vague, also that some have just practicable and possible and no immediately.
I have also noticed that some aviation "communities" have great emergency handling theory and others do not. When I flew the big grey pigs we were taught to approach emergencies in a four part process:
1. Initial actions
2. Analysis
3. Corrective Action
4. Follow up
Initial actions were essentially "fly the aircraft" meaning get to a safe regime of flight where attention could be given to the emergency without adding risk.
Analysis meant "what do you see?" and involved calling the indications and deciding what the actual emergency was.
Corrective action meant getting in the checklist and following the procedures within.
Follow up involved determining what effect the emergency will have on the mission and where we would recover and how. It also included a discussion on what was the next worst thing that could happen so we could look through that checklist and choose our recovery plan accordingly.
Now, we were military and shipborne so this may seem an onerous process but I have used it since in several different aircraft to inject calm and order into a stressful inflight incident. Of course, some emergencies will leave you no time to work through these steps as a hands and feet response will be required RFN to save the ship! Oh well.
Bah, sorry this got so wordy!
V7
I experienced several spurious fire warnings in the Sea King - in the hover at high ambient temps, dipping down around Rosie Roads mostly. Confirming an actual fire was part of our emergency response for sure but I can't recall if it was well laid out in the checklist.
I do recall having an actual electrical fire inside the sonar dome control box at the AESOP station during a practice IFR approach in VMC. Cabin filled with smoke and we declared a mayday and landed on a nearby beach. Of course, the base went nuclear, ringing the crash bells, etc. We were fine on the beach, where the Aesops hauled the box out and tossed it out the door and we sat with the rotors turning until it stopped smoking, trying to get comms with the base...
A couple of observations though:
I have noticed that some RFMs have excellent definitions of land as soon as practicable, possible and immediately and others are quite vague, also that some have just practicable and possible and no immediately.
I have also noticed that some aviation "communities" have great emergency handling theory and others do not. When I flew the big grey pigs we were taught to approach emergencies in a four part process:
1. Initial actions
2. Analysis
3. Corrective Action
4. Follow up
Initial actions were essentially "fly the aircraft" meaning get to a safe regime of flight where attention could be given to the emergency without adding risk.
Analysis meant "what do you see?" and involved calling the indications and deciding what the actual emergency was.
Corrective action meant getting in the checklist and following the procedures within.
Follow up involved determining what effect the emergency will have on the mission and where we would recover and how. It also included a discussion on what was the next worst thing that could happen so we could look through that checklist and choose our recovery plan accordingly.
Now, we were military and shipborne so this may seem an onerous process but I have used it since in several different aircraft to inject calm and order into a stressful inflight incident. Of course, some emergencies will leave you no time to work through these steps as a hands and feet response will be required RFN to save the ship! Oh well.
Bah, sorry this got so wordy!
V7
Objective Continuous Risk Assessment Process
