Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
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Skadi,
My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ...
Incorrect, available with battery power alone.
My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ...
Yes, if an EPU is connected...
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SID what role is your 135 in? Just note you are challenging the conclusions of the AAIB.
Maybe RVDT can explain if there is a difference between a Police Helicopter (Mission Bus) and a normal 135?
Maybe RVDT can explain if there is a difference between a Police Helicopter (Mission Bus) and a normal 135?
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
My role - Current operator; 2,500 hrs on type.
I have not challenged the AAIB report.
I have not said anything directly in relation to SPAO
I said "I suggest that the next time you get into a 135, switch on the Battery, switch on the Avionics, (leaving the SHED BUSS switch alone) and notice that the Rad Alt and landing lamp are powered."
I repeat, "My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ..." (i.e. get to know your machine, each is different)
I am not getting drawn into any pointless discussions with someone that needlessly quotes to me the AAIB report and then goes to say ...
... when the report says, "When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position." and "The engine control panel switches for the FADECs were found set to ON and the ENG I and ENG II switches were guarded in the FLIGHT position."
Stop your blind offering of possible explanations, it helps no one.
I have not challenged the AAIB report.
I have not said anything directly in relation to SPAO
I said "I suggest that the next time you get into a 135, switch on the Battery, switch on the Avionics, (leaving the SHED BUSS switch alone) and notice that the Rad Alt and landing lamp are powered."
I repeat, "My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ..." (i.e. get to know your machine, each is different)
I am not getting drawn into any pointless discussions with someone that needlessly quotes to me the AAIB report and then goes to say ...
The rest of you post I agree with except the relight reference was in respect to the first engine failing offering a possible explanation why one of the prime pumps was selected ON.
Stop your blind offering of possible explanations, it helps no one.
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My role - Current operator; 2,500 hrs on type.
I said "I suggest that the next time you get into a 135, switch on the Battery, switch on the Avionics, (leaving the SHED BUSS switch alone) and notice that the Rad Alt and landing lamp are powered."
I repeat, "My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ..." (i.e. get to know your machine, each is different)
I am not getting drawn into any pointless discussions with someone that needlessly quotes to me the AAIB report and then goes to say ...
... when the report says, "When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position." and "The engine control panel switches for the FADECs were found set to ON and the ENG I and ENG II switches were guarded in the FLIGHT position."
Stop your blind offering of possible explanations, it helps no one.
I said "I suggest that the next time you get into a 135, switch on the Battery, switch on the Avionics, (leaving the SHED BUSS switch alone) and notice that the Rad Alt and landing lamp are powered."
I repeat, "My point being, get in your aircraft and find out what will or will not be available in the event of ..." (i.e. get to know your machine, each is different)
I am not getting drawn into any pointless discussions with someone that needlessly quotes to me the AAIB report and then goes to say ...
... when the report says, "When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position." and "The engine control panel switches for the FADECs were found set to ON and the ENG I and ENG II switches were guarded in the FLIGHT position."
Stop your blind offering of possible explanations, it helps no one.
SID Thanks you for your post, I am not sure what your point is exactly as you seem determined to attack me rather than address the issues.
Firstly, the accident report actually states:
"The investigation identified the following contributory factors:2. The RADALT and steerable landing light were unpowered after the second engine flamed out, leading to a loss of height information and reduced visual cues"
How this relates to your helicopter I do not know. However, you seem to be implying that the RADALT remains available (and to use your words); "in the event of..."
Secondly the AAIB reports states:
"Photographs taken by the first responders appeared to show at least one of the prime pump switches in the off position. When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position".
We can infer several things from this. Either the original photo was correct, maybe implying an attempted relight, OR, the AAIB inspection was correct, implying maybe that the prime pumps were selected in error and lieu of, the transfer pumps. Solely in the pursuit of understanding because it may lead on to a key point in training ourselves. That above all is the purpose of studying these reports.
My experience of the EC135 is woefully small compared to yours. In my question of "Role" I was not questioning your experience, just the "Role" your helicopter(s) you have flown were in. In this question I do not have enough knowledge to know if the Mission Bus (Shed when the Gens drop off line) causes the RADALT and Lamp to drop off line in all EC135s. Maybe you know the answer. However, intentional or not, your posts seem to suggest that you disagree with the AAIB conclusion on this particular issue....or am I missing the point.
This should be a "No-Blame" culture. Understanding is what we should seek.
"Blind Explanations" - this does not make sense to me. What exactly are you referring to? You can keep plugging away. I will try to remain patient with you.
Maybe RVDT can explain if there is a difference between a Police Helicopter (Mission Bus) and a normal 135?
Wander out to your particular 135 and gaze up at the Overhead Panel. Observe carefully. All will be revealed. CB's on the SHED BUS 1 and SHED BUS 2 will tell you what is what.
Also take note of AVIONIC SHED BUS 1 and AVIONIC SHED BUS 2 - items listed there will be avionics that get shed and will vary amongst serial numbers and roles as you imply.
You will note on a standard glass cockpit (MEGHAS) aircraft that you will lose SEARCH LIGHT (not landing light), RAD ALT, AFT FUEL PUMP.
Avionics can vary considerably but I would suspect that you will still lose all mission radios and COM 1 at the minimum. In Sid's case he appears to still have the RAD ALT. He could have a steam gauge aircraft which obviously has
a lower consumption and it is feasible.
Each 135 has it's own unique Avionics Manual applicable to that serial number. On the one I operate it is 284 pages and covers specific customer avionics only - the generic avionics are in the AMM.
The SHED BUS is there for total loss of DC Power Generation and the requirement to be able to continue for a specified period of time on the battery and dumps it automatically for you.
Be aware that if you do get the opportunity to fiddle with a live aircraft and decide to power it all up to see for yourself, with Ground Power connected the SHED BUS and High Power Consumers WILL be powered.
While you are at it review the procedure in the RFM pre-flight w.r.t. checks of the BUS TIE's and SHED BUS. It often gets missed and I actually do it as part of the pre-start.
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RVDT thank you for your guidance. I was wondering because on checking the Training Manual and generic Flight Manual there is no real explanation as to what is shed. In the cockpit O/H CB diagram the RADALT does not seem to appear anywhere. Whilst I am TR on the 135 I have never yet flown it operationally. We are waiting for our helicopter to arrive but your guidance will be invaluable in us working out what happens when both GENs drop off line.
I have some experience in the 1990s on 355s and 105s for Plod/HEMS. In those days a mission bus seemed to do this job, shedding all the mission kit to preserve the battery so I am familiar with the reasons and requirement. However, like you say, if devil in the detail is serial number specific I need to take care of this.
It just goes to prove that posting on PPRUNE can improvement our understanding and knowledge by sharing and I am grateful to you for that. I feel all the more of a **** now for calling you out on my previous posts. Its good to communicate with someone with good knowledge.
Thank for the help.
I have some experience in the 1990s on 355s and 105s for Plod/HEMS. In those days a mission bus seemed to do this job, shedding all the mission kit to preserve the battery so I am familiar with the reasons and requirement. However, like you say, if devil in the detail is serial number specific I need to take care of this.
It just goes to prove that posting on PPRUNE can improvement our understanding and knowledge by sharing and I am grateful to you for that. I feel all the more of a **** now for calling you out on my previous posts. Its good to communicate with someone with good knowledge.
Thank for the help.
When we were starting up an IFR EMS Program using BK-117's in an area based on the shoreline of one of the Great Lakes.....I made myself very unpopular when I raised questions about the ramifications of various electrical and fuel pump failures.
Not only did such failures impact the flying of the aircraft, fuel endurance, but also the loss of vital Mission Equipment that would have an impact on Critical Care Patients in the back.
Much planning and foresight is required when outfitting and equipping an aircraft for new tasks.
If, as stated by more than one Poster, the Crews of Police aircraft found the Caution Lights to interfere with NVG use and thus that was a reason for moving switches.....might that have had a role in this accident.
Not only did such failures impact the flying of the aircraft, fuel endurance, but also the loss of vital Mission Equipment that would have an impact on Critical Care Patients in the back.
Much planning and foresight is required when outfitting and equipping an aircraft for new tasks.
If, as stated by more than one Poster, the Crews of Police aircraft found the Caution Lights to interfere with NVG use and thus that was a reason for moving switches.....might that have had a role in this accident.
DB,
As Sid has already pointed out, in his aircraft and the majority of aircraft in his operation's fleet, the RADALT is connected to the battery bus - this mod was done post and as a direct result of the Glasgow incident.
G-SPAO was airframe serial No 0546 and not modified in the manner described.
With reference to "implying an attempted relight", as you are already type rated on the 135 you will know that for In Flight Engine Restart, "Prime Pump ON" is step 7, "Engine Switch OFF" is Step 4 - Both Engine Switches were found at FLIGHT and Gated.
There was no attempted relight.
As Sid has already pointed out, in his aircraft and the majority of aircraft in his operation's fleet, the RADALT is connected to the battery bus - this mod was done post and as a direct result of the Glasgow incident.
G-SPAO was airframe serial No 0546 and not modified in the manner described.
With reference to "implying an attempted relight", as you are already type rated on the 135 you will know that for In Flight Engine Restart, "Prime Pump ON" is step 7, "Engine Switch OFF" is Step 4 - Both Engine Switches were found at FLIGHT and Gated.
There was no attempted relight.
But why, when already low on fuel, did the A/C divert over the accident area? What can the Police Control room tapes reveal? Police Air Ops, was my area of responsibility, and I have to say that I have never yet looked into an incident where there was no relevant comment made by the on board Police crew to their Control room! Are we really expected to believe that whilst all this was happening, and various warnings were being received regarding fuel state, - followed the loss of the first engine, the Police crew said nothing??
Sorry I cannot accept that!
TF
Sorry I cannot accept that!
TF
TF,
Part of your question is easy to answer -
Lose an engine and you lose it's generator
Lose a generator, you lose the mission bus
Lose the mission bus, you lose the Police radios.
Even if the SHED Bus switch had been activated, which it wasn't, it still takes around 40 secs for the Airwave head to fully re-boot.
Prior to the first engine quitting however, I have absolutely no idea.
Part of your question is easy to answer -
Lose an engine and you lose it's generator
Lose a generator, you lose the mission bus
Lose the mission bus, you lose the Police radios.
Even if the SHED Bus switch had been activated, which it wasn't, it still takes around 40 secs for the Airwave head to fully re-boot.
Prior to the first engine quitting however, I have absolutely no idea.
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Tigerfish: Glasgow air ops was not constant string of chatter between the aircrew and force control. I no longer have any interaction with the unit so I don't know how frequently they speak to force control now, but I can't see how it changes anything.
There's nothing unusual in them reporting clear of a job, and then calling again as they land, after a transit back to base.
The absence of a independent, battery powered, CVR is why we don't know what was going on in the last ten minutes.
There's nothing unusual in them reporting clear of a job, and then calling again as they land, after a transit back to base.
The absence of a independent, battery powered, CVR is why we don't know what was going on in the last ten minutes.
Wander out to your particular 135 and gaze up at the Overhead Panel. Observe carefully. All will be revealed. CB's on the SHED BUS 1 and SHED BUS 2 will tell you what is what.
Also take note of AVIONIC SHED BUS 1 and AVIONIC SHED BUS 2 - items listed there will be avionics that get shed and will vary amongst serial numbers and roles as you imply...
Also take note of AVIONIC SHED BUS 1 and AVIONIC SHED BUS 2 - items listed there will be avionics that get shed and will vary amongst serial numbers and roles as you imply...
Airpolice,
I do not know where Tigerfish has obtained the impression that the aircraft diverted over the accident area, but it is my understanding that it was returning to base at the time of the accident. Where he raises an interesting point though is in relation to the earlier diversion to the East of Glasgow where several orbits were flown over parts of the motorway network, after low fuel warnings had illuminated. It seems totally inconceivable that there was no traffic on the police radios in relation to this activity, nor apparently any post facto attempt to identify what might have occasioned it. Given the fuel situation, it must surely have been of some significance to have caused the crew to prolong the flight.
I do not know where Tigerfish has obtained the impression that the aircraft diverted over the accident area, but it is my understanding that it was returning to base at the time of the accident. Where he raises an interesting point though is in relation to the earlier diversion to the East of Glasgow where several orbits were flown over parts of the motorway network, after low fuel warnings had illuminated. It seems totally inconceivable that there was no traffic on the police radios in relation to this activity, nor apparently any post facto attempt to identify what might have occasioned it. Given the fuel situation, it must surely have been of some significance to have caused the crew to prolong the flight.
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Airpolice,
I do not know where Tigerfish has obtained the impression that the aircraft diverted over the accident area, but it is my understanding that it was returning to base at the time of the accident. Where he raises an interesting point though is in relation to the earlier diversion to the East of Glasgow where several orbits were flown over parts of the motorway network, after low fuel warnings had illuminated. It seems totally inconceivable that there was no traffic on the police radios in relation to this activity, nor apparently any post facto attempt to identify what might have occasioned it. Given the fuel situation, it must surely have been of some significance to have caused the crew to prolong the flight.
I do not know where Tigerfish has obtained the impression that the aircraft diverted over the accident area, but it is my understanding that it was returning to base at the time of the accident. Where he raises an interesting point though is in relation to the earlier diversion to the East of Glasgow where several orbits were flown over parts of the motorway network, after low fuel warnings had illuminated. It seems totally inconceivable that there was no traffic on the police radios in relation to this activity, nor apparently any post facto attempt to identify what might have occasioned it. Given the fuel situation, it must surely have been of some significance to have caused the crew to prolong the flight.
You can't just make things up and then claim there "must" be an explanation.
Perhaps there was radio chat, perhaps their wasn't. Maybe it just wasn't relevant.
Traffic crews don't radio in about every vehicle they look at, or discuss in the car. Response crews are not on the radio every couple of minutes talking to the control room about what they are seeing out on the streets. Why are you all so convinced that the helicopter crew would have told anyone what they were looking at?
Neither Police Scotland, not the AAIB are obliged to tell anyone what they found, or didn't find in the radio tapes, if it's considered not relevant.
I think you should be more concerned about the fact that the AAIB contains errors, and is being presented to the FAI, and the public, as if it was correct.
The impact of the "low fuel warnings" needs to be taken in context of how much fuel that crew usually landed with. Close examination of flight logs, to show patterns of flight duration, over a year, might be more enlightening than listening to the radio
Airpolice,
I entirely agree with you that a close examination of flight logs could provide useful contextual material. Just as obviously, so could ANYTHING which was said on ANY radio during the latter stages of this flight. Your suggestion that Police Scotland and AAIB are entitled to withhold it on grounds of relevance ( or for that matter any other grounds) is ridiculous, not least as particulars of radio traffic earlier in the flight are included, when they are patently irrelevant.
Look at the radar trace again, look at the detour, and ask yourself whether it was likely a pilot low on fuel would have undertaken it on a whim, and without some form of external input or communication.
I entirely agree with you that a close examination of flight logs could provide useful contextual material. Just as obviously, so could ANYTHING which was said on ANY radio during the latter stages of this flight. Your suggestion that Police Scotland and AAIB are entitled to withhold it on grounds of relevance ( or for that matter any other grounds) is ridiculous, not least as particulars of radio traffic earlier in the flight are included, when they are patently irrelevant.
Look at the radar trace again, look at the detour, and ask yourself whether it was likely a pilot low on fuel would have undertaken it on a whim, and without some form of external input or communication.
Jayteeto,....Ever hear of the "One Dissenting Vote Rule"?
Air Police.....Since when does the Plod determine what is relevant to an inquiry and on its own decide to release what potential evidence is in its possession?
Did the Scottish Police adopt a "Hillary Clinton" position and pick and choose what it told Investigators or did it just handover the Tapes and let the Investigators examine every radio exchange during the flight in question?
Please don't try to convince us letting the Police make their own determination in any way enhances the AAIB Investigation.
If you think the AAIB Investigative Report is flawed in some way....perhaps you might consider how the "missing" segments of the Taped Conversation with the Aircraft ADDS to the questions about the AAIB Report.
Air Police.....Since when does the Plod determine what is relevant to an inquiry and on its own decide to release what potential evidence is in its possession?
Did the Scottish Police adopt a "Hillary Clinton" position and pick and choose what it told Investigators or did it just handover the Tapes and let the Investigators examine every radio exchange during the flight in question?
Please don't try to convince us letting the Police make their own determination in any way enhances the AAIB Investigation.
If you think the AAIB Investigative Report is flawed in some way....perhaps you might consider how the "missing" segments of the Taped Conversation with the Aircraft ADDS to the questions about the AAIB Report.
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I might be the one dissenter, but I am also the pilot who nearly did the same thing a week or so later.
i saw it with my own eyes
It very nearly caught me out
It happened to me, why dismiss it may have happened to Dave.........
i saw it with my own eyes
It very nearly caught me out
It happened to me, why dismiss it may have happened to Dave.........
JT, so your Red captions were telling the truth, and the gauges were false?
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Correct
however the time airborne was confusing. At the start of the day the gauges read 400kg. Due to the fault on the supply tank probes, it was estimated I ACTUALLY had only 370kg (approx)
I knew something was wrong late in the day, but running time/other indications were confusing me. The first red light blew my brain, but I had figured what was happening by then and was landing when the second red light came on.
indicated was 49/26/43
actual on draining was 23/0/22 ............
CAD still read 48/26/43 when tanks were drained.
Folks, please TRUST the red lights and get on the deck ASAP, even if you think it’s a false indication
however the time airborne was confusing. At the start of the day the gauges read 400kg. Due to the fault on the supply tank probes, it was estimated I ACTUALLY had only 370kg (approx)
I knew something was wrong late in the day, but running time/other indications were confusing me. The first red light blew my brain, but I had figured what was happening by then and was landing when the second red light came on.
indicated was 49/26/43
actual on draining was 23/0/22 ............
CAD still read 48/26/43 when tanks were drained.
Folks, please TRUST the red lights and get on the deck ASAP, even if you think it’s a false indication