UH-72 to Rucker ? What's the Army thinking?
With the Bell 206 out of production, there are a lot of good single on the market for less than $1000/hr.....Bell 407Gx, AW119Kx, AS-350, EC-120, Bell SLS ..... just to name a few.
...But only one of those has "power by Pratt & Whitney"...
...But only one of those has "power by Pratt & Whitney"...
Coming from an era of aviation similar to SASLess and LW50, I felt compelled to comment. Our services should look to exactly what they are attempting to achieve with their pilot training curricula. My era we flew 4 different aircraft each more complex as we progressed through each phase. During basic training in the T-34 we were not even required to communicate on the radio. We then advanced to the T-28B/C where I believe the task was intimidation. (i.e. blower shift going through 12,000 ft IFR under the hood) was more than intimidating. Then on to helicopters. The TH-57A humbled an aviator with almost 100 flight hours but achieved a transition to an ability to hover. We finished up with the TH-1L. Many like me flew the UH-1D. This provided a feel for an operational machine, while also providing IFR training. Yes, IFR in a machine with only a stab bar. The UH-1D didn’t even have a turn needle and ball in front of the instructor. This system met the requirements of the times.
Today is different. The entire fleet is comprised of only heavy multi-engine complex machines. The curricula has not kept pace with this transition. Look to Lufthanza’s facility in Phoenix. They provide very specific training in machines specifically equipped to meet their operational requirements. The US government needs to follow this model. By comparison, the operational costs of most fleet machines, machines like the EC-135/145, Bell 412/429 or even an S-76 are a drop in the bucket when compared to the cost of operating any aircraft in the fleet. The end product would be better equipped to handle today’s fleet with less time required at the final transition.
Today is different. The entire fleet is comprised of only heavy multi-engine complex machines. The curricula has not kept pace with this transition. Look to Lufthanza’s facility in Phoenix. They provide very specific training in machines specifically equipped to meet their operational requirements. The US government needs to follow this model. By comparison, the operational costs of most fleet machines, machines like the EC-135/145, Bell 412/429 or even an S-76 are a drop in the bucket when compared to the cost of operating any aircraft in the fleet. The end product would be better equipped to handle today’s fleet with less time required at the final transition.
Who can claim Bell doesn't support the 206's? Bell support of its products is still #1 in world.
Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass. Going to the 72 which has crappy autorotation capability will result in auto's not being needed because of hull losses. So what do you get? A bunch of AF447 pilots who look for the glass to save them instead of the drilled in training to make auto's in their sleep. Do not need to auto in a twin? Tell that to those killed in Glasgow!
The Sultan
Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass. Going to the 72 which has crappy autorotation capability will result in auto's not being needed because of hull losses. So what do you get? A bunch of AF447 pilots who look for the glass to save them instead of the drilled in training to make auto's in their sleep. Do not need to auto in a twin? Tell that to those killed in Glasgow!
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The Air Force primary helo trainer is essentially a souped up UH-1H. While the addition of glass and its management is a bad thing in my opinion (primary helo training should be heavily focused on clock to map to ground type skills) and I think the exposure to actual touch down autos was valuable, the "simple" rotor system is a detriment. The under-slung, high inertia rotor system teaches bad habits. A young guy who can hover the Huey by shaking the crap out of the cyclic will make me vomit once you toss him into a Blackhawk.
The issue I see with something like the Lakota is the rigid rotor and breaking things when a young kid who can barely hover tries to set it down, and suddenly all those forces get instantly applied to the mast once the skids hit the ground and the fuselage can't move.
But it is what it is, there is no money for a new acquisition, the current trainers are apparently unsustainable and the Army has these "extra" aircraft hanging around. Maybe square peg round hole but it's probably cheaper given the frame of mind that they'd be operating the Lakota anyway, whether it's in a pilot training role or whatever the Guard does with them.
As to the concept that the Kiowa is better at supporting the troops than the Apache, harrumph, it's more complex than that.
The issue I see with something like the Lakota is the rigid rotor and breaking things when a young kid who can barely hover tries to set it down, and suddenly all those forces get instantly applied to the mast once the skids hit the ground and the fuselage can't move.
But it is what it is, there is no money for a new acquisition, the current trainers are apparently unsustainable and the Army has these "extra" aircraft hanging around. Maybe square peg round hole but it's probably cheaper given the frame of mind that they'd be operating the Lakota anyway, whether it's in a pilot training role or whatever the Guard does with them.
As to the concept that the Kiowa is better at supporting the troops than the Apache, harrumph, it's more complex than that.
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Who can claim Bell doesn't support the 206's? Bell support of its products is still #1 in world.
Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass.
Basic training is suppose to be how to fly not manage glass.
We've all read the R&W surveys and know what they say.
Many people agree with you on the purpose of basic training, however, those who are determining future fleet direction are typically not among them. That may be unpleasant to hear, but it happens to be supported by the facts.
If you believe the future of Naval or Army helicopter training remains a steam-gauge 206, go ahead and float that proposal.
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DoD rates for 2013 show the TH-67 around $700/hr , and UH-72 around $2500/hr. Again. Is there a benefit to learning to fly on a complex , twin that is worth 3x more the hourly costs when you fly over 100k flt hours annually? The TH-XX, I have never heard of before, and as of 6 months ago, the Army's postition was they didn't need a new trainer. The Navy, who frankly would have more reason than the Army to train with a twin, doesn't want or require a twin either. There is no good justification for it.
I still contend this is the tail wagging the Army dog. The Army needs to find a home for Lakotas so the rest of their re-alignment works, so they are creating requirements to justify the HIGH hourly costs to operate them.
I still contend this is the tail wagging the Army dog. The Army needs to find a home for Lakotas so the rest of their re-alignment works, so they are creating requirements to justify the HIGH hourly costs to operate them.
Last edited by Stinger10; 19th Feb 2014 at 15:17.
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Understand the acquisition money excuse, but if you fly 100k flt hours a year, and the Lakota costs 3x as much per hour, how many years would you have to fly to pay for a new fleet at $3M per for a good SE helicopter? Its about total ownership costs.
The commercial helicopter industry understands this and has figured out a way to make it into a REAL business. Hence the boom over the past 10 years. Its TIME DoD learned a few lessons like this. Acquisition costs are only the begining and typically smaller than the total lifecycle costs. JSF is a perfect example. The big aquisition number will seem small compared to what it costs to operate and maintain them over +30 years.
All the services are geared toward the easiest solution instead the best solution, which may actually take some inginutiy and work to accomplish. But its only taxpayer $$$$ right?
The commercial helicopter industry understands this and has figured out a way to make it into a REAL business. Hence the boom over the past 10 years. Its TIME DoD learned a few lessons like this. Acquisition costs are only the begining and typically smaller than the total lifecycle costs. JSF is a perfect example. The big aquisition number will seem small compared to what it costs to operate and maintain them over +30 years.
All the services are geared toward the easiest solution instead the best solution, which may actually take some inginutiy and work to accomplish. But its only taxpayer $$$$ right?
Last edited by Stinger10; 19th Feb 2014 at 15:17.
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The military outsources just about everything else, why not just send the accepted students to the local rotorcraft school where the taxpayers could drop $12,000 and the students would have a private certificate plodding around in an R22. Just the basic flying and navigating skills.
Feel free to train them in anything they want after that, but for the basic hovering and flying skills, why have a new airframe acquisition and maintenance program when all that already exists in dozens of places throughout the US now?
I get the whole "the military is better" fever, but the military would then have plenty of time to indoctrinate the student into the "military" way.
Feel free to train them in anything they want after that, but for the basic hovering and flying skills, why have a new airframe acquisition and maintenance program when all that already exists in dozens of places throughout the US now?
I get the whole "the military is better" fever, but the military would then have plenty of time to indoctrinate the student into the "military" way.
Diethelm:
You are invited to review the results of the IFS program that the USN instituted back in the early 2000's to answer your question.
You are invited to review the results of the IFS program that the USN instituted back in the early 2000's to answer your question.
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Actually the USAF still uses an IFS program, a contract company teaches basic flying and the AF way of structured learning in I believe DA-20s. Then those who can learn the way the way the AF teaches, don't get sick and don't quit because it isn't what they thought it would be, go to UPT.
But once again, you're talking about spending money on something new vs something already bought and while new might cost less in the long run something already bought is a possible solution that already has programmed costs budgeted for, and less uncertainty.
Ain't government spending screwy?
But once again, you're talking about spending money on something new vs something already bought and while new might cost less in the long run something already bought is a possible solution that already has programmed costs budgeted for, and less uncertainty.
Ain't government spending screwy?
Is it surprising mil aviation costs so much money ? Surely you start on a simple cheap trainer, it is hard enough for most pilots to grasp flying let alone how a complicated glass cockpit twin engine helicopter works when you first start! What's the chop rate on a US army course ? When Brit army taught me we started on a chipmunk fixed wing, of 13 starters 3 were chopped before we got near a helicopter, basic rotary on a 341 another 3 went, By the end of advanced rotary another 2 had gone. That is 8 from 13, now if that was in a helicopter, an expensive twin wow that's a lot of money to show 60% of course is not suitable
busdriver, I was referring to the NAVY IFS, not the Air Force IFS, which programs are NOT conducted in the same manner.
Just having a program may or may not produce the results you seek. (See the T-3 deal at USAFA of a few years ago as an example).
How you implement such a program makes a significant difference. The Air Force IFT (which was linked to a PPL as a performance objective) seems to have answered the mail on UPT failures when it was in place. Won't comment on the USAF IFS as it stands now.
I see in this thread quite a bit of hand waving about 'send 'em to civvy school' and so on, but if you don't structure the program right, you aren't furthering the development of your budding military aviator. Providing that there are performance standards and the ability to fail, one should be able to weed out the unmotivated early on, and the unable by the time it is over.
Is government spending screwy?
Is water wet?
EDIT:
Early in the Navy program's life (circa 2006) Navy Post Graduate School in coordination with the Naval Air Training Command looked at IFS as the Navy conducted it and found it to require significant improvement.
ROI wise, it wasn't cost effective. Is it cost effective now?
I'll see what I can find out.
How does this relate to the thread?
At 2500 dollars per flight hour, the UH-72 is an expensive primary trainer. The ROI numbers for the T-34C were just under 400 dollars per hour, for the T-37 Tweet about 1100 dollars per hour, and for the T-6 were (last I recall) about six hundred dollars per flight hour. (Will try to get some better numbers on UPT/T-6 costs, that may be off by a bit).
First hit: $2,235 per flight hour for the T-6??? Not sure if that is calculated the same as for the Tweet ...
I'd say there is ample room for a program that will give an ROI for introductory helo training, depending upon how the Army structures the program. I'd go to the USAF for advice on this one, as their approach seems to me to be more effective than how the Navy has proceeded. (It galls me to say that, as a Navy man, but results matter).
Just having a program may or may not produce the results you seek. (See the T-3 deal at USAFA of a few years ago as an example).
How you implement such a program makes a significant difference. The Air Force IFT (which was linked to a PPL as a performance objective) seems to have answered the mail on UPT failures when it was in place. Won't comment on the USAF IFS as it stands now.
I see in this thread quite a bit of hand waving about 'send 'em to civvy school' and so on, but if you don't structure the program right, you aren't furthering the development of your budding military aviator. Providing that there are performance standards and the ability to fail, one should be able to weed out the unmotivated early on, and the unable by the time it is over.
Is government spending screwy?
Is water wet?
EDIT:
Early in the Navy program's life (circa 2006) Navy Post Graduate School in coordination with the Naval Air Training Command looked at IFS as the Navy conducted it and found it to require significant improvement.
ROI wise, it wasn't cost effective. Is it cost effective now?
I'll see what I can find out.
How does this relate to the thread?
At 2500 dollars per flight hour, the UH-72 is an expensive primary trainer. The ROI numbers for the T-34C were just under 400 dollars per hour, for the T-37 Tweet about 1100 dollars per hour, and for the T-6 were (last I recall) about six hundred dollars per flight hour. (Will try to get some better numbers on UPT/T-6 costs, that may be off by a bit).
First hit: $2,235 per flight hour for the T-6??? Not sure if that is calculated the same as for the Tweet ...
I'd say there is ample room for a program that will give an ROI for introductory helo training, depending upon how the Army structures the program. I'd go to the USAF for advice on this one, as their approach seems to me to be more effective than how the Navy has proceeded. (It galls me to say that, as a Navy man, but results matter).
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 20th Feb 2014 at 14:09.
Is it just DOC costs you are considering or are you rolling the DACs in there LW?
The T-34Cs were around for about 30 years, and their acquisition costs were much lower then than a comparable type is today.
2500$ hourly cost for a -72 seems a bit high, but even 2000$ would be.
The T-34Cs were around for about 30 years, and their acquisition costs were much lower then than a comparable type is today.
2500$ hourly cost for a -72 seems a bit high, but even 2000$ would be.
Do Airline Pilots start their training on 737's or Challengers?
Last time I checked they started on small single engine piston airplanes and then progressed to more sophisticated and complex aircraft.
The point about using a "cheap" simple helicopter to "weed" out those deemed unsuitable for continuing training would have a lot of merit before putting the successful candidates into the more expensive aircraft.
Last time I checked they started on small single engine piston airplanes and then progressed to more sophisticated and complex aircraft.
The point about using a "cheap" simple helicopter to "weed" out those deemed unsuitable for continuing training would have a lot of merit before putting the successful candidates into the more expensive aircraft.
Tottigol, I am pretty sure the accounting rules changed between the time that T-34C was being put together to replace the T-28B/C, and the time that T-6 was to Replace both the Tweet (T-37) and the T-34C.
Back in the late 90's, I think the number I saw tossed around for "cost per flight hour, (burdened) for the Tweet was between 1100 and 1200 dollars, and that was from discussing JPATS issues with folks at AETC. At the time, the cost per flight hour for T-34C was around 350 per flight hour. The projection I saw for T-6, at the time, was 700-800 dollars per flight hour. Don't know what the actuals are. (Best I can estimate, these were DOC).
I don't think that either of those figures accounted for amortizing the initial cost of the aircraft, (DAC) but represented the annual O & M budgeting figure to get gas and maintenance funded to keep them in the air. (If someone has folded in recurring program cost factors for depot level repairs, that might explain some of the numbers).
As the price of fuel has gone up, numbers like the ones I was dealing with back then probably make no sense: since fuel prices have just about tripled since the late 1990's / early 2000's.
Also, my numbers are some years out of date.
A link to a USAF listing of numbers for a whole load of aircraft, from B-2 to T-6 are hopefully apples to apples comparisons, and only include the annual O & M funding lines required to keep them flying. That was where the 2300 or so per hour for a T-6A was grabbed.
When trying to represent the cost to operate, I am pretty sure one should not roll in Acquisition costs (DAC): you are mixing different colors of money. I recall from some classes many years ago that that you are not allowed to mix the streams.
APN-1 and major acquisition money is not to be mixed with O & M money.
Then again, rules do change over time. I am not in that realm any more, and may have missed some rule changes on costing and estimating.
This leaves me scratching my head on cost per flight hour figures for a givne airframe. I'll keep looking, keeping in mind how expensive fuel is these days.
Back in the late 90's, I think the number I saw tossed around for "cost per flight hour, (burdened) for the Tweet was between 1100 and 1200 dollars, and that was from discussing JPATS issues with folks at AETC. At the time, the cost per flight hour for T-34C was around 350 per flight hour. The projection I saw for T-6, at the time, was 700-800 dollars per flight hour. Don't know what the actuals are. (Best I can estimate, these were DOC).
I don't think that either of those figures accounted for amortizing the initial cost of the aircraft, (DAC) but represented the annual O & M budgeting figure to get gas and maintenance funded to keep them in the air. (If someone has folded in recurring program cost factors for depot level repairs, that might explain some of the numbers).
As the price of fuel has gone up, numbers like the ones I was dealing with back then probably make no sense: since fuel prices have just about tripled since the late 1990's / early 2000's.
Also, my numbers are some years out of date.
A link to a USAF listing of numbers for a whole load of aircraft, from B-2 to T-6 are hopefully apples to apples comparisons, and only include the annual O & M funding lines required to keep them flying. That was where the 2300 or so per hour for a T-6A was grabbed.
When trying to represent the cost to operate, I am pretty sure one should not roll in Acquisition costs (DAC): you are mixing different colors of money. I recall from some classes many years ago that that you are not allowed to mix the streams.
APN-1 and major acquisition money is not to be mixed with O & M money. Then again, rules do change over time. I am not in that realm any more, and may have missed some rule changes on costing and estimating.
This leaves me scratching my head on cost per flight hour figures for a givne airframe. I'll keep looking, keeping in mind how expensive fuel is these days.
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Lonewolf, wasn't meant to poke, just to point out the IFS concept is still alive somewhere in the DoD. I don't actually know too much about the current system as I went through the previous IFT program. As you said, it needs to be standardized, my experience was with a AF base flying club with mostly retired military pilots or maintenance NCOs (who subsequently earned a CFI) as the primary IPs, and they were excellent. However, I know guys who ended up training with a mom and pop organization and while they got a PPL within the required 50 hours (very easy when that is your only job) it did little to prepare them for military style and pace of instruction.
I don't agree with the continual "it's too complex for a basic trainer" mindset, as if two engines is some monumental shift, but it definitely is more expensive and there is probably a cheaper way to do business.
I don't agree with the continual "it's too complex for a basic trainer" mindset, as if two engines is some monumental shift, but it definitely is more expensive and there is probably a cheaper way to do business.
Lonewolf, wasn't meant to poke, just to point out the IFS concept is still alive somewhere in the DoD.
The results of IFS for the Navy showed mixed results, at best.
I have been advised that the link I provided was as pretty a picture as could have been painted of the program, based on what it was believed would be achieved by putting it into place in the early 00's. This is from someone who is much more familiar with the program than I.
What the Army has to sort out is whether or not they can save hours, dollars and fatigue life on the UH-72 via a well structured IFT sort of program in ... Robbies? Enstrom? Schweizer? Jet Rangers?
When you look at the volume of pilots they may be running through a system, HOW one puts that program into place and maintains standards is non- trivial problem to solve.
Your point on just who is providing this IFS (and standards) is spot on.
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No offense, but I think you guys are missing the point. IFS or no IFS, Army flys between 80-100k flight hours a year. That will not change dramatically ovet the next 10 years and by using the UH-72 it will cost , at a minimum, 150-200% more per hour. The will literally spend all the savings of not replacing the Kiowa on flight hours at Rucker? Why ? Because the UH-72 needs a home? They will also be, with the exception of German 105s and now EC-135s, the only ones to employ an EC-145 as a primary trainer. There has to be a smarter more pragmatic solution.
Last edited by Stinger10; 10th Mar 2014 at 15:31.