UH-72 to Rucker ? What's the Army thinking?
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UH-72 to Rucker
Another factor is the abysmal level of maintenance that civilian contractors at Rucker have always had. "Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow?" should be the mission statement for the civilian workforce.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.
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Contract performance or the lack of is an Army problem....not the Contractor's problem. Write the Contract properly, enforce the terms of the Contract, and those kinds of problems go away.
Of course if you do that....you ruin any chance of post retirement employment by.....a Contractor don't you?
Of course if you do that....you ruin any chance of post retirement employment by.....a Contractor don't you?
Another factor is the abysmal level of maintenance that civilian contractors at Rucker have always had. "Why do today what you can put off until tomorrow?" should be the mission statement for the civilian workforce.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.
The availability will be very poor, on a good day.
Your generalized statement cannot go unchallenged.
When I was on active duty, I got to see some of the contract maintenance at work.
Some was pretty good, some not so much.
As BB says, how good it is has two prime factors:
1. How well the contract was written
2. How effective the oversight is
a third factor is
3. How the funding lines on the contract and on parts were integrated into the overall support plan. Again, that varied depending upon which operation I saw and got to be supported (or badly supported) by.
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Contract Maintenance
I hear this all the time' "Contractors aren't getting the work done"
I tell the Active Duty guys I will stay all night to get this aircraft that you broke fixed. Call the O-5 and get my overtime approved.
First thing the Officer says is he's not staying late you are.
The units budget is for me to work 40 hours a week. That's it. They don't want to hire anyone to work nights or on the weekends. That's what they have Active Duty for.
I tell the Active Duty guys I will stay all night to get this aircraft that you broke fixed. Call the O-5 and get my overtime approved.
First thing the Officer says is he's not staying late you are.
The units budget is for me to work 40 hours a week. That's it. They don't want to hire anyone to work nights or on the weekends. That's what they have Active Duty for.
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Lots of focus here on cost per hour. Not much on the effectiveness of the training:
1) The soft teetering head on a Jet Ranger is totally different than the responsive H72, Black Hawk and Apache. I spent a good part of my career trying to break the sloppy stick habits of pilots who thing a cyclic can be wiggled without moving the helicopter, who then blame a nimble helicopter for being "unstable". The H-72 is much more instructive in this regard, and closer to creating the stick habits for the Army fleet.
2) Twin engine housekeeping and diagnostics. Managing and diagnosing power failures is the #1 cause of acccidents (after CFIT) and absolutely unteachable in a single engine helo.
3) The real cost is the loss of $25 million worth of Apache or Hawk for an accident. Save one pilot error accident, pay for flight school for a few years.
1) The soft teetering head on a Jet Ranger is totally different than the responsive H72, Black Hawk and Apache. I spent a good part of my career trying to break the sloppy stick habits of pilots who thing a cyclic can be wiggled without moving the helicopter, who then blame a nimble helicopter for being "unstable". The H-72 is much more instructive in this regard, and closer to creating the stick habits for the Army fleet.
2) Twin engine housekeeping and diagnostics. Managing and diagnosing power failures is the #1 cause of acccidents (after CFIT) and absolutely unteachable in a single engine helo.
3) The real cost is the loss of $25 million worth of Apache or Hawk for an accident. Save one pilot error accident, pay for flight school for a few years.
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However did we survive ?
Teaching folks over the years about Engine problems from simple failures to some confusing kinds of failures, one thing was plain and that was very few folks understood how to trouble shoot the failures.
The Engineering thought that put Torque Gauges into Helicopters failed to consider how dependent (sometimes way too improperly) Pilots become on that particular device.
I wish the Torque gauges were smaller in size and lower in the stack of engine gauges than the N1/Ng gauges. It would sure have helped in figuring out which engine had the problem.
Of all the Engine instruments I see the Torquemeter as being of the lesser value than the Nr and N1/Ng gauges during trouble shooting engine problems.
One Man's Opinion of course.
Teaching folks over the years about Engine problems from simple failures to some confusing kinds of failures, one thing was plain and that was very few folks understood how to trouble shoot the failures.
The Engineering thought that put Torque Gauges into Helicopters failed to consider how dependent (sometimes way too improperly) Pilots become on that particular device.
I wish the Torque gauges were smaller in size and lower in the stack of engine gauges than the N1/Ng gauges. It would sure have helped in figuring out which engine had the problem.
Of all the Engine instruments I see the Torquemeter as being of the lesser value than the Nr and N1/Ng gauges during trouble shooting engine problems.
One Man's Opinion of course.
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Originally Posted by Boudreaux Bob
So tell me about the commonality of the Lakota to any other helicopter in the US Army Fleet of Aircraft.....or any other Branch of the Military for that matter?
Now if you were referring to Black Hawks then perhaps you would have a point.
Now if you were referring to Black Hawks then perhaps you would have a point.
So the Army will always have the UH-72 fleet cost, but why force it to keep paying the TH-57 fleet cost as well?
The choice is between TH-57+UH-72 or UH-72 only.
UH-72 only will have much lower cost than TH-57+UH-72.
And, as NickLappos says, UH-72 training is much more appropriate for UH-60/AH-64/UH-72 operation than is TH-57 training.
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Exactly - there were no new Apaches being bought, they just got rid of the Kiowa Warriors instead of keeping some and getting rid of some Apaches, which was the other choice.
The writing was on the wall - there was going to be a reduction in the number of Army helicopters, both combat and utility - it was up to the Army to decide how to keep as much capability as possible in the process.
The decision was made to keep the most-capable helos possible - and to eliminate whole types to reduce the maintenance/supply/training burden in the process.
While AH-64s will be over-spec'ed in the recon helo role, OH-58Ds would be underspec'ed (and therefore less-efffective and more vulnerable) in most CAS missions, where the AH-64s would be perfect.
The writing was on the wall - there was going to be a reduction in the number of Army helicopters, both combat and utility - it was up to the Army to decide how to keep as much capability as possible in the process.
The decision was made to keep the most-capable helos possible - and to eliminate whole types to reduce the maintenance/supply/training burden in the process.
While AH-64s will be over-spec'ed in the recon helo role, OH-58Ds would be underspec'ed (and therefore less-efffective and more vulnerable) in most CAS missions, where the AH-64s would be perfect.
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Will the 64's be as effective in the Scout Role as are the Kiowa's?
It sounds like the Army is trying to copy the Air Force which is once again trying to do away with the A-10 in favor of F-16's.
It sounds like the Army is trying to copy the Air Force which is once again trying to do away with the A-10 in favor of F-16's.
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Interesting article on Navy Helicopter Training (regardless of Nick Lappos' opinion)
Initial helicopter training was never about # of engines. It was about getting student pilots in the air frequently, and learning the necessary skills like full-autos (which can be the result of several emergencies, not just engine failures) to save them and their crew one day.....
Army saying they can do it all in a sim is doing the students a dis-service. Am glad the Navy isn't going down the same misguided path. Even the FAA feels there is a distinct value in these maneuvers and still requires them for a rotorcraft rating.
Any modern commercial helicopter is going to feature a cockpit that will translate better to modern combat helicopters. That' s far from unique to the UH-72.
January 2015 Rotorcraft Pro Article "Going Vertical!"
Army saying they can do it all in a sim is doing the students a dis-service. Am glad the Navy isn't going down the same misguided path. Even the FAA feels there is a distinct value in these maneuvers and still requires them for a rotorcraft rating.
Any modern commercial helicopter is going to feature a cockpit that will translate better to modern combat helicopters. That' s far from unique to the UH-72.
January 2015 Rotorcraft Pro Article "Going Vertical!"
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Twin Trainer
I have no doubt that different departments of the military will provide explanations to justify their own ideas of how to manage their budgets and sometimes there may well exist some very spurious calculations or at least some illogical math models.
So essentially one department or entity can justify any fleet.
What we found in Canada was that in the end we finally did introduce a twin for pilot training but retained the single for the beginning of pilot introduction to helicopters.
The thought process being that without any singles in the fleet no one could see the point or justify the need to maintain strictly a single engine trainer. But no one was willing to let go of the essential skills and foundation that it provides. So a mixed fleet was retained of Bell 206 and 412.
Pilot do their initial training up to their first basic handling test which includes autorations to touchdown. They then move on to the twin where we introcude crew concept, IFR, NVG and earn their wings in an environment they will see at their units.
The advantage has been that the squadrons and their respective type schools receive a much better candidate and the costs savings have shown up there. So there can be a savings passed on which can justify the loss of the single in the basic phase.
It's becoming more and more common that militaries do not have singles anymore so if that is the case, why spend so much time and money training on one. In the case of training only on singles the units inherit candidates that are simply not ready. Type schools or squadrons spend too much time on larger aircraft training them to fly in a crew, hone their IFR and learn NVG. Having a twin or mixed fleet with a twin during the basic portion to graduate pilots with those skills can save a lot of money at the unit end of the production line. We have found this is a better model for a modern military.
So essentially one department or entity can justify any fleet.
What we found in Canada was that in the end we finally did introduce a twin for pilot training but retained the single for the beginning of pilot introduction to helicopters.
The thought process being that without any singles in the fleet no one could see the point or justify the need to maintain strictly a single engine trainer. But no one was willing to let go of the essential skills and foundation that it provides. So a mixed fleet was retained of Bell 206 and 412.
Pilot do their initial training up to their first basic handling test which includes autorations to touchdown. They then move on to the twin where we introcude crew concept, IFR, NVG and earn their wings in an environment they will see at their units.
The advantage has been that the squadrons and their respective type schools receive a much better candidate and the costs savings have shown up there. So there can be a savings passed on which can justify the loss of the single in the basic phase.
It's becoming more and more common that militaries do not have singles anymore so if that is the case, why spend so much time and money training on one. In the case of training only on singles the units inherit candidates that are simply not ready. Type schools or squadrons spend too much time on larger aircraft training them to fly in a crew, hone their IFR and learn NVG. Having a twin or mixed fleet with a twin during the basic portion to graduate pilots with those skills can save a lot of money at the unit end of the production line. We have found this is a better model for a modern military.
