Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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Tony Cable is a top, top guy. The family of Dave Trail have picked absolutely the right man to explain the truth. Anyone wishing to simply blame the deceased pilot at an FAI better have their sh1t in one pile.
I wonder if I can guess which solicitor the family have engaged?
I wonder if I can guess which solicitor the family have engaged?
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
toptobottom;
Yep - thanks for reminding us all SS. Not a bad guess at all, even though I say so myself; he ran out of fuel...
Can't believe all the bull$hit that comes from your over-active brain (sic)
Yep - thanks for reminding us all SS. Not a bad guess at all, even though I say so myself; he ran out of fuel...
Can't believe all the bull$hit that comes from your over-active brain (sic)
So, ttb, you are totally ignoring the recorded fault in the display systems?
If the value of the fuel display can be changed by using electronics, why couldn't a fault in the system reproduce that change in value? After all, the FLM tells us that the numerical display is the primary source of fuel value.
Silsoe - don't you realise what an amateur nerd you sound like? Ignorant speculation is not attractive. Put it down, move on and get a life mate, before you embarrass yourself again...
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Sorry to have upset you so much to drive you to insults ttb
As I said, just a thought.
In my 'ignorant world', wiggly amps do funny unexpected things sometimes. If lbs were the value indicated it would bring along a different kettle of fish, including to cause the main tank contents to read '34'. Of course as you would undoubtably know, in forward flight this is a figure that a knowledgeable pilot would realise to be unusable. I'll leave you to work out the significance of this.
I would move on as you demand, however unlike you I cannot believe that this is a simple 'run out of fuel' situation. To have your opinion that they knowingly ran out of fuel, may suggest your insults are unwarranted.
I'm not going to argue this one way or the other, just putting it out there for discussion. If you can explain why this cannot occur, please do. At the moment you are unable to explain otherwise, you don't even know if a lbs indication configuration is possible or not, otherwise you would have told me why this scenario is impossible.
That's my current set of cards on the table. Would you like to take a seat and join in, instead of rudely commenting out of the audience!
All the best.
As I said, just a thought.
In my 'ignorant world', wiggly amps do funny unexpected things sometimes. If lbs were the value indicated it would bring along a different kettle of fish, including to cause the main tank contents to read '34'. Of course as you would undoubtably know, in forward flight this is a figure that a knowledgeable pilot would realise to be unusable. I'll leave you to work out the significance of this.
I would move on as you demand, however unlike you I cannot believe that this is a simple 'run out of fuel' situation. To have your opinion that they knowingly ran out of fuel, may suggest your insults are unwarranted.
I'm not going to argue this one way or the other, just putting it out there for discussion. If you can explain why this cannot occur, please do. At the moment you are unable to explain otherwise, you don't even know if a lbs indication configuration is possible or not, otherwise you would have told me why this scenario is impossible.
That's my current set of cards on the table. Would you like to take a seat and join in, instead of rudely commenting out of the audience!
All the best.
Hi Gents, Ladies,
I can't remember if it has been mentioned before and I can't see it anywhere, but with the acknowledged 'dodgy CAD', could it be that the numerical fuel indication was somehow 'tripped' to make it show in lbs and not kgs?
"CPDS
A fault relating to one of the display systems was recorded and further work is being undertaken to establish the meaning and possible causes of the fault."
In this scenario with 47/43 lbs indicating, there would only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks. By the time this may have been fully, if at all realised and the warnings came on (late?), a dirty dash back to base may have been the only reasonable course of action at the time.
Just another thought
I can't remember if it has been mentioned before and I can't see it anywhere, but with the acknowledged 'dodgy CAD', could it be that the numerical fuel indication was somehow 'tripped' to make it show in lbs and not kgs?
"CPDS
A fault relating to one of the display systems was recorded and further work is being undertaken to establish the meaning and possible causes of the fault."
In this scenario with 47/43 lbs indicating, there would only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks. By the time this may have been fully, if at all realised and the warnings came on (late?), a dirty dash back to base may have been the only reasonable course of action at the time.
Just another thought
even though I say so myself; he ran out of fuel
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Don't you just hate it when a quote isn't related to a name!!!!
MG, you've quoted my explanation about the supply tanks!
The indication may have been 47/43 (lbs) ; low but above the minimum if the indication was in kilos, and base was only a short hop away. However there would actually only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks which of course would not be enough. But of course as you've quoted this you must have already read it!
Maybe with an indication of 167 (lbs) on the main tank display, (but there only actually being 76 kgs in it), the main tank was not a concern and maybe the pumps being off were also not a concern as a low speed portion of the flight was being undertaken at the time and maybe the cautions came on requiring the pumps to be off.
Of course if the fuel indications were in lbs, ie reading higher than actual, and the CAD went u/s what fuel values do you go on?
As I said, just a thought.
(p.s. I didn't say the other quote, ttb!)
MG, you've quoted my explanation about the supply tanks!
The indication may have been 47/43 (lbs) ; low but above the minimum if the indication was in kilos, and base was only a short hop away. However there would actually only be 21/19 kgs in the tanks which of course would not be enough. But of course as you've quoted this you must have already read it!
Maybe with an indication of 167 (lbs) on the main tank display, (but there only actually being 76 kgs in it), the main tank was not a concern and maybe the pumps being off were also not a concern as a low speed portion of the flight was being undertaken at the time and maybe the cautions came on requiring the pumps to be off.
Of course if the fuel indications were in lbs, ie reading higher than actual, and the CAD went u/s what fuel values do you go on?
As I said, just a thought.
(p.s. I didn't say the other quote, ttb!)
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
MG;
Doesn't explain why the Supply tanks were empty with fuel in the Main and the Transfer Pumps switched off.
Doesn't explain why the Supply tanks were empty with fuel in the Main and the Transfer Pumps switched off.
SS,
Interesting conjecture and the graphics of course would still be relevant.
Although I would have to wonder about the hypothesis when the PIC had over 5K total and ~ 650 on type whether he would have surely noticed based on the numbers that the fuel burn had apparently halved miraculously?
Interesting conjecture and the graphics of course would still be relevant.
Although I would have to wonder about the hypothesis when the PIC had over 5K total and ~ 650 on type whether he would have surely noticed based on the numbers that the fuel burn had apparently halved miraculously?
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MLA
The issue of the numbers is irrelevant. The MLA is the compelling issue. Even if SID is right the AC is still below the MLA at the point of flameout.
Operating a helicopter this close to the fuel limits in open flight is hazardous.
Just because its hard to believe an experienced pilot can make a mistake does not mean it did not transpire this way. The Brent Spar, AF447, Cormorant Alpha, Sumburgh L2. All experienced crews doing inexplicable things.
If that AC had a history of fuel contents problems why were the pilots not recording, chasing the issues. This too is poor culture if SIDS statements are true.
Operating a MEH over a city with very little fuel in the tanks, pumps incorrectly configured, seems the most likely scenario. Poor knowledge, poor culture, poor decision making. After all a police helicopter is not directly saving lives. Why take such risks. Culture?
Operating a helicopter this close to the fuel limits in open flight is hazardous.
Just because its hard to believe an experienced pilot can make a mistake does not mean it did not transpire this way. The Brent Spar, AF447, Cormorant Alpha, Sumburgh L2. All experienced crews doing inexplicable things.
If that AC had a history of fuel contents problems why were the pilots not recording, chasing the issues. This too is poor culture if SIDS statements are true.
Operating a MEH over a city with very little fuel in the tanks, pumps incorrectly configured, seems the most likely scenario. Poor knowledge, poor culture, poor decision making. After all a police helicopter is not directly saving lives. Why take such risks. Culture?
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Operating a MEH over a city with very little fuel in the tanks, pumps incorrectly configured, seems the most likely scenario.
Unpalatable as it is, logic suggests that it is by far (I'd hazard 98%) the most likely scenario.
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Fortunately, Accident Investigation don't decide by what logic suggests. They try to find out what actually happened. Just like the Mull enquiry made logical assumptions, luckily we have moved on
MG, you've quoted my explanation about the supply tanks!
What does?
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DB, I tiptoed at 'culture' back in March. http://www.pprune.org/8387541-post2743.html
I don't really want to press this particular 'cultural' line of thought at the moment, although this may well prompt further discussion.
When I do a duty at a different unit, during the brief I say to the crew that if I do something that is different than the other pilots or they aren't sure what I am doing, or have any other concern, please bring it up at the time.
I like to think that this firstly breaks the CRM ice and hopefully empowers them to question what this unknown pilot that has appeared on their doorstep is doing. It's ok for everyone to be CRM'd, but as much as we try to make the cockpit an 'open environment', to actually say something to or to question a pilots actions, especially in the cockpit with a totally unknown or even a very well known pilot, takes a lot when you're 'out of the classroom'.
Back at the normal duty base, this train of thought still has to be maintained. The TFO's must feel that they can speak up when they feel something is different, unusual or not quite right. However, each unit is different in its 'culture' and there may be many reasons why TFO's may not feel they are in a position to challenge or question their pilot, their actions or any particular setting or situation that may develop in the cockpit.
My point, is that despite all the CRM training we complete, the classroom is a totally different place than the cockpit on a dark wet night, with an unfamiliar, familiar or overfamiliar crew with varying levels of confidence, security, arousal, situational awareness and cognitive abilities .
This is in no way directed at any particular unit or operation, but a general ramble of things CRM, out of the classroom that may or may not be relevant here.
I don't really want to press this particular 'cultural' line of thought at the moment, although this may well prompt further discussion.
When I do a duty at a different unit, during the brief I say to the crew that if I do something that is different than the other pilots or they aren't sure what I am doing, or have any other concern, please bring it up at the time.
I like to think that this firstly breaks the CRM ice and hopefully empowers them to question what this unknown pilot that has appeared on their doorstep is doing. It's ok for everyone to be CRM'd, but as much as we try to make the cockpit an 'open environment', to actually say something to or to question a pilots actions, especially in the cockpit with a totally unknown or even a very well known pilot, takes a lot when you're 'out of the classroom'.
Back at the normal duty base, this train of thought still has to be maintained. The TFO's must feel that they can speak up when they feel something is different, unusual or not quite right. However, each unit is different in its 'culture' and there may be many reasons why TFO's may not feel they are in a position to challenge or question their pilot, their actions or any particular setting or situation that may develop in the cockpit.
My point, is that despite all the CRM training we complete, the classroom is a totally different place than the cockpit on a dark wet night, with an unfamiliar, familiar or overfamiliar crew with varying levels of confidence, security, arousal, situational awareness and cognitive abilities .
This is in no way directed at any particular unit or operation, but a general ramble of things CRM, out of the classroom that may or may not be relevant here.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Well yes. You're talking about false readings in them when they were empty.
A very very wild stab, but what's to say that when this was indeed realised, (21/19) an attempt was made to land in the road at the junction, but unfortunately the fuel quantity just wasn't enough to allow this to happen?
You're without doubt absolutely correct that 'nothing so far explains why the supply tanks were empty and the transfer pumps were switched off', which is why some of us wish to discuss the possibilities no matter how 'extreme or unlikely' they may appear.
It's ok for everyone to be CRM'd, but as much as we try to make the cockpit an 'open environment', to actually say something to or to question a pilots actions, especially in the cockpit with a totally unknown or even a very well known pilot, takes a lot when you're 'out of the classroom'
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If both engines had stopped on me I would have been reaching for those prime pump switches as well.
Maybe its time to increase operating and transit heights to above 1500 AGL not the normal low ops.
Maybe its time to increase operating and transit heights to above 1500 AGL not the normal low ops.
Re-starting an engine at that altitude, at night, over a City, single pilot on Emergency lighting.....are you kidding?
I would have been concentrating on getting the lever down, picking the best spot available, and if time permitted yelling out a Mayday call.
There appears to be a huge traffic intersection right in front of it.
I'd have autorotated right into there, accepting any oncoming traffic as bad luck, acceptable at night, me thinks.