AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Outside the oil industry, gulliBell is probably describing the life of half the world's helicopter pilots.
CASA identify you and take you out of the system along with anyone else involved in that operation
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BA - I do not need to read the CASA thread - I know the organisation extremely well. like all organisations there is Good, bad and ugly.
Just a word of caution though. Blaming the regulator for the behaviour and attitudes of Gullibell is a gross over simplification.
Just because the law says you can it does not mean you should. That's still called airmanship I believe.
However, in loyalty to CASA and the many fine people who work hard there each day - the operation Gullibell describes is not IAW with CARs either in respect of Maintenance or Flight Operations. If you like I can explain why!!
Come on Brian you are much better than that!!
DB
Just a word of caution though. Blaming the regulator for the behaviour and attitudes of Gullibell is a gross over simplification.
Just because the law says you can it does not mean you should. That's still called airmanship I believe.
However, in loyalty to CASA and the many fine people who work hard there each day - the operation Gullibell describes is not IAW with CARs either in respect of Maintenance or Flight Operations. If you like I can explain why!!
Come on Brian you are much better than that!!
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 13th Sep 2013 at 22:10.
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SATSUMA - in majority of these accidents the pilot has not reacted or attempted to recover from the UA. When the pilot does react the outcome is usually favourable, like the recent S92 incident. The copilot will have passed his OPC and I am sure UAs would have been on the menu. Our Canadian brothers are as regulated and professional as anywhere else.
I can think of only one case where attempted recovery has subsequently and horribly failed. That was the AS365 in Morecombe Bay.
No this problem is far more complex and insidious and it may be related to how we train for these events.
At present we generally ask the Pilot Flying to close his eyes and then set up the UA, he opens his eyes and recovers. In doing it this way we are not actually training him to recognise the most important aspect which is the onset of the UA.
By not seeing the full progression of the UA we are not practising the intervention skills and/or policy nor are we allowing the crew to develop coping strategies and the necessary airmanship, CRM and MCC to optimise his chances of reacting early enough in the sequence of events.
In this class of helicopter, a fully developed low speed UA, especially coupled with a high ROD is a horrible prospect for even the most skilled pilot. I know because I have been there. Twice. Luck, timing and skill and by far luck plays the greater part. By this I mean the you're lucky if you get one at 500 feet, unlucky if you get presented with the the same prospect at 100 feet.
The chances of recovery at this stage depend on whether the pilot runs out of luck, skill or altitude before he can restablish a ROC.
We have to recognise, that despite the intimation from some posters on this thread that their skills have thus far saved them from ever getting there, and this may of course be absolutley true for them, some extremely well qualified, skilful and highly respected pilots have not been so fortunate.
In terms of skillsets, if we accept that luck and height play the greater part, by far the most impactful strategy must be to develop skills that prevent the initial flight path deterioration in the first place. This may be an automation skill or a manual flying skill, depending on the AC at its systems.
To do this we have to get better at recognising the onset of a UA. We have to start practising our airmanship, CRM, MCC and intervention so that hopefully we develop a skillset to deploy, other automation or manual, that will manage these risks better than we are doing now.
The latest EC products do exactly this. The DAFCS actually recognises the early symptoms of a UA, loss of airspeed, loss of height, excessive ROC/ROD and automatically intervenes to restore a safe flight path. These are backstop hidden protections.
Any ideas from TRIs in this respect. Are we actually training for the wrong event here. Instead of putting our faith, and therefore our training efforts solely into recovery, should we be doing much, much more to enable the pilot to recognise, manage and intervene during the early stages rather than simply asking him to open his eyes and recover!!!
These skills re after all, the core fundamental risk management of a stabilised approach.
DB
I can think of only one case where attempted recovery has subsequently and horribly failed. That was the AS365 in Morecombe Bay.
No this problem is far more complex and insidious and it may be related to how we train for these events.
At present we generally ask the Pilot Flying to close his eyes and then set up the UA, he opens his eyes and recovers. In doing it this way we are not actually training him to recognise the most important aspect which is the onset of the UA.
By not seeing the full progression of the UA we are not practising the intervention skills and/or policy nor are we allowing the crew to develop coping strategies and the necessary airmanship, CRM and MCC to optimise his chances of reacting early enough in the sequence of events.
In this class of helicopter, a fully developed low speed UA, especially coupled with a high ROD is a horrible prospect for even the most skilled pilot. I know because I have been there. Twice. Luck, timing and skill and by far luck plays the greater part. By this I mean the you're lucky if you get one at 500 feet, unlucky if you get presented with the the same prospect at 100 feet.
The chances of recovery at this stage depend on whether the pilot runs out of luck, skill or altitude before he can restablish a ROC.
We have to recognise, that despite the intimation from some posters on this thread that their skills have thus far saved them from ever getting there, and this may of course be absolutley true for them, some extremely well qualified, skilful and highly respected pilots have not been so fortunate.
In terms of skillsets, if we accept that luck and height play the greater part, by far the most impactful strategy must be to develop skills that prevent the initial flight path deterioration in the first place. This may be an automation skill or a manual flying skill, depending on the AC at its systems.
To do this we have to get better at recognising the onset of a UA. We have to start practising our airmanship, CRM, MCC and intervention so that hopefully we develop a skillset to deploy, other automation or manual, that will manage these risks better than we are doing now.
The latest EC products do exactly this. The DAFCS actually recognises the early symptoms of a UA, loss of airspeed, loss of height, excessive ROC/ROD and automatically intervenes to restore a safe flight path. These are backstop hidden protections.
Any ideas from TRIs in this respect. Are we actually training for the wrong event here. Instead of putting our faith, and therefore our training efforts solely into recovery, should we be doing much, much more to enable the pilot to recognise, manage and intervene during the early stages rather than simply asking him to open his eyes and recover!!!
These skills re after all, the core fundamental risk management of a stabilised approach.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 13th Sep 2013 at 22:56.
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To slightly change the discussion, let me present a scenario which may well be pertinant to the accident under discussion.
You are flying a routine approach in IMC, you have set up the autopilot and all appears to be well but you have made a mistake - we all make mistakes occasionally.
You break out of cloud at 500 feet and find yourself decending at 1000 fpm. You now have 30 seconds to stay out of the water. This is a nasty surprise, you really should have been paying more attention to monitoring but there is no time for recriminations, what do you do next ?
a) Try to figure out why the system is doing something unexpected and fix it.
b) Disconnect the autopilot and recover manually.
Are your reactions and skills up to the challenge ?
You are flying a routine approach in IMC, you have set up the autopilot and all appears to be well but you have made a mistake - we all make mistakes occasionally.
You break out of cloud at 500 feet and find yourself decending at 1000 fpm. You now have 30 seconds to stay out of the water. This is a nasty surprise, you really should have been paying more attention to monitoring but there is no time for recriminations, what do you do next ?
a) Try to figure out why the system is doing something unexpected and fix it.
b) Disconnect the autopilot and recover manually.
Are your reactions and skills up to the challenge ?
TAG - neither of course!
To try to fathom out "what its doing now" whilst plummeting earthwards would be foolish and inappropriate, and possibly fatal.
To disconnect the autopilot would be equally stupid because you now are flying a helicopter designed to always have artificial stability operative, but have removed that artificial stability and are now flying a twitchy and unstable monster.
The correct response is to drop down a level or several of automation - ie go from whatever upper modes were coupled, to basic stability (normally based around attitude and heading retention). Raise the collective to arrest the descent, select a sensible attitude etc. No point in making it much much harder by disconnecting the autopilot unless your macho-ness is more important than your's and the passengers' lives.
To try to fathom out "what its doing now" whilst plummeting earthwards would be foolish and inappropriate, and possibly fatal.
To disconnect the autopilot would be equally stupid because you now are flying a helicopter designed to always have artificial stability operative, but have removed that artificial stability and are now flying a twitchy and unstable monster.
The correct response is to drop down a level or several of automation - ie go from whatever upper modes were coupled, to basic stability (normally based around attitude and heading retention). Raise the collective to arrest the descent, select a sensible attitude etc. No point in making it much much harder by disconnecting the autopilot unless your macho-ness is more important than your's and the passengers' lives.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 13th Sep 2013 at 23:17.
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Come on Brian you are much better than that!!
Both the REPCON program and CEO Policy Notice CEO PN029 2005 2 Multi Engine Helicopters Operational Performance Standards, I suspect, though do not have proof, are an outcome of my discussions with the regulatory bodies. I say "suspect" because they appeared five months following those discussions.
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Hi Brian,
CEO 29 follows the doctrine of ICAO and I agree with you, it misses the mark for Offshore Operations by a long chalk. However, it recognises the very diverse nature of Australian helicopter operations and in doing so, gives the radical minority just enough rope to hang themselves.
You can lead a horse to water, but if it jumps in and commits suicide it is not your fault (this was my over riding impression formed dealing with operators and pilots during my time as an FOI(H)).
DB
CEO 29 follows the doctrine of ICAO and I agree with you, it misses the mark for Offshore Operations by a long chalk. However, it recognises the very diverse nature of Australian helicopter operations and in doing so, gives the radical minority just enough rope to hang themselves.
You can lead a horse to water, but if it jumps in and commits suicide it is not your fault (this was my over riding impression formed dealing with operators and pilots during my time as an FOI(H)).
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 13th Sep 2013 at 23:41.
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TAG - BWAP ( Ball - wings - attitude (for Vy), power when and as appropriate).
Easy on PPRUNE, very different in a large basiv AP helicopter with a heart full of adrenalin, a bus full Pax and a mouth as dry as a grannies armpit!!
In the EC225, I tut-tut at the instigator, press the GA button, check two green GAs on the FND, follow the "I Press the Button (IPB)" philosophy (Installation, Prioritisation and Behaviour) to monitor the DAFCS, install HDG at 26 KIAS and carry on with my coffee.
But I am fortunate to fly the EC225!!
DB
Easy on PPRUNE, very different in a large basiv AP helicopter with a heart full of adrenalin, a bus full Pax and a mouth as dry as a grannies armpit!!
In the EC225, I tut-tut at the instigator, press the GA button, check two green GAs on the FND, follow the "I Press the Button (IPB)" philosophy (Installation, Prioritisation and Behaviour) to monitor the DAFCS, install HDG at 26 KIAS and carry on with my coffee.
But I am fortunate to fly the EC225!!
DB
Back in post 1255 I said this....
In the Training done during Sim and In-flight Checks/training....do the UK Operators perform such practice maneuvers to properly expose Crews to such situations? Are Pilots checked to see if they take proper corrective action for Non-Responsive Pilots?
One thing I noticed in the Sim was when things started going wrong....one of the first reactions of a lot of Pilots was to de-select the Autopilot and revert to hand flying.
Part of that stemmed from the newness of both Sim Training and Autopilots. I would think as Automation and one's experience/familiarity with modern Autopilots this tendency would decrease.
The single most glaring mistake I saw was the failure to increase power upon executing a Missed Approach.....and when that happened....we saw a slow motion crash. The Crew would decide to go Missed....hit the G/A button....make their Radio Call....start looking for charts, maps, changing radio frequencies or whatever.....and the Autopilot would do its best to comply but at some point the climb rate could not be produced by the decrease in Airspeed and then the loss of control happened.
Generally, Unusual Attitude Recovery training is done with lots of airspeed and at higher altitudes. Low Airspeed events close to the ground are where helicopters are the most at risk.
What is the system in the UK for such training and testing on Base Checks?
Do you practice low or zero airspeed upsets?
Part of that stemmed from the newness of both Sim Training and Autopilots. I would think as Automation and one's experience/familiarity with modern Autopilots this tendency would decrease.
The single most glaring mistake I saw was the failure to increase power upon executing a Missed Approach.....and when that happened....we saw a slow motion crash. The Crew would decide to go Missed....hit the G/A button....make their Radio Call....start looking for charts, maps, changing radio frequencies or whatever.....and the Autopilot would do its best to comply but at some point the climb rate could not be produced by the decrease in Airspeed and then the loss of control happened.
Generally, Unusual Attitude Recovery training is done with lots of airspeed and at higher altitudes. Low Airspeed events close to the ground are where helicopters are the most at risk.
What is the system in the UK for such training and testing on Base Checks?
Do you practice low or zero airspeed upsets?
In the Training done during Sim and In-flight Checks/training....do the UK Operators perform such practice maneuvers to properly expose Crews to such situations? Are Pilots checked to see if they take proper corrective action for Non-Responsive Pilots?
Last edited by SASless; 13th Sep 2013 at 23:58.
We are all pretty much in agreement that flying skills (handling) are vitally important in all areas but management of systems and knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of those systems is crucial.
The balance of the 2 is, as Keithl echoes, all down to quality and quantity of training.
The balance of the 2 is, as Keithl echoes, all down to quality and quantity of training.
.BTW, do Rafsar crews still get 4hours TRAINING per shift?
"Although the first officer had almost 1000 total flight hours on the S-92A, many of those hours were spent in coupled flight during instrument flight rules (IFR) flights to and from the offshore facilities, and not hand flying the helicopter. As a result, the first officer did not feel confident about having the necessary instrument flying skills to safely recover from the unusual attitude that had developed" From the Cougar incident.
Maybe it's time to raise the minimums for co-pilots BEFORE starting off in Offshore flying. Maybe 1500 TT PIC in helicopters would be a good number, at least you'd have decent manipulation skills. I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world when you are flying in one of the most demanding environments (IFR, Night over water etc)...
Or am I just too cautious
Maybe it's time to raise the minimums for co-pilots BEFORE starting off in Offshore flying. Maybe 1500 TT PIC in helicopters would be a good number, at least you'd have decent manipulation skills. I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world when you are flying in one of the most demanding environments (IFR, Night over water etc)...
Or am I just too cautious
Last edited by Heliringer; 14th Sep 2013 at 00:36.
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I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world
Should you wander over to Tech Log you'll find much discussion on hand flying skills v use of george - outcome of the San Francisco 777 accident and incident and others. Has long been a source of discussion among airline crews, and how sim training, as it's currently used, does not enhance manual skills.
Al-bert
yes and we still do an hour's IF (in the aircraft) of GH including UPs and 2 hand flown approaches every month - we are clearly a long way behind the commercial world in our approach to training, fancy putting safety ahead of £s and pennies
BTW, do Rafsar crews still get 4hours TRAINING per shift?
Crab
and let me guess, co pilots go on to be captains? Do you think that might happen in the 'commercial world' too? How do they ever develop that GH/UP skill in a sim? My glasses are misting up now at the thought of those poor deprived co's - must go- NURSE, NURSE, the screens! 
yes and we still do an hour's IF (in the aircraft) of GH including UPs and 2 hand flown approaches every month - we are clearly a long way behind the commercial world in our approach to training, fancy putting safety ahead of £s and pennies
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How can you be sure that the co-pilot has the hours and the experience with the systems to be confident enough to take over from a "Non-Responsive Pilot"? In a rapid descent in any aircraft, heli, or glider in a spin, there is very little time....we were trained to be violent if necessary in taking over....
Confidence has to be part of the makeup of any pilot. I had to take over an approach being made by the Chairman of the Soaring Society of the USA, visiting our club, who was undershooting, and failed to recognise or respond when prompted! Doesn't matter who outranks you, you have to squeak up!
The first officer in the Canadian incident was hesitant. Training, as SAS says again and again, needs to cover recognition of the problems leading to a possible upset so as to keep the situation from ever developing.
Confidence has to be part of the makeup of any pilot. I had to take over an approach being made by the Chairman of the Soaring Society of the USA, visiting our club, who was undershooting, and failed to recognise or respond when prompted! Doesn't matter who outranks you, you have to squeak up!
The first officer in the Canadian incident was hesitant. Training, as SAS says again and again, needs to cover recognition of the problems leading to a possible upset so as to keep the situation from ever developing.
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Where does that familiarity, that expertise, that practice come from?
TRAINING. And as much of it as you can get.
TRAINING. And as much of it as you can get.
For you guys and us, a lot of our job is routine, but we have to ensure we are trained and prepared to take the correct actions in the event of an emergency. It is very easy to let this slip.
Correct me if wrong, but you guys are trained how to auto rotate and land on engine failure and have to demonstrate this hands on?
The chance of having to use this in anger seems to me much less than having to get an aircraft out of danger when it finds itself descending quickly at low speed for whatever reason with possible CFIT consequence. Should you not have to be trained and exercised on how to do this with AP and manually?
Also agree on need to be able to recognise quickly when the a/c is starting to get into this situation.
I admire DB's and others passion for safety and automation, but as we all know automation can go wrong - although on modern systems reliability is high. Then you have to be able to use manual skills?
Edited to add this quote from Neil Armstrong which applies to all of us.
You've got to expect things are going to go wrong. And we always need to prepare ourselves for handling the unexpected
Last edited by thelearner; 14th Sep 2013 at 09:10.
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Also this headline was not what was required for the EC225 and it also got some attention on that social media site. Glad it was a faulty bulb only, but of course this was not apparent on the early headlines.