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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013

Old 27th Nov 2013, 23:06
  #2301 (permalink)  
 
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SAS

So just to be clear, from your previous post, can you confirm that you believe management deficiencies will turn out to have a "huge role" in the Sumburgh crash?

And any particular reason why you didn't respond to the questions I asked you in post 2281?
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 09:26
  #2302 (permalink)  
 
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Rotorspeed,

If he doesn't then I certainly do - and not just management of the operator!

Mars
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 10:55
  #2303 (permalink)  
 
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I see post 2281 belonging to Biggles.....perhaps you might repeat the question as I do not see your post.

As "Management" can have different meanings at different times...I will say "Yes"....as I include Training Captains, Check Captains, Sim Instructors, Safety Managers and the like in "Management".

As to "Huge"....that is your choice of wording.

Significant....yes, notable......yes, will they be called out by the AAIB....who knows at this point!
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 11:02
  #2304 (permalink)  
 
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As "Management" can have different meanings at different times..
Anyone you may have left out? Wasn't the Captain supposed to be "managing" the flight? What about the Regulator?

A very vague description of Management with weasel words
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 16:28
  #2305 (permalink)  
 
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SAS

My post 2281 related to your post on the Air Methods accident and was:

"SAS

What do you think the crew would have been looking at displayed on the HSI if they were completing a localiser approach - it seems from the report they were tracking parallel to the localiser 1 mile left? And even if they thought the middle marker was the outer marker, why would they not have seen from the DME readout that this was incorrect?

How could such errors possibly be training, management, policy or SOP errors? Wasn't it just largely basic crew error, with mitigation for poor radar vectors? "

No SAS, "huge" was your wording actually. Read you own post again - para 2 under Humm.

Quite right, industry insider! SAS, I think you know that most people will assume you mean the company business managers when you say "management". And if not, and you mean training captains and check captains, why not be a bit more specific and say so? Or perhaps you would rather responsibility was heaped on corporate management - in fact I do find that tends to be your style. If flight crew don't believe they are trained to fly a task they shouldn't do it - and surely they should be able to be judge that. Do you think that the Sumburgh crew were not confident they were sufficiently trained to fly the NPA safely? I very much doubt it.
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 17:51
  #2306 (permalink)  
 
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I don' guess you two would consider non-standard cockpits to be a Management issue or concern?

Would you consider having one guy fulfill the Base Manager, Base Training Captain, and Base Safety Officer tasks as being good thinking by Management as well?

Do you reckon the Corporate Check Pilot arriving on site then watching the Duty Crew launch in the Spare Aircraft after doing a Bag Swap from the Duty Aircraft...into IMC Conditions in a mountainous area in an aircraft they were not familiar with (and having significantly different equipment) not a Management Concern?

Would you consider the Corporate Mantra of anytime, anywhere, any weather (contingent to FAA OpSpecs minima)....but ignoring the actual practice of most of their IFR crews avoiding flying in actual IMC whenever possible a Management issue?

If you disagree with the notion Management (at all levels/functions) does not play a role in the environment Flight Crews find themselves operating in....then just say so. But....you are already aware most others disagree with that view.

You certainly are free to disagree.....but at least offer up some corroboration of your own views.


Answer some of your own questions.....why did they parallel the course and not track the course? What would explain that?

I presented an explanation for the lack of DME information....did you not read that? If they did not use the DME "Hold" function they would not have had any DME readout to see.....if you recall how that system works in a Sperry Cockpit.

If they did not use that function.....why not? Did they train that way? Did they not understand how that function worked....did they not understand how that particular piece of equipment worked on the Spare Aircraft?

Did the Check Pilot do an Orientation Briefing on the Spare Aircraft before the Crew launched in it?

You have a lot of questions you could be asking or is it you just want to disagreeable?
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Old 28th Nov 2013, 20:49
  #2307 (permalink)  
 
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SAS, I wasn't even considering your unrelated onshore EMS Bell 412 accident in the USA. I haven't studied it, read of it, and I am not interested in it. This thread is about an AS332L2 fatal accident in Sumburgh UK at the end of an offshore flight.

I don't think its appropriate or relevant to drag up any old CFIT accident on the other side of the world and start pontificating about management. The AAIB won't even think about or consider this Bell 412 USA accident.

If disagreeing with you and wanting to stick to relevance is "disagreeable" to you, so be it.
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Old 29th Nov 2013, 08:04
  #2308 (permalink)  
 
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Last week the FAA issued a report on “Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems”.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2501.pdf

A small (informal) helicopter group has been looking at that report and their view of it, and its relevance, is as follows:

“The report is comprehensive and appears to cover and summarise most of the issues that we have addressed over a short period of discussion. However, when the report is being read, it is difficult not to fall into the trap of confirmatory bias.

The comparisons between the population examined in the report and our industry is not just one of scale it is also a matter of (lack of) parallel experiences, foreshortened timescales, and variance in operations (for example, we might perhaps require less emphasis on manual skills). We benefit from the application of automation, but this comes at a price because we have not had time to adapt our thinking and processes to, what is, a revolutionary approach to operations. Only in the offshore industry - and probably only in deep-water operations - is there a move to comprehensively re-equip with equipment that has cockpit integration/automation approaching the complexity of the population in this report. Fortunately, this is one of the few corners of our industry that does have the ability to move as one and make necessary changes. Perhaps we might be the exemplar in any changes that are made and this needs to be conveyed to other parts of our industry.

Compared to the airline industry, which is largely homogeneous, we are a collection of very small operators who, for understandable reasons, are more interested in competition than cooperation. For that reason, we do not have the clout to force a change in design (even the authors of the report are only recommending that the process 'takes account of' human-centric design - they make few recommendations for concrete changes in regulations). Nevertheless, because we are a small industry, it is possible to engender the required change in the culture of oversight, training and operations (in a reasonable time scale) although deciding what constitutes 'required change' is going to be the first and most difficult step.

It is accepted that, although changes (of various magnitudes) are necessary in design, certification, training requirements, training regimes, operating procedures, crew cooperation etc., the process of change must be owned at the highest level and be applied and driven from the top. Hence there is a need to ask questions about required changes in:

1. the system;
2. the regulator;
3. the regulations; and
4. oversight.

It needs to be understood that the system should include a version of the ‘plan/do/monitor/adjust’ improvement cycle as part of the State Safety Programme (SSP) – as does the operators SMS. We can continue to discuss how the recommendations of the report are applied to our industry but, in the final analysis, unless the solution at all levels contains a version of this process, it will not be enduring.”


Mars
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Old 5th Dec 2013, 09:45
  #2309 (permalink)  
 
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AS 332 L2 thread gone AWOL?

The Sumburgh thread seems to have gone missing - possibly a formatting error somewhere? The most recent couple of pages of entries appear to be imaccessible. Any chance one of the 'deities' could take a look (and then delete this?)?
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 16:13
  #2310 (permalink)  
 
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It appears from the graphs at the end of the AAIB report that the HP must have sub-consciously moved the collective down every time he got a height check (and was always above the nominal glidepath) - the graph shows clear steps of reducing Tq and lever position during the approach.

This would account for the cyclic program reducing the speed to keep the desired RoD which eventually resulted in the high nose up, low speed condition (despite speed calls at 80 kts and 35 kts) that finally led to the VRS.

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 17:08
  #2311 (permalink)  
 
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As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
Chances are one of the test pilots at EC could explain that, since I expect they were involved in the development process.
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 17:58
  #2312 (permalink)  
 
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Quote:
As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?

Chances are one of the test pilots at EC could explain that, since I expect they were involved in the development process.
Anyone would think ths was the first 3-axis autopilot ever invented! There were 3-axis Sperry 7000s flying in S76As in the eighties (to name but one prior model). It's nothing new......
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 18:47
  #2313 (permalink)  
 
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As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
The work done by Qinetiq on the VAAC Harrier / JSF is interesting in terms of the thought process gone through to get the solution they have. Perhaps something that could translate to rotary winged aircraft?
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 20:00
  #2314 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by [email protected] View Post

As I said before - it is so counter-intuitive to have a configuration where cyclic controls RoD and lever controls speed - how did anyone think that was a good idea?
It is only counter intuitive if you have been badly trained - trained that you always use cyclic to control airspeed and collective to control the vertical element. As I have mentioned before this plain doesn't work throughout the flight envelope, so why do the dipsticks teach it?

To me, engaging a vertical mode on cyclic and controlling speed with collective is just as intuitive as the other way round, under the appropriate conditions. It is just a matter of selecting the optimal way of doing it for the circumstances. A pilot who can't cope with that shouldn't be flying.
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 20:30
  #2315 (permalink)  
 
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HC.
I'm kind of in agreement with crab, but open to discussion. How do you fly the other way round? Set a power setting on collective and then set a speed either side of the curve to get a rate of climb or descent? Not something I'm familiar with. Could you explain?
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 20:44
  #2316 (permalink)  
 
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212man,
I worked on a 3-axis A/P that was fitted both to the Alouette III and the 212... but that goes back to the mid-seventies, so I reckon I'd better stay out of the discussion !
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 21:23
  #2317 (permalink)  
 
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That's the way the Puma was designed. Counterintuitive maybe but it worked. Set a pitch and fly on the cyclic, I know having attended No 1 Puma course in the RAF, we didn't have multi-axis AFCS's in those days though.
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 21:25
  #2318 (permalink)  

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Either method can work but obviously you have to fully understand what the autopilot is doing, and what it is not doing.

I often fly off airfield letdowns, i.e. non-precision approaches. I find it more intuitive and more accurate to let the airspeed hold do it's job and to initiate and subsequently control the ROD with collective.

At MDA (actually just before) I level off the aircraft using collective. It helps to know the required S+L Tq setting for the IAS being flown but this was already in use at TOD, then I activate "ALT" hold mode. That way the IAS will not decrease under influence of the AP. If I am visual, I then disengage the Alt and Heading modes together using the release button and fly with all AP modes out. If not visual, with the ALT mode engaged, lowering the lever again will cause the IAS to be decreased.

I prefer this method because levelling off using the VS mode requires hand swapping on the cyclic at a critical stage (to reset the VSI bug to zero). This is in addition to raising the collective to avoid a reduction of IAS as the aircraft levels itself off.
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 21:47
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Originally Posted by high spirits View Post
HC.
I'm kind of in agreement with crab, but open to discussion. How do you fly the other way round? Set a power setting on collective and then set a speed either side of the curve to get a rate of climb or descent? Not something I'm familiar with. Could you explain?


The simplest example is when you are cruising at max continuous power. That means you can't raise the collective any more. So if the heli starts to descend, you have to raise the nose slightly and accept a reduction in airspeed. You are in fact flying altitude on the cyclic and leaving the power alone.


In the context of autopilots, when you engage altitude hold on a 3 axis machine, or a 4 axis machine being flown in 3 axis, the altitude hold goes onto the cyclic (assuming you are not going too slowly). It all seems totally normal to me!


In a 3 axis machine flying a non-precision instrument approach you could chose either IAS or VS / ALT.A on the cyclic. The former has the advantage of ensuring an L2-scenario doesn't develop. The latter has the advantage of allowing precise control of the vertical profile including level-off at MDA. Which is best I think depends on a couple of factors: How fast you intend to go, and which is the most important parameter.


So for an approach flown fast, well above Vy, you might choose to couple to VS/ALT.A . For an ILS, where glideslope is the most important parameter to be precise with, I would want to couple it to the autopilot (presuming the autopilot was good at flying it!). However the pitfall in the event of a go-around is that you now have a climb being demanded on the cyclic, you must remember to raise the collective or risk running out of speed, and if you go OEI the most important parameter to have the AP controlling is the airspeed, at Vy.


For an approach flown near to Vy, I would definitely want to couple to IAS and control the vertical mode with the collective.


So there is no one-size-fits all answer. But the pilot of a modern autopiloted helicopter who can't make a sensible decision about which mode to couple and which to fly, and follow it through to a safe conclusion, is incompetent. Just like a pilot who can only turn right, but not left!


Whilst I am rambling on, also consider the interchangability of kinetic and potential energy 1/2 MV^2 = MGH. Cancelling out the constants M and G gives us 1/2 v2 proportional to H. Note the speed squared term. So at low speed, a modest change of speed has a small effect on altitude. At high speed, a very small change in speed (very small change in pitch attitude if you like) has a huge effect on altitude. So if you are intent on maintaining a certain speed with the cyclic whilst doing 150kts, tiny changes in cyclic will induce high vertical speeds that the collective is probably unable to contain, or at least it will be very uncomfortable if you try. It is just not the right way to fly at high speed because it doesn't work!
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 22:21
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212man,
I worked on a 3-axis A/P that was fitted both to the Alouette III and the 212... but that goes back to the mid-seventies, so I reckon I'd better stay out of the discussion !
Quite, I just wanted to mention one (non EC) type.......

1/2 MV^2 = MGH
and, of course, F=G.M1.M2/R^2 .......
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