Helicopter - v - crane LONDON
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Quite simply because the flight profile depicted from Lambeth Bridge is completely at odds with any normal flight profile I have seen or flown. Heathrow ATC normally get very upset if you stray off the helilanes, even slightly. And that's in the rest of the CTR, not when your track is taking you through a restricted area into which you are not allowed to fly.
Why did the aircraft fly that route? Why did it not fly along the Thames like it was supposed to? What possible reason could there be for not continuing along the Thames from Lambeth Bridge (i.e. following H4)? Why did it veer away from the route along the Thames (the change in direction is about 45 degrees)?
The pilot reports no technical problems. The pilot continues to respond normally to radio calls beyond Lambeth Bridge. There was clearly some other reason as to why the pilot did not go into that bend in the river. If it's not weather, what other possible reasons could there be?
Why did the aircraft fly that route? Why did it not fly along the Thames like it was supposed to? What possible reason could there be for not continuing along the Thames from Lambeth Bridge (i.e. following H4)? Why did it veer away from the route along the Thames (the change in direction is about 45 degrees)?
The pilot reports no technical problems. The pilot continues to respond normally to radio calls beyond Lambeth Bridge. There was clearly some other reason as to why the pilot did not go into that bend in the river. If it's not weather, what other possible reasons could there be?
ST - I assume he was using a King as well, but even on the 430 it's a single button push, so hardly a distraction and certainly not more than a second, even if the frequency wasn't lined up ready.
I agree, the texting thang is a red herring and I doubt it directly had any material effect on those last few seconds.
I agree, the texting thang is a red herring and I doubt it directly had any material effect on those last few seconds.
Avoid imitations
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ST - I assume he was using a King as well, but even on the 430 it's a single button push, so hardly a distraction and certainly not more than a second, even if the frequency wasn't lined up ready.
However, the CAA have very quickly made quite clear their official stance on pilots using "PED"s in the cockpit.
It is never clear whether he is on a VFR clearance (with a maximum altitude) on top and therefore must be 1000' clear of cloud vertically or a SVFR clearance (must keep in sight of the ground) - he is offered both but the actual service isn't decided.
So - narrowing down to facts that seem plausible.
Look at the northbound track, which goes west of the heliport towards Brent - the standard way to avoid 157 (in a twin) if your clearance is "not above 1000ft". This pilot was fully aware of the restriction.
Look at the contorted route from Westminster to the incident. Going off-route, G-CRST loses its exemption to 157. With a pilot like PB, there would be a serious reason to do so. For some reason, he couldn't glue himself to the river and track slowly to the Heliport, when cleared. If he could, he surely would, because it's the safest route with no high obstacles. The river route must have been obscured.
An option would normally be to climb back on top. But that maybe wasn't open to him due to the height restrictions imposed by Heathrow at that part of the airspace.
He also knew that once he was west of VB, he was in Class A and exempt from the 1000ft rule. And he knew that he would be exempted from the 500ft rule once he was "landing in accordance with normal aviation practice."
The heliport's zone kisses the west edge of VB. So, once past VB, he could claim he was on approach to Battersea once he had the clearance.
He may also had to revert to his heli routes chart. Someone like PB would have this memorised - but when the vis drops, that chart is very useful. Except that the current version doesn't show the 770ft St Georges obstruction. And, if you missed the NOTAM,.......
Look at the northbound track, which goes west of the heliport towards Brent - the standard way to avoid 157 (in a twin) if your clearance is "not above 1000ft". This pilot was fully aware of the restriction.
Look at the contorted route from Westminster to the incident. Going off-route, G-CRST loses its exemption to 157. With a pilot like PB, there would be a serious reason to do so. For some reason, he couldn't glue himself to the river and track slowly to the Heliport, when cleared. If he could, he surely would, because it's the safest route with no high obstacles. The river route must have been obscured.
An option would normally be to climb back on top. But that maybe wasn't open to him due to the height restrictions imposed by Heathrow at that part of the airspace.
He also knew that once he was west of VB, he was in Class A and exempt from the 1000ft rule. And he knew that he would be exempted from the 500ft rule once he was "landing in accordance with normal aviation practice."
The heliport's zone kisses the west edge of VB. So, once past VB, he could claim he was on approach to Battersea once he had the clearance.
He may also had to revert to his heli routes chart. Someone like PB would have this memorised - but when the vis drops, that chart is very useful. Except that the current version doesn't show the 770ft St Georges obstruction. And, if you missed the NOTAM,.......
Last edited by JimBall; 26th Jan 2013 at 13:33.
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Crab:
I can see how he could have been on either when in City CTR (Class D), but it had to have been a SVFR clearance inside London CTR - it's Class A. I agree, however, that the phraseology used between the two parties is not clear in this regard.
JimBall:
My point exactly. And the reason for the deviation in the route is the elephant in the room.
It is never clear whether he is on a VFR clearance
JimBall:
Look at the contorted route from Westminster to the incident. Going off-route, G-CRST loses its exemption to 157. With a pilot like PB, there would be a serious reason to do so. For some reason, he couldn't glue himself to the river and track slowly to the Heliport, when cleared. If he could, he surely would, because it's the safest route with no high obstacles. The river route must have been obscured.
Last edited by sarboy w****r; 26th Jan 2013 at 14:00.
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In conditions like this I've been naughty in the past(20 years ago). Gone up 150ft in to the restricted airspace on the basis that there would be nothing to hit up there but lot's to hit downstairs. I could have explained the incursion if needs be by wrong altimeter setting
Let's face it an incursion of a few hundred feet will not bring Heathrow traffic falling over London.
Let's face it an incursion of a few hundred feet will not bring Heathrow traffic falling over London.
Cook Book Pilots see Rules as being etched in Stone and are quite happy to assess all sorts of blame to any straying from them no matter the reason or extent.....unfortunately. The good news is Cook Bookers...generally sort themselves out in dramatic ways all the time slapping themselves on their own back prior to hitting the ground at steep angles and high speeds.
In the current case.....ATC did not seem to object to what was going on even if they were watching.
No Harm....no Foul....just like in sports play is it not?
In the current case.....ATC did not seem to object to what was going on even if they were watching.
No Harm....no Foul....just like in sports play is it not?
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Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement.
- the VHF freq change was the most probable 'distraction' perhaps.
Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement.
At 07:55, 4mins before being told to contact Battersea, The question was asked, "Is Battersea open do you know?"
That would suggest to me that at 07:55, 122.9 wasn't dialled up as Battersea wasn't yet a cleared destination. Was the freq dialled up in anticipation that Battersea was open and would accept? Who knows.
Perhaps, as this was so 'routine' it would be expected that the frequency would already be dialled up, perhaps when the frequency change took place, it was seen that 122.9 wasn't dialled up already....after all, every other time before going into Battersea, it would have been.
I think I'm fairly proficient on the 430 and given the scenario of, acknowledging freq change, (start clock) flipping freqs over, flipping them back, dialling up 122.9 then flipping over again, took 8 seconds. (Not re-flipping would drop a second)
I don't know the 109 so won't know where the radio would be positioned, but if it was out of line of sight, the dialled up freqs might not be so in your face given the scenario. Also, when do the wheels get lowered?
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ATC would need to be asked why there was no objection at the time, but one reason why perhaps they did not say anything at the time was because they knew the weather to be poor and the pilot to be working hard and simply chose not to highlight the point until a later stage. Why put undue pressure on a pilot in poor weather, who has just effectively asked for a weather div and who is manoeuvring at low level to position for finals?
Furthermore, rules are there for a reason. Sometimes rules need to be broken, I agree entirely. But that is in emergencies, not because "we need to get the job done." If the rules don't allow you to get the job done, then you need to question the rules or question what it is that you are trying to achieve. That's not Cook Book Piloting, it's simply being professional. Maybe you didn't intend for it to come across the way I have read it, but "no harm, no foul" is pretty cavalier, wouldn't you say?
I know of professional pilots who have done what this pilot appears to have done, i.e. push the weather limits inside London CTR. I don't like to admit it, but I have been one of them. In fact, the circumstantial evidence is that G-CRST was probably being flown like that. "No harm, no foul" flying, getting the job done. All very professional, non-Cook Book Piloting.
Right up to the point that the aircraft flew into an obstacle and killed someone who was just going about his business, walking to work.
YOP:
Or admitting at Lambeth Bridge that today is not your day, climb back up in the gap in which you're descending until VMC on top again and head south, RTB Redhill.
Furthermore, rules are there for a reason. Sometimes rules need to be broken, I agree entirely. But that is in emergencies, not because "we need to get the job done." If the rules don't allow you to get the job done, then you need to question the rules or question what it is that you are trying to achieve. That's not Cook Book Piloting, it's simply being professional. Maybe you didn't intend for it to come across the way I have read it, but "no harm, no foul" is pretty cavalier, wouldn't you say?
I know of professional pilots who have done what this pilot appears to have done, i.e. push the weather limits inside London CTR. I don't like to admit it, but I have been one of them. In fact, the circumstantial evidence is that G-CRST was probably being flown like that. "No harm, no foul" flying, getting the job done. All very professional, non-Cook Book Piloting.
Right up to the point that the aircraft flew into an obstacle and killed someone who was just going about his business, walking to work.
YOP:
Of course the elephant in the room question is did pride stop him declaring an emergency and being recovered by clearance from Heathrow?
Sarboy.....sounds like you have a hidden agenda that is beginning to show itself. Care to come clean and tell us exactly what you are trying to achieve here?
You continue to make assumptions and then make pronouncements based upon the assumptions.
You continue to make assumptions and then make pronouncements based upon the assumptions.
Last edited by SASless; 26th Jan 2013 at 17:23.
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YOP - very unlikely. There seems to have been a presumption by many that the whole of the south east of the UK was subject to fog or low cloud at the time of the accident, and that a major airport ILS let down was the only safe option available to PB. This is wrong. Some of the southeast - within 30 miles of London - had no fog at all with clear blue skys. G-CRST had enough fuel to fly over 200 miles. I do not believe PB would have had any major concerns as to how he was going to be able to safely land somewhere. His predicament did not constitute an emergency.
Particularly with fog, it is very easy to assume the few METARS that are available before 09.00 represent the widespread picture. It can be better - or indeed worse - within a short distance, with hill tops often being clear too.
Particularly with fog, it is very easy to assume the few METARS that are available before 09.00 represent the widespread picture. It can be better - or indeed worse - within a short distance, with hill tops often being clear too.
Last edited by rotorspeed; 26th Jan 2013 at 18:08.
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No hidden agenda. I really liked PB, although I only met him a couple of times in passing.
I just think that all of the initial evidence released by the AAIB seems to indicate that he probably got it wrong and got caught out by the weather - and all the holes lined up just when he ran out of options.
G-CRST should not have gone past Lambeth Bridge. A lot of evidence points to the fact that perhaps he shouldn't have even taken off. Whether it was one single issue that caused the accident or several in combination is largely irrelevant. This is the first recorded helicopter fatality in London. It's just important that those of us that operate over London ask ourselves whether our current practices resemble this incident - we don't need another.
I just think that all of the initial evidence released by the AAIB seems to indicate that he probably got it wrong and got caught out by the weather - and all the holes lined up just when he ran out of options.
G-CRST should not have gone past Lambeth Bridge. A lot of evidence points to the fact that perhaps he shouldn't have even taken off. Whether it was one single issue that caused the accident or several in combination is largely irrelevant. This is the first recorded helicopter fatality in London. It's just important that those of us that operate over London ask ourselves whether our current practices resemble this incident - we don't need another.
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I have to agree completely with Sarboy. His posts have been objective throughout and based on what looks to me to be a complete understanding of the exact rules of flying in and around the lanes and normal behaviour there. He has just applied logic to that knowledge and the reported facts to reach the obvious conclusion. I cannot see how any assessment of the last 5 minutes of the flight as described in the AAIB report can lead you to any other interpretation (although am open to seeing suggestions). PB was just too experienced for it to be anything other than pushing the weather too far given the facts stated. If he had any sort of visibility/situational awareness how would it have happened?
I flew down the lanes through London for the first time since the accident today and considered again the routes and heights as I was flying it. One thing that really struck me was just how low 770ft is in relation to that part of town. I am usually 1500+ through that section and even that is not far away from a number of the taller buildings dotted around. The thought of hitting that crane sent a cold chill through me as I considered it from above.
I flew down the lanes through London for the first time since the accident today and considered again the routes and heights as I was flying it. One thing that really struck me was just how low 770ft is in relation to that part of town. I am usually 1500+ through that section and even that is not far away from a number of the taller buildings dotted around. The thought of hitting that crane sent a cold chill through me as I considered it from above.
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The following link remains active at the time of this post.
1997 Agusta 109E Power (G-CRST)
Perhaps it will be removed some time soon. I am surprised it is still there.
The i/p layout of G-CRST is depicted. The Avionics spec shows the following fit
* Bendix King KMD 150 MFD
* Collins ADF 60
* Collins DME 42
* Collins VHF 22A x 1
* Collins VIR 32 x 1
* Garmin GMA 340 Intercom
* Garmin GNS 430 x 1 VHF/NAV
* Garmin GTX 330 Mode S TPDR
* Please note avionic equipment fit subject to confirmation and survey
* Skywatch 497 TAS
* Sperry Helicas II Flight Director
* Sperry Rad Alt RT300
The pdf file states Information correct as at 03/01/2013.
1997 Agusta 109E Power (G-CRST)
Perhaps it will be removed some time soon. I am surprised it is still there.
The i/p layout of G-CRST is depicted. The Avionics spec shows the following fit
* Bendix King KMD 150 MFD
* Collins ADF 60
* Collins DME 42
* Collins VHF 22A x 1
* Collins VIR 32 x 1
* Garmin GMA 340 Intercom
* Garmin GNS 430 x 1 VHF/NAV
* Garmin GTX 330 Mode S TPDR
* Please note avionic equipment fit subject to confirmation and survey
* Skywatch 497 TAS
* Sperry Helicas II Flight Director
* Sperry Rad Alt RT300
The pdf file states Information correct as at 03/01/2013.
Setting the scene
I have been keeping occasional tabs on this thread so I apologise if this has been covered already.
I did not know PB but my initial thoughts after the incident was that his luck run out that day. He made a decision, maybe a 50/50 but unfortunately he chose the wrong one. It happens to all of us numerous times but that fateful day was not going to be his best, however, now that the initial AAIB report is out I think a little different.
Firstly the text "I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to" says a lot to me. Maybe it does not really mean much to many but to me it sets the tone.
Secondly texting when in the phase of flight that he was in my opinion is not my common practice. Some say that this was NOT detrimental to the outcome but I disagree. In the area that he was and the issues he was having texting is yet another unnecessary distraction. For those who are familiar with being in IMC or bad weather low level with obstacles around that are going to hurt if you hit them it's not a nice place and requires the utmost concentration to remain as safe as possible. Distractions are not welcome in those instances.
I have text when flying but cannot remember doing it in a crucial phase of flight but I will remember this incident and be careful when I text if I do at all.
Nothing can be done now to turn the clock back and prevent this terrible accident from happening and I hope all the family and friends of the two victims can find salvation somewhere soon.
All pilots can no doubt learn from this, I know I have.
What may be frightening is the number of us who have been or could have been in the exact same position and got away with it.
Now these are MY opinions and thoughts and are in no way there to represent others.
RIP PB.
I did not know PB but my initial thoughts after the incident was that his luck run out that day. He made a decision, maybe a 50/50 but unfortunately he chose the wrong one. It happens to all of us numerous times but that fateful day was not going to be his best, however, now that the initial AAIB report is out I think a little different.
Firstly the text "I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to" says a lot to me. Maybe it does not really mean much to many but to me it sets the tone.
Secondly texting when in the phase of flight that he was in my opinion is not my common practice. Some say that this was NOT detrimental to the outcome but I disagree. In the area that he was and the issues he was having texting is yet another unnecessary distraction. For those who are familiar with being in IMC or bad weather low level with obstacles around that are going to hurt if you hit them it's not a nice place and requires the utmost concentration to remain as safe as possible. Distractions are not welcome in those instances.
I have text when flying but cannot remember doing it in a crucial phase of flight but I will remember this incident and be careful when I text if I do at all.
Nothing can be done now to turn the clock back and prevent this terrible accident from happening and I hope all the family and friends of the two victims can find salvation somewhere soon.
All pilots can no doubt learn from this, I know I have.
What may be frightening is the number of us who have been or could have been in the exact same position and got away with it.
Now these are MY opinions and thoughts and are in no way there to represent others.
RIP PB.
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Jeepys;
Sadly the "land in a field" bit was a classic Barnseism. PB knew the customer well, and I suspect that one of the reasons the customer enjoyed flying with him was a rather loud, joyous and ironic sense of humour.
I strongly doubt there was any intention to do any such thing and I believe that may be backed up by the fact he didn't go below 1000' at Elstree. Knowing the man as well as I did it was the sort of remark he would make in fun. A classic reminder to all of us that whatever we do, it will all be found out in the sweep-up when we aren't there to answer the questions.
SND
Sadly the "land in a field" bit was a classic Barnseism. PB knew the customer well, and I suspect that one of the reasons the customer enjoyed flying with him was a rather loud, joyous and ironic sense of humour.
I strongly doubt there was any intention to do any such thing and I believe that may be backed up by the fact he didn't go below 1000' at Elstree. Knowing the man as well as I did it was the sort of remark he would make in fun. A classic reminder to all of us that whatever we do, it will all be found out in the sweep-up when we aren't there to answer the questions.
SND
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readgeoff
Maybe so, but it could be said that although he may well have said it in jest at the time, maybe to lighten the atmosphere and to assure the client, the fact that he said "I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to" appears to me that he realised that landing in a field was very much a possibility as a last resort to make the pick up.
The reason we say things but don't carry our words out, is because circumstances turn out where we don't have to do what we earlier said.
Are you saying that if he got over Elstree (as he did), binned it due to the cloud cover (as he did), but when turning back southbound saw a field through a gap in the cloud, he wouldn't have considered going for a field close to Elstree to pick up the client? I would suggest that the field option was always in his head
I'm just thinking that from being VMC on top and enquiring if Battersea was open, it's very interesting that the very next call after being told it was open was “I can actually see Vauxhall, If I could maybe head down to H3... H4 sorry”
Given where he was when this call took place, are you really telling us that the 'landing in a field' in a rural area scenario, was never an option that morning?
Going back to ST's earlier post of;
"Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement."
Wouldn't knowing which route you are on also be a routine and mandatory requirement?
Sir Niall makes a very good point. There are many things we say in jest that we would never actually do in reality. This could well be one of them.
The reason we say things but don't carry our words out, is because circumstances turn out where we don't have to do what we earlier said.
Are you saying that if he got over Elstree (as he did), binned it due to the cloud cover (as he did), but when turning back southbound saw a field through a gap in the cloud, he wouldn't have considered going for a field close to Elstree to pick up the client? I would suggest that the field option was always in his head
I'm just thinking that from being VMC on top and enquiring if Battersea was open, it's very interesting that the very next call after being told it was open was “I can actually see Vauxhall, If I could maybe head down to H3... H4 sorry”
Given where he was when this call took place, are you really telling us that the 'landing in a field' in a rural area scenario, was never an option that morning?
Going back to ST's earlier post of;
"Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement."
Wouldn't knowing which route you are on also be a routine and mandatory requirement?