Helicopter - v - crane LONDON

[Pittsextra]

Jed - yeah but then why identify the Witness A and Operator as different entities?

But its amazing that the only one that seems to say "are you sure?" is the client!!

[mark one eyeball]

So many strange things going on with this short flight
I agree with previous post no pressure to get into the air "chill pill" good way of putting it and yes that might have been the beginning of the Swiss cheese scenario
Weather around London poor, single pilot operation over central London
Texting using mobile phone from the helicopter in flight, that's a new one for me is that allowed? I know a train driver being dismissed for that kind of thing
Special VFR clearances around London seem too open ended recipe for future incidents
Holding close to a large building in poor visibility
Wow!
I think The CAA has a lot to consider here for future helicopter flights over London

[zkdli]

With regard to VFR and SVFR. The determination of whether a pilot can comply with the minima for operation in VMC lies with the pilot. There are specific limits applied for aircraft operating in a control zone VFR or SVFR inbound or outbound from an airfield.

However when transiting a control zone, in general the requirement for a helicopter operating in class "D" airspace below 3,000ft amsl, the pilot must operate in sight of the surface and with a minimum inflight visibility of 1,500m. It lies with the pilot to determine if he has that flight visbility. Regarding the in sight of the surface point, I believe that all METARS in the area the the pilot was flying reported a broken cloud base. Given that broken is anything from 5 oktas to 7 oktas, it is possible that the pilot could see the surface even when he was "good VMC" on top - the pilot never said it was an undercast.
More evidence on this is when the pilot reported that he could see Vauxhall bridge, at this time the pilot was in sight of the surface.
The UK AIP gives weather minima for various zones etc, one point in the Heathrow entry (EGLL AD2.2) is that to operate in the CTR on a heli route the minimum vis to do so is 1,000m.

[Hummingfrog]

SASLESS

I only flew over London once....and that was by mistake....amply pointed out to me and my Mate by serious powers that were at Redhill's upper floors. We did not know it was London....but we did know exactly what time it was when we determined where we were....and where we were not.

I think this also happened, at night, in 1940 but it wasn't in a helicopter and the pilot and nav had an interview without coffee with a big cheese in Berlin

HF

[SASless]

The determination of whether a pilot can comply with the minima for operation in VMC lies with the pilot

I agree with that statement but that avoids the question I posed.

ATC issues the Clearance based upon some reported weather minima determined NOT by the Pilot. ATC has to decide if the Controlled Airspace can be done VFR, SVFR, or IFR. When issued a VFR or SVFR Pilot....compliance with that Clearance requires the Pilot to operate within the limitations of the ATC Clearance as to route, height, and any special instructions. If the Pilot is unable to maintain VFR or SVFR he has to report that to ATC and announce his intentions/desires to include requesting an IFR clearance.

Is that how it works over London?

Or is there Uncontrolled Airspace over London that does not require an ATC clearance at all....or would not require an SVFR or IFR Clearance when weather minimum for that airspace is below VFR minima?

Is there a clear cut answer to this....that someone knowing can answer?

[Lonewolf_50]

1) poor with freezing fog and low cloud
2) very high with course and destination changes, radio and frequency changes and commercial plan changes.

I would be communicating using old fashioned radio to an ATC unit who could give me vectors and weather information not a mobile phone, until I was on the ground and safe.

Based on the evidence to date, that is what he was doing, industry insider.

Walking through the time line as I understand it, the "text" communication ceased from the cockpit about four minutes before the mishap. If you look at the radio transmissions being discussed and available, he was absolutely doing the old fashioned "work with ATC" drill that all of us are familiar with ... using a radio.

Why was he talking to them? To see if he can get into a helioport or not, or if he has to adapt another course of action. (Some are suggesting that RTB is what he had chose when the helo and crane tried to occupy the same space).

Unless further information is available, I find the issue of "texting" to be a red herring.

Four minutes at 60-70 knots is how far? Four miles, and more, depends on winds.

Anyway, I am out of this thread, sorry to have intruded.

[Stevie B]

Notam

Friend of mine has just pointed out the Lat/Long of the crane that was published in the Notam. Not sure how accurate Google Earth is, but 5129N 00007W seems to be about half a mile to the East, just on the Western edge of The Oval cricket ground.....I could be mistaken.

Mind you, the Notam does say "Within 1nm of" the above position...

[AnFI]

Muddled

The flight was completely safe above bkn cloud in very good visibility all the way to elstree (where there were "no holes"), and the divert to redhill, which was clear, was a fine plan that would have presented no difficulty. A careful look at the txt exchange shows that it was useful and positively helpful (the best up to date information, and no distraction of any kind). It became awkward when it appeared that Battersea was "open" - OPEN is a loaded word and can be taken to mean a number of things... like perhaps the wx is ok for example. The only unread msg was saying conditions at Redhill were good and it was useful information - which nearly got through.

The heli was in very good conditions "VMC on top" of broken cloud.
There was no txt distraction during the negotiation to go to Batt - indeed only radio as an 'extra workload' including an unlucky frequency change 7seconds before collision.

I am amazed that obstacles are not lit by high intensity lighting especially in close proximity to aerodromes - yes it might have made the difference
You can't be sure he was in cloud despite it appearing so from some perspectives - and anyway clouds still have visibilty sometimes of several hundred meters - so a suitable light may have been seen especially on a boom which was implausibly far from a tall building (which may have been in sight (probably was))

I saw blue sky nearby, so his local conditions are hard to call.

This pilot was famously WRONGLY blamed before for an accident which turned out sometime later to have been a mechanical failure... so it is completely unacceptable to rule out a malfunction, or some other factor, of some kind in this case.

[zkdli]

SASLESS
From the report - The pilot was given a clearance through controlled airspace via the london eye enroute to his destination which was not in the London City or London CTR. The minima regarding aircraft inbound or outbound from an airfield in the zone therefore did not apply. He was give a choice between VFR or Special VFR - this allowed the pilot to comply with either criteria. He was given a maximum altitude to fly in the zone.
You can see from all CAA publications and the AAIB report that the route was in CAS and a clearance was given. It is the responsibility of the pilot to advise if he cannot comply with the clearance and relevent parts of rule 5. The report also shows that the controller asked the pilot if he wanted an IFR clearance - the pilot declined this opportunity and said the he was VMC" on top" - given the weather reports, this did not necessarily mean that he was not complying with the VFR.

[readgeoff]

@NorthSouth. I am not suggesting the client is to blame for commercial pressure in this incident. Indeed as pointed out the client was suggesting not to take off from Redhill in the first place.... Twice.

By commercial pressure I mean in the mind of Mr Barnes for whatever reason real or imagined. Several radio messages and texts look to me to show a pressure to perform or at least be seen to try his best "at least we tried" "just put it down in a field if I have to" etc.

That ultimately looks to have led to Mr Barnes chosing to try to get to Battersea at his clients suggestion descending from a safe VMC position above the tops in an IFR machine into poorer weather below above central London.

As others have said and is so often the case this report has many alarm bells ringing throughout the chain of events.

[Helinut]

SASless,

There are 2 Control Zones that cover the area of (Centralish) London:

The London Control Zone and the City Zone.

The former is Class A airspace and the latter is Class D. It is not clear to me at all times during the flight which of these 2 zones the helicopter was in: sometimes it would not be in either zone. [In the areas in the vicinity of Redhill and Elstree the helicopter would be in uncontrolled airspace below the London Terminal Manouevring Area (which starts at 2500ft)] Vauxhall Bridge and St George's Wharf are fairly close to the boundary between the 2 zones. My recollection (no chart to hand) is that they are both just in the Class D City Zone.

In Class A airspace IFR is the norm. VFR is not permitted and non IFR traffic may be permitted SVFR.
In Class D VFR and IFR are permitted, although non-IFR traffic may have to be SVFR in some circumstances.

The flight rules not only affect the visibility and weather limits but also the low flying rules that apply. For example, when under SVFR an aircraft is exempt from the 1,000 ft rule, but not when VFR.

[Pittsextra]

Given this:-

0640
Pilot
Operator
Freezing fog all london airports ok up north have text [client] clearing between 8 - 10

0705
Witness A
Pilot
Give me a call as I have checked weather and freezing fog around at the moment

What does the limitations section say about icing for a 109E?

[AnFI]

Pitts - misconstrued..

There is no indication that he flew in any icing conditions - not a factor.

[JimBall]

Maybe some silence, pending the final AAIB report?

They have so many things to consider with this flight. Its return journey to London from the aborted Elstree landing went straight into Class D. To remain legal off-routes, G-CRST would have to consider the 1000ft rule and the impact of EGR 157. (Note - the northbound track shows an awareness of 157, kinking left for Brent.)

Looking at the detailed track from Westminster (157), it seems he may have been forced lower as he tried to avoid 157. Given his experience, this could mean that he was in cloud from after leaving Westminster Bridge, heading west.

These so-called secure areas of 157, 158, 159 don't do the job they should. And may cause problems for low level traffic.

But that's it from me on this.

Too sad.

[Pittsextra]

Really??? you're kidding... AAIB:-

At 0720 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 3,100 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C and QNH was 1010 hPa.
At 0738 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 1,300 m, the temperature was -6° C, the dew point was -6° C and QNH was 1010 hPa.
At 0804 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 5,000 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C and QNH was 1011 hPa.


Much of the area was prone to widespread low cloud, poor visibility and patches of freezing fog. Cloud bases were in the range of 100 ft to 400 ft agl at 0800 hrs. Visibility was generally below 4,000 m, with several areas of London, including London City Airport, reporting freezing fog with visibility of approximately 700 m.

Visibility at nearby airports (London Heathrow, London City and Royal Air Force Northolt) was generally less than 4,000 m at 0800 hrs, and as low as 700 m at London City Airport. Freezing fog was forecast for Redhill and Elstree Aerodromes, and at London Heliport until 1000 hrs.

[OvertHawk]

I have many thoughts on this, but the one that appears not have have been mentioned thus far is - "The Passenger reported that he twice told the pilot that the weather at Elstree was bad and recommended that he should not take off"

Call me a cynic, but he would say that wouldn't he? We've only got his word for that and he's hardly likely to turn round and say "oh yeah - i told him there were some holes around Elstree and really encouraged him to try" is he?

Whilst the texts are a matter of record, the contents of phone calls are not.

[jimf671]

Friend of mine has just pointed out the Lat/Long of the crane that was published in the Notam. Not sure how accurate Google Earth is, but 5129N 00007W seems to be about half a mile to the East, just on the Western edge of The Oval cricket ground.....I could be mistaken.

Mind you, the Notam does say "Within 1nm of" the above position...

Yes. Using notamdecoder.com that position, from the Q line, resolves to the grounds of Ibberton House which is most of the way to the Clapham Road and 800m from the crane (over 3000' from centre of river?).

However, as you point out, the NOTAM states WI 1NM, and this is reflected in the 2nm diameter circle displayed for this notice on notaminfo.com.

Two interesting small discrepancies emerge though.
1. The notaminfo.com map displays the location at a more accurate position within 150m of the crane and a similar distance from the river.
2. The NOTAM E line shows seconds figures in the position information and resolves to Pascal St outside Covent House which is 600m from the crane and the same, about 2000', from the centre of the river.


"... and offers no analysis."

[AnFI]

Pitts - yes really, surely you'll agree?

"3,100 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C" - is not icing conditions.

Most of his flight was in crystal blue bone dry air, with a shallow presence of colder moister air below him - but no indication of flying IN icing conditions - it might be a red herring.

Just because FZFG is present at some locations does not mean he was in it.

[Pittsextra]

AnFi - with the addition of this:-

"Much of the area was prone to widespread low cloud, poor visibility and patches of freezing fog. Cloud bases were in the range of 100 ft to 400 ft agl at 0800 hrs."

I don't think you can say with certainty that there was no possibility of meeting icing.

Of course you can say just because the met briefing says XYZ doesn't mean you are in it, so from that I agree, but I don't plan my flight with the mindset "what the hell I'll have a go and stick it in a field"...

If thats how we are going to advocate we go flying its not for me.

[NorthSouth]

zkdli:

The pilot was given a clearance through controlled airspace via the london eye enroute to his destination which was not in the London City or London CTR. The minima regarding aircraft inbound or outbound from an airfield in the zone therefore did not apply. He was give a choice between VFR or Special VFR - this allowed the pilot to comply with either criteria. He was given a maximum altitude to fly in the zone.

Elstree to the London Eye goes through the London CTR and R157 - the Eye is inside R157. A clearance into the London CTR cannot be VFR, it can only be SVFR or IFR. And the report says "At 0755 hrs, G-CRST was put under radar control as it entered the London CTR." So there is surely a question of what kind of clearance was offered and how that might have affected the conduct of the flight.

readgeoff, re the decision to go to Redhill, NB that AFTER his client told him Battersea was open, the pilot texted his operator asking if Redhill was still clear, but the AAIB notes that the reply "Yes it’s fine still here" "was not read". So the pilot had no confirmation of conditions at Redhill, but had some inkling that Battersea might be possible. So I can't see that it necessarily indicates any kind of commercial pressure mindset. Couldn't it equally have been the client showing concern for the pilot, knowing he had taken off despite the client's advice, and trying to do his best to find somewhere for him to divert safely? He went to the trouble of phoning Battersea - apparently unprompted.
NS