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AW139 Accident rate discussion

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AW139 Accident rate discussion

Old 30th Aug 2011, 22:02
  #101 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Teefor Gage
What ever happened to all those comments from Shell Management? Has he been moderated? I wonder if the real Shell Management would agree with many of his comments in other areas of Rotorheads?
Sorry for the thread creep, but couldn'r resist it!
Shell Management has chosen to delete a number of his posts on this and on other threads. Since many of his posts are preserved as quotes in posts made in reply to his comments, his deletions are somewhat superfluous
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Old 31st Aug 2011, 08:16
  #102 (permalink)  
 
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AW 139 Accident Resources

Following the receipt of further information surrounding Qatar 1 and 2, the comments associated with both of these accidents have now been amended.

Regarding Qatar 1 Gulf Helicopters appear to be abrogating any responsibility in respect of their response to the event stating that AW carried-out all the work to the tailboom (repair and inspection). Commentators are however questioning the extent of the inspection as well as some of the procedures (relating to flight operations) prior to the aircraft being grounded. One member of PPRuNe mailed me to say that the tail-collapse occurred while trying to initiate taxi with the parking brake on and there are other comments besides.

In respect of Qatar 2 I cannot make any headway. I have received several PM's from people 'in the know' claiming (categorically) that a 'locking tool' of some description had been left attached to the tail rotor, a claim that Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies.

In such circumstances all one can do is hope that the investigating authorities are competent, thorough and impartial so that the industry may discover the truth.

Herewith then is the latest instalment of the table now reflecting the above-mentioned discoveries:

Issue No. 3




Notes:

1. This table is not intended to substitute official findings relating to AW139 accidents. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of the AW139’s accident history.

2. Columns ‘e’, ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with assistance from members belonging to PPRuNe’s Rotorheads community and are a product of recommendations and suggestions tendered by those claiming knowledge of the subject matter.

3. This table seeks to neither endorse nor criticise the AW139 product, but to communicate as effectively as possible the most basic known details surrounding AW139 accidents.

4. Accident No. 2 (A7-GHC) [Qatar 1]: The available information (via members of PPRuNe) indicates that a) A flight deck incident involving lack of familiarisation with the aircraft’s autopilot resulted in a landing with tail strike. b) The aircraft apparently continued to operate after the tail strike despite opposition from one member of the flight crew. c) The aircraft was then grounded for 10 days during which time (according to an unofficial spokesman for Gulf Helicopters) AW carried-out the necessary repairs. d) There are doubts (in the minds of some) regarding the extent of the repair carried-out on the tailboom with some indicating that no “deep” inspection occurred. e) Gulf Helicopters say: “No damage was evident on the tailboom structure as inspected by both Gulf Helicopters & AgustaWestland representatives, all above board and correctly handled, just that no one could see or detect the fact that the composite honeycomb core had in fact sheared internally down the centre thereby not showing up by delamination 'Tap testing' or NDT.” As a result of these comments the accident has been attributed to both structural and human failure.

5. Accident No. 6 (A7-GHA) [Qatar 2]: Conflicting reports dominate this incident. There are accusations that a “tool” or “locks” were not removed from the tail rotor and which resulted in a blade shear. Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies this stating that it is a “good theory” but “not true”. The complete contrast in statements between Gulf Helicopters and external parties has meant that this accident has now reverted to ‘Under Investigation’ status.

AW139 Accident Threads on PPRuNe and Official Publications:

1. UAE 2 JUN 2008

2. QATAR 25 AUG 2009

3. SPAIN 21 JAN 2010 / INTERIM STATEMENT

4. HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010 / INTERIM STATEMENT

5. SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011

6. QATAR 2 MAY 2011

7. MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011

8. CHINA 17 AUG 2011

9. BRASIL 19 AUG 2011

Accident Photos (TRB's):


'Qatar 2' 2 May 2011


Brasil 19 AUG 2011
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Old 31st Aug 2011, 10:05
  #103 (permalink)  
 
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Thank you for your work Savoia.

You can add the Priliminary report on Brazilian accident added by patatas on http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/461...ml#post6671873

http://www.abraphe.org.br/wp-content...A7a-de-Voo.pdf
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Old 31st Aug 2011, 11:07
  #104 (permalink)  
 
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was probably mechanic error (a failure to remove some type of lock prior to start-up)

Where-you-get-your-information-that-was probably mechanic error (a failure to remove some type of lock prior to start-up).
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Old 31st Aug 2011, 20:49
  #105 (permalink)  
 
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AW 139 more news and informations

Dear all pilots AW139,
since 4 years i am flying the 139 we had several problem with this great machine tail vibrations even when i grounded this AIRCRAFT but the operator did not take seriousely this problem until know this machine has a orgonomy cockpit and tail problem.for the orgonomy cockpit the way how the sas realyse botton is located on the syclique is wrong and specialy by night flight if you press the botton sas realyse the AUTOPILOT 1 -2 will desangage and you will lose the motion how to activate the attitude mode so the pilots will lose the flight motion with unstable flight by night specialy dangerous for No IFR experianced pilots for the seconde problem is the tail rotor vibrations problem AGUSTAWESTLAND should dont lie to the oparators.
THanks a lot and god bless all pilots.
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Old 1st Sep 2011, 09:04
  #106 (permalink)  
 
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I take it that you pressed the SAS release button during a night flight and scared yourself? Well we all make mistakes and I am sure you won't do it again. Instructors can only teach so much and it is up to professional pilots to read the RFM and understand the location and function of switches and buttons and which ones not to play with (normally red ones).

I am amazed at the amount of AW139 pilots I see who will happily correct AP problems in flight at 150 kts by de-selecting and re-engaging AP's 1 and 2 with no verification and little thought to the consequences.

Next time you are in the sim ask the instructor to fail both AP's when you are flying at 150kts (preferably in IMC). You will have much more respect for those little buttons after that I guarantee.
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Old 1st Sep 2011, 12:03
  #107 (permalink)  
 
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Code:
Originally Posted by Savoia
Regarding Qatar 1 Gulf Helicopters appear to be abrogating any responsibility in respect of their response to the event stating that AW carried-out all the work to the tailboom (repair and inspection). Commentators are however questioning the extent of the inspection as well as some of the procedures (relating to flight operations) prior to the aircraft being grounded. One member of PPRuNe mailed me to say that the tail-collapse occurred while trying to initiate taxi with the parking brake on and there are other comments besides.

In respect of Qatar 2 I cannot make any headway. I have received several PM's from people 'in the know' claiming (categorically) that a 'locking tool' of some description had been left attached to the tail rotor, a claim that Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies.
Savoia,

if you looked at Note 4, QHC has taken into service 9A-GHC even after the severe tail stike occurred during operations (such condition has been not fully declared at the moment of the subsequent accident on the tarmac).

Looking at the QCAA report - confidential, not shareable but available on every Maintenance Manager desk - all the stress tests conducted with the relevant authorities representatives on a set of Tail Assy (even with major debonding modes) have provided negative results.

There is no connection between the accident and the taxiing phase, but between the energy released by the accident which has compromised the Tail Assy.

Moreover, regarding the TR Blades - it is obviously visible that the failure mode is the same, but it is not possible to demonstrate, if not during an investigative assessment, which is the root cause.
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Old 1st Sep 2011, 13:02
  #108 (permalink)  
 
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QHC has taken into service 9A-GHC
A7 not 9A
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Old 1st Sep 2011, 15:02
  #109 (permalink)  
 
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I am not flying 139 but I would like to ask if making a torque limit might take the long term stress out of the tail rotor and drive train. I see this as one consideration when mitigating tq and trgb and trb issues even if it did cost performance.

Discussion?

DD
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Old 2nd Sep 2011, 04:31
  #110 (permalink)  
 
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Its a new toy

Pt 29? The true testing starts with the first owner, Looking at the design with slab sides on both fuslage & boom you can see the design flaws. weak T/R? like the carry over of designers of other aircraft,Same people same problems.
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Old 2nd Sep 2011, 11:42
  #111 (permalink)  
 
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9Aplus,

correct, sorry, it was a typo

PO dust devil,

any evidence of torque scratches on drive train in any accident. TRDS and xGBs have other quality concerns, however in such cases HUMS comes in help in a very effective way.
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Old 2nd Sep 2011, 12:10
  #112 (permalink)  
 
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NSW Copy that, but if there's some latent weakness in the TR drive system from MGB to TR wouldn't less TQ be a reasonable limitation?

FWIW, I am not type rated - but if they were my aircraft on my operation, I would consider a local restriction to that effect notwithstanding loss of payload or performance category brag rights. Until someone came up with a definitive explanation anyway.

The silence from the manufacturer regulators and all is hurting my ears......

DD
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Old 2nd Sep 2011, 19:41
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The silence from the manufacturer regulators and all is hurting my ears.....
DD
Can I make your words mine as well??
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Old 2nd Sep 2011, 20:03
  #114 (permalink)  
 
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Feel free.....Just be aware some people don't like the way I blaspheme, use profanity and swear. I am guilty of each and worse.

DD

Last edited by PO dust devil; 2nd Sep 2011 at 20:05. Reason: removed a couple of F words I use to fill awkward gaps in conversation.
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 18:13
  #115 (permalink)  
 
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In preceding three years of flying Aw139, I have come across three events wherein the Pilot has pressed SAS release button, where as the intention was to press FD disengage/standby button.On analysis we realized that these pilots had a habit of using thumb for pressing SAS release button instead of recommended middle finger. If thumb is used as a habit, you are likely to mix up between the two buttons i.e. SAS and FD.
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 18:43
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I find that looking at which button you are pressing first helps tremendously.
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 18:55
  #117 (permalink)  
 
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Epiphany,

Don't be a smart arse, those buttons are not lit at night when the biggest f*ck up's happen and you know it. That is one of the main screw up's AW made in the cockpit.

Safe flying bro.
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 19:15
  #118 (permalink)  
 
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This must have been asked many times before but .. can't AW relocate one or both of the switches/buttons if this would (even in the smallest way) help mitigate future 'finger trouble'?

And, if AW are a little slow in applying such changes would it not be possible for individual clients to request this modification in much the same way as the Aussie defence force requested that EC install twist-grips in the Ecureuil?
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 19:34
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Savoia and Griffo

You can have it any way you want if you are prepared to pay. Cockpit ergonomics are of course a bit subjective given that one man's heaven is another's nightmare depending on what you were flying before.

Given that both the FDS/By button and the A/P OFF button (curiously misnamed) have to be close at hand it is a toss-up what to do with them. One useful modification to the A/P Off button would be to provide a tactile cue - like a very sharp spike on the top of it. Joking apart there is some food for thought there but that would probably be negated by those that insist on wearing gloves..... maybe we stick with the sharp spike idea!!

We could ask for the LNAV button to be labelled 'FMS' and the NAV button 'VOR' seeing as that's what they do and given that we have a plethora of buttons that include the word 'NAV' in them on both the Guidance Controller and the Display Controller.

All in all it does show that our beautiful beast can be improved upon. Are going to tell them or shall I? No, you had better do it.

G.

PS. Please list in your next post all the things you want to improve when the 'B' model arrives giving details of your proposed solution. No-go areas - TR ..... I think we can safely say that that is work-in-progress.
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Old 3rd Sep 2011, 19:53
  #120 (permalink)  
 
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Are going to tell them or shall I?
I suspect that my 'brothers' at Agusta are already none too pleased about my table although, to be fair, the table has showed (at least to me) the remarkable extent of the 'human error' component in 139 accidents several of which (as already mentioned) seem to have links to the autopilot and related systems.

One presumes that operators have access to AW customer feedback. Failing that it would do no harm if a number of 139 operators were to unite in voicing their concerns .. if indeed their concerns are aligned!.
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