Following the receipt of further information surrounding Qatar 1 and 2, the comments associated with both of these accidents have now been amended.
Regarding Qatar 1 Gulf Helicopters appear to be abrogating any responsibility in respect of their response to the event stating that AW carried-out all the work to the tailboom (repair and inspection). Commentators are however questioning the extent of the inspection as well as some of the procedures (relating to flight operations) prior to the aircraft being grounded. One member of PPRuNe mailed me to say that the tail-collapse occurred while trying to initiate taxi with the parking brake on and there are other comments besides.
In respect of Qatar 2 I cannot make any headway. I have received several PM's from people 'in the know' claiming (categorically) that a 'locking tool' of some description had been left attached to the tail rotor, a claim that Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies.
In such circumstances all one can do is hope that the investigating authorities are competent, thorough and impartial so that the industry may discover the truth.
Herewith then is the latest instalment of the table now reflecting the above-mentioned discoveries:
Issue No. 3
Notes:
1. This table is not intended to substitute official findings relating to AW139 accidents. It is instead a ‘quick reference’ resource for those wishing to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of the AW139’s accident history.
2. Columns ‘e’, ‘f’ and ‘g’ have been composed with assistance from members belonging to PPRuNe’s Rotorheads community and are a product of recommendations and suggestions tendered by those claiming knowledge of the subject matter.
3. This table seeks to neither endorse nor criticise the AW139 product, but to communicate as effectively as possible the most basic known details surrounding AW139 accidents.
4. Accident No. 2 (A7-GHC) [Qatar 1]: The available information (via members of PPRuNe) indicates that a) A flight deck incident involving lack of familiarisation with the aircraft’s autopilot resulted in a landing with tail strike. b) The aircraft apparently continued to operate after the tail strike despite opposition from one member of the flight crew. c) The aircraft was then grounded for 10 days during which time (according to an unofficial spokesman for Gulf Helicopters) AW carried-out the necessary repairs. d) There are doubts (in the minds of some) regarding the extent of the repair carried-out on the tailboom with some indicating that no “deep” inspection occurred. e) Gulf Helicopters say: “No damage was evident on the tailboom structure as inspected by both Gulf Helicopters & AgustaWestland representatives, all above board and correctly handled, just that no one could see or detect the fact that the composite honeycomb core had in fact sheared internally down the centre thereby not showing up by delamination 'Tap testing' or NDT.” As a result of these comments the accident has been attributed to both structural and human failure.
5. Accident No. 6 (A7-GHA) [Qatar 2]: Conflicting reports dominate this incident. There are accusations that a “tool” or “locks” were not removed from the tail rotor and which resulted in a blade shear. Gulf Helicopters emphatically denies this stating that it is a “good theory” but “not true”. The complete contrast in statements between Gulf Helicopters and external parties has meant that this accident has now reverted to ‘Under Investigation’ status.
AW139 Accident Threads on PPRuNe and Official Publications:
1.
UAE 2 JUN 2008
2.
QATAR 25 AUG 2009
3.
SPAIN 21 JAN 2010 /
INTERIM STATEMENT
4.
HONG KONG 3 JUL 2010 /
INTERIM STATEMENT
5.
SOUTH KOREA 23 FEB 2011
6.
QATAR 2 MAY 2011
7.
MALAYSIA 30 JUN 2011
8.
CHINA 17 AUG 2011
9.
BRASIL 19 AUG 2011
Accident Photos (TRB's):
'Qatar 2' 2 May 2011
Brasil 19 AUG 2011