Canada: Cormorant & Cyclone thread
Canadian Maritime Helicopter Procurement Document
“The Worst Procurement
in the History of Canada”
Solving the Maritime Helicopter Crisis
Michael Byers and Stewart Webb
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sit...%20History.pdf
in the History of Canada”
Solving the Maritime Helicopter Crisis
Michael Byers and Stewart Webb
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sit...%20History.pdf
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Some light bed time reading. Had a quick read and I'm glad that it covers some points close to my heart, no true 30 minute run dry time (despite misleading promotional material, manufacturer's claims, loop holes added by the FAA, etc), political face saving not to purchase the 101 for the second requirment (having already having had to purchased the previously cancelled 101 for ths SAR).
And the usual 'mission creep'/increasing requirements from the Canadians (typical of most countries in this business). Found it interesting that this is the likely reason that the Canadians don't stick it to Sikorsky for fear of being countersued.
Everyone's a loser, especially the service personnel that need the aricraft and the taxpayers footing the bill.
Waiting to see what happens now. Any bookies out there taking bets on this?
And the usual 'mission creep'/increasing requirements from the Canadians (typical of most countries in this business). Found it interesting that this is the likely reason that the Canadians don't stick it to Sikorsky for fear of being countersued.
Everyone's a loser, especially the service personnel that need the aricraft and the taxpayers footing the bill.
Waiting to see what happens now. Any bookies out there taking bets on this?
Now that I have had a chance to read the entire document and have had a little time to reflect on the issues outlined within, I do not see much different from similar issues that have played out on other programs around the world. ED is it mission creep that derails programs or is it just a case of the manufacturers promising more than they could possibly deliver? Over the last twenty years the helicopter industry has seen other programs with similar results. As an example, ten years after the Nordic Standard Helicopter Program decision was made some of the member countries have had to fall back on direct government procurement of off the shelf military aircraft to fill the gaps left by the standard program failures. One telling quote from this paper sums up the issue: “According to the Auditor General’s Office, the overall project risk was assessed to be “low to medium” because the Cy¬clone was considered to be non-developmental as it would be utilizing “off-the-shelf” technologies.
Transforming the S-92 into a military aircraft has turned out to be more difficult than anticipated.
Transforming the S-92 into a military aircraft has turned out to be more difficult than anticipated.
Thoughts
Have not cracked open the report yet, however two observations re recent posts:
Shawn, re PM Jean Cretin and his decision not to continue with the 101: could it have been the same reasons that the US Gov't decided similarly?
Espresso Drinker, in the list for whom we should shed a tear, could we add UTC stockholders?
Shawn, re PM Jean Cretin and his decision not to continue with the 101: could it have been the same reasons that the US Gov't decided similarly?
Espresso Drinker, in the list for whom we should shed a tear, could we add UTC stockholders?
"Light Reading "
Espresso Drinker has is right: that report is indeed light reading. Just one example: in para 8 re Lengthening Delays, it proposes that the Canadian Navy may have been caught off guard in 2012 due to the delays. Preposterous: the Canadian Gov't has had a test team of test pilots and engineers at the SA Flight Test Facility in West Palm Beach since the outset of flying, and that group has been involved in the progress of the program since the get-go.
Anyone know the provenance of the report?
Anyone know the provenance of the report?
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The true extent of the delay is now 5yrs and counting.
Why doesnt the product meet demand exactly? I observe that the original engines were underpowered but why so long in finding replacements?
Finally, why is the common theme -the DoD / government:
EH101(CH149) / F35 / CH148 are all blunders on an epic scale. The blind leading the blind here, no?
Why doesnt the product meet demand exactly? I observe that the original engines were underpowered but why so long in finding replacements?
Finally, why is the common theme -the DoD / government:
EH101(CH149) / F35 / CH148 are all blunders on an epic scale. The blind leading the blind here, no?
"The true extent of the delay is now 5yrs and counting.
Why doesn't the product meet demand exactly? I observe that the original engines were underpowered but why so long in finding replacements? (Why any need to, calculations \ weights incorrect
)
Finally, why is the common theme -the DoD / government:
EH101(CH149) / F35 / CH148 are all blunders on an epic scale. The blind leading the blind here, no?
"
TC
I think you are being to kind
Why doesn't the product meet demand exactly? I observe that the original engines were underpowered but why so long in finding replacements? (Why any need to, calculations \ weights incorrect
)Finally, why is the common theme -the DoD / government:
EH101(CH149) / F35 / CH148 are all blunders on an epic scale. The blind leading the blind here, no?
"TC
I think you are being to kind
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To answer some of the questions posed to me, especially John's, I understand that the US (Navair) wanted so many changes to the initial specification of the US101 presidential aircraft that the cost just rocketed. My favorite examples, 'the airstair door opening is too low, we don't want the president to have to stoop as he exits the aircraft, we want a higher door' (not a cheap and easy job to modify the aircraft structure to accomodate a bigger door), 'the downwash from the rotors is too powerful and could damage the turf of the White House Lawn, we want you to redesign the rotor blades (again not cheap and easy and would have resulted in longer blades necessitating a lengthening of the tail boom). Multiply these and 100's more minor mods and I think that you might get the idea.
Jack, no one is blameless in this game, but even to start with the customer's performance requirements/spec are pushing the bounderies of the available aircraft (from all the manufacturers), especially naval/ASW aircraft full of fancy 'stuff'. Then when they start asking for changes when you thought that they were happy the original aircraft spec then things get difficult, especially the weight.
I guess it's a bit like agreeing a price on a new standard model car and shaking hands on it, for the customer to say just before he takes delivery that actually he wants built in Sat. Nav./GPS, metallic paint and alloys wheels.
Henry Ford had the right idea, any colour (color) as long as it's black.
Jack, no one is blameless in this game, but even to start with the customer's performance requirements/spec are pushing the bounderies of the available aircraft (from all the manufacturers), especially naval/ASW aircraft full of fancy 'stuff'. Then when they start asking for changes when you thought that they were happy the original aircraft spec then things get difficult, especially the weight.
I guess it's a bit like agreeing a price on a new standard model car and shaking hands on it, for the customer to say just before he takes delivery that actually he wants built in Sat. Nav./GPS, metallic paint and alloys wheels.
Henry Ford had the right idea, any colour (color) as long as it's black.
A post from nearly a year back that seems worth repeating
The COTS dogma is an abject failure, when attempting to use a civilian-designed and certified helicopter.
In each and every case, requirement creep catches up to the machine. This causes schedule delays, performance hits, and budget overruns.
S92 - CH148 : 4 years late now, millions over budget, and still no completed IDMGB or mission system package
VH71 - AW101 : Billions over budget thanks to insane requirement changes midway though the design process
CSARX, VXX : All axed due to inflated costs in the face of progressively tighter budgets
EC145 - UH72 : One of the few touted "success stories", but this is because this machine was not very militarized and its mission is designed almost exactly the same as its civil counterpart (quite a rarity). That said, even this helicopter had some fairly major issues with its new avionics overheating, which required the addition of some fairly ungainly cooling equipment cutting into its capacity.
The idea that taking a COTS machine and "cheaply" obtaining your military helicopter is deeply flawed and this has been proven over recent history. The customer always realizes (after the contract award) just how much of a compromise it is to be constrained to the COTS product performance, and then tries to redesign it to such an extent that the process breaks down.
In each and every case, requirement creep catches up to the machine. This causes schedule delays, performance hits, and budget overruns.
S92 - CH148 : 4 years late now, millions over budget, and still no completed IDMGB or mission system package
VH71 - AW101 : Billions over budget thanks to insane requirement changes midway though the design process
CSARX, VXX : All axed due to inflated costs in the face of progressively tighter budgets
EC145 - UH72 : One of the few touted "success stories", but this is because this machine was not very militarized and its mission is designed almost exactly the same as its civil counterpart (quite a rarity). That said, even this helicopter had some fairly major issues with its new avionics overheating, which required the addition of some fairly ungainly cooling equipment cutting into its capacity.
The idea that taking a COTS machine and "cheaply" obtaining your military helicopter is deeply flawed and this has been proven over recent history. The customer always realizes (after the contract award) just how much of a compromise it is to be constrained to the COTS product performance, and then tries to redesign it to such an extent that the process breaks down.
If you turn back the clock a little more than 50 years, one would find that most of our helicopter fleet was derived from civil certified machines. This was in part due to the US Army’s lack of having any formal aircraft evaluation system in place. I don’t believe that the US Army’s AVSCOM included helicopter procurement until around 1964. Until 1964 any aircraft that vied for US Army procurement had to be civil certified. The UH-1, CH-47 and UH-3A were all civil certified machines. The kicker back then was that only straight forward modifications (armor, armament & specific communications equipment) were required to field the machines. The same can be said of the recent fielding of the UH-72. COTS is a viable solution for some of the more straight forward missions. No one can argue that the S-92 is very capable SAR aircraft that has been proven operationally around the world. There is a significant leap when one attempts to insert any civil certified airframe into the very demanding world of military ASW or CSAR missions. The cost of participation increases dramatically.
Last edited by Jack Carson; 12th Feb 2013 at 20:19.
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Annoyingly one could easily replace "Canada" with "Germany" or any other european country currently trying to resolve the aging helicopter fleet issue.
So it´s not just Sikorsky who mess it up, Eurocopter is just as bad, maybe even worse.
Billions of Dollars and Euros being wasted due to incompetency and ignorance.
Tom
So it´s not just Sikorsky who mess it up, Eurocopter is just as bad, maybe even worse.
Billions of Dollars and Euros being wasted due to incompetency and ignorance.
Tom
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Jack:
Are you pointing at the Australian or Kiwi side of this?
Royal Australian Navy went for a new version (digital AFCS, new tactical nav/attack system) and ended up not getting anything.
Royal New Zealand Navy bought the older, steam driven version and seem to be happy with that after nearly 15 years...
Are you pointing at the Australian or Kiwi side of this?
Royal Australian Navy went for a new version (digital AFCS, new tactical nav/attack system) and ended up not getting anything.
Royal New Zealand Navy bought the older, steam driven version and seem to be happy with that after nearly 15 years...
Shawn,
I was looking more toward the process than the aircraft. The procurement process has morphed into a monster that generates multi-thousand page detailed Request For Proposals (RFPs) requiring overwhelming levels of detail and technical data. Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson describes this evolution quite succinctly in his biography, Kelly - More than My Share of it All, when comparing the development processes for the C-130A and the C-5A. In his book he describes how a C-130 was required to transport the company’s response to the C-5 RFP while the C-130 response fit in a single loose leaf type binder. In retrospect, how much less costly would it have been for New Zealand to procure SH-2Gs directly from the US Government through the FMS process.
I was looking more toward the process than the aircraft. The procurement process has morphed into a monster that generates multi-thousand page detailed Request For Proposals (RFPs) requiring overwhelming levels of detail and technical data. Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson describes this evolution quite succinctly in his biography, Kelly - More than My Share of it All, when comparing the development processes for the C-130A and the C-5A. In his book he describes how a C-130 was required to transport the company’s response to the C-5 RFP while the C-130 response fit in a single loose leaf type binder. In retrospect, how much less costly would it have been for New Zealand to procure SH-2Gs directly from the US Government through the FMS process.
HELI-EXPO: Sikorsky
Looks like Mauer is owning up for the delay as being caused by SAC mission system programming.
Sikorsky chief executive Mick Mauer says he believes that a compromise remains likely on deadlocked negotiations over a contract to supply 28 maritime patrol helicopters (MHP) to the Royal Canadian Air Force.
Although some Canadian lawmakers have called for a re-competition of the 2004 award to Sikorsky, Mauer says is still "hopeful that we're going to resolve" the dispute.
"I think we're going to work our way through this," Maurer says. "We've one this before."
At the same time, Mauer acknowledges that it was Sikorsky's problems developing the software for the CH-148 Cyclone fleet that led to the delays and the need to re-compete the contract.
"The issue we have in terms of the programme is that our software is behind on the mission system," he explains. "The contract doesn't allow us to deliver the aircraft that kind of disconnect."
The current negotiations are aimed at creating a contractual means for Sikorsky to deliver the helicopters with an initial software load for the mission systems, then phase in the full range of capabilities over a period of time.
"I expect some time soon we'll start to see maybe a breakthrough to get those two aligned," he says.
So far, Sikorsky already has started production on 26 of the purchased 28 CH-148s, which are modified versions of the S-92 heavylift helicopter.
Although some Canadian lawmakers have called for a re-competition of the 2004 award to Sikorsky, Mauer says is still "hopeful that we're going to resolve" the dispute.
"I think we're going to work our way through this," Maurer says. "We've one this before."
At the same time, Mauer acknowledges that it was Sikorsky's problems developing the software for the CH-148 Cyclone fleet that led to the delays and the need to re-compete the contract.
"The issue we have in terms of the programme is that our software is behind on the mission system," he explains. "The contract doesn't allow us to deliver the aircraft that kind of disconnect."
The current negotiations are aimed at creating a contractual means for Sikorsky to deliver the helicopters with an initial software load for the mission systems, then phase in the full range of capabilities over a period of time.
"I expect some time soon we'll start to see maybe a breakthrough to get those two aligned," he says.
So far, Sikorsky already has started production on 26 of the purchased 28 CH-148s, which are modified versions of the S-92 heavylift helicopter.
Canada and Sikorsky Still Circling on Cyclone
Canada and Sikorsky continue to work at the mess that is the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter program. The Department of National Defence (DND) has posted an update on the much-delayed program, while procurement agency Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) says it will impose significant additional penalties on Sikorsky for late delivery.
Sikorsky parent United Technologies, meanwhile, has taken a $157 million charge to cover its costs for the delays, including the expected penalties. Also Sikorsky will lose $14 million on each of the 28 helicopters it delivers, and now admits its C$3.4 billion ($3.3 billion) 20-year in-service support contract will never recover the losses on its C$1.9 billion procurement contract.
When the contracts were signed in November 2004, the first CH-148 was scheduled to be delivered in November 2008. The root of the problem is that Canada signed a fixed-price procurement contract for an aircraft that still had to be developed. The contract requires the delivery of fully compliant helicopters, and the Cyclone is not there yet.
Sikorsky has been trying to persuade Canada to modify the contract to allow it to deliver the aircraft in an interim standard, then upgrade them. And it claims the DND wants to take the helicopters, so that it can begin training, but part of the problem is that the contract is with PWGSC, which is a separate agency.
The manufacturer says 24 of the 28 Cyclones are in production, assembly or test. Four of them (804, 806, 807 and 808) have been delivered to CFB Shearwater, but they remain the property of Sikorsky and are being used as ground‑based aids to support technician training. No aircraft were delivered in 2012, and Sikorsky is now planning to hand over eight a year beginning in 2013.
The original contract was renegotiated in December 2008, and required delivery of fully compliant helicopters to begin in June 2012 (a delay of 3 years 9 months). Unless that contract is modified, that means Sikorsky will not complete delivery of the helicopters until 2015.
But the DND, in its update, says it expects "to take formal delivery of the interim maritime helicopters in 2013", which might offer a glimmer of hope. The DND says issues that must be resolved before it can take formal delivery of the first interim helicopters include Canadian military flight clearance and training of the initial cadre of aircrew and technicians.
The Cyclone, a unique and substantially modified derivative of the commercial S-92, encountered problems first with the aircraft and later with its mission system. Sikorsky now says the mission system equipment is 97% complete -- enough to begin training, it believes, but not everything the DND wants and the PWGSC contracted for.
Sikorsky parent United Technologies, meanwhile, has taken a $157 million charge to cover its costs for the delays, including the expected penalties. Also Sikorsky will lose $14 million on each of the 28 helicopters it delivers, and now admits its C$3.4 billion ($3.3 billion) 20-year in-service support contract will never recover the losses on its C$1.9 billion procurement contract.
When the contracts were signed in November 2004, the first CH-148 was scheduled to be delivered in November 2008. The root of the problem is that Canada signed a fixed-price procurement contract for an aircraft that still had to be developed. The contract requires the delivery of fully compliant helicopters, and the Cyclone is not there yet.
Sikorsky has been trying to persuade Canada to modify the contract to allow it to deliver the aircraft in an interim standard, then upgrade them. And it claims the DND wants to take the helicopters, so that it can begin training, but part of the problem is that the contract is with PWGSC, which is a separate agency.
The manufacturer says 24 of the 28 Cyclones are in production, assembly or test. Four of them (804, 806, 807 and 808) have been delivered to CFB Shearwater, but they remain the property of Sikorsky and are being used as ground‑based aids to support technician training. No aircraft were delivered in 2012, and Sikorsky is now planning to hand over eight a year beginning in 2013.
The original contract was renegotiated in December 2008, and required delivery of fully compliant helicopters to begin in June 2012 (a delay of 3 years 9 months). Unless that contract is modified, that means Sikorsky will not complete delivery of the helicopters until 2015.
But the DND, in its update, says it expects "to take formal delivery of the interim maritime helicopters in 2013", which might offer a glimmer of hope. The DND says issues that must be resolved before it can take formal delivery of the first interim helicopters include Canadian military flight clearance and training of the initial cadre of aircrew and technicians.
The Cyclone, a unique and substantially modified derivative of the commercial S-92, encountered problems first with the aircraft and later with its mission system. Sikorsky now says the mission system equipment is 97% complete -- enough to begin training, it believes, but not everything the DND wants and the PWGSC contracted for.