CHC find S92 & AW139 "Unacceptable"
This little switch, in its self could lead to problems if the crew are unaware it is in the regrade position while descending low level, either IMC or on an inky black night. A warning on the CAS (Crew Alerting System) while in regrade might be a helpful improvement. I don't recall there even being an advisory, maybe Geoffers could help me out here, as I never knowingly fly with it in regrade.
While on the subject of CAS warnings, you get a warning every time you arm the floats, which seems to me a waste of a warning at a time in the flight when if something else is going on it would be good to know about it. The crews get so used to cancelling a warning as they arm the floats that they might inadvertently cancel a coincidental warning without noticing.
While on the subject of CAS warnings, you get a warning every time you arm the floats, which seems to me a waste of a warning at a time in the flight when if something else is going on it would be good to know about it. The crews get so used to cancelling a warning as they arm the floats that they might inadvertently cancel a coincidental warning without noticing.
There is no "150ft" advisory in the CAS when in regrade mode.
You are right about cancelling the CAS, when I arm the floats my right hand is on the switch and the left is ready to cancel the cas with the collective button.
We just need to add TCAS, moving map, HEGPWS,AVAD,cup holder,DVD,MP3 player, a good paint desing,de-icing,blonde flight attendant... etc. to be happy
MightyGem, funny question but, how would a Bond TRE know how a 139 works when Bond don't have any ? The spec CHC bought was may be not the best, granted
His comments were aimed mostly at the reliability of the EFIS screens and various spurious captions that kept appearing.
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Aser
Shuttling offshore you may well have the gear down as you fly between platforms.
What warnings will you get then?
MG - We do get more than our fair share of CAS warnings which seem to solve themselves. No 1 Audio Fail seems to be very common. MGB Oil Px is another even when the guage is reading 3.2 bar!
Red
PS Aser you have hit the nail on the head. Most important adition for everyones safety - Cup Holders!!!
Shuttling offshore you may well have the gear down as you fly between platforms.
What warnings will you get then?
MG - We do get more than our fair share of CAS warnings which seem to solve themselves. No 1 Audio Fail seems to be very common. MGB Oil Px is another even when the guage is reading 3.2 bar!
Red
PS Aser you have hit the nail on the head. Most important adition for everyones safety - Cup Holders!!!
Well I would say that the system as now described does not meet the requirements of JAR-OPS 3.660. JAR-OPS 3 says as I quoted before. It does not say "a voice warning .... operating below a preset height provided the pilot remembers to make the correct switch setting with a visual warning capable of operating at a height selectable by the pilot.
I know that the subject of the possibility to switch off the warning was an issue with the S92 JOEB - the solution was to force removal of the offending switch (actually button iirc)
This 139 underwent the JAA JOEB (Joint Ops Evaluation Board), the whole point of which is to check compliance with JAR-OPS 3. The result is published on the JAA website and is mostly bull**** and a list of credits. The appendices which includes the "tick list" for compliance with the various paras of JAR-OPS 3, seem to be missing (surprise surprise).
Perhaps I misunderstand the rule or the warning system, but it seems to me that this aircraft is not in compliance with JAR-OPS 3.660 and therefore it should not be flying. The regulatory system seems to have failed in this case - its notable that the majority of JOEB members were Italian and I suspect if we looked into it, none of them would turn out to have any offshore experience.
Why should the introduction of new types, with a safety fanfare, allow evasion of good rules that were introduced in response to fatal accidents?
All in all piss poor and it would not have been flying in the UK in Brian's day!
Maybe JimL would care to comment on my interpretation?
HC
I know that the subject of the possibility to switch off the warning was an issue with the S92 JOEB - the solution was to force removal of the offending switch (actually button iirc)
This 139 underwent the JAA JOEB (Joint Ops Evaluation Board), the whole point of which is to check compliance with JAR-OPS 3. The result is published on the JAA website and is mostly bull**** and a list of credits. The appendices which includes the "tick list" for compliance with the various paras of JAR-OPS 3, seem to be missing (surprise surprise).
Perhaps I misunderstand the rule or the warning system, but it seems to me that this aircraft is not in compliance with JAR-OPS 3.660 and therefore it should not be flying. The regulatory system seems to have failed in this case - its notable that the majority of JOEB members were Italian and I suspect if we looked into it, none of them would turn out to have any offshore experience.
Why should the introduction of new types, with a safety fanfare, allow evasion of good rules that were introduced in response to fatal accidents?
All in all piss poor and it would not have been flying in the UK in Brian's day!
Maybe JimL would care to comment on my interpretation?
HC
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Some within the industry might possibly believe the opinions expressed by CHC are indicative of an attempt to blame the manufacturers for the inability of the internal support structure to support the current (and future) fleet.
If you were to have a conversation from anyone within the group, you might well hear alarming stories of inadequate spares provisioning, inadequate manpower and technical resources and a serious lack of overhaul capacity to maintain the current level of operations. There appears to be a never ending revolving door of personnel, not counting the myriad on stress leave or simply taking other more achievable positions within the company.
Apparently, the internal workings of Heli-One represent an unequalled challenge in the history of the helicopter industry, where the cultural clash between expatriate Norwegians and everyone else, is something to behold! Interesting times, but when you try to shift the blame to others, sometimes the resulting truth from the other side is something to behold, and will certainly make interesting reading for everyone else!
SAR contract anyone?
If you were to have a conversation from anyone within the group, you might well hear alarming stories of inadequate spares provisioning, inadequate manpower and technical resources and a serious lack of overhaul capacity to maintain the current level of operations. There appears to be a never ending revolving door of personnel, not counting the myriad on stress leave or simply taking other more achievable positions within the company.
Apparently, the internal workings of Heli-One represent an unequalled challenge in the history of the helicopter industry, where the cultural clash between expatriate Norwegians and everyone else, is something to behold! Interesting times, but when you try to shift the blame to others, sometimes the resulting truth from the other side is something to behold, and will certainly make interesting reading for everyone else!
SAR contract anyone?
HC, I agree: as described it does not meet 3.660. I find this particulraly ironic given the amount of grief and effort that went into confirming that the EGPWS in the S-92 DOES meet 3.660. You'd have thought the Dutch authority would have picked up on this too, given they have direct experience of night shuttling CFIT with the S-76.
212 -Yes, and it also begs the question why a European manufacturer is churning stuff out that is not fit for purpose on its own patch.
Sikorsky can be forgiven for getting that bit wrong - at Sikorsky School they are all taught that the earth is flat and you fall off if you go beyond continental USA. Most cannot spell Yawrup never mind point to it on a map.
HC
Sikorsky can be forgiven for getting that bit wrong - at Sikorsky School they are all taught that the earth is flat and you fall off if you go beyond continental USA. Most cannot spell Yawrup never mind point to it on a map.
HC
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Can't let helicomparitor (what a misnomer - should be helibiaser) hold court too much longer! The slur on American will not be returned, because I think European pilots do a darn fine job, and would be welcomed on my flight line, any time.
I believe Honeywell and Sikorsky got it right, with the EGPWS and has a piece of kit that meets the full requirement of JAR-OPS 3.660 and has a number of other, excellent altitude warning modes.
Noting the cause of a number of offshore accidents (as the investigator), I am glad to see the various modes of EGPWS beyond AVAD, and await an impartial user to tell how it works. Why? because an EGPWS is hooked to all the instruments and the warnings (aural, visual, and display) the means to improve it is right at hand, with a software update.
So, those of you who operate an EGPWS S76 or S92, let Honeywell and Sikorsky know how it works, and how to make it better.
helicomparitor you, to your passenger's misfortune, must go to your corner, you refused the advanced technology on your latest helos, so you fact-less opinions do not get a vote!
I believe Honeywell and Sikorsky got it right, with the EGPWS and has a piece of kit that meets the full requirement of JAR-OPS 3.660 and has a number of other, excellent altitude warning modes.
Noting the cause of a number of offshore accidents (as the investigator), I am glad to see the various modes of EGPWS beyond AVAD, and await an impartial user to tell how it works. Why? because an EGPWS is hooked to all the instruments and the warnings (aural, visual, and display) the means to improve it is right at hand, with a software update.
So, those of you who operate an EGPWS S76 or S92, let Honeywell and Sikorsky know how it works, and how to make it better.
helicomparitor you, to your passenger's misfortune, must go to your corner, you refused the advanced technology on your latest helos, so you fact-less opinions do not get a vote!
From Nick's naughty-corner
Nick
No slur given to American pilots, just those designing the aircraft. I naively would expect to be able to buy an S76 C++ from Sikorsky in Sikorsky's full knowledge that it was to be operated in Europe, and find that it was equipped to operate legally in Europe, but I believe we found that not to be the case recently - even the FDR did not comply with European regs and don't mention the HUMS system!
My point really is that this is more understandable than buying a European helicopter and finding it does not comply with European operational regs - though still not excusable.
You are right that one of EGPWS's better attributes is that it is software driven and once the software has been improved and is not just a stunted version of fixed wing software, it will probably become worthwhile. I am aware of two initiatives, one to develop v26 of the software with better AVAD functionality and another (RTCA H-TAWS working group) to look afresh at modes 1-5 in order to make them relevant for offshore ops. Interestingly I am told that even the fixed-wing boys consider modes 1-5 to be pretty useless - the algorithms have been slashed and burnt over the years to get rid of nuisance warnings and are now hardly worth the ROM they take up. They regard only the E part as being of any use and imho that part is quite good for onshore ops.
Interestingly I conducted a straw poll of some of our 225 pilots to ask if they would like to trade in their AVAD for EGPWS v24. They all said "no", including a couple of guys who had operated the C++ in Nigeria with EGPWS.
But eventually EGPWS will represent a safety improvement not a deterioration, and then we shall have it!
HC
No slur given to American pilots, just those designing the aircraft. I naively would expect to be able to buy an S76 C++ from Sikorsky in Sikorsky's full knowledge that it was to be operated in Europe, and find that it was equipped to operate legally in Europe, but I believe we found that not to be the case recently - even the FDR did not comply with European regs and don't mention the HUMS system!
My point really is that this is more understandable than buying a European helicopter and finding it does not comply with European operational regs - though still not excusable.
You are right that one of EGPWS's better attributes is that it is software driven and once the software has been improved and is not just a stunted version of fixed wing software, it will probably become worthwhile. I am aware of two initiatives, one to develop v26 of the software with better AVAD functionality and another (RTCA H-TAWS working group) to look afresh at modes 1-5 in order to make them relevant for offshore ops. Interestingly I am told that even the fixed-wing boys consider modes 1-5 to be pretty useless - the algorithms have been slashed and burnt over the years to get rid of nuisance warnings and are now hardly worth the ROM they take up. They regard only the E part as being of any use and imho that part is quite good for onshore ops.
Interestingly I conducted a straw poll of some of our 225 pilots to ask if they would like to trade in their AVAD for EGPWS v24. They all said "no", including a couple of guys who had operated the C++ in Nigeria with EGPWS.
But eventually EGPWS will represent a safety improvement not a deterioration, and then we shall have it!
HC
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Aser- with the reference to your cup holder, I can fit my coffee mug quite nicely in the co pilots door pocket, with the handle over the side, next to my water bottle . Furthermore, I also have the luxury of the MP3 player, however, it plays the usual landing, take off briefs... but its there 
when its flying!!!!!!
. Furthermore, I also have the luxury of the MP3 player, however, it plays the usual landing, take off briefs... but its there when its flying!!!!!!
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"Some within the industry might possibly believe the opinions expressed by CHC are indicative of an attempt to blame the manufacturers for the inability of the internal support structure to support the current (and future) fleet."
Or Maybe, just MAYBE it is a statement of the fact that the current level of seviceability is unacceptable NO MATTER WHAT THE REASON.
I can remember in a previous life in Nigeria when ALL 6 of the new whistles and bells, ra-ra-ra, shiny marvellous EC155's that Shell went out and bought were AOG due to snags that had everone saying that it was a piece of cr@p and that the 76 was so much better etc etc.
Now that CHC has actually put it in writing instead of just carrying on and working through the growing pains it appears that everyone is looking beyond the obvious intent of the statement, vis......
Quote:
"So far this year the Sikorsky S92 and AgustaWestland AW139 have had a combined availability rate of 75%. Even though it is normal that new aircraft types have a lower rate of availability during the introduction period, the current performance of the S92 and AW139 is unacceptable. The Company is currently in discussions with the manufacturers to remedy this situation as soon as possible by increasing spare parts production and improving technical support and aircraft design."
I agree wholeheartedly that the current incarnation of Heli-1 is less than ideal, but does anyone know whether the parts are actually available from the manufacturers for H1 to actually deliver to the field?
Or Maybe, just MAYBE it is a statement of the fact that the current level of seviceability is unacceptable NO MATTER WHAT THE REASON.
I can remember in a previous life in Nigeria when ALL 6 of the new whistles and bells, ra-ra-ra, shiny marvellous EC155's that Shell went out and bought were AOG due to snags that had everone saying that it was a piece of cr@p and that the 76 was so much better etc etc.
Now that CHC has actually put it in writing instead of just carrying on and working through the growing pains it appears that everyone is looking beyond the obvious intent of the statement, vis......
Quote:
"So far this year the Sikorsky S92 and AgustaWestland AW139 have had a combined availability rate of 75%. Even though it is normal that new aircraft types have a lower rate of availability during the introduction period, the current performance of the S92 and AW139 is unacceptable. The Company is currently in discussions with the manufacturers to remedy this situation as soon as possible by increasing spare parts production and improving technical support and aircraft design."
I agree wholeheartedly that the current incarnation of Heli-1 is less than ideal, but does anyone know whether the parts are actually available from the manufacturers for H1 to actually deliver to the field?
Helicomparator
A number of interesting points arise from this discussion:
JAR-OPS 3.660 rule is objective and therefore needs additional material to provide guidance on methods of compliance. In trying to understand the intent of the rule it is worthwhile looking at the reasons for its presence; it followed the accident to the S61N in the Penzance to Scillies scheduled service which resulted from a (slow) controlled descent into water - resulting in fatalities. This resulted in the requirement for a RADALT and AVAD (an early attempt at an HTAWS for overwater flights) to be fitted for flights over water - this was then migrated to JAR-OPS 3.
The UK regulations were accompanied by guidance material which, for no apparent reason, was not carried over to JAR-OPS 3 – here are excerpts from the UK guidance material (AIL0114):
Research activity has indicated that the characteristics above can be satisfactorily met if the warning format incorporates the following features:
a) A unique tone should precede the voice message. A further tone after the voice may enhance uniqueness and attention-getting without causing undue annoyance.
b) The perceived urgency of the tone and voice should be moderately urgent.
c) The message should be compact as opposed to lengthy, provided the meaning is not compromised e.g. ’One fifty feet’ as opposed to ’One hundred and fifty feet’.
d) An information message is preferable (e.g. ’One hundred feet’). Messages such as ’Low height’ do not convey the correct impression during deliberate descents through the datum height
e) Command messages (e.g. ’Pull up, Pull up’ are not acceptable unless they relate specifically to height monitoring (e.g. ’Check height’).
f) The volume of the warning should be adequate and not variable below an acceptable minimum value.
Every effort should be made to prevent spurious warning.
Altitude Trigger
The height at which the audio warning is triggered by the radio altimeter should be such as to provide adequate warning for the pilot to take corrective action. It is envisaged that most installations will adopt a height in the range of 100 – 160 ft. It will not be permissible for the datum to be altered in flight.
The pre-set height should not be set such that it will coincide with commonly used instrument approach minima (i.e. 200 ft). Once triggered, the message must sound within 0.5 seconds.
The voice warning should be triggered only whilst descending through the pre-set height and be inhibited whilst ascending.
The fact that this advisory material is not present in JAR-OPS 3 has complicated the issues – it was suggested recently that this material be inserted but this was resisted for a number of reasons. Whilst the requirement is perfectly acceptable for over water CAT flight, there are a number of circumstances (such as SAR) where an inhibit switch might be required; it is also the case that the JAR-OPS 3.660 does not distinguish between a RADALT fitted for use over water and one for use over land (those of you who flew helicopters which were first fitted with AVAD will be reminded that, whilst it could be relied upon to provide a necessary warning when flying over water, the call occurred on every approach over land); it is optimised for use over water, not land.
It is also the case that the introduction of other warning devices into the cockpit (EGPWS, ACAS etc.) had drawn attention to the fact that there is no equivalent guidance in AC 29-2B Chg 2 to AC 25.1322 - the integration of alerts and warnings in the cockpit (in fact in the S92 and other helicopters, the EGPWS specifically assumes responsibility for other warnings). The lack of clear general (in an equivalent to AC 25.1322) and specific (in JAR-OPS 3.660) guidance therefore puts the manufacturer at a disadvantage.
Helicomparator is correct that, for offshore operations, the JOEB for the AW139 should have picked this up (as another JOEB did for the S92 – due mainly to the presence of the CAA flight department), it is clear that the construction of the AW139 JOEB invited this oversight; it is not clear that either of the two operational pilots (one Italian and one Canadian) had offshore experience, and this points to a weakness in the system. (Unfortunately, the provision of joint JOEB teams (FAA/TC/JAA) makes it certain that compliance with operational requirements (for EASA/JAA JAR-OPS 3) are reduced in importance alongside the common elements (provision of training courses, STD, MMELs etc).)
The intent of JAR-OPS 3.660 is that there will be a voice message associated with the RADALT; an ‘alert’ will be given with the attainment of a bugged height (ascent or descent) such as ‘check height’, and a ‘warning’ when reaching the ‘preset’ (by the manufacturer) height; such a warning will announce the preset height - for example ‘100 feet’ or ‘150 feet’. Both calls should be preceded by ‘attension tones’
As an additional point, AC 25.1322 makes it clear that all messages should be prioritised and integrated – it is not clear from this discussion that this is being achieved for the aircraft mentioned.
The extension of the discussion, between Helicomparator and Nick Lappos, to the protection modes of EGPWS/HTAWS is welcome. Although the functionality required by JAR-OPS 3.660 has now been introduced to mode 6 of the EGPWS, there is still a need to re-assess the relevance of protection modes 1-5 to offshore operations.
The tailoring of protection modes 1-5 can bring further safety benefits for offshore operations; additionally, if the press release from Honeywell on the further development of SVS is correct, then the addition, and integration, of real-time obstacle sensors into HTAWS/SVS will provide the protection from mobile obstacles that is missing in the current implementation of EGPWS (in the 'enhanced' mode)
Jim
A number of interesting points arise from this discussion:
JAR-OPS 3.660 rule is objective and therefore needs additional material to provide guidance on methods of compliance. In trying to understand the intent of the rule it is worthwhile looking at the reasons for its presence; it followed the accident to the S61N in the Penzance to Scillies scheduled service which resulted from a (slow) controlled descent into water - resulting in fatalities. This resulted in the requirement for a RADALT and AVAD (an early attempt at an HTAWS for overwater flights) to be fitted for flights over water - this was then migrated to JAR-OPS 3.
The UK regulations were accompanied by guidance material which, for no apparent reason, was not carried over to JAR-OPS 3 – here are excerpts from the UK guidance material (AIL0114):
Whilst most current Radio Altimeters include a height warning light, this is not considered sufficient for alerting a pilot to an inadvertent descent as his attention may be directed away from the indicator at the critical time. It is for this reason that an audio low height warning is considered necessary. The warning must be distinguishable from other warnings and should therefore be a clear and concise voice message.
Research activity has indicated that the characteristics above can be satisfactorily met if the warning format incorporates the following features:
a) A unique tone should precede the voice message. A further tone after the voice may enhance uniqueness and attention-getting without causing undue annoyance.
b) The perceived urgency of the tone and voice should be moderately urgent.
c) The message should be compact as opposed to lengthy, provided the meaning is not compromised e.g. ’One fifty feet’ as opposed to ’One hundred and fifty feet’.
d) An information message is preferable (e.g. ’One hundred feet’). Messages such as ’Low height’ do not convey the correct impression during deliberate descents through the datum height
e) Command messages (e.g. ’Pull up, Pull up’ are not acceptable unless they relate specifically to height monitoring (e.g. ’Check height’).
f) The volume of the warning should be adequate and not variable below an acceptable minimum value.
Every effort should be made to prevent spurious warning.
Altitude Trigger
The height at which the audio warning is triggered by the radio altimeter should be such as to provide adequate warning for the pilot to take corrective action. It is envisaged that most installations will adopt a height in the range of 100 – 160 ft. It will not be permissible for the datum to be altered in flight.
The pre-set height should not be set such that it will coincide with commonly used instrument approach minima (i.e. 200 ft). Once triggered, the message must sound within 0.5 seconds.
The voice warning should be triggered only whilst descending through the pre-set height and be inhibited whilst ascending.
It is also the case that the introduction of other warning devices into the cockpit (EGPWS, ACAS etc.) had drawn attention to the fact that there is no equivalent guidance in AC 29-2B Chg 2 to AC 25.1322 - the integration of alerts and warnings in the cockpit (in fact in the S92 and other helicopters, the EGPWS specifically assumes responsibility for other warnings). The lack of clear general (in an equivalent to AC 25.1322) and specific (in JAR-OPS 3.660) guidance therefore puts the manufacturer at a disadvantage.
Helicomparator is correct that, for offshore operations, the JOEB for the AW139 should have picked this up (as another JOEB did for the S92 – due mainly to the presence of the CAA flight department), it is clear that the construction of the AW139 JOEB invited this oversight; it is not clear that either of the two operational pilots (one Italian and one Canadian) had offshore experience, and this points to a weakness in the system. (Unfortunately, the provision of joint JOEB teams (FAA/TC/JAA) makes it certain that compliance with operational requirements (for EASA/JAA JAR-OPS 3) are reduced in importance alongside the common elements (provision of training courses, STD, MMELs etc).)
The intent of JAR-OPS 3.660 is that there will be a voice message associated with the RADALT; an ‘alert’ will be given with the attainment of a bugged height (ascent or descent) such as ‘check height’, and a ‘warning’ when reaching the ‘preset’ (by the manufacturer) height; such a warning will announce the preset height - for example ‘100 feet’ or ‘150 feet’. Both calls should be preceded by ‘attension tones’
As an additional point, AC 25.1322 makes it clear that all messages should be prioritised and integrated – it is not clear from this discussion that this is being achieved for the aircraft mentioned.
The extension of the discussion, between Helicomparator and Nick Lappos, to the protection modes of EGPWS/HTAWS is welcome. Although the functionality required by JAR-OPS 3.660 has now been introduced to mode 6 of the EGPWS, there is still a need to re-assess the relevance of protection modes 1-5 to offshore operations.
The tailoring of protection modes 1-5 can bring further safety benefits for offshore operations; additionally, if the press release from Honeywell on the further development of SVS is correct, then the addition, and integration, of real-time obstacle sensors into HTAWS/SVS will provide the protection from mobile obstacles that is missing in the current implementation of EGPWS (in the 'enhanced' mode)
Jim
Thanks Jim, I think its a great pity that this material has been lost from the public domain - we are now seeing the consequences of that and presumably must wait for the next fatal accident before its reborn.
Although you say that AVAD is optimised for overwater not overland, it still has considerable value overland (though EGPWS is probably better) and with correct operating procedures, does not produce nuisance warnings. SAR is not covered by JAR-OPS 3 and even if it were (as HHA is), that would be the sort of area where a National Authority could grant a dispensation to allow an inhibit switch for the fixed height call - just like our very own JSAR had. When inhibited, the AVAD CWP caption was illuminated so there was little doubt that the 100' call was off. But in reality it was rarely used as 100' is normally far too high for winching.
Do you think there is any chance of getting the advisory material back into circulation during the transfer to EASA OPS? The longer its left, the more aircraft there will be around that are not compliant and so the harder it would be to introduce.
And what to do about the 139? If we are correct that its not compliant, does anyone care enough to do anything about it?
HC
Although you say that AVAD is optimised for overwater not overland, it still has considerable value overland (though EGPWS is probably better) and with correct operating procedures, does not produce nuisance warnings. SAR is not covered by JAR-OPS 3 and even if it were (as HHA is), that would be the sort of area where a National Authority could grant a dispensation to allow an inhibit switch for the fixed height call - just like our very own JSAR had. When inhibited, the AVAD CWP caption was illuminated so there was little doubt that the 100' call was off. But in reality it was rarely used as 100' is normally far too high for winching.
Do you think there is any chance of getting the advisory material back into circulation during the transfer to EASA OPS? The longer its left, the more aircraft there will be around that are not compliant and so the harder it would be to introduce.
And what to do about the 139? If we are correct that its not compliant, does anyone care enough to do anything about it?
HC
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In reference the the Battery and heated windscreen issue, Agusta has already offered a more powerful main battery with more capacity and also a larger 27ah auxillary battery also. We just recently got the larger 27 Ah auxillary battery as a proactive reliability measure and it also helps move the CG a liitle more forward. Last year most of our starting was with battery carts/ ground power and this in itself I am sure save us from some of the hassles other operators experienced
The heated glass windscreens are now available, contact Agusta
The heated glass windscreens are now available, contact Agusta
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AVAD
All the above noted. I will do what I can to mitigate the shortcomings of the system on the 139 during training but as a sim instructor doing type ratings we don't normally get into the areas related to LOFT. When we do get around to doing recurrent training then we should get the opportunity to cover these problems and fully investigate the problem.
Nonetheless there will be some value in highlighting the best way of using the system and lessons learnt early on do tend to stick. (regrade switch etc).
I have to say that I have some serious issues with a set up that labels the rad alt test button "Decision Height" (the knob also changes the DH, shown on the PFD) and the associated radalt driven "Decision Height" visual cues on the Primary Flight Display. Can we get some movement on the evil concept that Rad Alt height can in any way be considered as a "Decision Height" - except when over water!
Meanwhile I sense a long road ahead for any changes.
G
Nonetheless there will be some value in highlighting the best way of using the system and lessons learnt early on do tend to stick. (regrade switch etc).
I have to say that I have some serious issues with a set up that labels the rad alt test button "Decision Height" (the knob also changes the DH, shown on the PFD) and the associated radalt driven "Decision Height" visual cues on the Primary Flight Display. Can we get some movement on the evil concept that Rad Alt height can in any way be considered as a "Decision Height" - except when over water!
Meanwhile I sense a long road ahead for any changes.
G
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We have found the larger batteries both main and Aux improved the starting. We would use grd power to start 1 engine, then disconnect that and start no2 on the batteryon the 1st start of the day. This helped cycle the batteries, then every start that day was done on the main batteries...
Geoff, that's a valid point about DH, and the same applies to the EC products too. If your SOPs continue to treat it as a rad-alt 'bug' then it doesn't seem to cause a problem, but may do other operators. I'm equally bemused as to why the S-92 shouts "Altitude, Altitude" at you when you pass the Rad-alt height bug!
HC, you really must get your ex 76 pilots to get out more: what a crass response!
As has been stated above, and in more detail on another thread, V.24 EGPWS has ALL the functionality of an AVAD, plus a whole bunch of other goodies. A scan through the last few months worth of AAIB monthly bulletins will show how these 'extras' have saved huge embarrassment, or worse, for several FW crews (Do-328 and Dash-8 spring to mind with 'glideslope' and 'obstacle' warnings).
As for aural alert prioritisation, well, if you have an engine fire and failure on rotation, it REALLY isn't your day but, in any case, maybe Nr and height should be your primary concerns: not waiting for some woman to hold your hand and say "check height" or "One hundred", isn't that the PNF's job? At least you have the opportunity to pass those levels: some of us start below 100 ft in the first place!
HC, you really must get your ex 76 pilots to get out more: what a crass response!
As has been stated above, and in more detail on another thread, V.24 EGPWS has ALL the functionality of an AVAD, plus a whole bunch of other goodies. A scan through the last few months worth of AAIB monthly bulletins will show how these 'extras' have saved huge embarrassment, or worse, for several FW crews (Do-328 and Dash-8 spring to mind with 'glideslope' and 'obstacle' warnings).As for aural alert prioritisation, well, if you have an engine fire and failure on rotation, it REALLY isn't your day but, in any case, maybe Nr and height should be your primary concerns: not waiting for some woman to hold your hand and say "check height" or "One hundred", isn't that the PNF's job? At least you have the opportunity to pass those levels: some of us start below 100 ft in the first place!
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Orange, TX USA
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Over weight
Sorry, but all the decks I look at on the GOM say 12,000. It will be a long time before we get a real chance at them here. Most of the 139 work is on temporary jobs. Anything long term still goes to the mediums.
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I disagree. eg during an ARA with the gear down, descending below bugged height gives you "Minimums", but if you climb back up to above bugged height (as you would) you will then never get another voice warning. You have either to land or climb 200' above bugged height to rearm the system. So once you have triggered the first warning, you are left without protection.
I think you should bear in mind that the EGPWS installation is highly configurable. Sikorsky spent some time with the 92 trying to make it good, but I don't think the same is true for the 76. They just bolted it on and there are some significant differences - the main one I know is that on the 92, mode 1 is permanently inhibited, but not on the 76. There seems no logic to that!
HC
V.24 EGPWS has ALL the functionality of an AVAD
I think you should bear in mind that the EGPWS installation is highly configurable. Sikorsky spent some time with the 92 trying to make it good, but I don't think the same is true for the 76. They just bolted it on and there are some significant differences - the main one I know is that on the 92, mode 1 is permanently inhibited, but not on the 76. There seems no logic to that!
HC