Well I would say that the system as now described does not meet the requirements of JAR-OPS 3.660. JAR-OPS 3 says as I quoted before. It does not say "a voice warning .... operating below a preset height provided the pilot remembers to make the correct switch setting with a visual warning capable of operating at a height selectable by the pilot.
I know that the subject of the possibility to switch off the warning was an issue with the S92 JOEB - the solution was to force removal of the offending switch (actually button iirc)
This 139 underwent the JAA JOEB (Joint Ops Evaluation Board), the whole point of which is to check compliance with JAR-OPS 3. The result is published on the JAA website and is mostly bull**** and a list of credits. The appendices which includes the "tick list" for compliance with the various paras of JAR-OPS 3, seem to be missing (surprise surprise).
Perhaps I misunderstand the rule or the warning system, but it seems to me that this aircraft is not in compliance with JAR-OPS 3.660 and therefore it should not be flying. The regulatory system seems to have failed in this case - its notable that the majority of JOEB members were Italian and I suspect if we looked into it, none of them would turn out to have any offshore experience.
Why should the introduction of new types, with a safety fanfare, allow evasion of good rules that were introduced in response to fatal accidents?
All in all piss poor and it would not have been flying in the UK in Brian's day!
Maybe JimL would care to comment on my interpretation?
HC