What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
It would seem to me the Osprey would be the perfect VH aircraft....fast...can land vertically....safest machine in the Marine Inventory....wonder why they cannot replace the VH-3's with VH-22's?
Granted they might have to do without the Nuke proof dunny or whatever made the 71's unusable in the role.
Granted they might have to do without the Nuke proof dunny or whatever made the 71's unusable in the role.
Um lifting, then I am indeed in deep regret. I should have worked on getting that commercial helicopter ticket before I left the Navy, and tried to get on with a commercial vertrep crew. It may have put stress back on the marriage, but I think it's a job I'd have enjoyed quite a bit more than I do now. I really liked flying at sea ...
Glad to see the Kmax (non IFR certified) idea was scotched.
I was against contracting out the VERTREP mission. I guess it's working out well enough. Onward we march, into the future.
In re the Forbes article, again:
Why report good news? Any reporter can still write a story based on cost, since (as is admitted later in the article) the bird is very expensive.
I reject this conclusion. The Army has a fleet of something like 2000 Blackhawks. IF we go back to my analysis above, in terms of how many people you can move per aircraft, divide 2000 aircraft by 2.2 and you get about 910 Osprey equivalents. That's six times as many as the Marines Have, at about five times the price per (100 million or so versus 20 million or so for a Blackhawk) to get 2.2 times the volume of lift ... and while all performance metrics don't scale evenly up and down, the magnitude of the replacement cost with the newer capability, versus the more modestly priced and very reliable Blackhawk, puts you into the following dollar range ... (and don't forget the cited $11,000 dollars per flight hour figure from the GAO).
910 x 100,000,000 = $91,000,000,000
At some point, you run out of money. (I have no inside information, but I suspect that the decision to axe the new amphib vehicle was in part a strategic move to keep funding lines open for Osprey ... not sure).
The Army has a lot of other stuff to buy and maintain, and have chosen not to put speed at as high a priority in their requirements as the Marines have.
Does anyone? 
The whole article seems to have been written by someone wearing rose tinted glasses.
Glad to see the Kmax (non IFR certified) idea was scotched.
I was against contracting out the VERTREP mission. I guess it's working out well enough. Onward we march, into the future.
In re the Forbes article, again:
The Osprey has suffered both kinds of setbacks during its history, but not lately so the views many “experts” have of the program are outdated. With production progressing smoothly and few operational problems being encountered, there isn’t much about the V-22 program today that an enterprising reporter can sink his or her teeth into.
Except maybe this: if the Osprey is performing so much better than legacy aircraft, then why are military services other than the Marine Corps continuing to sink money into traditional solutions to military needs that cannot meet requirements as effectively?
910 x 100,000,000 = $91,000,000,000
At some point, you run out of money. (I have no inside information, but I suspect that the decision to axe the new amphib vehicle was in part a strategic move to keep funding lines open for Osprey ... not sure).
The Army has a lot of other stuff to buy and maintain, and have chosen not to put speed at as high a priority in their requirements as the Marines have.
The answer, unfortunately, is that the military doesn’t have a rigorous methodology for capturing and comparing all the costs associated with different approaches to performing missions.
The whole article seems to have been written by someone wearing rose tinted glasses.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 14th Apr 2011 at 14:34.
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It would seem to me the Osprey would be the perfect VH aircraft....fast...can land vertically....safest machine in the Marine Inventory....wonder why they cannot replace the VH-3's with VH-22's?
Why V-22 may not be the VIP bird any time soon.
As I understand some of the requirements and constraints for the VIP bird(s)
1) The aircraft has to have been in service for a number of years (10? don't know why that number comes to mind) so that a track record for reliability is already established
2) The issue of how big a storm/rotorwash vortex gets kicked up by the aircraft on the White House Lawn factors into whether or not it is suitable for that part of the mission ... which may be PR intensive, but is still part of how the Presidential transport fits into the President's routine.
I think the second point was a factor in H-53 not being eligible? (Not sure where I heard that, it's been a few years). 53E kicks up roughly hurricane force winds in a hover ... and I understand that V-22 kickes up a healthy storm as well.
As I understand some of the requirements and constraints for the VIP bird(s)
1) The aircraft has to have been in service for a number of years (10? don't know why that number comes to mind) so that a track record for reliability is already established
2) The issue of how big a storm/rotorwash vortex gets kicked up by the aircraft on the White House Lawn factors into whether or not it is suitable for that part of the mission ... which may be PR intensive, but is still part of how the Presidential transport fits into the President's routine.
I think the second point was a factor in H-53 not being eligible? (Not sure where I heard that, it's been a few years). 53E kicks up roughly hurricane force winds in a hover ... and I understand that V-22 kickes up a healthy storm as well.
VH-53D Considered in the 1970s
The CH-53D was considered for Presidential missions in the 1970s. Rotor down wash was cited as one of the main reasons for rejecting it. One aircraft was actually painted in the traditional white top paint scheme and traveled around with the VH-3s as a support bird. The CH-53E’s disk loading is considerably higher than the D. This issue was obviously over looked when the EH-101 was recently selected by the Navy. The EH-101 at 32500 lbs and the CH-53D at 42000 lbs have approximately the same disk loading and resulting down wash velocities.
Continuing my rant about the Over-The-Horizion (OTH) Amphibious Assault strategy of the USMC....and what appears to be a contradiction between "Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk!" when reality is compared to the Smoke and Mirrors emanating from Henderson Hall.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program was axed....so no new amtrac for that capability of OTH.
The Osprey does not shine in the hauling of external loads when compared to helicopters.
Now we find the new amphib ships are doing away with well decks to accomodate "aviation" assets. That makes sense in a left handed way re the termination of the EFV program.
The question I ask....why do we have an "Aviation Only" LHA with no way to carry/launch/retrieve Amtracs, LCM's LCU's, Seal Assault Craft? Is that not just a Mini-CV (aircraft carrier without catapult capability)?
Can some of you Leathernecks explain where all this is going to take us....especially if the VTOL version of the F-35 fails to live up to the promises made by the builder?
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program was axed....so no new amtrac for that capability of OTH.
The Osprey does not shine in the hauling of external loads when compared to helicopters.
Now we find the new amphib ships are doing away with well decks to accomodate "aviation" assets. That makes sense in a left handed way re the termination of the EFV program.
The question I ask....why do we have an "Aviation Only" LHA with no way to carry/launch/retrieve Amtracs, LCM's LCU's, Seal Assault Craft? Is that not just a Mini-CV (aircraft carrier without catapult capability)?
Can some of you Leathernecks explain where all this is going to take us....especially if the VTOL version of the F-35 fails to live up to the promises made by the builder?
the future USS America (LHA 6), the first ship in the LHA Replacement program. LHA 6 was placed under contract in June 2007 with NGSB. LHA 6 will be an aviation-centric modified repeat of the LHD 8 and is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 2013. Key differences between LHA 6 and the LHD class ships include an enlarged hangar deck, enhanced aviation maintenance facilities, increased aviation fuel capacity, additional aviation storerooms, removal of the well deck, and an electronically reconfigurable C4ISR suite. Three of the original five Tarawa-class LHAs were recently decommissioned: USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3) in October 2005, USS Saipan (LHA 2) in April 2007 and USS Tarawa (LHA 1) in March 2009.
Although Marines are enthusiastic about the new ship, many of them question the decision to build a $3 billion ship without a well deck. It’s been a point of contention between the Navy and Marine Corps for some time.
The aviation-centric design of the LHA replacement — or LHA(R) — also has raised questions about its long term usefulness. Considering that Marines require heavy trucks and armored vehicles once they reach the shore, most of that equipment can only be transported by hovercraft, not by helicopters.
“It’s been a long-running debate, and it’s still not settled,” says Robert Work, a naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C. “There are a lot of questions on LHA(R). Will it become the standard, or will it become only a niche capability?”
There are five Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships, with three still in service. Two were decommissioned in recent years: USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) retired in October 2005 and USS Saipan (LHA-2) in April 2006.
The USS America, designated as LHA-6, will be part of the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault echelon — a group of warships that would deploy along with Navy cruisers and destroyers for major contingencies. The next two LHA ships, to be funded in 2010 and 2014, are intended for the maritime pre-positioning force squadron — a logistics sea base for troops. The fourth and final ship, currently funded in the 2017 to 2018
timeframe, would also be part of the assault echelon.
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James T. Conway pressed for an increase in
the amphibious fleet and succeeded. The plan now is to build up to 11 “big deck” amphibious assault ships — eight LHDs and three LHA(R)s — and dedicate them all to the assault echelon.
There’s no clear plan yet on whether to put big decks in the logistics squadron — that decision will be deferred until after the fiscal 2010 budget, says Work. The Marines lately have been trying to make a case that they need three additional amphibious assault vessels, for a total of 14. “The chances of that happening, I think, are zero,” he says.
The LHA-6 hull is based on the design used in the USS Makin Island (LHD-8), which is the first gas-turbine ship in the Wasp class of amphibious assault ships. Both are under construction at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in Pascagoula, Miss. The LHD-8 is expected to be completed in May.
An aviation-centric amphibious ship is not a new concept. In the late 1950s, the Navy built a class of amphibious assault ships called Landing Platform Helicopters, or LPH. These vessels carried Marines and rotory-wing aircraft. The only way to leave the ship was by air.
“That turned out to be largely a failed experiment,” says Work. In operations off the coast of Lebanon in the late 1970s, the ships’ helicopters encountered a significant air threat that resulted in the Marines being transferred to another amphibious ship to go ashore by sea.
“What we learned about the LPH is that we needed a well deck,” says Marine Col. Robert Coates, director of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s training and exercise group.
The United States in 1975 began building amphibious ships with both well decks and flight decks. The well decks on the Tarawa-class allowed watercraft and hovercraft, such as landing craft utility (LCU) and landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC), to float into the ship to load or unload Marines and cargo and transport them ashore.
“It was a tremendous success. The ship was extremely flexible. The Marines could get off either by sea or by air,” says Work.
The LHD Wasp-class ships are an improved version of the Tarawa-class. Aboard the sixth ship of the class, the USS Bonhomme Richard, Marine Lt. Col. Robert Rice comments on its versatility. “When you have a ship like the Bonhomme Richard that can do simultaneous well deck and flight deck operations, I think it represents a significant threat that can never be discounted,” he says.
With a wide flight deck that resembles that of an aircraft carrier, the LHD traditionally deploys in a trio of warships called an amphibious task force. The other two vessels commonly are the transport dock ship (LSD-class) and the dock landing ship (LPD-class). Collectively, the ships carry a Marine expeditionary unit and a wide range of aircraft, vehicles and watercraft. The total force is called an amphibious ready
group, or ARG. Depending on the missions that crop up, the units can stay together or operate separately.
Without a well deck, the LHA(R) might be more limited, Marines say. “If you’re tasked with a situation where there’s multiple tasks going on simultaneously, you have to split the ARGs up,” points out Rice. “That’s going to be tough to decide which ship goes where. If ships are limited in capabilities, then we’re limiting our options.”
During the early 2000s, the Navy adopted a position that future amphibious operations would be achieved through aerial maneuver. They feared future enemies would mine waters near shores and threaten ships sailing in coastal areas with missiles and other defenses to prevent Marines from coming ashore by sea.
This position was buttressed by the Marines’ pursuit of the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey, an aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter, and also rotate its propellers to fly like a conventional aircraft. The tilt rotors on the V-22 must be locked in a vertical position in order for mechanics to work on it. That requires more hangar space than is available in the older LHD-class and LHA-class ships.
Though the Marines still insisted on maintaining the well deck capability, the Navy built LHA(R) as an aviation-focused vessel. “We’re still an amphibious assault ship, but we’re focusing on the aviation aspects,” says Michael Arnold, manager of the LHA-6 class at Naval Sea Systems Command.
Critics can’t help but associate the LHA(R) with the old LPH-class ships.
“There is some superficial resemblance because neither one of us has a well deck,” Arnold says. But the Marines abandoned the LPH-2 class because the ships were too small to be able to operate the airplanes that they wanted. “They couldn’t fit all of their airplanes on that ship,” he says.
The V-22 is significantly larger than the helicopter it replaces and the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighter also is larger than the AV-8B Harrier that it will replace. They require larger flight decks and hangar space and more fuel and storage capacity, all of which are found on the LHA(R) — a much larger vessel than the LPHs. “It’s that kind of thinking that drove us to LHA-6,” says Arnold.
The aviation-centric design of the LHA replacement — or LHA(R) — also has raised questions about its long term usefulness. Considering that Marines require heavy trucks and armored vehicles once they reach the shore, most of that equipment can only be transported by hovercraft, not by helicopters.
“It’s been a long-running debate, and it’s still not settled,” says Robert Work, a naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C. “There are a lot of questions on LHA(R). Will it become the standard, or will it become only a niche capability?”
There are five Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships, with three still in service. Two were decommissioned in recent years: USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) retired in October 2005 and USS Saipan (LHA-2) in April 2006.
The USS America, designated as LHA-6, will be part of the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault echelon — a group of warships that would deploy along with Navy cruisers and destroyers for major contingencies. The next two LHA ships, to be funded in 2010 and 2014, are intended for the maritime pre-positioning force squadron — a logistics sea base for troops. The fourth and final ship, currently funded in the 2017 to 2018
timeframe, would also be part of the assault echelon.
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James T. Conway pressed for an increase in
the amphibious fleet and succeeded. The plan now is to build up to 11 “big deck” amphibious assault ships — eight LHDs and three LHA(R)s — and dedicate them all to the assault echelon.
There’s no clear plan yet on whether to put big decks in the logistics squadron — that decision will be deferred until after the fiscal 2010 budget, says Work. The Marines lately have been trying to make a case that they need three additional amphibious assault vessels, for a total of 14. “The chances of that happening, I think, are zero,” he says.
The LHA-6 hull is based on the design used in the USS Makin Island (LHD-8), which is the first gas-turbine ship in the Wasp class of amphibious assault ships. Both are under construction at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in Pascagoula, Miss. The LHD-8 is expected to be completed in May.
An aviation-centric amphibious ship is not a new concept. In the late 1950s, the Navy built a class of amphibious assault ships called Landing Platform Helicopters, or LPH. These vessels carried Marines and rotory-wing aircraft. The only way to leave the ship was by air.
“That turned out to be largely a failed experiment,” says Work. In operations off the coast of Lebanon in the late 1970s, the ships’ helicopters encountered a significant air threat that resulted in the Marines being transferred to another amphibious ship to go ashore by sea.
“What we learned about the LPH is that we needed a well deck,” says Marine Col. Robert Coates, director of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s training and exercise group.
The United States in 1975 began building amphibious ships with both well decks and flight decks. The well decks on the Tarawa-class allowed watercraft and hovercraft, such as landing craft utility (LCU) and landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC), to float into the ship to load or unload Marines and cargo and transport them ashore.
“It was a tremendous success. The ship was extremely flexible. The Marines could get off either by sea or by air,” says Work.
The LHD Wasp-class ships are an improved version of the Tarawa-class. Aboard the sixth ship of the class, the USS Bonhomme Richard, Marine Lt. Col. Robert Rice comments on its versatility. “When you have a ship like the Bonhomme Richard that can do simultaneous well deck and flight deck operations, I think it represents a significant threat that can never be discounted,” he says.
With a wide flight deck that resembles that of an aircraft carrier, the LHD traditionally deploys in a trio of warships called an amphibious task force. The other two vessels commonly are the transport dock ship (LSD-class) and the dock landing ship (LPD-class). Collectively, the ships carry a Marine expeditionary unit and a wide range of aircraft, vehicles and watercraft. The total force is called an amphibious ready
group, or ARG. Depending on the missions that crop up, the units can stay together or operate separately.
Without a well deck, the LHA(R) might be more limited, Marines say. “If you’re tasked with a situation where there’s multiple tasks going on simultaneously, you have to split the ARGs up,” points out Rice. “That’s going to be tough to decide which ship goes where. If ships are limited in capabilities, then we’re limiting our options.”
During the early 2000s, the Navy adopted a position that future amphibious operations would be achieved through aerial maneuver. They feared future enemies would mine waters near shores and threaten ships sailing in coastal areas with missiles and other defenses to prevent Marines from coming ashore by sea.
This position was buttressed by the Marines’ pursuit of the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey, an aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter, and also rotate its propellers to fly like a conventional aircraft. The tilt rotors on the V-22 must be locked in a vertical position in order for mechanics to work on it. That requires more hangar space than is available in the older LHD-class and LHA-class ships.
Though the Marines still insisted on maintaining the well deck capability, the Navy built LHA(R) as an aviation-focused vessel. “We’re still an amphibious assault ship, but we’re focusing on the aviation aspects,” says Michael Arnold, manager of the LHA-6 class at Naval Sea Systems Command.
Critics can’t help but associate the LHA(R) with the old LPH-class ships.
“There is some superficial resemblance because neither one of us has a well deck,” Arnold says. But the Marines abandoned the LPH-2 class because the ships were too small to be able to operate the airplanes that they wanted. “They couldn’t fit all of their airplanes on that ship,” he says.
The V-22 is significantly larger than the helicopter it replaces and the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighter also is larger than the AV-8B Harrier that it will replace. They require larger flight decks and hangar space and more fuel and storage capacity, all of which are found on the LHA(R) — a much larger vessel than the LPHs. “It’s that kind of thinking that drove us to LHA-6,” says Arnold.
Last edited by SASless; 20th Apr 2011 at 00:34.
SASless: I share your dismay at the lack of a well deck. (What, LCAC's not available to move ship to shore? ???)
That said, I don't think the Marines have posited the airwing as being solely V-22. You'd expect a MAW to deploy with Heavy Lift (53's) and Med lift (22's) and the usual Light Attack (hueys and snakes) elements.
That leaves the concerns in re moving heavy stuff via V-22 answered ... but it doesn't answer the mail on how you move the typical load out of trucks and such ship to shore.
Doing it all by sling load under a 53???
Seems a bit confusing. I'd need to understand the requirements document that went into the LHA-6 (sample) to grasp why the folks at Henderson Hall chose to go that way. (Once again the Navy seems to be building ships for specialty reasons, not the multi purpose platforms ... see also that littoral combat DD thingy ...)
Put another way, why not just build more LHD's rather than a stripped down LHA? Cheaper?
That said, I don't think the Marines have posited the airwing as being solely V-22. You'd expect a MAW to deploy with Heavy Lift (53's) and Med lift (22's) and the usual Light Attack (hueys and snakes) elements.
That leaves the concerns in re moving heavy stuff via V-22 answered ... but it doesn't answer the mail on how you move the typical load out of trucks and such ship to shore.
Doing it all by sling load under a 53???
Seems a bit confusing. I'd need to understand the requirements document that went into the LHA-6 (sample) to grasp why the folks at Henderson Hall chose to go that way. (Once again the Navy seems to be building ships for specialty reasons, not the multi purpose platforms ... see also that littoral combat DD thingy ...)
Put another way, why not just build more LHD's rather than a stripped down LHA? Cheaper?
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Is that not just a Mini-CV (aircraft carrier without catapult capability)?
Yes. Just as a Burke-class ship isn't a cruiser, and the F-18E/F is merely an upgraded C/D.
Put Amtracs, LCM's, LCU's, Seal Assault Craft, etc. on ships with well decks.
Yes. Just as a Burke-class ship isn't a cruiser, and the F-18E/F is merely an upgraded C/D.
Put Amtracs, LCM's, LCU's, Seal Assault Craft, etc. on ships with well decks.
Last edited by Modern Elmo; 24th Apr 2011 at 13:02.
LCM's, LCU's, and the current Amtrac are useless in O-T-H amphib operations. They are too slow and thus too vulnerable. The argument here is whether the O-T-H concept is fatally flawed as it was based upon the Osprey, LCAC, and EFV.
The EFV program died after Tens of Billions of Dollars being wasted.
That knocked the third leg out from under the stool as I see it.
If the main justification for the Osprey was O-T-H , then how does the USMC use that argument now?
The Navy does not want to expose its ships to shore based anti-ship missile or gunfire.
How does removing the well deck from an Amphib ship enhance Amphibious capability? If you want an "escort carrier" for the Amphib Group....design build that particular ship and not modify an existing design that at best is only a compromise!
Some body is spending a pot full of taxpayer's money on a flawed concept!
The EFV program died after Tens of Billions of Dollars being wasted.
That knocked the third leg out from under the stool as I see it.
If the main justification for the Osprey was O-T-H , then how does the USMC use that argument now?
The Navy does not want to expose its ships to shore based anti-ship missile or gunfire.
How does removing the well deck from an Amphib ship enhance Amphibious capability? If you want an "escort carrier" for the Amphib Group....design build that particular ship and not modify an existing design that at best is only a compromise!
Some body is spending a pot full of taxpayer's money on a flawed concept!
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If you want an "escort carrier" for the Amphib Group....design build that particular ship and not modify an existing design that at best is only a compromise!
The Navy Dept. and tis subset, the USMC, did prefer a larger, all new desing for the America ships class. They had to compromise for budgetary reasons.
...and also to dodge friction with people opposed to changes in military technology and concepts of operation. That's not an escort carrier, Senator. It's an LHA(R)!
Now Senator, ah, moving on to your questions about 8 inch and 16 inch gun naval fire support ...
The Navy Dept. and tis subset, the USMC, did prefer a larger, all new desing for the America ships class. They had to compromise for budgetary reasons.
...and also to dodge friction with people opposed to changes in military technology and concepts of operation. That's not an escort carrier, Senator. It's an LHA(R)!
Now Senator, ah, moving on to your questions about 8 inch and 16 inch gun naval fire support ...
What gun support? What does the USN have that can provide Naval Gunfire support from 20-25 miles offshore?
This whole thing is a myth!
This whole thing is a myth!
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And rightfully so...
The Osprey’s never-ending P.R. problem
By Philip Ewing Thursday, April 21st, 2011 10:24 am
Posted in Air
On Wednesday, as it does like clockwork every few weeks, the New York Times editorial page called for DoD to eliminate the V-22 Osprey. In a get-tough writeup about how the Obama administration must make big cuts to the defense budget, the editors wrote this: “Eliminating the Marine Corps’ costly and accident-prone V-22 Osprey vertical take off and landing aircraft would save another $10 billion to $12 billion.” The Times editorial board has been far from the only voice to target the Osprey this year; it has been in the crosshairs of white paper after white paper on the budget situation.
But as commentators and opinion-makers have continued to despise what they call an unsafe aircraft, military officials say the Osprey is meeting or exceeding all their needs. The Marine Corps and Air Force hit 100,000 hours of Osprey flight last month, and according to safety records quoted by Boeing, the Osprey has the lowest rate of Class A mishaps of any Marine rotary-wing aircraft in the past 10 years. (But beware: As we’ve learned, DoD statistics can mean anything you want.) This month, Marine Corps Ospreys made their longest-ever flights, covering some 2,800 miles from Afghanistan to Souda Bay, Crete, where they went on to rejoin the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge. Anecdotally, many troops love the Osprey — it has become just another airplane in the war zone.
And yet the V-22 still carries a stigma from the decades it took to develop, as well as the infamous 2000 crash that killed 19 Marines. A decade later, many people prefer to continue viewing the Osprey as a dangerous experiment, rather than an operational aircraft that has flown thousands of missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti and elsewhere. Compared to the aircraft it replaced — the Marines’ legendary, leaky old CH-46 Sea Knight — the Osprey may have to serve decades more before it can be accepted in its own right.
What do you think — is all the skepticism justified given the Osprey’s checkered past and unconventional nature? Or should people start cutting the big birds some slack?
Read more: DoD Buzz | The Osprey’s never-ending P.R. problem
DoDBuzz.com
By Philip Ewing Thursday, April 21st, 2011 10:24 am
Posted in Air
On Wednesday, as it does like clockwork every few weeks, the New York Times editorial page called for DoD to eliminate the V-22 Osprey. In a get-tough writeup about how the Obama administration must make big cuts to the defense budget, the editors wrote this: “Eliminating the Marine Corps’ costly and accident-prone V-22 Osprey vertical take off and landing aircraft would save another $10 billion to $12 billion.” The Times editorial board has been far from the only voice to target the Osprey this year; it has been in the crosshairs of white paper after white paper on the budget situation.
But as commentators and opinion-makers have continued to despise what they call an unsafe aircraft, military officials say the Osprey is meeting or exceeding all their needs. The Marine Corps and Air Force hit 100,000 hours of Osprey flight last month, and according to safety records quoted by Boeing, the Osprey has the lowest rate of Class A mishaps of any Marine rotary-wing aircraft in the past 10 years. (But beware: As we’ve learned, DoD statistics can mean anything you want.) This month, Marine Corps Ospreys made their longest-ever flights, covering some 2,800 miles from Afghanistan to Souda Bay, Crete, where they went on to rejoin the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge. Anecdotally, many troops love the Osprey — it has become just another airplane in the war zone.
And yet the V-22 still carries a stigma from the decades it took to develop, as well as the infamous 2000 crash that killed 19 Marines. A decade later, many people prefer to continue viewing the Osprey as a dangerous experiment, rather than an operational aircraft that has flown thousands of missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti and elsewhere. Compared to the aircraft it replaced — the Marines’ legendary, leaky old CH-46 Sea Knight — the Osprey may have to serve decades more before it can be accepted in its own right.
What do you think — is all the skepticism justified given the Osprey’s checkered past and unconventional nature? Or should people start cutting the big birds some slack?
Read more: DoD Buzz | The Osprey’s never-ending P.R. problem
DoDBuzz.com
$50 Million UH-60's?
The V-22 looks a bargain against against the now $50M apiece UH-60 that Sweden bought. I guess it is half the cost of the $120M or so S-92 the Canadians have not received.
The Sultan
The Sultan
The Government of Sweden has requested a possible sale of 15 UH-60M BLACKHAWK Helicopters, 34 T700-GE-701D General Electric Engines (30 installed and 4 spares), 15 AN/AAR-57(V)3 Common Missile Warning Systems, AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets, Aviation Mission Planning Station, transportable operations simulator, communications equipment, spare and repair parts, tools and support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $546M.
Read the GAO report about the Osprey....way too long to post the pertinent sections re cost, cost over run, under peformance, un-suitability for tasks, comparative costs for the aircraft being replaced......and on and on.
GAO-09-482, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments
Is that Texas or Marine Math you are using there Pard?
Last edited by SASless; 26th Apr 2011 at 03:30.
Well played, SAS, referencing a 2 year old document, itself referencing 3 year old data to come to its conclusions regarding the suitability of the V-22 in theater.
Meanwhile, in the real world, the V22 essentially "flew in the face" of the GAOs conclusions in its deployments since 2008, with 50,000 of the 100,000 fleet flight hours occuring in the last two years. So, I suppose lowest cost per seat mile, safest rotorcraft in Marine inventory, increased readiness rates, etc etc dont mean a thing if you want to continue to set up the historical strawman of past issues.
Might as well have thrown the baby out with the bathwater on the Blackhawk too, eh? As you may or may not recall, the first S-70 prototype 73-21650 crashed in 1976 with 14 people on board who luckily survived, only for the exact same airframe to crash again in 1978 in Stratford killing 4 sikorsky employees. That was an entirely conventional helicopter. And can we even count how many TR failures and horrific crashes there have been with the CH53 series? Just ask the Israelis.
And suppose you do eliminate the V22. Whats your alternative? The 53K? Which now has a unit cost of $55-65 million, itself already delayed? Its barely out of (a rather suspect) CDR. How is its success such a foregone conclusion?
Meanwhile, in the real world, the V22 essentially "flew in the face" of the GAOs conclusions in its deployments since 2008, with 50,000 of the 100,000 fleet flight hours occuring in the last two years. So, I suppose lowest cost per seat mile, safest rotorcraft in Marine inventory, increased readiness rates, etc etc dont mean a thing if you want to continue to set up the historical strawman of past issues.
Might as well have thrown the baby out with the bathwater on the Blackhawk too, eh? As you may or may not recall, the first S-70 prototype 73-21650 crashed in 1976 with 14 people on board who luckily survived, only for the exact same airframe to crash again in 1978 in Stratford killing 4 sikorsky employees. That was an entirely conventional helicopter. And can we even count how many TR failures and horrific crashes there have been with the CH53 series? Just ask the Israelis.
And suppose you do eliminate the V22. Whats your alternative? The 53K? Which now has a unit cost of $55-65 million, itself already delayed? Its barely out of (a rather suspect) CDR. How is its success such a foregone conclusion?
Awlright Sans....
What is the per unit cost of the MV-22, CV-22? Tell us your numbers.
How do you respond to the GAO's questions about Out Year funding costs in the current Fiscal situation we find our Country confronting?
Expound on just why we need the Osprey in light of the now defunct EFV and removal of Well Decks from several of the new LHA's....both of which shoot the Over the Horizon Amphib Assault concept squarely in the ass...if you would please?
The Navy has zero capability to provide Naval Gunfire in the support of Marines engaged in an OTH beach assault....does that also not show the OTH to be a darn myth and a bullcorn way to justify many Billions of tax payers money for something that just plain don't exist....that being the ability of the USMC and the US Navy to perform OTH Amphibious Assault DESPITE all the money spent so far....and that which is going to be spent in this pursuit of a way to justify a Marine Corps based upon Amphibious Assault.
Take a step back....and look at the "big" picture....not just the Osprey all by itself....the whole OTH thing reeks of something that ain't Rosewater and Flowers does it not?
If one accepts the fact there is no OTH Capability in the cards (remember the lack of amtracs that can get to the beach in a timely safe manner from over the horizion) then CONVENTIONAL aircraft nicely fit the ACTUAL need.
Or do they not in your view?
Outside OTH capability....we are still using a variant of the techiques used in the days of the whaleboat and Ship's landing forces with the additon of Vertical Envelopment techiques which the USMC pioneered and the Army perfected.
At what costs to the Nation do we continue with this mythological OTH concept? If we bin the OTH effort....what is actually lost that we cannot live without?
Tell us please.....I am sure lots of folks would participate in an honest debate on this.
What is the per unit cost of the MV-22, CV-22? Tell us your numbers.
How do you respond to the GAO's questions about Out Year funding costs in the current Fiscal situation we find our Country confronting?
Expound on just why we need the Osprey in light of the now defunct EFV and removal of Well Decks from several of the new LHA's....both of which shoot the Over the Horizon Amphib Assault concept squarely in the ass...if you would please?
The Navy has zero capability to provide Naval Gunfire in the support of Marines engaged in an OTH beach assault....does that also not show the OTH to be a darn myth and a bullcorn way to justify many Billions of tax payers money for something that just plain don't exist....that being the ability of the USMC and the US Navy to perform OTH Amphibious Assault DESPITE all the money spent so far....and that which is going to be spent in this pursuit of a way to justify a Marine Corps based upon Amphibious Assault.
Take a step back....and look at the "big" picture....not just the Osprey all by itself....the whole OTH thing reeks of something that ain't Rosewater and Flowers does it not?
If one accepts the fact there is no OTH Capability in the cards (remember the lack of amtracs that can get to the beach in a timely safe manner from over the horizion) then CONVENTIONAL aircraft nicely fit the ACTUAL need.
Or do they not in your view?
Outside OTH capability....we are still using a variant of the techiques used in the days of the whaleboat and Ship's landing forces with the additon of Vertical Envelopment techiques which the USMC pioneered and the Army perfected.
At what costs to the Nation do we continue with this mythological OTH concept? If we bin the OTH effort....what is actually lost that we cannot live without?
Tell us please.....I am sure lots of folks would participate in an honest debate on this.
We all know that "per unit cost" talk can be skewed by however you slice up the pie due to R&D, maintenance, build quantity, and the myriad costs associated with production. The current usually-agreed-upon values for the V22 are typically around $65-70 million a piece, but if you use the GAO calculations from 2007 then it looks like $93 million.
Im not totally qualified to speak about the Marine's ideas about the OTH philosophy. I suppose I trust that the Marines understand their own evolving requirements enough to ask for the capabilities, and that the requirements are fluid and evolutionary over time. What isnt in question is that the capability provided by the Osprey is highly valued within the Marines and AFSOC. Does that jive with OTH, and are they mutually dependent? I dont think its as relevent as you do.
btw EFV is not dead, it has changed names to MPC/ACV and the new program is being fast tracked (no pun intended) for 2014 at last mention.
Even IF OTH were completely abandoned, my original question remains. What are your alternatives for the V22? Should we just piss away the investment (like VXX times 10) made over the last 2 decades just when the aircraft is hitting its stride as evidenced by repeated good performances in the field and the capability it provides AFSOC and Marine commanders? Do we reopen the CH46 lines or what?
To me, it looks like the argument against the Osprey has shifted with the winds of its successes. No longer can people just hammer away on it being unsafe or unsuccessful in the field. The criticism has turned into attacking the tactical philosophy behind the Marines original requirement for the V22 in the first place.
Im not totally qualified to speak about the Marine's ideas about the OTH philosophy. I suppose I trust that the Marines understand their own evolving requirements enough to ask for the capabilities, and that the requirements are fluid and evolutionary over time. What isnt in question is that the capability provided by the Osprey is highly valued within the Marines and AFSOC. Does that jive with OTH, and are they mutually dependent? I dont think its as relevent as you do.
btw EFV is not dead, it has changed names to MPC/ACV and the new program is being fast tracked (no pun intended) for 2014 at last mention.
Even IF OTH were completely abandoned, my original question remains. What are your alternatives for the V22? Should we just piss away the investment (like VXX times 10) made over the last 2 decades just when the aircraft is hitting its stride as evidenced by repeated good performances in the field and the capability it provides AFSOC and Marine commanders? Do we reopen the CH46 lines or what?
To me, it looks like the argument against the Osprey has shifted with the winds of its successes. No longer can people just hammer away on it being unsafe or unsuccessful in the field. The criticism has turned into attacking the tactical philosophy behind the Marines original requirement for the V22 in the first place.