S76 down in Baltic Sea (Now incl NTSB Safety Recommendation)
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Thanks after re reading the article I see the servo had 2,200 hrs since overhaul. Would the plasma spray be a standard repair to an oversized housing ?
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Within our company it is a requirement for the stick jump and interlock check first flight of the day and a stick jump after every subsequent start. Maybe this would have picked up the suspect servo.
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What price safety
Always sad when you see folk trying to deal with the internal trauma effect that a fatal accident has within an operating company.
The possible demise of Copterline serves to underline the old adage
"If you think safety is expensive - try having an accident".
Estimates we use to illustrate the costs of such an event are between $150m and $250m.
Anybody from management reading this I hope will give people like Dr Steve Walters a call and get him to build you a Safety Management System. No better time like now to get investment cash out of the CEO and the shareholders. The most important aspect of a successful SMS is "buy-in" from the management and now is a good time to get on the bandwagon.
Terrible when something like this happens but at least something good may come of it if a lot of folk get wise to the "cheap and cheerful" philosophy.
G
The possible demise of Copterline serves to underline the old adage
"If you think safety is expensive - try having an accident".
Estimates we use to illustrate the costs of such an event are between $150m and $250m.
Anybody from management reading this I hope will give people like Dr Steve Walters a call and get him to build you a Safety Management System. No better time like now to get investment cash out of the CEO and the shareholders. The most important aspect of a successful SMS is "buy-in" from the management and now is a good time to get on the bandwagon.
Terrible when something like this happens but at least something good may come of it if a lot of folk get wise to the "cheap and cheerful" philosophy.
G
How long does it take to do a stick jump check?
Once in fourteen starts?
Would I know a "bad" indication if I saw it....and would I report it immediately?
.....or would I say to myself...."Ah...that is not so bad....I'll tell the Engineers about it when I get back."
Once in fourteen starts?
Would I know a "bad" indication if I saw it....and would I report it immediately?
.....or would I say to myself...."Ah...that is not so bad....I'll tell the Engineers about it when I get back."
Avoid imitations
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The Flight Manual says "no stick jump" during the pre-flight hydraulics check. I am absolutely certain this means nothing other than just that. That's what I have always been led to understand, especially on the S-76.
I've never found any problem with the hydraulics (of any helicopter) apart from leaks / pressure loss and so it is easy to become complacent. However, in view of this report I will personally be even more vigilant during these particular checks. I will also be more concerned about the possible implications of an in flight "Servo Jam" warning.
I recall a Chinook crash in the Falklands Islands, about twenty years ago, that killed some colleagues of mine in similar circumstances to this accident. That aircraft nosed over to the vertical from 1,000ft on a post maintenance test flight and went straight in. No conclusive evidence was found although there was some discussion about manufacturing standards / specification and matching of critical hydraulic components. Perhaps there is more we must learn here.
I've never found any problem with the hydraulics (of any helicopter) apart from leaks / pressure loss and so it is easy to become complacent. However, in view of this report I will personally be even more vigilant during these particular checks. I will also be more concerned about the possible implications of an in flight "Servo Jam" warning.
I recall a Chinook crash in the Falklands Islands, about twenty years ago, that killed some colleagues of mine in similar circumstances to this accident. That aircraft nosed over to the vertical from 1,000ft on a post maintenance test flight and went straight in. No conclusive evidence was found although there was some discussion about manufacturing standards / specification and matching of critical hydraulic components. Perhaps there is more we must learn here.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 20th Nov 2005 at 19:08.
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A stick jump check takes all of 15 seconds... checking for control binding, roughness, proper tip path, control jump between systems... we have been doing them before each flight for a good 15 years in our fleet... one of the largest in the world.
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Sikorsky AOL
Sikorsky have issued an AOL stating that they do not recommend following the NTSB's advice. The cause of the accident is still under investigation.
G
G
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NTSB v Sikorsky
When the Copterline tragedy occurred Sikorsky eventually (after a significant delay) circulated a letter advising of `an S76 mishap`.12 dead - some mishap!
Now the NTSB has identified what it believes to be a good reason for immediate checks to be carried out on the aircraft, yet Sikorsky are quibbling about interpretation of test results and recommending a wait and see policy.
Imagine the fun and games the lawyers will have should another S76 mishap occur whilst we are waiting for Sikorsky and the FAA to find the same page in the hymn book.
Perhaps a note to Eric Hansen, S76 Program Manager at Sikorsky might help.
Now the NTSB has identified what it believes to be a good reason for immediate checks to be carried out on the aircraft, yet Sikorsky are quibbling about interpretation of test results and recommending a wait and see policy.
Imagine the fun and games the lawyers will have should another S76 mishap occur whilst we are waiting for Sikorsky and the FAA to find the same page in the hymn book.
Perhaps a note to Eric Hansen, S76 Program Manager at Sikorsky might help.
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On another note, if the NTSB is right, and the servo was the problem, if the pilot had turn off the proper hydraulic system, it is possible that he will regain control.
Cheers
FH
Cheers
FH
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Might be old news, but I just found this on AIN...
NTSB: ’Urgent’ Action Needed on Sikorsky S-76
An ongoing investigation into the August 10 fatal crash of an S-76C+ in the Baltic Sea has led the NTSB to ask the FAA to take “urgent” action on several recommendations. Flight-data recordings show that the twin-turbine helicopter “pitched up and rolled to the left, followed by a series of rotations to the right before striking the water,” killing all 14 aboard. The investigation to date revealed that one of three main-rotor blade hydraulic actuators had an “uncommanded” extension, resulting in loss of control. Subsequent investigation found a “number of serious discrepancies within the forward actuator.” The Safety Board wants the FAA to require S-76 operators to conduct immediate and recurring tests and corrections for hydraulic leakage and contamination in all of the main rotor actuators with more than 500 hours since new or overhaul. Additionally, the NTSB wants the FAA to reemphasize to S-76 operators the importance of, and requirement for, a preflight check of control movement smoothness and flight control “stick-jump” at every engine start.
G
NTSB: ’Urgent’ Action Needed on Sikorsky S-76
An ongoing investigation into the August 10 fatal crash of an S-76C+ in the Baltic Sea has led the NTSB to ask the FAA to take “urgent” action on several recommendations. Flight-data recordings show that the twin-turbine helicopter “pitched up and rolled to the left, followed by a series of rotations to the right before striking the water,” killing all 14 aboard. The investigation to date revealed that one of three main-rotor blade hydraulic actuators had an “uncommanded” extension, resulting in loss of control. Subsequent investigation found a “number of serious discrepancies within the forward actuator.” The Safety Board wants the FAA to require S-76 operators to conduct immediate and recurring tests and corrections for hydraulic leakage and contamination in all of the main rotor actuators with more than 500 hours since new or overhaul. Additionally, the NTSB wants the FAA to reemphasize to S-76 operators the importance of, and requirement for, a preflight check of control movement smoothness and flight control “stick-jump” at every engine start.
G
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I, for one, decided to do the stick-jump test for every start, and most takeoffs. It takes all of 2 seconds, and is well worth the time it takes. I would do it for all takeoffs, but I just don't always remember.
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Watch this space
For those have yet to catch up with events you should be aware that the guys at Sikorsky feel that the NTSB was a little premature with their Safety Notice.
Once issued this notice was swiftly followed by a letter to all operators from Sikorsky explaining that they disagreed with the NTSB conclusions.
I've spoken with some guys from the factory and know a little more about it now and I'm sure they will publish their own conclusions as soon as they feel able.
Suffice it to say that when the RFM says that you need to do something then the instruction is not there for fun - the stick-jump check is a must.
G
Once issued this notice was swiftly followed by a letter to all operators from Sikorsky explaining that they disagreed with the NTSB conclusions.
I've spoken with some guys from the factory and know a little more about it now and I'm sure they will publish their own conclusions as soon as they feel able.
Suffice it to say that when the RFM says that you need to do something then the instruction is not there for fun - the stick-jump check is a must.
G
Is it just me or does anyone else feel that this is another of those accidents where everyone feels "Let´s just blame it on the pilots" syndrome is the way out!
We´ll they are not with us anymore to defend them selves so it´s an easy way out.
Has anyone considered that the root cause of the problems is more likely a failure of critical component and that it may or may NOT have been discovered during hyd test! If that component failed it´s just as likely that the FDR failed to register that they perhaps actually DID a stick jump test!
Sure it´s a good idea to do the jump test but just maybe the pilots did it and noticed nothing unusual?
How can similar accident be avoided in the future? Is it by doing the stick jump test always or is it perhaps better to design new components that do not fail!
We´ll they are not with us anymore to defend them selves so it´s an easy way out.
Has anyone considered that the root cause of the problems is more likely a failure of critical component and that it may or may NOT have been discovered during hyd test! If that component failed it´s just as likely that the FDR failed to register that they perhaps actually DID a stick jump test!
Sure it´s a good idea to do the jump test but just maybe the pilots did it and noticed nothing unusual?
How can similar accident be avoided in the future? Is it by doing the stick jump test always or is it perhaps better to design new components that do not fail!
If that component failed it´s just as likely that the FDR failed to register that they perhaps actually DID a stick jump test!
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If the servo actuator itself jammed (as I understand is suspected), not just a jammed pilot valve (as would be indicated by the SERVO JAM warning light mentioned in an earlier post), control of that A/C could not be maintained by any pilot, I would think. Something you don't train for, there is nothing you could do about it. Imagine, any movement of the controls would move only two out of the three actuators, leaving the swash plate fixed at the ceased actuator, giving control responses that would be completely unpredictable to a flying pilot. Add the AFCS giving inputs, some of which would be fed back to the controls, and all through the mixing unit, things get ugly really fast. Catastrophic single point failures, yikes.