Spatial Disorientation
Better red than ...
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: Appleby-in-Westmorland Cumbria England
Posts: 1,412
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Banjo
Quite agree. IMHO realistically it is about effective supervision of low time pilots after PPL so that people are flying alone in increasingly more challenging situations, within their competency range.
The challenge is where supervision is not welcome because a low time pilot has purchased a helicopter and operate outside of the flying club/ hire/ experienced group boundary.
At the same time, most (all?) of fatal UK R44 accidents since '94 have involved higher hour pilots (usually IMC + Night conditions), hence the first question about "what to do, what if".
IMHO again, it is on the boundary of day VFR that the biggest 'did'nt see it coming' risk occurs because of early morning fog not cleared or rising fog just after CET.
VFRP (PRB) you know there are 60+ aircraft wreaks in the Dark Peak, all of whom 'missed' missing the top by about 30 feet. But not one helicopter (and lets keep it that way).
h-r
the question might better be “how can we teach pilots to be more flexible in their decision making process and improve their judgment so as to prevent them from placing themselves in such a position?”
The challenge is where supervision is not welcome because a low time pilot has purchased a helicopter and operate outside of the flying club/ hire/ experienced group boundary.
At the same time, most (all?) of fatal UK R44 accidents since '94 have involved higher hour pilots (usually IMC + Night conditions), hence the first question about "what to do, what if".
IMHO again, it is on the boundary of day VFR that the biggest 'did'nt see it coming' risk occurs because of early morning fog not cleared or rising fog just after CET.
VFRP (PRB) you know there are 60+ aircraft wreaks in the Dark Peak, all of whom 'missed' missing the top by about 30 feet. But not one helicopter (and lets keep it that way).
h-r
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It doesn't need the CAA to do anything. It needs more instructors to bang in to heads of their pupils the kind of thing I've said above and to give them some practical experience and training of the hazards of poor weather and how to handle it.
This is a practical issue; use of the mark one eyeball, anticipation, judgement, co-ordination. Just what helo pilots are supposed to be good at.
This is a practical issue; use of the mark one eyeball, anticipation, judgement, co-ordination. Just what helo pilots are supposed to be good at.
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: The Dark Side
Posts: 483
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Many years ago whilst flying with the famous "Speechless One" doing an A2 upgrade, I had a Seaking back to 20 KIAS, SAS out, single engine, actual off Portsmouth to recover the "ball" from the trail - I was very current!! You must be current big time and half-arsed instrument ratings only delay the inevitable.
PS Sim time is great but there is nothing like 100% real aircraft time to sort the men from the boys!!
GAGS
E86
PS Sim time is great but there is nothing like 100% real aircraft time to sort the men from the boys!!
GAGS
E86
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: England/Arizona
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have to say that I would prefer pilots learning not to place themselves in a position of inadvertent IMC rather than being able to just avoid it/escape it if they get in to it.
With certain peoples make up (and owner pilots can be some of the worst) a little experience will make them think they are able to fly in such conditions and one day they and their passengers luck will run out.
Any experienced IFR pilot will tell you that if you do not stay in regular practice you quickly lose your skills. A PPL with little initial training and no recurring training will never have the skills needed to save themselves when lost in IMC. (Don't forget also that a clear night with no ground lighting as can be found in parts of the UK also constitute a dangerous situation where instrument skills may/will be required. (More than one aircraft has flown in to the ground on a clear night due to lack of references flown by both commercial and private pilots).Taught the decision making process that leads them not to launch in the first place in to such conditions will leave them in a much safer place.
This weekend may well be a sad example.
The 206 lost this weekend crashed close to my home. At the time I was contemplating a short motorway trip to visit a friend. As the weather conditions were very bad and I could not see the end of my garden (rain/mist/low cloud and wind) I spent a few minutes deciding if the trip was worth it or not knowing as I do that the motorway would be full of tailgaters driving way to fast for the conditions. This process of weighing up the pro's and cons was for a simple car trip let alone a flight.
The pilot of the Jet Ranger put down in a field after finding the conditions too bad. Sensible choice. It would then appear that after being on the ground for a while for whatever reason he decided to leave the safety of the field and take off again with the result that all on board perished. Why was this decision made? We will never know suckers gap, lack of information, feeling better once on the ground or group decision making process, not always a good idea. A tragedy that flying skills alone could maybe not save but the ability to decide not to fly again in such conditions would mean all would surely have gone home to their families.
I don’t completely disagree with you Rotorspeed but sadly not all instructors teach such behaviour or even have the right attitude themselves. Also once qualified PPL’s need never see the instructor again but a 3 yearly course to attend would at least help to keep the people thinking about the issues. This would have to be something mandated by the CAA as in the commercial world. Also instructors should have more emphasis on teaching such captaincy skills to students.
For those interested I decided not to make the drive as conditions really were awful and the trip was not that important.
Banjo.
P.S. I do not mean to tar all PPL’s or owner pilots with the same brush I am merely generalising based on my experiences there will always be exceptions to any rule. And yes I realise there are ATPL/CPL holders out there just as bad but no system is perfect. Nor do I know for a fact that it was pilot error in the accident and admit to pre-judging the outcome based on the conditions at the time. That is why I said this weekend …..may well….be a sad example. If I turn out to be wrong then I offer my full and unconditional apologies.
With certain peoples make up (and owner pilots can be some of the worst) a little experience will make them think they are able to fly in such conditions and one day they and their passengers luck will run out.
Any experienced IFR pilot will tell you that if you do not stay in regular practice you quickly lose your skills. A PPL with little initial training and no recurring training will never have the skills needed to save themselves when lost in IMC. (Don't forget also that a clear night with no ground lighting as can be found in parts of the UK also constitute a dangerous situation where instrument skills may/will be required. (More than one aircraft has flown in to the ground on a clear night due to lack of references flown by both commercial and private pilots).Taught the decision making process that leads them not to launch in the first place in to such conditions will leave them in a much safer place.
This weekend may well be a sad example.
The 206 lost this weekend crashed close to my home. At the time I was contemplating a short motorway trip to visit a friend. As the weather conditions were very bad and I could not see the end of my garden (rain/mist/low cloud and wind) I spent a few minutes deciding if the trip was worth it or not knowing as I do that the motorway would be full of tailgaters driving way to fast for the conditions. This process of weighing up the pro's and cons was for a simple car trip let alone a flight.
The pilot of the Jet Ranger put down in a field after finding the conditions too bad. Sensible choice. It would then appear that after being on the ground for a while for whatever reason he decided to leave the safety of the field and take off again with the result that all on board perished. Why was this decision made? We will never know suckers gap, lack of information, feeling better once on the ground or group decision making process, not always a good idea. A tragedy that flying skills alone could maybe not save but the ability to decide not to fly again in such conditions would mean all would surely have gone home to their families.
I don’t completely disagree with you Rotorspeed but sadly not all instructors teach such behaviour or even have the right attitude themselves. Also once qualified PPL’s need never see the instructor again but a 3 yearly course to attend would at least help to keep the people thinking about the issues. This would have to be something mandated by the CAA as in the commercial world. Also instructors should have more emphasis on teaching such captaincy skills to students.
For those interested I decided not to make the drive as conditions really were awful and the trip was not that important.
Banjo.
P.S. I do not mean to tar all PPL’s or owner pilots with the same brush I am merely generalising based on my experiences there will always be exceptions to any rule. And yes I realise there are ATPL/CPL holders out there just as bad but no system is perfect. Nor do I know for a fact that it was pilot error in the accident and admit to pre-judging the outcome based on the conditions at the time. That is why I said this weekend …..may well….be a sad example. If I turn out to be wrong then I offer my full and unconditional apologies.
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Florida
Age: 52
Posts: 418
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Very interesting reading.
I shall now share an experience that I had a few weeks ago, that upon reflection was very close to life ending, but has been life changing.
I work for a gentleman who owns his own 206, is a rated pilot with maybe 200 hours flight time. He owns a ranch and the helipad is just shy of 4000 feet msl.
We had been up at the ranch all day and the clouds had what I would define as a very distinct base. You either had cloud or you didn't. We could also see the ocean some 25 miles away, so visibility was not a problem at all. Also the cloud layer ended maybe 5 miles from us and from then on the sky was clear.
We finished doing what we were doing and it was getting late, but I was not bothered about the return journey as we have done it many many times and there was sufficient light to get us out of the hills and over very well lit ground.
The helipad is situated on the top of a hill. We fired up and in my mind the ceiling was maybe 200 feet above us, so once again no problem. We would pick up and go off the pad and drop straight down in to the valley, which I knew was clear because we had just driven up it, and away, as I have done so before. By this time the main consideration was failing light rather than clouds.
Anyway to my surprise (I'm left seat, my boss right seat flying) we pick up and go straight. This takes us toward high ground, the top of which looked as though it was clear. As we climbed up, maybe 100 feet agl , to my surprise we started getting the tell tale 'whispy bits' of cloud coming past the bubble. I immediatley said "Stop climbing" thinking he would get the collective down and start a right turn to take us away down the valley. No response from the right seat.
By this time we were in it. Now I'm not talking low/poor visibility here. I'm talking full on IMC. To compound the problem the landing light was on, which fills the cockpit with an eerie white light. Now straight away we start a left turn. I tell him "We're turning! we're turning!" " Which way?!" he replies. The initial turn I felt 'seat of my pants' and confirmed it by looking over at the artificial horizon. Now as if the situation wasn't bad enough already the bulb on the artificial horizon was burned out. We were, I estimate, in a 45 degree left turn. Experience tells me that to the left there is a rather large hill. Luckily there was sufficient light that I could just make out the instrument. Maybe it was a good thing the landing light was on.
At this point I grab the aircraft from him, yelling " Get off, Get off!" as he had somewhat frozen up.
I pulled us back around to the right and remember looking at the artificial horizon and seeing that we were now in a gentle right turn. I have no idea what any of the other instruments were doing.
Through sheer good fortune, luck, God's good grace, whatever you might want to call it, we popped out in to a sucker hole after what seemed like an eternity. Straight away I bottomed the collective and descended. I remember seeing the ground as black in front of me and saying "Oh S**t" as my depth perception was messed up and by now the light was very bad. Luckily I saw a lake beneath me which indicated I was a good 750 agl. The more we dropped the better visibility became and I levelled off and we flew home.
So lessons learned from that? I don't even know where to start. Primarily I shouldn't have let the situation get as out of hand as it did. I have about 3200 hours all in helicopters and am instrument and commercially rated and also have an instructor ticket. In my opinion I was very slow in my reaction time. As soon as I saw the clouds coming past the bubble, rather than saying something, I should have done something i.e. get on the controls straight away. I also in the failing light underestimated the cloud base, thinking it was higher than it was. The entry in to the clouds was immediate. There was no gradual loss of visibility. It happened in a couple of seconds.
We are fitting a new artificial horizon. We have set ourselves an absolute latest time of departure. ( I live on the ranch, so was in no hurry to be going anywhere)
I remember thinking as we were fully in the clouds what a stupid way to kill myself and that frankly I knew better. I was honestly resigned to the fact that we were screwed and can promise you that the feeling that you get as you wait to slam into the ground is very, very unpleasant, particularly as you can't see anything.
Luckily a few days before I had done an instrument refresher course. Whether that helped or not I don't know. The thing is that it all happened so damn fast. From lift off to popping out into the sucker hole was maybe 2 minutes. As someone wrote earlier it is the transition from outside to inside that messes you up. When you are training you are ready for it to happen, so there is no surprise. When it happens for real and is unexpected you frankly crap yourself.
I consider myself to be very fortunate to have got out of it alive, primarily because we were so close to the ground having just lifted off.
I have also heard the last words of a student pilot caught under a cloud layer in an R22. The last words that he said were" I'm going to try and get on top." It took three weeks to find him in the ocean.
The most important lesson of all though is: DON'T GET IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE!
I shall now share an experience that I had a few weeks ago, that upon reflection was very close to life ending, but has been life changing.
I work for a gentleman who owns his own 206, is a rated pilot with maybe 200 hours flight time. He owns a ranch and the helipad is just shy of 4000 feet msl.
We had been up at the ranch all day and the clouds had what I would define as a very distinct base. You either had cloud or you didn't. We could also see the ocean some 25 miles away, so visibility was not a problem at all. Also the cloud layer ended maybe 5 miles from us and from then on the sky was clear.
We finished doing what we were doing and it was getting late, but I was not bothered about the return journey as we have done it many many times and there was sufficient light to get us out of the hills and over very well lit ground.
The helipad is situated on the top of a hill. We fired up and in my mind the ceiling was maybe 200 feet above us, so once again no problem. We would pick up and go off the pad and drop straight down in to the valley, which I knew was clear because we had just driven up it, and away, as I have done so before. By this time the main consideration was failing light rather than clouds.
Anyway to my surprise (I'm left seat, my boss right seat flying) we pick up and go straight. This takes us toward high ground, the top of which looked as though it was clear. As we climbed up, maybe 100 feet agl , to my surprise we started getting the tell tale 'whispy bits' of cloud coming past the bubble. I immediatley said "Stop climbing" thinking he would get the collective down and start a right turn to take us away down the valley. No response from the right seat.
By this time we were in it. Now I'm not talking low/poor visibility here. I'm talking full on IMC. To compound the problem the landing light was on, which fills the cockpit with an eerie white light. Now straight away we start a left turn. I tell him "We're turning! we're turning!" " Which way?!" he replies. The initial turn I felt 'seat of my pants' and confirmed it by looking over at the artificial horizon. Now as if the situation wasn't bad enough already the bulb on the artificial horizon was burned out. We were, I estimate, in a 45 degree left turn. Experience tells me that to the left there is a rather large hill. Luckily there was sufficient light that I could just make out the instrument. Maybe it was a good thing the landing light was on.
At this point I grab the aircraft from him, yelling " Get off, Get off!" as he had somewhat frozen up.
I pulled us back around to the right and remember looking at the artificial horizon and seeing that we were now in a gentle right turn. I have no idea what any of the other instruments were doing.
Through sheer good fortune, luck, God's good grace, whatever you might want to call it, we popped out in to a sucker hole after what seemed like an eternity. Straight away I bottomed the collective and descended. I remember seeing the ground as black in front of me and saying "Oh S**t" as my depth perception was messed up and by now the light was very bad. Luckily I saw a lake beneath me which indicated I was a good 750 agl. The more we dropped the better visibility became and I levelled off and we flew home.
So lessons learned from that? I don't even know where to start. Primarily I shouldn't have let the situation get as out of hand as it did. I have about 3200 hours all in helicopters and am instrument and commercially rated and also have an instructor ticket. In my opinion I was very slow in my reaction time. As soon as I saw the clouds coming past the bubble, rather than saying something, I should have done something i.e. get on the controls straight away. I also in the failing light underestimated the cloud base, thinking it was higher than it was. The entry in to the clouds was immediate. There was no gradual loss of visibility. It happened in a couple of seconds.
We are fitting a new artificial horizon. We have set ourselves an absolute latest time of departure. ( I live on the ranch, so was in no hurry to be going anywhere)
I remember thinking as we were fully in the clouds what a stupid way to kill myself and that frankly I knew better. I was honestly resigned to the fact that we were screwed and can promise you that the feeling that you get as you wait to slam into the ground is very, very unpleasant, particularly as you can't see anything.
Luckily a few days before I had done an instrument refresher course. Whether that helped or not I don't know. The thing is that it all happened so damn fast. From lift off to popping out into the sucker hole was maybe 2 minutes. As someone wrote earlier it is the transition from outside to inside that messes you up. When you are training you are ready for it to happen, so there is no surprise. When it happens for real and is unexpected you frankly crap yourself.
I consider myself to be very fortunate to have got out of it alive, primarily because we were so close to the ground having just lifted off.
I have also heard the last words of a student pilot caught under a cloud layer in an R22. The last words that he said were" I'm going to try and get on top." It took three weeks to find him in the ocean.
The most important lesson of all though is: DON'T GET IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE!
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: Australia
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A very though provoking thread. I can only echo the sentiments of those out there advising against unplanned IMC in that avoiding it is the best cure for it. Land if you have to and wait for an improvement in the weather.
There seem to be some on here that consider that going unplanned IMC while not trained to instrument fly will solve the danger posed by the weather. All you have done is traded one simple problem for a much tougher one. If you manage to control the aircraft and keep it under control, eventually you will have to land before the fuel runs out. That means an instrument approach, if the weather is good enough. If not you could end up right back where you started.
I am a reasonably experienced rotary wing instrument pilot. In a former life I was an Instrument Rating Examiner for the organisation I worked for. IMHO, the toughest instrument flying you will ever do, even if you are fully trained and current, is fly into IMC unplanned and get your butt safely back on the ground. This is especially so if you are single pilot without any AFCS.
Do not be afraid to turn back or land in the face of bad weather.
Press on itis occurs because people get away with it. Just because you got through the bad weather once does not make it safe. You can expect that whatever angels were sitting on your shoulder at that particular time will desert you if you fail to learn the lessons of pressing when you should turn back.
There seem to be some on here that consider that going unplanned IMC while not trained to instrument fly will solve the danger posed by the weather. All you have done is traded one simple problem for a much tougher one. If you manage to control the aircraft and keep it under control, eventually you will have to land before the fuel runs out. That means an instrument approach, if the weather is good enough. If not you could end up right back where you started.
I am a reasonably experienced rotary wing instrument pilot. In a former life I was an Instrument Rating Examiner for the organisation I worked for. IMHO, the toughest instrument flying you will ever do, even if you are fully trained and current, is fly into IMC unplanned and get your butt safely back on the ground. This is especially so if you are single pilot without any AFCS.
Do not be afraid to turn back or land in the face of bad weather.
Press on itis occurs because people get away with it. Just because you got through the bad weather once does not make it safe. You can expect that whatever angels were sitting on your shoulder at that particular time will desert you if you fail to learn the lessons of pressing when you should turn back.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Wembury, Devon
Age: 51
Posts: 69
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am a low time private pilot (100 hours) and own a R44 and am hence not restricted by the self hire 2500' cloud base, 2 kt winds etc constraints. I guess that puts me in a dangerous group of accidents waiting to happen.
Having read umpteen accident reports, 'fatal traps', done the robinson safety course etc, I know that clouds=death. However, I have flown with two separate instructors in marginal conditions and have gone momentarily imc both times. Knowing clouds=death I s**t myself both times and questioned wether these instructors were wrong to expose me to these conditions hence encouraging me to fly on my own in similar weather.
As a novice pilot I am ever hungry for experience and am glad to have experienced those conditions with an instructor and not on my own and feel I am better pilot as a result of it.
I feel the 5 hours learning instrument flying would be better spent flying in marginal conditions with an experienced instructor learning how to maintain vmc (ie. go lower and slower etc.).
However, having witnessed a guy jump out of an R44 yesterday with wife and two small boys and 'dog' and rotors still winding down, boys running under tail boom (I kid you not), I guess some people will kill themselves no matter what you try and teach them. No wonder us owner pilots get a bad reputation.
Having read umpteen accident reports, 'fatal traps', done the robinson safety course etc, I know that clouds=death. However, I have flown with two separate instructors in marginal conditions and have gone momentarily imc both times. Knowing clouds=death I s**t myself both times and questioned wether these instructors were wrong to expose me to these conditions hence encouraging me to fly on my own in similar weather.
As a novice pilot I am ever hungry for experience and am glad to have experienced those conditions with an instructor and not on my own and feel I am better pilot as a result of it.
I feel the 5 hours learning instrument flying would be better spent flying in marginal conditions with an experienced instructor learning how to maintain vmc (ie. go lower and slower etc.).
However, having witnessed a guy jump out of an R44 yesterday with wife and two small boys and 'dog' and rotors still winding down, boys running under tail boom (I kid you not), I guess some people will kill themselves no matter what you try and teach them. No wonder us owner pilots get a bad reputation.
I set a rule for myself a long time ago....for VMC flight at night, in bad weather, and over mountainous terrain.....any one is okay but no more than one at a time. When corporate flying in the mountains east of Seattle....and returning to home at night...my rule was cast in stone....off the pad...through the pass and in the well lit flatter ground by official night time. No debate...no argument...no discussion. If the execs wante to palavver past the deadline...we went to a local motel and flew home the next morning.
After scaring the bejesus out of all us when in a weak moment I let them convince me to fly in some windy and bumpy weather...we came to an unspoken plan that when the pilot said not today....they took their cars and not the helicopter.
All it takes is one moment of in-attention or loss of situational awareness for any reason and you can be in serious trouble quicker than a taxi driver will accept a tip.
After scaring the bejesus out of all us when in a weak moment I let them convince me to fly in some windy and bumpy weather...we came to an unspoken plan that when the pilot said not today....they took their cars and not the helicopter.
All it takes is one moment of in-attention or loss of situational awareness for any reason and you can be in serious trouble quicker than a taxi driver will accept a tip.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Out there somewhere
Posts: 353
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having just read all the replies on this subject I would like to say thank you lads. The experience you are passing on is invaluble and I'm glad you are all here to share it.
I am only a 100 hour student doing my stage 2 instrument. I have never doubted the value of learning to fly by instruments alone, but I have since learned by just being in the FTD that if I ever have the missfortune of flying into the fluffy stuff then I at least know how to get my arse back down to the ground, cos thats where I want to be!
Thanks again. I look forward to reading more!
I am only a 100 hour student doing my stage 2 instrument. I have never doubted the value of learning to fly by instruments alone, but I have since learned by just being in the FTD that if I ever have the missfortune of flying into the fluffy stuff then I at least know how to get my arse back down to the ground, cos thats where I want to be!
Thanks again. I look forward to reading more!
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Frankly it is ludicrous to say one suddenly ended up in IMC "with no warning". Nothing is up there but open sky! This is not like the road, where you can come round a corner and suddenly there is an obstruction! Evidence of the visibility ahead is constantly in front of you - provided you look hard enough!
The lack of visibility we are talking about will be simply down to water; either as precipitation (rain) or vapour (cloud). Cloud just not materialise instantly out of nowhere, it builds up. OK, sometimes quite quickly, but not in seconds!
Apart from freak conditions - and we're not talking about that here - imminent IMC entry is always predictable, provided you don't just sit there, fat, dumb and happy, steaming on in decreasing vis, too fast, without being fully aware of what's building up.
Keep a sensible minimium vis, depending on your experience, say 2000m, and whenever this decreases, especially rapidly, do a 180 and take stock of the situation. And get that speed down - you'll spot the problem earlier and you'll be able to do a tighter 180 to avoid it sooner.
The lack of visibility we are talking about will be simply down to water; either as precipitation (rain) or vapour (cloud). Cloud just not materialise instantly out of nowhere, it builds up. OK, sometimes quite quickly, but not in seconds!
Apart from freak conditions - and we're not talking about that here - imminent IMC entry is always predictable, provided you don't just sit there, fat, dumb and happy, steaming on in decreasing vis, too fast, without being fully aware of what's building up.
Keep a sensible minimium vis, depending on your experience, say 2000m, and whenever this decreases, especially rapidly, do a 180 and take stock of the situation. And get that speed down - you'll spot the problem earlier and you'll be able to do a tighter 180 to avoid it sooner.
rotorspeed:
You do not need freak conditions and you can have 10 miles of visibility to get into a situation where all outside reference is lost. Flying in the winter in Alaska, in the mountains or over water with an overcast is an eyeopener . There was one accident where a company lost 3 ships on the same glacier on the same day. Fortunately nobody was killed, but those three pilots where neither inexperienced nor stupid.
And reducing your speed isn't always a solution, because at lower speeds a helicopter is less stable.
I can tell you from my own experience, that sometimes it just takes a second to get into very dangerous situations just because you look in the wrong direction. I admit, that I should have turned around way earlier, but 30 seconds before that, the situation wasn't all that bad and I could still see for miles.
Never ever follow a more experienced pilot because you trust him. Take your own decisions.
You do not need freak conditions and you can have 10 miles of visibility to get into a situation where all outside reference is lost. Flying in the winter in Alaska, in the mountains or over water with an overcast is an eyeopener . There was one accident where a company lost 3 ships on the same glacier on the same day. Fortunately nobody was killed, but those three pilots where neither inexperienced nor stupid.
And reducing your speed isn't always a solution, because at lower speeds a helicopter is less stable.
I can tell you from my own experience, that sometimes it just takes a second to get into very dangerous situations just because you look in the wrong direction. I admit, that I should have turned around way earlier, but 30 seconds before that, the situation wasn't all that bad and I could still see for miles.
Never ever follow a more experienced pilot because you trust him. Take your own decisions.
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Florida
Age: 52
Posts: 418
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Rotorspeed - it is very easy to end up IMC with no warning, particularly at night. You simply do not see clouds.
In my situation you're correct, it was ludicrous what happened because we had fantastic visibility. The main problem was that in failing light I underestimated the ceiling height from our point of take off and within 5 or 10 seconds from take off was full IMC. Poor light plays tricks. Trust me, lesson learned.
Although some training is good to get an appreciation of flying under instruments until you have actually flown IMC you have no idea what it is like. I remember that once I had completed my instrument training as far as I was concerned I could have flown through a hurricane. It was not until I actually flew with an experienced pilot IMC that I realised that it is totally different. At that point I reralised a huge lesson: DON'T GET YOURSELF IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE.
To all those taking instrument lessons good luck, but trust me on this one: be under no illusion that you are skilled enough to be able to fly IMC.
You'll only get out of it alive if you're lucky.
In my situation you're correct, it was ludicrous what happened because we had fantastic visibility. The main problem was that in failing light I underestimated the ceiling height from our point of take off and within 5 or 10 seconds from take off was full IMC. Poor light plays tricks. Trust me, lesson learned.
Although some training is good to get an appreciation of flying under instruments until you have actually flown IMC you have no idea what it is like. I remember that once I had completed my instrument training as far as I was concerned I could have flown through a hurricane. It was not until I actually flew with an experienced pilot IMC that I realised that it is totally different. At that point I reralised a huge lesson: DON'T GET YOURSELF IN THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE.
To all those taking instrument lessons good luck, but trust me on this one: be under no illusion that you are skilled enough to be able to fly IMC.
You'll only get out of it alive if you're lucky.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 189
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have been reading this forum for some time but this thread has spurred me to register and reply.
I am feeling quite sick inside and rather happy to still be here judging from the stories above and some of the statistics.
Not long after gaining my licence I took off for a local flight in overcast conditions with a low cloudbase. Suffice it to say that the cloudbase was not well defined and I ended up in IMC. By the time I had looked down at the instruments, I had gained 300' and was in a left turn. Possibly because I had only recently finished the 5hrs of instrument appreciation, I managed to regain control, 180 and get back to VMC. I went straight back home, enough seen for the day. I was happy to just be alive and, having read this thread, I now appreciate just how lucky I was. Not only could I have been responsible for my own death but also my passenger and those on the ground that I could have hit. I have not flow anywhere near clouds or bad vis areas since. Lesson learned.
Whilst the 5hrs of instrument appreciation may have saved me on that occasion, the little bit of knowledge also probably allowed me to go on in conditions that I would otherwise not have. Those 5hrs are now some years away and I expect now useless. I must agree with all the suggestions above that more emphasis should be aimed at teaching the PPL to go nowhere near IMC, it is truly a deathtrap to the non-IFR pilot.
I have learned a lot from this forum. Thank you to you all for sharing your experiance and knowledge, it has great value.
I am feeling quite sick inside and rather happy to still be here judging from the stories above and some of the statistics.
Not long after gaining my licence I took off for a local flight in overcast conditions with a low cloudbase. Suffice it to say that the cloudbase was not well defined and I ended up in IMC. By the time I had looked down at the instruments, I had gained 300' and was in a left turn. Possibly because I had only recently finished the 5hrs of instrument appreciation, I managed to regain control, 180 and get back to VMC. I went straight back home, enough seen for the day. I was happy to just be alive and, having read this thread, I now appreciate just how lucky I was. Not only could I have been responsible for my own death but also my passenger and those on the ground that I could have hit. I have not flow anywhere near clouds or bad vis areas since. Lesson learned.
Whilst the 5hrs of instrument appreciation may have saved me on that occasion, the little bit of knowledge also probably allowed me to go on in conditions that I would otherwise not have. Those 5hrs are now some years away and I expect now useless. I must agree with all the suggestions above that more emphasis should be aimed at teaching the PPL to go nowhere near IMC, it is truly a deathtrap to the non-IFR pilot.
I have learned a lot from this forum. Thank you to you all for sharing your experiance and knowledge, it has great value.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: England/Arizona
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you three blades for your reply. I am sure that there are lots of people reading the posts who never reply to them we can see that from the counters. It is nice however when you get someone like yourself post and let us know that our ramblings are having an effect on some out there and maybe will help a few of the silent readers in their future flying. I have to agree with you that your distant 5 hours training are probably of next to no use to you by now. As you say the only answer is to avoid in the first place completely any instrument conditions flight.
Rotorspeed, I call it instrument conditions flight above because cloud and rain are not the only things to cause you to require flight by sole reference to instruments. As mentioned by Rotorbee there are white out conditions and lack of visible horizon due to haze or lighting and surface conditions. I have flown in Arizona at night and trust me when I say it is very easy to start to wonder which side is up when surrounded by hundreds of square miles of nothing with no ground light at all. You also have smog and industrial effects as well as many other traps which only time and a good instructor can go through for you. To say that it is ludicrous to end up inadvertent instrument flight is sadly not true. Yes some people get there because they had a set of blinkers on but others can arrive at that point who are conscientious pilots and simply got caught out by changing conditions quicker than their pilot/captaincy skills could cope with.
When it comes to accidents of any sort I have one golden rule I teach all my students,
“If you believe it could never happen to you then one day it probably will!!!”
This is for the simple reason that it shows an attitude that belittles the problem and blames such incidents on the pilot concerned and takes the though process no further as to how the various factors (and there are always many) combined to end in a smoking hole in the ground.
As I go through your posts on this subject I find myself wondering if one day we shan’t all be reading about you in a report. I say this not to start an argument but to promote honest inward exploring and thought. I do not know you and may well be wrong about your attitude and if so please accept my fullest apologies. However I am sure that I am not alone amongst the experienced pilots here and that if they are honest several of them have probably also thought the same reading your posts. As an aside, the go slower lower principle is only so useful. The obvious final point of a go slower and lower approach is to end up in a hover from one field to another a “relatively” safe but silly situation to be in. Long before this though on the way down you will have a good chance of hitting wires etc. or whilst going slower you will reduce speed to the point where any stability you may have had has gone and the results are predictable. Never go slower than 40 knots this speed can be faster in different types of A/C.
Anne Tenner I could not agree more. The hardest decision to make is to not fly when others are. The situation you describe of several helicopters departing from one location puts immense pressure on a nervous pilot who would rather not fly to say yes and follow them. (Remember fear is the feeling in your stomach you get when your brain says no and your mouth says yes). We must help to teach pilots to have the knowledge and strength of character to make such decisions.
It is for that reason that I started this thread to encourage the more experienced pilots to air their views in front of the less experienced so that they can see it is more than fine to say no to a flight and stay on the ground no matter what others are doing. It is in fact exactly what you should be doing and there is no shame in it.
Rotorspeed, I call it instrument conditions flight above because cloud and rain are not the only things to cause you to require flight by sole reference to instruments. As mentioned by Rotorbee there are white out conditions and lack of visible horizon due to haze or lighting and surface conditions. I have flown in Arizona at night and trust me when I say it is very easy to start to wonder which side is up when surrounded by hundreds of square miles of nothing with no ground light at all. You also have smog and industrial effects as well as many other traps which only time and a good instructor can go through for you. To say that it is ludicrous to end up inadvertent instrument flight is sadly not true. Yes some people get there because they had a set of blinkers on but others can arrive at that point who are conscientious pilots and simply got caught out by changing conditions quicker than their pilot/captaincy skills could cope with.
When it comes to accidents of any sort I have one golden rule I teach all my students,
“If you believe it could never happen to you then one day it probably will!!!”
This is for the simple reason that it shows an attitude that belittles the problem and blames such incidents on the pilot concerned and takes the though process no further as to how the various factors (and there are always many) combined to end in a smoking hole in the ground.
As I go through your posts on this subject I find myself wondering if one day we shan’t all be reading about you in a report. I say this not to start an argument but to promote honest inward exploring and thought. I do not know you and may well be wrong about your attitude and if so please accept my fullest apologies. However I am sure that I am not alone amongst the experienced pilots here and that if they are honest several of them have probably also thought the same reading your posts. As an aside, the go slower lower principle is only so useful. The obvious final point of a go slower and lower approach is to end up in a hover from one field to another a “relatively” safe but silly situation to be in. Long before this though on the way down you will have a good chance of hitting wires etc. or whilst going slower you will reduce speed to the point where any stability you may have had has gone and the results are predictable. Never go slower than 40 knots this speed can be faster in different types of A/C.
Anne Tenner I could not agree more. The hardest decision to make is to not fly when others are. The situation you describe of several helicopters departing from one location puts immense pressure on a nervous pilot who would rather not fly to say yes and follow them. (Remember fear is the feeling in your stomach you get when your brain says no and your mouth says yes). We must help to teach pilots to have the knowledge and strength of character to make such decisions.
It is for that reason that I started this thread to encourage the more experienced pilots to air their views in front of the less experienced so that they can see it is more than fine to say no to a flight and stay on the ground no matter what others are doing. It is in fact exactly what you should be doing and there is no shame in it.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Texas
Posts: 512
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Rotorspeed, I wish you good luck, but I think you're wrong. It can happen with no warning at all, especially at night. If you believe it can't then I suggest you continue to stay on the ground.
GLS is spot on...can happen in day time but at least you can see up until the last instant. At night....it can happen before you can blink.
Trotting along...aircraft all trimmed up...attitude hold working....setting up the telephone for the med crew in the back...looked up....and Hello! Nada...nothing...just a very puzzled looking mirror image of a handsome debonair helicopter pilot that looked amazingly like me. Fortunately, had a Flight Director and Autopilot....woke George up....got him all sorted out....rotated the heading bug around to whence I had come....few minutes later back out into the inky blackness but some lights on the ground....called approach and got a clearance....and on home we went. If it had been an unstabilized VMC machine.....well now...that would have been a much different story.
Trotting along...aircraft all trimmed up...attitude hold working....setting up the telephone for the med crew in the back...looked up....and Hello! Nada...nothing...just a very puzzled looking mirror image of a handsome debonair helicopter pilot that looked amazingly like me. Fortunately, had a Flight Director and Autopilot....woke George up....got him all sorted out....rotated the heading bug around to whence I had come....few minutes later back out into the inky blackness but some lights on the ground....called approach and got a clearance....and on home we went. If it had been an unstabilized VMC machine.....well now...that would have been a much different story.
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: Alderney or Lancashire UK
Posts: 570
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The sheer number of 'it happened to me' stories here make me think it is very common. It has certainly happened to me, a couple of times, and despite spouting here about it before, it happened again a couple of weeks ago - and no, I didn't see it coming, and I was 400 feet lower than the expected cloud base. I did a 180 and went home. I wont bore you with the details but I am realistic to know that flying in Northern Britain there is a strong possiblity it will happen again unless one only flies in clear blue skies.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Alba
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Like many others, I have followed this thread with interest. And no doubt I am not the only one who has had that unmistakable feeling in the pit of your stomach remembering my own brush with I-IMC while reading others accounts.
However, in some posts, I sense an almost naive understanding of the situations. Not about the subject of I-IMC, but that all flights are unimportant (in retrospect almost all lack importance in the event of an accident) or that staying on the deck or landing in a field miles from nowhere is an easy decision to make.
Commercial pressures are easy to blame after the fact, but very little of my flying is to places I want to go, with pax I want to fly, at times and conditions I want to fly in.
I once heard a commercial instructor say 'There are limits that both you and your aircraft are subject too and under no circumstances must these be exceeded, however you must be able to fly up to these limits.'
We have all flown in marginal conditions, knowing when you have exceeded those minimums is the key, and that's normally only after you've just given yourself a scare..!
Safe flying all.
However, in some posts, I sense an almost naive understanding of the situations. Not about the subject of I-IMC, but that all flights are unimportant (in retrospect almost all lack importance in the event of an accident) or that staying on the deck or landing in a field miles from nowhere is an easy decision to make.
Commercial pressures are easy to blame after the fact, but very little of my flying is to places I want to go, with pax I want to fly, at times and conditions I want to fly in.
I once heard a commercial instructor say 'There are limits that both you and your aircraft are subject too and under no circumstances must these be exceeded, however you must be able to fly up to these limits.'
We have all flown in marginal conditions, knowing when you have exceeded those minimums is the key, and that's normally only after you've just given yourself a scare..!
Safe flying all.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: canada
Posts: 100
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
re:SASless
Quote:
"I set a rule for myself a long time ago....for VMC flight at night, in bad weather, and over mountainous terrain.....any one is okay but no more than one at a time."
good plan to LIVE by !!
more should adopt this outlook
it always helps to have a poor flyer (passenger) on board, they will usually want to abort before you do
"I set a rule for myself a long time ago....for VMC flight at night, in bad weather, and over mountainous terrain.....any one is okay but no more than one at a time."
good plan to LIVE by !!
more should adopt this outlook
it always helps to have a poor flyer (passenger) on board, they will usually want to abort before you do