Spatial Disorientation
Don't forget smoke...
While working on bushfires in the Blue Mountains (west of Sydney) a few years back, I was required to report for bucketing duty at a spot a few miles away, around the rim of a large curved bowl. The only way to get there with certainty was to follow the 400'-high sandstone cliffs (at 3500' elevation) through the fires and smoke.
So, I puttered along at about 40kt, with the cliffs out to my right about 100' away, and all around me was white smoke. Except for the Navy Sea King that suddenly appeared in front of me, coming the other way, using the cliffs for a reference. And he was marginally closer to the cliff than me.
Only option was a snappy left turn away from the collision, and there I was, suspended in smoky space, with an unknown distance to the cliffs at the other side. First thought was to gently turn back towards the cliff and feel my way back to its visual reference, but after about 45 degrees of turn, I realised that it would appear just as suddenly as the Sea King had, and if I was coming at it at 90 degrees, I couldn't stop. So, turn back away from the cliff, lock onto the clocks, and pull the collective to fly away.
I didn't pop out until I was at 7000', well clear of the ground, as I had been climbing inside the massive smoke column. But at least my instrument training and experience from the military years before gave me the ability to still be here.
While working on bushfires in the Blue Mountains (west of Sydney) a few years back, I was required to report for bucketing duty at a spot a few miles away, around the rim of a large curved bowl. The only way to get there with certainty was to follow the 400'-high sandstone cliffs (at 3500' elevation) through the fires and smoke.
So, I puttered along at about 40kt, with the cliffs out to my right about 100' away, and all around me was white smoke. Except for the Navy Sea King that suddenly appeared in front of me, coming the other way, using the cliffs for a reference. And he was marginally closer to the cliff than me.
Only option was a snappy left turn away from the collision, and there I was, suspended in smoky space, with an unknown distance to the cliffs at the other side. First thought was to gently turn back towards the cliff and feel my way back to its visual reference, but after about 45 degrees of turn, I realised that it would appear just as suddenly as the Sea King had, and if I was coming at it at 90 degrees, I couldn't stop. So, turn back away from the cliff, lock onto the clocks, and pull the collective to fly away.
I didn't pop out until I was at 7000', well clear of the ground, as I had been climbing inside the massive smoke column. But at least my instrument training and experience from the military years before gave me the ability to still be here.
407 too,
I have another rule I live by..."The one dissenting vote rule." During my brief to the med crew or fire crew or working passengers such as biologists, etc....I raise the issue of "getting un-comfy with the situation....all it takes is one "No" vote and it is home we go or whatever it takes to get comfy again."
The biggest fright I ever gave myself without a doubt was on a ferry flight from Alaska to Lafayette, Louisana at the end of a summer season in Alaska haulling around cored drills with a Hughes 500D.
Those being the real cowboy days.....I was flying a machine that had a few defects....one of them being the airspeed indicator did not work. Having flown the machine all summer....I had gotten used to the airspeed/power combinations so I wasn't really fussed. (Statute of limitations having run out I can talk now). The machine also had no gyro instruments in it...just a mag compass and a single VHF comm.
It was a very hazy day as I approached the Grand Canyon at warp speed low level in the Go Fast......and vis being really poor....I began to look for the canyon....and look and look and look. Finally, I picked up the map...did the "lets unfold this thing...without flying into the ground routine". Got the map unfolded....refolded....then tried to figure out where I was. Being about brain dead....I was spending way too much time peering at the map....and merely glancing at the outside long enough only to make sure I was staying high enough to clear the sage brush.
About the time I was going to give up on the map....I developed a rather strange feeling...of being in a brown colored ping pong ball....I had flown off the North Rim of the Grand Canyon at 130 knots in a helicopter with zero instruments....not even a trim string...with horizontal and vertical vis of about a thousand feet. Might I remind you that at that point.....my vertical vis was about three thousand feet short of enough and the rim of the canyon was very rapidly disappearing behind me and I could only just barely make it out through the dust haze.
By the time I got back to the North Rim....I felt the need to land and walk around a bit.....but could not because I could not get my knees to quit shaking for what seemd like an hour. Except for not having enough fuel to go around the Canyon....I would certainly have done so....but one can fly down the side of the thing...find the bottom...scoot across to the other side and up the South Rim and off you go.
The current concept is "Situational Awareness". I did not have it that day.
Another thought....if the other pilot asks you what you think about the weather....that is a sign he doesn't like it...I always say...looks bad to me....what do you think. If the other guy needs reassurance he just might be seeing something you are not. Refer to the one dissenting vote rule in this situation.
I have another rule I live by..."The one dissenting vote rule." During my brief to the med crew or fire crew or working passengers such as biologists, etc....I raise the issue of "getting un-comfy with the situation....all it takes is one "No" vote and it is home we go or whatever it takes to get comfy again."
The biggest fright I ever gave myself without a doubt was on a ferry flight from Alaska to Lafayette, Louisana at the end of a summer season in Alaska haulling around cored drills with a Hughes 500D.
Those being the real cowboy days.....I was flying a machine that had a few defects....one of them being the airspeed indicator did not work. Having flown the machine all summer....I had gotten used to the airspeed/power combinations so I wasn't really fussed. (Statute of limitations having run out I can talk now). The machine also had no gyro instruments in it...just a mag compass and a single VHF comm.
It was a very hazy day as I approached the Grand Canyon at warp speed low level in the Go Fast......and vis being really poor....I began to look for the canyon....and look and look and look. Finally, I picked up the map...did the "lets unfold this thing...without flying into the ground routine". Got the map unfolded....refolded....then tried to figure out where I was. Being about brain dead....I was spending way too much time peering at the map....and merely glancing at the outside long enough only to make sure I was staying high enough to clear the sage brush.
About the time I was going to give up on the map....I developed a rather strange feeling...of being in a brown colored ping pong ball....I had flown off the North Rim of the Grand Canyon at 130 knots in a helicopter with zero instruments....not even a trim string...with horizontal and vertical vis of about a thousand feet. Might I remind you that at that point.....my vertical vis was about three thousand feet short of enough and the rim of the canyon was very rapidly disappearing behind me and I could only just barely make it out through the dust haze.
By the time I got back to the North Rim....I felt the need to land and walk around a bit.....but could not because I could not get my knees to quit shaking for what seemd like an hour. Except for not having enough fuel to go around the Canyon....I would certainly have done so....but one can fly down the side of the thing...find the bottom...scoot across to the other side and up the South Rim and off you go.
The current concept is "Situational Awareness". I did not have it that day.
Another thought....if the other pilot asks you what you think about the weather....that is a sign he doesn't like it...I always say...looks bad to me....what do you think. If the other guy needs reassurance he just might be seeing something you are not. Refer to the one dissenting vote rule in this situation.
Last edited by SASless; 26th Jan 2005 at 03:51.
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So, some of you seem to disagree with my view that good piloting skills should ensure you never end up in IMC with no warning.
OK, let's put to one side the issue of darkness, just for a minute. My comments have been centred on the big accident killer - certainly in Europe, and that is losing orientation and crashing in daylight, in poor weather; low cloud, drizzle rain etc.
Now I still maintain that, assuming you are a VFR pilot in a VFR machine, you should never get into IMC in these conditions, essentially by using the principles I have said earlier. And Banjo, if you read carefully what I said, that is to go lower and slower "and when you get too low turn round and go back, or land." Now if your view of when that point would be is a high hover over a field, that is a big worry. In Europe we have the 500ft rule if relevant and common sense judgement.
I think everyone here agrees that for a VFR pilot disorientation with lack of ground reference, is a very high risk situation. Exactly what happens in the final seconds before the accidents in such conditions.
But now I am puzzled. There are those of you who think such IMC situations cannot be avoided because they can be sudden, and who also accept that entry into such situations is highly dangerous. So what is it, just luck that determines when you have an IMC LOC accident? Perhaps we have found a clue as to why there are so many such accidents, because too many believe such situations cannot be avoided? I certainly would only want to travel with a pilot who believed our safety was firmly in his hands, catastrophic mechanical failure etc apart.
So please tell me, what actions/technique should pilots be employing to ensure they don't end up having these accidents? And it's no good just saying well they shouldn't go, because we all know weather conditions change en route, apart from anything else. What pilots here need is some good, practical advice as to how to handle such poor weather situations when they find them developing, and that's what I have tried to do.
Another tip, by the way, for the novices. When raining, always try and avoid bringing wet clothes into the cabin. A full complement of pax with wet coats will often provide moisture beyond the capability of the demister, leaving you in a virtual IMC condition. And get the screen fully demisted before you lift off.
Night flying? Well I have made comments earlier:
"Night poses greater risks of going inadvertent IMC, but then you've got to be much more cautious. Only follow routes with reasonable ground lighting, keep high, and always be wary of your visibility decreasing. If you could see a town 7 kms away and then it disappears, a big chunk of cloud has just got in the way. Descend until it returns in sight, then think sensibly what to do. Intermittent use of landing light to check for moisture is very valuable."
If you are not absolutely confident a flight can be safely carried out with sufficiently good reference to ground or ambient lighting to avoid IMC entry, you shouldn't be there as a VFR pilot in a VFR machine. The flight must be carried out by an IR pilot in an IFR machine.
OK, let's put to one side the issue of darkness, just for a minute. My comments have been centred on the big accident killer - certainly in Europe, and that is losing orientation and crashing in daylight, in poor weather; low cloud, drizzle rain etc.
Now I still maintain that, assuming you are a VFR pilot in a VFR machine, you should never get into IMC in these conditions, essentially by using the principles I have said earlier. And Banjo, if you read carefully what I said, that is to go lower and slower "and when you get too low turn round and go back, or land." Now if your view of when that point would be is a high hover over a field, that is a big worry. In Europe we have the 500ft rule if relevant and common sense judgement.
I think everyone here agrees that for a VFR pilot disorientation with lack of ground reference, is a very high risk situation. Exactly what happens in the final seconds before the accidents in such conditions.
But now I am puzzled. There are those of you who think such IMC situations cannot be avoided because they can be sudden, and who also accept that entry into such situations is highly dangerous. So what is it, just luck that determines when you have an IMC LOC accident? Perhaps we have found a clue as to why there are so many such accidents, because too many believe such situations cannot be avoided? I certainly would only want to travel with a pilot who believed our safety was firmly in his hands, catastrophic mechanical failure etc apart.
So please tell me, what actions/technique should pilots be employing to ensure they don't end up having these accidents? And it's no good just saying well they shouldn't go, because we all know weather conditions change en route, apart from anything else. What pilots here need is some good, practical advice as to how to handle such poor weather situations when they find them developing, and that's what I have tried to do.
Another tip, by the way, for the novices. When raining, always try and avoid bringing wet clothes into the cabin. A full complement of pax with wet coats will often provide moisture beyond the capability of the demister, leaving you in a virtual IMC condition. And get the screen fully demisted before you lift off.
Night flying? Well I have made comments earlier:
"Night poses greater risks of going inadvertent IMC, but then you've got to be much more cautious. Only follow routes with reasonable ground lighting, keep high, and always be wary of your visibility decreasing. If you could see a town 7 kms away and then it disappears, a big chunk of cloud has just got in the way. Descend until it returns in sight, then think sensibly what to do. Intermittent use of landing light to check for moisture is very valuable."
If you are not absolutely confident a flight can be safely carried out with sufficiently good reference to ground or ambient lighting to avoid IMC entry, you shouldn't be there as a VFR pilot in a VFR machine. The flight must be carried out by an IR pilot in an IFR machine.
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Cpl gave good lesson
One of my very good friends, once took me in his twin Squirrel cloud base at the time was about 1000 but was clear on top at 5000, his craft had all the bells and whistles that anyone could use, and so orft we went, as we climbed into the white stuff I sort of went all quiet and whilst I trusted him implicitly found that I could not agree with what the art/horizon was telling me, I had a full throated feeling that I was leaning to the left.
As planned we burst through at a tad under 5k to find vision all the way to Hellios, but I never want to feel like that again, very unnerving, and a situation that did not cure its self till vision was resumed, Day light and nearcloudless skies are my bag.
My acorn aint that big, in fact that cloud type flying almost makes me a Ladyman!!
PeterR-B
As planned we burst through at a tad under 5k to find vision all the way to Hellios, but I never want to feel like that again, very unnerving, and a situation that did not cure its self till vision was resumed, Day light and nearcloudless skies are my bag.
My acorn aint that big, in fact that cloud type flying almost makes me a Ladyman!!
PeterR-B
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Rotorspeed, I certainly do not think that a high hover is the time to give up in fact I think it is plain from my post that I said this was a “silly position to be in” and I was using polite words to describe that. Please feel free to insert a stronger phrase of your choice.
You mention the 500’ rule, I assume that you do not advocate this as a suitable limit to descend to before giving up. I would suggest that by the time you have come within 500’ of the ground as an inexperienced PPL (we are obviously not discussing current IFR pilots in suitable machines in this thread) then you are already way to close to meeting your maker.
I can not recall the exact date and am sure someone here will point me to it but I remember an accident back in 2003 involving a Hughes 369HS (OH-6) near Sevenoaks which was sadly fatal. The aircraft was at 500’ when it entered a descent of around 1500 FPM and impacted the ground at cruise speed of around 80kts and with a nose down attitude of approx 35-40 degrees if memory serves me right.
From 500’ to impact took just over ten seconds!
When you consider that it takes approximately 9 seconds for an experienced and current pilot to fully establish on instruments from an unexpected I-IMC event 500’ is just too close for comfort. The pilot had no idea until the last instant that he was in a turn or a descent. He had not shown any signs of being aware of the aircrafts flight path. Accident investigators suggested that this could have been due to the descending and turning movements masking each other from his sensory systems.
What makes this accident different were the weather conditions. What were they?
In excess of 10K visibility and a few clouds in excess of 3000 (yes thousand) feet. The pilot was apparently changing the radio frequency and looking inside at the time.
This accident though not an IMC incident does involve spatial orientation problems and also a large amount of captaincy failure. I mention it in response to Rotorspeeds question
More Captaincy /CRM type skills need to be taught. As this accident shows and others here have mentioned you can become unaware of your attitudes in more situations than just rain and clouds. We need to train pilots to be able to manage the aircraft and make informed decisions and act on them.
This means everything from teaching decision making processes and stressing the relevant parts of human factors to Met so that forecasts can be understood and conditions en route can be analysed if in fact they are not as predicted.
(as an aside how many PPL’s when taking their written tests at the flying club had a little “help” from others around or during the debrief from the tester to make sure they passed. I know I have seen it happen and talked to others who have experienced it and it is totally outrageous but I am sure it still happens in some of the less reputable clubs today and needs to be stamped out).
By teaching such skills we are not only helping to prevent I-IMC accidents we are also helping to prevent people flying when too tired or when their mind is on the business meeting they have just left. Taking off in an aircraft and running out of fuel because they where paying too much attention to the navigation due to poor pre flight planning or other distractions happens far far too often.
At the private pilot level in the rotary world I do not think we should be teaching instrument appreciation. There is no compulsory re-training so once you have your shiny new licence you need never practice such skills again. 5 hours flown several years ago will not help you when the soft brown stuff hits the large spinning thing. Good CRM/Captaincy skills that you use every time you fly though will stay with you and improve and help you to avoid such positions before they occur.
SASless you “handsome debonair helicopter pilot” you crack me up. Completely agree though I-IMC at night can easily happen with no warning but I do not see how we can teach PPL’s and keep them current to recover from such a situation without demanding a lot more training and recurring training at that. Stay away from it is my advice to them as I am sure you feel also.
You mention the 500’ rule, I assume that you do not advocate this as a suitable limit to descend to before giving up. I would suggest that by the time you have come within 500’ of the ground as an inexperienced PPL (we are obviously not discussing current IFR pilots in suitable machines in this thread) then you are already way to close to meeting your maker.
I can not recall the exact date and am sure someone here will point me to it but I remember an accident back in 2003 involving a Hughes 369HS (OH-6) near Sevenoaks which was sadly fatal. The aircraft was at 500’ when it entered a descent of around 1500 FPM and impacted the ground at cruise speed of around 80kts and with a nose down attitude of approx 35-40 degrees if memory serves me right.
From 500’ to impact took just over ten seconds!
When you consider that it takes approximately 9 seconds for an experienced and current pilot to fully establish on instruments from an unexpected I-IMC event 500’ is just too close for comfort. The pilot had no idea until the last instant that he was in a turn or a descent. He had not shown any signs of being aware of the aircrafts flight path. Accident investigators suggested that this could have been due to the descending and turning movements masking each other from his sensory systems.
What makes this accident different were the weather conditions. What were they?
In excess of 10K visibility and a few clouds in excess of 3000 (yes thousand) feet. The pilot was apparently changing the radio frequency and looking inside at the time.
This accident though not an IMC incident does involve spatial orientation problems and also a large amount of captaincy failure. I mention it in response to Rotorspeeds question
So please tell me, what actions/technique should pilots be employing to ensure they don't end up having these accidents?
This means everything from teaching decision making processes and stressing the relevant parts of human factors to Met so that forecasts can be understood and conditions en route can be analysed if in fact they are not as predicted.
(as an aside how many PPL’s when taking their written tests at the flying club had a little “help” from others around or during the debrief from the tester to make sure they passed. I know I have seen it happen and talked to others who have experienced it and it is totally outrageous but I am sure it still happens in some of the less reputable clubs today and needs to be stamped out).
By teaching such skills we are not only helping to prevent I-IMC accidents we are also helping to prevent people flying when too tired or when their mind is on the business meeting they have just left. Taking off in an aircraft and running out of fuel because they where paying too much attention to the navigation due to poor pre flight planning or other distractions happens far far too often.
At the private pilot level in the rotary world I do not think we should be teaching instrument appreciation. There is no compulsory re-training so once you have your shiny new licence you need never practice such skills again. 5 hours flown several years ago will not help you when the soft brown stuff hits the large spinning thing. Good CRM/Captaincy skills that you use every time you fly though will stay with you and improve and help you to avoid such positions before they occur.
SASless you “handsome debonair helicopter pilot” you crack me up. Completely agree though I-IMC at night can easily happen with no warning but I do not see how we can teach PPL’s and keep them current to recover from such a situation without demanding a lot more training and recurring training at that. Stay away from it is my advice to them as I am sure you feel also.
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SASless,
I almost fell off my chair with the leans just reading that. Please warn people before you tell that story.
Uwantme2landwhere,
There are such things as personal limits which we all should not fly beyond. The legal limit is exactly that and it should not be busted.
Chopperchav,
'Clear of cloud' means exactly that. Not 'in it for a second and then we're out'. Those instructors were failing as teachers. To quote a text on flying instruction...'the instructor shall demonstrate the highest standards of airmanship at all times'
I almost fell off my chair with the leans just reading that. Please warn people before you tell that story.
Uwantme2landwhere,
There are such things as personal limits which we all should not fly beyond. The legal limit is exactly that and it should not be busted.
Chopperchav,
'Clear of cloud' means exactly that. Not 'in it for a second and then we're out'. Those instructors were failing as teachers. To quote a text on flying instruction...'the instructor shall demonstrate the highest standards of airmanship at all times'
Banjo:
The accident report you refer to is available from the AAIB website as a PDF document.
From the report,
so I'm not convinced inadvertent IMC is relevant here, but you do make a good point about high rates of descent achievable under certain conditions.
The accident report you refer to is available from the AAIB website as a PDF document.
From the report,
The Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) for Biggin Hill for the period between 0700 hrs and 1600 hrs on 19 July 2003 gave a surface wind of 190°/10 kt with visibility in excess of 10 km and scattered cloud at 3,000 feet agl. At 0820 hrs an actual weather observation at Biggin Hill Airport recorded a surface wind of 160°/08 kt, varying in direction between 130° and 210°, with visibility in excess of 10 km and no cloud below 5,000 feet agl. The temperature was 22°C and the dew point was 16°C. In general the weather was fine, typical of a good summer's day, and it remained so for the duration of G-CSPJ's flight.
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Thanks for that NR. I knew someone would have the report about. I did mention in the post that this was not an IMC but does show how impossible it is to tell what an aircraft is doing by "seat of pants" as well as captaincy skills.
If you want to see a high rate of descent then look no further than an auto in a scout, talk about a brick. Great fun though!
If you want to see a high rate of descent then look no further than an auto in a scout, talk about a brick. Great fun though!
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Some good comments about avoiding inadvertant IMC. I think a major part of the problem is the lack of relevant practical training on how to assess the weather [with implications if worse than forecast], the importance of having an escape route if it all turns into a can of worms and the actual flying techniques required to achieve a safe recovery to a safe location.
I believe that this part of training has been neglected for several reasons. Firstly, it is not specifically required in any flight test for professional/private flying [as far as I am aware]. You can be the finest poler on Earth, but without being tested in poor weather scenario no one would aware of your shortcomings in poor wx [including YOU].
Training-wise, it can be awkward to teach and there is no set method for instructors to follow. It is not normally a set part of most training syllabi and gets glossed over, despite the flight-safety implications. When I used to instruct or ran training programs, I ensured that it was taught correctly with ground and air scenarios using practical techniques. With basic rotary training on poor [not marginal!] weather days, I would get airborne with students to both convince them that it was a serious business and give them practical airmanship instruction in how to safely deal with deteriorating weather [day or night].
If you have plenty of experience like some of the contributors here, then you probably do not require extra training. If you do lack experience, I suggest you find a very experienced instructor, invest some dosh for a days training and learn!!
I think part of the reason why poor wx accidents recur with such regularity is that there is little realistic flying training in this area. Part of this could be that it is very common to have instructors teaching PPLs with just a few hundred flying hours. They therefore lack experience flying in poor conditions. This will obviously cause a problem in both terms of credibility and capability as an instructor. What compounds it that these instructors were sometimes taught to fly by people of similar ability!.
When you combine the above factors, it should not be in the least surpising that poor wx. flying should cause anxiety at best and burning wreckage at worst.
I believe that this part of training has been neglected for several reasons. Firstly, it is not specifically required in any flight test for professional/private flying [as far as I am aware]. You can be the finest poler on Earth, but without being tested in poor weather scenario no one would aware of your shortcomings in poor wx [including YOU].
Training-wise, it can be awkward to teach and there is no set method for instructors to follow. It is not normally a set part of most training syllabi and gets glossed over, despite the flight-safety implications. When I used to instruct or ran training programs, I ensured that it was taught correctly with ground and air scenarios using practical techniques. With basic rotary training on poor [not marginal!] weather days, I would get airborne with students to both convince them that it was a serious business and give them practical airmanship instruction in how to safely deal with deteriorating weather [day or night].
If you have plenty of experience like some of the contributors here, then you probably do not require extra training. If you do lack experience, I suggest you find a very experienced instructor, invest some dosh for a days training and learn!!
I think part of the reason why poor wx accidents recur with such regularity is that there is little realistic flying training in this area. Part of this could be that it is very common to have instructors teaching PPLs with just a few hundred flying hours. They therefore lack experience flying in poor conditions. This will obviously cause a problem in both terms of credibility and capability as an instructor. What compounds it that these instructors were sometimes taught to fly by people of similar ability!.
When you combine the above factors, it should not be in the least surpising that poor wx. flying should cause anxiety at best and burning wreckage at worst.
Better red than ...
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I think part of the reason why poor wx accidents recur with such regularity is that there is little realistic flying training in this area. Part of this could be that it is very common to have instructors teaching PPLs with just a few hundred flying hours.
The other aspect of this is, of course, poor "supervision" (as in my first post) especially amongst the owner population and even more so amongst the off-site-owner population (no Joe in the Tower to pass comment as the voice of last resort).
Supervision, as a part of captaincy, does not have to involve a regular FI check ride, or more regaulation by the appropriate authority.
It can, as a part of captaincy, rightly include effective self briefing on wx/ sites/ en route weather/ hazards; consultation with other pilots, including the FI and personal limits.
If there is no risk, then nobody ever leaves the circuit. Too much and they die. The line between the two is difficult to assess without experience, hence the importance of some form of ongoing supervision and training over time, to keep practices sharp (& the LPC does not do that).
Pray tell what is "Captaincy"?
Is that another example of class consciousness or some term created by a British Gentleman to describe a pilot who happens to be the P-I-C of an aircraft....which includes single pilot aircraft...from student pilots right the way up to the guy in charge of a multi-pilot, multi-crew long distance international flight.
Is that another example of class consciousness or some term created by a British Gentleman to describe a pilot who happens to be the P-I-C of an aircraft....which includes single pilot aircraft...from student pilots right the way up to the guy in charge of a multi-pilot, multi-crew long distance international flight.
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SASless,
I think you are reading too much into it. Captaincy is the quality of being the captain, pilot in command, boss, head cheese, numero uno honcho, she who must be obeyed....sorry that's the wife. Any way the person on the spot in charge making the decisions. Reading some element of class into it is drawing a very long bow.
I think you are reading too much into it. Captaincy is the quality of being the captain, pilot in command, boss, head cheese, numero uno honcho, she who must be obeyed....sorry that's the wife. Any way the person on the spot in charge making the decisions. Reading some element of class into it is drawing a very long bow.
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Pray tell what is "Captaincy"?
It was the first thing that my flying instructor described to me and said was a key element of learning to fly, all those years ago.
Oh, spare me!
Easy things can be so complicated with effort. Which seat is the Captain's seat in an aircraft?
Since we have "captaincy" concerns from lesson one....ah, cmon' now.....pull the other one.....the one leg is getting a bit sore!
This is some British dry humour at play here....right?
Easy things can be so complicated with effort. Which seat is the Captain's seat in an aircraft?
Since we have "captaincy" concerns from lesson one....ah, cmon' now.....pull the other one.....the one leg is getting a bit sore!
This is some British dry humour at play here....right?
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Banjo
From the report it looked pretty clear that Hughes accident had absolutely nothing to do with spatial disorientation. Bit of a mystery I would say but best guess was that the pilot was simply not looking out of the aircraft (or at his AI/HSI) as he was preoccupied trying to change a radio frequency having probably moved his left hand to the cyclic in the LHD helo. IF that was the cause, it comes back to what I have been banging on about, and that is keep looking at what's keeping you upright - ie the ground, or if you are IMC, the instruments.
With regard to any 500 ft "decision height" for want of a better term, what on earth is the relevance of how long it takes to get orientated on instruments? The whole point is that you should never need to try!
And as for your advice on technique to avoid getting into inadvertent IMC, well sorry, but what a load of old waffle! That's not going to help anyone as they find themselves getting anxious about worsening weather.
Coorong
Agree wholeheartedly. Address that and some good progress might be made!
From the report it looked pretty clear that Hughes accident had absolutely nothing to do with spatial disorientation. Bit of a mystery I would say but best guess was that the pilot was simply not looking out of the aircraft (or at his AI/HSI) as he was preoccupied trying to change a radio frequency having probably moved his left hand to the cyclic in the LHD helo. IF that was the cause, it comes back to what I have been banging on about, and that is keep looking at what's keeping you upright - ie the ground, or if you are IMC, the instruments.
With regard to any 500 ft "decision height" for want of a better term, what on earth is the relevance of how long it takes to get orientated on instruments? The whole point is that you should never need to try!
And as for your advice on technique to avoid getting into inadvertent IMC, well sorry, but what a load of old waffle! That's not going to help anyone as they find themselves getting anxious about worsening weather.
Coorong
Agree wholeheartedly. Address that and some good progress might be made!
The Veloceraptor of Lounge Lizards
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All the above points are valid, however Rotorspeed flight into IMC with no warning does happen. I've seen it in the UK on 3 occasions. One minute VFR, the next fog all around and me sitting in a shrinking hole in the middle of it. The other area no-one has mentioned is the instrument failure situation. A while ago flying an IFR approach into a major airport at night I experienced a screen failure which took out my HSI but left the picture in place. I was very confused for a while just as I was intercepting the localiser. Fortunately I squeaked for help from the ground and the approach controller effectively gave me an SRA until I was happy with my scan taking in the LH seat instruments. I was working hard and I dread to think what would have happened had it been a flight director failure or multiple failures and I was left with the standbys.
My eternal thanks and respect go to that controller at EGGW!
My eternal thanks and respect go to that controller at EGGW!
Rotorspeed - the problem with your advice is that it is too simple - if we just said to people before they went flying 'don't crash' it would have about the same effect as your 'don't go below 500' ie none.
In the harsh reality of the GA heli world people get airborne to do something (fly to see friends, have lunch, sightsee etc) and have had to make time in their busy lives to do it. Therefore many of them are unlikely to be put off at the first hurdle (crap weather forecast) as the met man is often wrong and it has got be worth 'giving it a go'.
Then, once airborne the pressure to complete the task and avoid disappointing others or themselves leads pilots into compromising their training.
Even if they started with a 'not below 500' philosophy' they will kid themselves that 'just this once' they can go to 400' just to get round the last bit of bad weather after which it is bound to get better.
Now it's really crap and having compromised their principles once, convince themselves that it is better to push on than turn back - completely ignoring the obvious evidence of lowering cloudbase and worsening vis.
Many pilots have done this and got away with it because the met man was wrong and it really was the last bit of cloud before the wx improved.
But if your luck is out and you keep pushing then inadvertant IMC is almost inevitable, made worse because you are unsure of your position and therfore that of high ground, masts etc and have no idea what your safety altitude is even if you could fly on instruments to get there.
This is how crashes happen.
If you don't believe people get airborne unprepared then why did I have to show an R44 pilot where his intended landing site was yesterday by flying over it and talking him on, because he hadn't checked either the contact frequency or the grid reference before he got airborne.
Unless the CAA mandates instrument training for PPLs, no-one will bother because a. they don't think IIMC will ever happen to them and b. it costs money and the CAA have already taken enough of that from them.
In the harsh reality of the GA heli world people get airborne to do something (fly to see friends, have lunch, sightsee etc) and have had to make time in their busy lives to do it. Therefore many of them are unlikely to be put off at the first hurdle (crap weather forecast) as the met man is often wrong and it has got be worth 'giving it a go'.
Then, once airborne the pressure to complete the task and avoid disappointing others or themselves leads pilots into compromising their training.
Even if they started with a 'not below 500' philosophy' they will kid themselves that 'just this once' they can go to 400' just to get round the last bit of bad weather after which it is bound to get better.
Now it's really crap and having compromised their principles once, convince themselves that it is better to push on than turn back - completely ignoring the obvious evidence of lowering cloudbase and worsening vis.
Many pilots have done this and got away with it because the met man was wrong and it really was the last bit of cloud before the wx improved.
But if your luck is out and you keep pushing then inadvertant IMC is almost inevitable, made worse because you are unsure of your position and therfore that of high ground, masts etc and have no idea what your safety altitude is even if you could fly on instruments to get there.
This is how crashes happen.
If you don't believe people get airborne unprepared then why did I have to show an R44 pilot where his intended landing site was yesterday by flying over it and talking him on, because he hadn't checked either the contact frequency or the grid reference before he got airborne.
Unless the CAA mandates instrument training for PPLs, no-one will bother because a. they don't think IIMC will ever happen to them and b. it costs money and the CAA have already taken enough of that from them.
Senis Semper Fidelis
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Pilots often seem to ignore advice because of the Macho logic of the male thinking, I know of one skilled Fi who made that mistake and three people died, one through stupidity the other two cos they were pax, and had no control over the Fi who ignored CPL advice of DON,T FLY, he did, they all died, within 16 miles of the take off point
Sadly the Fi had, wanted, needed, but didnt want to stay the night and fly the next day. the lessons are there read AAI GTLME
Vfr
Sadly the Fi had, wanted, needed, but didnt want to stay the night and fly the next day. the lessons are there read AAI GTLME
Vfr
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It's all well and good to say that one should never get into IMC unexpectedly, but it seems Rotorspeed hasn't had that much experience. Sooner or later it will happen. I was once flying a 206 loaded with tired roughnecks down the beach under a 700' ceiling, with 10 miles or so of visibility, no worries, when the sky just fell on me. The clouds simply opened up and with no warning visibility was near zero in heavy rain and high winds. I immediately made a turn, trying to keep the ground in sight, but the turn didn't help, and I ended up doing a 360 back into the wind and landed on the beach. Half an hour later we continued on. More times than I want to think about I've had the skies dump on me, visibility go to nil, and there I was, saying "Just let me get out of this alive and I'll never never do it again!" Good pilots keep having it happen, and many of them don't survive it, so it's obviously possible. Sticking your head in the sand and saying it's entirely preventable is just silly, IMO. It happens, and one has to be prepared to get out alive. Certainly caution is one of the main ways to live, but more is needed.