HEMS - Regulations and saving life
Red On, Green On
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Perhaps the medics and/or the aircrew wanted to pop into John Lewis afterwards?
The site will have probably been used before - they have a very comprehensive database of viable landing sites in central London.
The site will have probably been used before - they have a very comprehensive database of viable landing sites in central London.
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It would take no more than 5 minutes in an ambulance or police car to get to Hyde Park (Marble Arch end). It didnt seem to be a massive hurry either as the aircraft was on the ground for at least 30 mins before the patient arrived by ambulance.
Just a question, thats all!!
Foz
Just a question, thats all!!
Foz
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Nobody's getting at you Foz, they're just answering your question.
There's simply no need to land further away when there's a perfectly suitable landing site nearer the patient. The Square is assessed as suitable landing site by the experts (or it wouldn't be used) so there's no need to land further away at one of the parks.
I don't think you should read too much into the delay between the helicopter landing and the patient arriving. There could be many reasons for that.
Heliport
There's simply no need to land further away when there's a perfectly suitable landing site nearer the patient. The Square is assessed as suitable landing site by the experts (or it wouldn't be used) so there's no need to land further away at one of the parks.
I don't think you should read too much into the delay between the helicopter landing and the patient arriving. There could be many reasons for that.
Heliport
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I don't know the details of the incident you were witness to, but some background on the HEMS operation might help.
They are called only after some pretty tight screening at the 999 center in London, and dispatch with a doctor on board.
They are able to land within 100 yards of the site of the site in order to make the transfer to the helicopter as quickly as possible. The doctor makes the decision whether to transport the patient by helicopter or ambulance and to which hospital - the ambulance folks don't have nearly as much training or experience as the doctor, which is why the helicopter is so valuable.
And they land in a lot of places where the clearances are tight, probably tighter than Cavendish Square...
They are called only after some pretty tight screening at the 999 center in London, and dispatch with a doctor on board.
They are able to land within 100 yards of the site of the site in order to make the transfer to the helicopter as quickly as possible. The doctor makes the decision whether to transport the patient by helicopter or ambulance and to which hospital - the ambulance folks don't have nearly as much training or experience as the doctor, which is why the helicopter is so valuable.
And they land in a lot of places where the clearances are tight, probably tighter than Cavendish Square...
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They landed in an area next to my office a few months ago which seems unbelievably tight: trees, street furniture, buildings, etc ...
Originally landed on top of a carpark (from which the patient had fallen), then manoeuvered down some time after doc had jumped out
Fantastic airmanship - and probably marshalling from the ground too! Would that be by a second crew member?
Originally landed on top of a carpark (from which the patient had fallen), then manoeuvered down some time after doc had jumped out
Fantastic airmanship - and probably marshalling from the ground too! Would that be by a second crew member?
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I once saw the HEMS Dauphin in the street outside Charing Cross Hospital, and if he had six feet of clearance from three lamp posts I'd be surprised.
An acquaintance in Richmond has had his garden scouted out by the Air Ambulance people as an emergency landing site. Personally I'd be hard put to park my bike in it, and it makes Cavendish Square look like the Gobi.
Good to know these chaps will fly through the eye of a needle when we need them.
An acquaintance in Richmond has had his garden scouted out by the Air Ambulance people as an emergency landing site. Personally I'd be hard put to park my bike in it, and it makes Cavendish Square look like the Gobi.
Good to know these chaps will fly through the eye of a needle when we need them.
US EMS Death rate soars in the new year
WASHINGTON — A sharp increase in fatal accidents on medical helicopters and planes over the past year has prompted two federal aviation agencies to launch safety reviews and to consider broad improvements, the agencies said this week.
The issue has been under examination for months, but three crashes that killed six people in the past nine days have made the issue more urgent.
• A pilot and a paramedic died Monday night when their helicopter plunged into the Potomac River near Washington, D.C.
• Three people died Tuesday when a twin-turboprop used to carry patients crashed in Rawlings, Wyo.
• The pilot of a medical helicopter died in a Jan. 5 crash in Falkner, Miss.
At least 37 people have died in 12 medical helicopter and plane crashes over the past 12 months, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. Seven died in 2003.
The FAA has never taken a hard look at the EMS business....changes usually come within the industry and are generally driven by insurance costs.
The issue has been under examination for months, but three crashes that killed six people in the past nine days have made the issue more urgent.
• A pilot and a paramedic died Monday night when their helicopter plunged into the Potomac River near Washington, D.C.
• Three people died Tuesday when a twin-turboprop used to carry patients crashed in Rawlings, Wyo.
• The pilot of a medical helicopter died in a Jan. 5 crash in Falkner, Miss.
At least 37 people have died in 12 medical helicopter and plane crashes over the past 12 months, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. Seven died in 2003.
The FAA has never taken a hard look at the EMS business....changes usually come within the industry and are generally driven by insurance costs.
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EMS accidents
As we all know, the trouble is that two of the three examples cited were not strictly "EMS" accidents. The two helicopter crashes were at night: one in bad weather; the other at very low altitude. Neither ship had patients onboard. Either accident could have happened to any operator that flies at night. It would be wrong to single out EMS for these two. But they will. Perhaps the NTSB ought to widen their focus a bit and do a safety check of the entire helicopter industry.
Dog,
One had gone to a scene to pickup a patient....had a minor mechanical problem....and was enroute back to an alternate landing site....and crashed. It was an EMS aircraft and had been on an EMS mission until the maintenance problem occurred.
The second aircraft in the DC area was an EMS aircraft returning to its base in Fredricksburg after completing an EMS flight. One of the people killed was a medical crew member.
The KingAir was on an EMS mission when it crashed.
Sorry....all three were EMS aircraft and crews involved....no matter how you want to argue it. Just because no patient was onboard does not make it something other than what it is.
There is a crisis coming in the EMS business.....however you want to colour the statistics....we are killing a lot of people in the process of conducting EMS operations. The numbers were way up last year....and if the current trend continues, this year will set new records and surpass the grim years when we really slayed a bunch. That situation led to a lot of changes in the EMS industry....maybe it time for another evolutionary change.
I would love to see a real "Blue Ribbon Panel" address safety issues in both the EMS industry and the Gulf of Mexico offshore operations. The cat would certainly be in the pigeons then!
One had gone to a scene to pickup a patient....had a minor mechanical problem....and was enroute back to an alternate landing site....and crashed. It was an EMS aircraft and had been on an EMS mission until the maintenance problem occurred.
The second aircraft in the DC area was an EMS aircraft returning to its base in Fredricksburg after completing an EMS flight. One of the people killed was a medical crew member.
The KingAir was on an EMS mission when it crashed.
Sorry....all three were EMS aircraft and crews involved....no matter how you want to argue it. Just because no patient was onboard does not make it something other than what it is.
There is a crisis coming in the EMS business.....however you want to colour the statistics....we are killing a lot of people in the process of conducting EMS operations. The numbers were way up last year....and if the current trend continues, this year will set new records and surpass the grim years when we really slayed a bunch. That situation led to a lot of changes in the EMS industry....maybe it time for another evolutionary change.
I would love to see a real "Blue Ribbon Panel" address safety issues in both the EMS industry and the Gulf of Mexico offshore operations. The cat would certainly be in the pigeons then!
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I'm still not sure I see how these helicopter accidents constitute an indictment of the EMS industry. In both cases, there was no patient onboard. Thus, the "pressure to perform" on the pilot was no greater than on any other commercial pilot. It could easily have been me taking off in horrible weather at night from a site landing in my R-44, or scooting low-level up the Potomac River at night. To my mind, there is nothing about these accidents that points to any peculiar aspect or hazard of the EMS mission.
And maybe the NTSB will realize that right off the bat. And maybe they'll go, "Gee, you know, flying helicopters commercially at night really sucks! They fly in bad weather and they fly routes that mandate ridiculously low altitudes...no wonder they crash a lot!"
And maybe the NTSB will realize that right off the bat. And maybe they'll go, "Gee, you know, flying helicopters commercially at night really sucks! They fly in bad weather and they fly routes that mandate ridiculously low altitudes...no wonder they crash a lot!"
Ok Dog....
Lets try another way....what markings were on the side of the aircraft? Lifeflight, Lifeguard, Air Life....did the aircraft have EMS interiors, were the aircraft licensed as ambulances? Did the crews have something besides a Red Cross CPR certification? The mere fact they were EMS aircraft and were returning from an EMS mission makes it an EMS related event...elsewise they would have been home snug in their beds and not been up flying.
Are you suggesting helicopters should not fly after dark?
If I can send a student off on a solo night cross country...why should professional pilots not be able to fly in the dark? (....and do so safely?)
Do we crash more aircraft after dark?
What is intrinsically different between day and night flying that makes Night EMS ops so dangerous?
We know flying single engine over open water is hazardous....particularly if the sea state exceeds the capability of the emergency float system on the aircraft...but that does not slow down the offshore industry in the Gulf of Mexico.
What is your point Dog? Assert yourself here....make your case?
Lets try another way....what markings were on the side of the aircraft? Lifeflight, Lifeguard, Air Life....did the aircraft have EMS interiors, were the aircraft licensed as ambulances? Did the crews have something besides a Red Cross CPR certification? The mere fact they were EMS aircraft and were returning from an EMS mission makes it an EMS related event...elsewise they would have been home snug in their beds and not been up flying.
Are you suggesting helicopters should not fly after dark?
If I can send a student off on a solo night cross country...why should professional pilots not be able to fly in the dark? (....and do so safely?)
Do we crash more aircraft after dark?
What is intrinsically different between day and night flying that makes Night EMS ops so dangerous?
We know flying single engine over open water is hazardous....particularly if the sea state exceeds the capability of the emergency float system on the aircraft...but that does not slow down the offshore industry in the Gulf of Mexico.
What is your point Dog? Assert yourself here....make your case?
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SASless:
Aircraft get "licensed" as ambulances? Man, I need to learn more about the EMS industry.
Look, all's I'm saying is that just because these helicopters were painted up to look like ambulances, it had nothing to do with the crashes....UNLESS someone can point out to my feeble brain how these accidents were fundamentally different because of their mission. They could have been private, corporate or air-taxi ships in the same scenarios with the same outcomes. And I believe that the NTSB will see that relatively quickly.
Neither aircraft were on a strictly EMS mission at the time, which makes that factor incidental. So why point the accusing finger at EMS? I don't see the relevance. Was there some EMS necessity for flying that low up the Potomac River? (One story I read said radar returns indicated that the helicopter was at 100' +/- 50'.)
For the Mississippi crash, was there some peculiar EMS necessity for taking off and flying in very poor weather at night? The pilot was merely repositioning it to Faulkner University or a nearby hospital pad to park it for the night, no? In other words, just exactly what were the EMS issues that factored into these crashes? They were helicopter crashes, plain and simple. To say that they occurred because they were on an "EMS mission" is a red herring.
If these two helicopters had been painted with corporate colors, or television station logos, would we be championing the NTSB to investigate those market segments? Of course not.
I cannot answer this, as it is not a valid question. As you know, the actual hard number of aircraft crashed after dark is irrelevant. We must compare the number of hours flown in daylight to the number of hours flown after sunset. The rate of aircraft accidents at night is probably higher, yes. But that is just my gut talking (although that rumbling might be that I have not had breakfast yet).
SASless, your posts are usually intelligent and sane. And I understand your passion about safety, especially with regard to the GOM and EMS segments. But I think it is wrong to lump these particular two accidents into the EMS category. We need to look deeper at why helicopters crash in general.
Lets try another way....what markings were on the side of the aircraft? Lifeflight, Lifeguard, Air Life....did the aircraft have EMS interiors, were the aircraft licensed as ambulances?
Look, all's I'm saying is that just because these helicopters were painted up to look like ambulances, it had nothing to do with the crashes....UNLESS someone can point out to my feeble brain how these accidents were fundamentally different because of their mission. They could have been private, corporate or air-taxi ships in the same scenarios with the same outcomes. And I believe that the NTSB will see that relatively quickly.
Neither aircraft were on a strictly EMS mission at the time, which makes that factor incidental. So why point the accusing finger at EMS? I don't see the relevance. Was there some EMS necessity for flying that low up the Potomac River? (One story I read said radar returns indicated that the helicopter was at 100' +/- 50'.)
For the Mississippi crash, was there some peculiar EMS necessity for taking off and flying in very poor weather at night? The pilot was merely repositioning it to Faulkner University or a nearby hospital pad to park it for the night, no? In other words, just exactly what were the EMS issues that factored into these crashes? They were helicopter crashes, plain and simple. To say that they occurred because they were on an "EMS mission" is a red herring.
If these two helicopters had been painted with corporate colors, or television station logos, would we be championing the NTSB to investigate those market segments? Of course not.
Do we crash more aircraft after dark?
SASless, your posts are usually intelligent and sane. And I understand your passion about safety, especially with regard to the GOM and EMS segments. But I think it is wrong to lump these particular two accidents into the EMS category. We need to look deeper at why helicopters crash in general.
Dog,
Saying these were not EMS related still escapes me....I received Concern notices about them....an EMS industry accident/incident notification group. To say "EMS" does not apply here would be like saying a crash of a longline helicopter lifting fire gear while on a USFS firefighting contract was not a utility helicopter crash because it was really "leased" to a public agency.
Your point that we would not be saying what we are if it had been an ENG aircraft or a corporate aircraft is probably true....however....it was an EMS aircraft....and EMS operators are losing aircraft and crews at an increasing rate over the past two years.
I can assure you the job advertisements for the replacement pilots shall say...."EMS pilot....blah...blah..blah".
How do you explain the increasing accident rate in the EMS market? Just a fluke in the stats....real increase....nothing to worry about....cost of doing business?
Maybe we need to start posting the photographs of the dead....to put faces with the numbers. I begin to think the EMS industry is in a state of denial....kinda like the Wildebeasts when they do the migration....don't look back, just keep running!
Saying these were not EMS related still escapes me....I received Concern notices about them....an EMS industry accident/incident notification group. To say "EMS" does not apply here would be like saying a crash of a longline helicopter lifting fire gear while on a USFS firefighting contract was not a utility helicopter crash because it was really "leased" to a public agency.
Your point that we would not be saying what we are if it had been an ENG aircraft or a corporate aircraft is probably true....however....it was an EMS aircraft....and EMS operators are losing aircraft and crews at an increasing rate over the past two years.
I can assure you the job advertisements for the replacement pilots shall say...."EMS pilot....blah...blah..blah".
How do you explain the increasing accident rate in the EMS market? Just a fluke in the stats....real increase....nothing to worry about....cost of doing business?
Maybe we need to start posting the photographs of the dead....to put faces with the numbers. I begin to think the EMS industry is in a state of denial....kinda like the Wildebeasts when they do the migration....don't look back, just keep running!
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G'day fellas.
Just some thoughts from an outsider (ie non-USA, but EMS none-the-less).
Dog, it seems that you are trying to highlight the fact that all helicopter night/poor weather operations carry increased risk that ought to be studied rather than just giving one part of the industry that attention. In this I agree.
However, I also agree with the assertion that these were EMS aircraft employed in the EMS role. The fact that an Air Ambulance is not actually carrying a patient does not mean that it is not doing an EMS job. The EMS role encompasses the whole day - from pre-flight briefings, through training, stand-by periods, crew rest, earlier jobs (and their potential carry-over stresses), maintenance, admin etc etc. So, if a bunch of EMS aircraft begin to show an increased occurence of crashes, especially in a certain flight regimen, surely you agree that a study including all possible causative factors should be made as to why.
Now I know nothing of the circumstances of these recent accidents, but do we know if the crews' decisions may have been influenced by EMS-specific factors? Perhaps they had just performed a particularly harrowing job, or were under pressure to return to base to perform another job. What were the cultures of the opperations in question with regards to turning jobs down due to poor conditions, or allowing aircrew to be possibly pressured by medical factors which, whilst important, do not change the fact that some flights are better left until flight conditions improve.
My point is simply that EMS is differant from other ops in that the life and death pressures can impinge on the decision-making process of the aircrew. I think perhaps a study of training and equipment suitability and CRM knowledge levels of flight, management AND medical/tasking personel would be a good place to start considering the fact that there is a perceived increase in accidents of aircraft engaged in EMS tasking of some kind.
Just my two bits from a down under EMS/fire operator.
Cheers
Just some thoughts from an outsider (ie non-USA, but EMS none-the-less).
Dog, it seems that you are trying to highlight the fact that all helicopter night/poor weather operations carry increased risk that ought to be studied rather than just giving one part of the industry that attention. In this I agree.
However, I also agree with the assertion that these were EMS aircraft employed in the EMS role. The fact that an Air Ambulance is not actually carrying a patient does not mean that it is not doing an EMS job. The EMS role encompasses the whole day - from pre-flight briefings, through training, stand-by periods, crew rest, earlier jobs (and their potential carry-over stresses), maintenance, admin etc etc. So, if a bunch of EMS aircraft begin to show an increased occurence of crashes, especially in a certain flight regimen, surely you agree that a study including all possible causative factors should be made as to why.
Now I know nothing of the circumstances of these recent accidents, but do we know if the crews' decisions may have been influenced by EMS-specific factors? Perhaps they had just performed a particularly harrowing job, or were under pressure to return to base to perform another job. What were the cultures of the opperations in question with regards to turning jobs down due to poor conditions, or allowing aircrew to be possibly pressured by medical factors which, whilst important, do not change the fact that some flights are better left until flight conditions improve.
My point is simply that EMS is differant from other ops in that the life and death pressures can impinge on the decision-making process of the aircrew. I think perhaps a study of training and equipment suitability and CRM knowledge levels of flight, management AND medical/tasking personel would be a good place to start considering the fact that there is a perceived increase in accidents of aircraft engaged in EMS tasking of some kind.
Just my two bits from a down under EMS/fire operator.
Cheers
Yet another non-US opinion.
On another thread Nick and SAS made some comments in reply to my comments regarding this issue.
To qualify myself:
I did Ambo work in Canada for the better part of 3yrs. It was 24hr shifts IFR and NVFR. We responded to scene calls using S76A models and did patient transfers. 12 machines, 8 bases. To date no machines lost during a call.
Perhaps due to great piloting?
But I know that isn't so, because I think AA work tends to attract SOME (note: NOT ALL) of the lowest skilled aviators in our industry.
...and I worked there
No doubt I will be arguing this comment for days to come.
Perhaps it was due to great machinery?
Nope..all were A models and most were without autopilots, all were underpowered and the most sophisticated gear was the green screen RADAR (which didn't work that well in my ride).
The reason in my opinion was two fold.
A) The Canadian Rules were adhered to explicitly and the company rules were even tougher.
The NVFR/IFR rules are very specific and you have to follow them to the letter. Unlike the BK117 accident in NZ that we discussed years ago. The company SOP's were designed to make the decision to go flying a no brainer due to the fact that the lowest common denominator might be captain.
They completely factored out the pilots abilities in the decision and stated that if you don't have this + that + and some of that; you just do not go.
Constantly the "management" would email and provide examples of accidents from the states. And they were always from the states. I don't mean to be rude to Nick but the comment from the other thread went something like,
"well what about the person who needs the service?"
Sometimes you just have to say SORRY, no can do.
It ain't worth hurting yourself or getting the "I'd rather be on the ground" feeling for someone you don't know. We are not hero's just pilots. The hero's are the paramedics and nurses and they will gladly tell you that
On average I think we would turn down 30% or more of requests.
B) The contract was a government tender.
Being prepaid and government sponsored, it made not going flying profitable.
Prior to the contract being issued, another company flew a 222 on the same operation but for a contracted rate. They got paid when they flew. Some of the stories about those days sent shivers up your spine. I think the most watched video at that base was Nick Lappos in "exposing the myths of ICING conditions"
Remove the motivator of profit and competition and you will have your accident rate cut in half.
On another thread Nick and SAS made some comments in reply to my comments regarding this issue.
To qualify myself:
I did Ambo work in Canada for the better part of 3yrs. It was 24hr shifts IFR and NVFR. We responded to scene calls using S76A models and did patient transfers. 12 machines, 8 bases. To date no machines lost during a call.
Perhaps due to great piloting?
But I know that isn't so, because I think AA work tends to attract SOME (note: NOT ALL) of the lowest skilled aviators in our industry.
...and I worked there
No doubt I will be arguing this comment for days to come.Perhaps it was due to great machinery?
Nope..all were A models and most were without autopilots, all were underpowered and the most sophisticated gear was the green screen RADAR (which didn't work that well in my ride).
The reason in my opinion was two fold.
A) The Canadian Rules were adhered to explicitly and the company rules were even tougher.
The NVFR/IFR rules are very specific and you have to follow them to the letter. Unlike the BK117 accident in NZ that we discussed years ago. The company SOP's were designed to make the decision to go flying a no brainer due to the fact that the lowest common denominator might be captain.
They completely factored out the pilots abilities in the decision and stated that if you don't have this + that + and some of that; you just do not go.
Constantly the "management" would email and provide examples of accidents from the states. And they were always from the states. I don't mean to be rude to Nick but the comment from the other thread went something like,
"well what about the person who needs the service?"
Sometimes you just have to say SORRY, no can do.
It ain't worth hurting yourself or getting the "I'd rather be on the ground" feeling for someone you don't know. We are not hero's just pilots. The hero's are the paramedics and nurses and they will gladly tell you that
On average I think we would turn down 30% or more of requests.
B) The contract was a government tender.
Being prepaid and government sponsored, it made not going flying profitable.
Prior to the contract being issued, another company flew a 222 on the same operation but for a contracted rate. They got paid when they flew. Some of the stories about those days sent shivers up your spine. I think the most watched video at that base was Nick Lappos in "exposing the myths of ICING conditions"
Remove the motivator of profit and competition and you will have your accident rate cut in half.
Rotordog - the reason that these accidents didn't happen to you in your R44 is that you probably wouldn't have been under the pressure to fly that these guys were. As SASless points out they were both returning from missions which meant they had got airborne very quickly - I'm not saying they weren't properly prepared, but it's very different spending an hour doing pre-flight planning and met checking from launching in 5 minutes on a rescue job. With all the adrenaline pumping, crews are usually very sharp and aware but once the job is finished or cancelled there is a natural slump in arousal levels as all that is left is the return to base. This is the time when people get caught out and crews and management need to be aware of it.
Steve76 and w_ocker make very good points - EMS is a business and therefore commercial pressures apply, on top of all the professional ones. Unless the pilots are confident that management will back them up when they decide not to fly, they will keep on pushing the limits and some will get hurt.
Steve76 and w_ocker make very good points - EMS is a business and therefore commercial pressures apply, on top of all the professional ones. Unless the pilots are confident that management will back them up when they decide not to fly, they will keep on pushing the limits and some will get hurt.
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Folks,
This is a very interesting topic and please keep the replies coming. I flew in the US for years and was always interested in the night element of EMS flying. I now fly 24hr SAR on the west coast of Ireland and feel much safer on that than the thought of night RTA type scene work.
The point about profit and government contracts is certainly valid. The only pressure here is that which we put on ourselves. The decisions of the crews (conservative or follhardy) are rarely questioned except by each other and money is not a consideration. The direct pressure on corporate or charter pilots is routinely much more, in my experiences.
The equipment is a factor. Once you have good freezing levels and an IFR machine you have a very good safety net.....particularly if you can couple an ILS. Punch in the autopilot and have the HP monitor it, removes a huge amount of workload.
Two crew is certainly a help(4 even better) provided you are working with and not against each other.
Local knowledge is a huge factor. Having it frees up so much mental capacity.When I think of guys doing relief work for the large EMS companies in the States and moving from site to site I shudder.
So what makes night so dangerous. Obviously fatigue is one. Youre tired. You dont give a **** and you just want your bed. Can be difficult to be disciplined.
Not flying very often doesnt help either. And after hours of sitting around talking ****e, the momentum to go and do something productive can be strong.
We routinely fly into prepared off airport helipads and fueling sites. They are fine because you know them and the terrain.
CFIT accidents rarely happen during the day except in cases of inadvertent IMC. If the wx drops you can safely land anywhere. SAR EMS etc during the day is not an overtly difficult job. BUT!!!!!!When I fly over the countryside at night happily up at MSA ( or below MSA on a known GPS route) I look down and think.... landing on the side of the road down there unaided is simply very dangerous. Flying night visual contact single pilot in a VFR only machine....and then having to land.... Lots of odds aginst you.
This industry learned years ago that you cant fly (safely) low level offshore at night without 2 IFR pilots or a coupler or both. It learned that you cant get down to and hover (safely) over the back of anything small (at night) without a hover height hold.
Ban night scene work, allowing all night flights to be done from known sites would be first on my wish list.... Any comments.....???
This is a very interesting topic and please keep the replies coming. I flew in the US for years and was always interested in the night element of EMS flying. I now fly 24hr SAR on the west coast of Ireland and feel much safer on that than the thought of night RTA type scene work.
The point about profit and government contracts is certainly valid. The only pressure here is that which we put on ourselves. The decisions of the crews (conservative or follhardy) are rarely questioned except by each other and money is not a consideration. The direct pressure on corporate or charter pilots is routinely much more, in my experiences.
The equipment is a factor. Once you have good freezing levels and an IFR machine you have a very good safety net.....particularly if you can couple an ILS. Punch in the autopilot and have the HP monitor it, removes a huge amount of workload.
Two crew is certainly a help(4 even better) provided you are working with and not against each other.
Local knowledge is a huge factor. Having it frees up so much mental capacity.When I think of guys doing relief work for the large EMS companies in the States and moving from site to site I shudder.
So what makes night so dangerous. Obviously fatigue is one. Youre tired. You dont give a **** and you just want your bed. Can be difficult to be disciplined.
Not flying very often doesnt help either. And after hours of sitting around talking ****e, the momentum to go and do something productive can be strong.
We routinely fly into prepared off airport helipads and fueling sites. They are fine because you know them and the terrain.
CFIT accidents rarely happen during the day except in cases of inadvertent IMC. If the wx drops you can safely land anywhere. SAR EMS etc during the day is not an overtly difficult job. BUT!!!!!!When I fly over the countryside at night happily up at MSA ( or below MSA on a known GPS route) I look down and think.... landing on the side of the road down there unaided is simply very dangerous. Flying night visual contact single pilot in a VFR only machine....and then having to land.... Lots of odds aginst you.
This industry learned years ago that you cant fly (safely) low level offshore at night without 2 IFR pilots or a coupler or both. It learned that you cant get down to and hover (safely) over the back of anything small (at night) without a hover height hold.
Ban night scene work, allowing all night flights to be done from known sites would be first on my wish list.... Any comments.....???
Last edited by Decks; 16th Jan 2005 at 09:04.
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Most comments on this thread have been generalisations, and there's nothing wrong with that. But with regard to what, if anything, should change in the US EMS industry to reduce the clearly unacceptable accident rate, it would be interesting to look at the specific error that caused each of the accidents over say the last three years.
Was the fundamental error breaching existing operating regulations and procedures? Was it bad pilot judgement operating within the regulations? Mechanical failure? Etc.
If anyone's got the time and interest to go through the records and come up with the detail of the accident causing error I think it would make interesting reading and point to the changes that would have the greatest effect.
For example, the fact presumably is that hundreds of EMS missions take place in bad weather at night each year, many to unprepared sites, and not only do they not crash, presumably the pilots do not think they are taking unreasonable risks either?
So what makes the difference? Surely, luck rarely comes into it, unless its your turn for the statistical chance of mechanical failure?
Was the fundamental error breaching existing operating regulations and procedures? Was it bad pilot judgement operating within the regulations? Mechanical failure? Etc.
If anyone's got the time and interest to go through the records and come up with the detail of the accident causing error I think it would make interesting reading and point to the changes that would have the greatest effect.
For example, the fact presumably is that hundreds of EMS missions take place in bad weather at night each year, many to unprepared sites, and not only do they not crash, presumably the pilots do not think they are taking unreasonable risks either?
So what makes the difference? Surely, luck rarely comes into it, unless its your turn for the statistical chance of mechanical failure?
As to the hundreds of night missions in bad weather and the guys do not think they are taking a great risk.....think about what you just said?
Having done just that...maybe not in the hundreds....but certainly more than a few....and did so as a roving relief pilot.
A few of the trips stand out....
Full Harvest moon....about midnight....heading for State College, PA....getting to the point where the valley narrowed down and had but a couple of ridges to cross...expected to see the lights of town up ahead...but no lights...and vis was getting all shimmery...turned on a landing light to discover I was in one heck of a snowstorm. 180 turn and rtb.
Scene call southwest of San Antonio....noticed the air under the street lights looked kinda "smokey"...on the way back....encountered some real fog....maintained visual contact with the surface but really wished I wasn't there. Popping up was not a good choice...might not have been able to get back down.
Night flight to St. Mary's, PA....cross grain to the mountains....no lights on the ground.....thus no horizion on a cold overcast winter night. Violated the rules....but hard to say you cannot go when the sky is clear....and vis unlimited. Sweated gallons on the way back when the moon had set.....but a beautiful flight up.
The common threads to all of these...night, very dark areas, no weather radar, single pilot, VMC/VFR flight to remote locations, very short time to spare for alternates fuel wise.
The use of known and inspected landing zones greatly reduces risk.
Patients die if you do not go....but they have been dying long before the helicopter EMS business started up.
Two pilots and fully IFR equipped aircraft for night flying would be much safer.
People can argue about a lot of things...but until you have trotted around some parts of this country at night with limited visibility.....one cannot begin to understand how "dark" it gets.
The current argument within EMS circles has to do with the use and value of NVG's for night work.
I accept all the arguments for the NVG's....I absolutely love flying with them....to fly at night unaided...frankly terrifies me. The one argument I have against them...is what do you do when you find yourself in the middle of no-where....either have a real complete goggle failure (rare) or fly yourself into weather as when using the MK I eyeball? When you lose vis on goggles....you are in a very real pickle! You now have to conduct an inadvertent IMC drill and do so single pilot in an aircraft without an autopilot to assist you. That is not a healthy situation to be in.
Any thoughts?
Having done just that...maybe not in the hundreds....but certainly more than a few....and did so as a roving relief pilot.
A few of the trips stand out....
Full Harvest moon....about midnight....heading for State College, PA....getting to the point where the valley narrowed down and had but a couple of ridges to cross...expected to see the lights of town up ahead...but no lights...and vis was getting all shimmery...turned on a landing light to discover I was in one heck of a snowstorm. 180 turn and rtb.
Scene call southwest of San Antonio....noticed the air under the street lights looked kinda "smokey"...on the way back....encountered some real fog....maintained visual contact with the surface but really wished I wasn't there. Popping up was not a good choice...might not have been able to get back down.
Night flight to St. Mary's, PA....cross grain to the mountains....no lights on the ground.....thus no horizion on a cold overcast winter night. Violated the rules....but hard to say you cannot go when the sky is clear....and vis unlimited. Sweated gallons on the way back when the moon had set.....but a beautiful flight up.
The common threads to all of these...night, very dark areas, no weather radar, single pilot, VMC/VFR flight to remote locations, very short time to spare for alternates fuel wise.
The use of known and inspected landing zones greatly reduces risk.
Patients die if you do not go....but they have been dying long before the helicopter EMS business started up.
Two pilots and fully IFR equipped aircraft for night flying would be much safer.
People can argue about a lot of things...but until you have trotted around some parts of this country at night with limited visibility.....one cannot begin to understand how "dark" it gets.
The current argument within EMS circles has to do with the use and value of NVG's for night work.
I accept all the arguments for the NVG's....I absolutely love flying with them....to fly at night unaided...frankly terrifies me. The one argument I have against them...is what do you do when you find yourself in the middle of no-where....either have a real complete goggle failure (rare) or fly yourself into weather as when using the MK I eyeball? When you lose vis on goggles....you are in a very real pickle! You now have to conduct an inadvertent IMC drill and do so single pilot in an aircraft without an autopilot to assist you. That is not a healthy situation to be in.
Any thoughts?