HEMS - Regulations and saving life
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Sasless
OK, you wont get in a 350 or a 206l/407 at night and fly ems , but you'll get in a 30 year old surplus restricted H model huey and snatch logs off the hill for 8 hours a day!.....
I am confused
Ps. headed to beautiful Beaumont TX Tuesday for the new gig we discussed the other day... I must return to practiing me espanol.
RB
OK, you wont get in a 350 or a 206l/407 at night and fly ems , but you'll get in a 30 year old surplus restricted H model huey and snatch logs off the hill for 8 hours a day!.....
I am confusedPs. headed to beautiful Beaumont TX Tuesday for the new gig we discussed the other day... I must return to practiing me espanol.
RB
rotorboy....
You will not see me snatching logs in a 30 year old Huey either....ever!
I will admit to taking the 30 year old Huey and a 150 foot longline and going way up in the mountains in summer to fling water at a raging forest fire. I never said I was a scaredycat.....just never thought myself completely stupid.
You will not see me snatching logs in a 30 year old Huey either....ever!
I will admit to taking the 30 year old Huey and a 150 foot longline and going way up in the mountains in summer to fling water at a raging forest fire. I never said I was a scaredycat.....just never thought myself completely stupid.
"Just a pilot"
Some thoughts, tangentally related to the unfortunate event that originated this thread-
Engine failures aren't necessarily killers; howve, pilot failure is routinely fatal. The number of engines doesn't change the accident rate.
Years ago I saw some numbers from the US Army regarding "Class A" accidents. 90% of engine failures, at night and/ or IMC were successful.
IF, and that's big "if," this event was a power failure, it seems it was hardly in the worst circumstance for it- the surrounding area looked large, clear and flat. I'm not speculating on cause by any means- engine failures are never like the chop in training....
But, there's a problem in the industry. We train new EMS pilots to do vertical ascents, and seldom teach how to survive a power failure in that regime. It can be done, in a 206 at least. The images I've seen don't seem to show evidence of that technique having been applied.
The 206 is as safe as any aircraft in non-sched service- twin, single, fixed or rotary. It has one significant vulnerability- LTE. Some eyewitnesses relate descriptions that could be LTE.
I'm going to play my harp a bit more on the pilot failure theme- This helo was newly refurbished and placed into service. The pilot had something like a month in the employ of AEL. Compared to the average experience level at my program, this pilot was a relatively low-time.
Anecdotally, it seems there are points unusually common in proportion, in the last year or so of US EMS accidents:
"Unaided" night flight;
New type, or recently refurbed aircraft;
Relatively inexperienced pilots;
Challenging situations, well out of the norm for run of the mill helicopter pilot training.
Yes, I know- old timers have crashed with years of experience in that very aircraft and LZ- But we are the majority of the fleet, in my observation. Pilot failure kills across all demographics.
Engine failures aren't necessarily killers; howve, pilot failure is routinely fatal. The number of engines doesn't change the accident rate.
Years ago I saw some numbers from the US Army regarding "Class A" accidents. 90% of engine failures, at night and/ or IMC were successful.
IF, and that's big "if," this event was a power failure, it seems it was hardly in the worst circumstance for it- the surrounding area looked large, clear and flat. I'm not speculating on cause by any means- engine failures are never like the chop in training....
But, there's a problem in the industry. We train new EMS pilots to do vertical ascents, and seldom teach how to survive a power failure in that regime. It can be done, in a 206 at least. The images I've seen don't seem to show evidence of that technique having been applied.
The 206 is as safe as any aircraft in non-sched service- twin, single, fixed or rotary. It has one significant vulnerability- LTE. Some eyewitnesses relate descriptions that could be LTE.
I'm going to play my harp a bit more on the pilot failure theme- This helo was newly refurbished and placed into service. The pilot had something like a month in the employ of AEL. Compared to the average experience level at my program, this pilot was a relatively low-time.
Anecdotally, it seems there are points unusually common in proportion, in the last year or so of US EMS accidents:
"Unaided" night flight;
New type, or recently refurbed aircraft;
Relatively inexperienced pilots;
Challenging situations, well out of the norm for run of the mill helicopter pilot training.
Yes, I know- old timers have crashed with years of experience in that very aircraft and LZ- But we are the majority of the fleet, in my observation. Pilot failure kills across all demographics.
Devil 49,
I agree with your statements. We usually do agree on these matters. My point is not that "engines" in any multiple are the cure-all. It would follow I think, that any operator (think combination here of hospital/vendor/insurance company/FAA/government agency) of a 24/7 EMS helicopter would strive to achieve the safest method of operation possible.
That would include sophisticated IFR equipped multi-engine aircraft, well trained IFR current and proficient crews, two pilot crews, medical crews trained in all aspects of the aviation task, a firm set of minimum standards, a very healthy safety culture that demands complete teamwork and encourages bonding of the aviation and medical teams into one cohesive and close knit group. Installation of additional equipment like Night suns, scene lights, IR filters for the nightsun, NVG's.....all would be standard equipment. Ground units would be trained in preparing LZ's....pre-planned LZ's would be set up all over the operating area and surveyed for changes over time.
All that sounds good....but we know the truth.
Training is only to minimum standards required. Those standards are not very demanding in reality. Shortage of Money and manpower resources prevent most of the other sought after improvements.
I question the data from the Army study, did night also include NVG flight where you can see something....that makes a heck of a change in safety? All these safe engine failures, etc at night...in single engine aircraft in the cruise or setting at a hover unmasking over a cleared area...again using NVG's?
The Army kills pilots and writes off Aircraft with great regularity as well....recall the crash in South Carolina along the interstate....killed three people in a BlackHawk. They recently lost one at Fort Hood, killing eleven troops.
The whole trend upwards in safety when one transitions from a single engine 206 or 350 to a twin engined IFR machine is undisputeable. But, as you clearly point out.....the vast number of fatal accidents are caused by the Human being and not the machine. We can never teach judgement....until we do....we will continue to have those kinds of accidents and deaths.
The key to drastically reducing the fatal crash rate is to improve the control measures to prevent bad judgement decisions. For example, a Risk Matrix system if used would help the pilot find a reason to say NO and have a defensible reason. Operators being held accountable in court for their actions (both civil and criminal...as well as certificate action by the FAA) for violations of the FAR's and other laws would go a long way towards reducing the pressure on pilots to fly in questionable weather.
We have to operate at a profit or the operations will fail for financial reasons....but the marginal operators that are only surviving by pushing the pilots would find themselves in other work.
It basically all comes down to the individual pilot....the old addage I learned in a different field of work...but so true here.
"Tea too hot to hold...Tea too hot to drink!" Know when to say NO and then stick to your guns....no waffling or going out to do a weather check. Weather checks are done in front of a computer or by telephone, not in the air. We are too fallible for that method.
One man's opinion here.
I agree with your statements. We usually do agree on these matters. My point is not that "engines" in any multiple are the cure-all. It would follow I think, that any operator (think combination here of hospital/vendor/insurance company/FAA/government agency) of a 24/7 EMS helicopter would strive to achieve the safest method of operation possible.
That would include sophisticated IFR equipped multi-engine aircraft, well trained IFR current and proficient crews, two pilot crews, medical crews trained in all aspects of the aviation task, a firm set of minimum standards, a very healthy safety culture that demands complete teamwork and encourages bonding of the aviation and medical teams into one cohesive and close knit group. Installation of additional equipment like Night suns, scene lights, IR filters for the nightsun, NVG's.....all would be standard equipment. Ground units would be trained in preparing LZ's....pre-planned LZ's would be set up all over the operating area and surveyed for changes over time.
All that sounds good....but we know the truth.
Training is only to minimum standards required. Those standards are not very demanding in reality. Shortage of Money and manpower resources prevent most of the other sought after improvements.
I question the data from the Army study, did night also include NVG flight where you can see something....that makes a heck of a change in safety? All these safe engine failures, etc at night...in single engine aircraft in the cruise or setting at a hover unmasking over a cleared area...again using NVG's?
The Army kills pilots and writes off Aircraft with great regularity as well....recall the crash in South Carolina along the interstate....killed three people in a BlackHawk. They recently lost one at Fort Hood, killing eleven troops.
The whole trend upwards in safety when one transitions from a single engine 206 or 350 to a twin engined IFR machine is undisputeable. But, as you clearly point out.....the vast number of fatal accidents are caused by the Human being and not the machine. We can never teach judgement....until we do....we will continue to have those kinds of accidents and deaths.
The key to drastically reducing the fatal crash rate is to improve the control measures to prevent bad judgement decisions. For example, a Risk Matrix system if used would help the pilot find a reason to say NO and have a defensible reason. Operators being held accountable in court for their actions (both civil and criminal...as well as certificate action by the FAA) for violations of the FAR's and other laws would go a long way towards reducing the pressure on pilots to fly in questionable weather.
We have to operate at a profit or the operations will fail for financial reasons....but the marginal operators that are only surviving by pushing the pilots would find themselves in other work.
It basically all comes down to the individual pilot....the old addage I learned in a different field of work...but so true here.
"Tea too hot to hold...Tea too hot to drink!" Know when to say NO and then stick to your guns....no waffling or going out to do a weather check. Weather checks are done in front of a computer or by telephone, not in the air. We are too fallible for that method.
One man's opinion here.
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SASSless/Devil 49:
I have resisted entering this debate up to now because it appears to have uniquely American flavour but we do have to question the statement that “engine failures are not killers” and the number of engines “do not change the accident rate”. Whether a fatal accident results from a power failure in a single engine helicopter is a matter of: conditions of light and surface; the flight envelope in which the failure occurs; and the skill and training of the pilot (and the potential for survival should this occur over inhospitable terrain).
If an engine failure occurs in a twin it is unlikely to lead to an accident - unless it occurs in a regime where ‘exposure’ is being taken; in which case it should have been the result of a risk assessment (by the pilot - sometimes known as aeronautical decision making). Putting aside the issue of the probability of an engine failure; wouldn’t we all rather be in a twin if an engine failure occurs - under almost any circumstances?
One point it is difficult to find quarrel with is the cultural change that occurs when twin engine IFR operations are being conducted. The skill set that is required to deal with emergencies is more related to management of situations and less to handling - that is not to say that handling is less important but can be more considered. My experience is also that pilots flying twins are more likely to fly in accordance with the regulations - I’m not sure why that is.
If as Devil 49 implies, the spate of accidents appears to be due to a reduction of the experience levels, and if that reduction of experience is likely to continue, it might be appropriate to think about a minimum level of experience for HEMS or the raising of the operational limits as well as improved training and checking - really a must.
There is also a duty of care argument, not just for HEMS but for all operations where an engine failure has the potential for death or injury; when contracting for a flight in a single engine helicopter (especially at night or over inhospitable terrain such as the sea) how many passengers are made aware of the increase in the potential for an accident - with its concomitant risk of death or injury?
I have resisted entering this debate up to now because it appears to have uniquely American flavour but we do have to question the statement that “engine failures are not killers” and the number of engines “do not change the accident rate”. Whether a fatal accident results from a power failure in a single engine helicopter is a matter of: conditions of light and surface; the flight envelope in which the failure occurs; and the skill and training of the pilot (and the potential for survival should this occur over inhospitable terrain).
If an engine failure occurs in a twin it is unlikely to lead to an accident - unless it occurs in a regime where ‘exposure’ is being taken; in which case it should have been the result of a risk assessment (by the pilot - sometimes known as aeronautical decision making). Putting aside the issue of the probability of an engine failure; wouldn’t we all rather be in a twin if an engine failure occurs - under almost any circumstances?
One point it is difficult to find quarrel with is the cultural change that occurs when twin engine IFR operations are being conducted. The skill set that is required to deal with emergencies is more related to management of situations and less to handling - that is not to say that handling is less important but can be more considered. My experience is also that pilots flying twins are more likely to fly in accordance with the regulations - I’m not sure why that is.
If as Devil 49 implies, the spate of accidents appears to be due to a reduction of the experience levels, and if that reduction of experience is likely to continue, it might be appropriate to think about a minimum level of experience for HEMS or the raising of the operational limits as well as improved training and checking - really a must.
There is also a duty of care argument, not just for HEMS but for all operations where an engine failure has the potential for death or injury; when contracting for a flight in a single engine helicopter (especially at night or over inhospitable terrain such as the sea) how many passengers are made aware of the increase in the potential for an accident - with its concomitant risk of death or injury?
"Just a pilot"
SASless, I saw the US Army numbers I mentioned so long ago (1983) that I doubt that the current tactical philosophy is pertinent- or goggles- for that matter. What stuck in my mind is how safe helicopter operations can be, with a well trained crew in a real safety culture.
The 206 safety record reflects that as well, it is- or was- the machine of choice for fleet 135 operators that wanted to make money. Hence a very high share of hours flown were by professionals, often with a real safety culture, and sometimes- world class training. Some of the instructors I had the privilege of flying with at PHI were among the best I ever saw, anywhere, since 1968. And, at that time they swung a big stick at the company, safety, equipment and "rules and procedures"-wise. I'm painting with a very broad brush here, but many 135 training departments are almost invisible in their respctive companies, no matter the quality of staff- they don't influence much beyond the government required paperwork. My impresion is they're expected to generate that paper at minimal cost and be good and be quiet the rest of the time. The connection and influence that the training department had at the corporate level made PHI one of the safest operators in the world- when it worked well. When they were pushed down the influence ladder, it was less successful.
Any connection between more sophisticated equipment and safety is the product of reverse selection of data. Pilots selected for upgrades to IFR and multis, are generally more senior and thus have a higher experience level, are generally more skilled, and more dedicated and knowledgeable professionals. My experience is that the weak among that group are soon known by their reputation, and weeded out after selection, by their peers.
No thank you(emphatically!), to the European solution. I shudder when I read the threads discussing aviation rules over there. Besides, and I don't have any data to support this opinon, but I've been told that there's no significant difference in accident rates between our system and theirs, generally speaking- perhaps EMS gets better support, I don't know.
Any connection to improved safety in Europe, or anywhere, is not regulations or equipment- it's the professional pilots, company support and respect for their professional pilots.
MARS, you make a couple very good points-
I would indeed rather be in a twin. Right now I'm more afraid of the dark and the stuff in it, than I am of engine failures. I'm more likely to survive an engine failure at night over the Smokies than I am an encounter with a dark tower, or wires. I do not go in questionable weather, so that's moot.
Also your level of care issue has always been a puzzle to me. If I go to the airport and buy a ticket for air transport, I am entitled to the highest level of care- what we call 121. But, if my broken and usually unconscious body is stuffed into a helo EMS, it's an "charter," and falls under 135????
The 206 safety record reflects that as well, it is- or was- the machine of choice for fleet 135 operators that wanted to make money. Hence a very high share of hours flown were by professionals, often with a real safety culture, and sometimes- world class training. Some of the instructors I had the privilege of flying with at PHI were among the best I ever saw, anywhere, since 1968. And, at that time they swung a big stick at the company, safety, equipment and "rules and procedures"-wise. I'm painting with a very broad brush here, but many 135 training departments are almost invisible in their respctive companies, no matter the quality of staff- they don't influence much beyond the government required paperwork. My impresion is they're expected to generate that paper at minimal cost and be good and be quiet the rest of the time. The connection and influence that the training department had at the corporate level made PHI one of the safest operators in the world- when it worked well. When they were pushed down the influence ladder, it was less successful.
Any connection between more sophisticated equipment and safety is the product of reverse selection of data. Pilots selected for upgrades to IFR and multis, are generally more senior and thus have a higher experience level, are generally more skilled, and more dedicated and knowledgeable professionals. My experience is that the weak among that group are soon known by their reputation, and weeded out after selection, by their peers.
No thank you(emphatically!), to the European solution. I shudder when I read the threads discussing aviation rules over there. Besides, and I don't have any data to support this opinon, but I've been told that there's no significant difference in accident rates between our system and theirs, generally speaking- perhaps EMS gets better support, I don't know.
Any connection to improved safety in Europe, or anywhere, is not regulations or equipment- it's the professional pilots, company support and respect for their professional pilots.
MARS, you make a couple very good points-
I would indeed rather be in a twin. Right now I'm more afraid of the dark and the stuff in it, than I am of engine failures. I'm more likely to survive an engine failure at night over the Smokies than I am an encounter with a dark tower, or wires. I do not go in questionable weather, so that's moot.
Also your level of care issue has always been a puzzle to me. If I go to the airport and buy a ticket for air transport, I am entitled to the highest level of care- what we call 121. But, if my broken and usually unconscious body is stuffed into a helo EMS, it's an "charter," and falls under 135????
Last edited by Devil 49; 25th Feb 2005 at 17:02.
Mars,
The point about educating your passenger and the "duty of care" issue is an interesting one. I suggest my idea of holding management and owners responsible as well as pilots and mechanics/engineers might go a long way of improving the situation.
Consider this concept in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil businesss....No jigsaw down there....no effective SAR at all...particularly at night. The primary SAR response will be non-SAR capable commerical helicopters and surface vessels again primarily non SAR capable private vessels. The USCG is busy doing the Homeland Security bit and that has adversely impacted the SAR mission they are so famous for in the past.
Every single day....thousands of passengers are flying in the GOM without survival suits or any viable SAR helicopter service to assist in an emergency. If you go down at night.....you are in big, big trouble.
This is the mindset over here.....bottomline numbers first....everything else second.
The point about educating your passenger and the "duty of care" issue is an interesting one. I suggest my idea of holding management and owners responsible as well as pilots and mechanics/engineers might go a long way of improving the situation.
Consider this concept in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil businesss....No jigsaw down there....no effective SAR at all...particularly at night. The primary SAR response will be non-SAR capable commerical helicopters and surface vessels again primarily non SAR capable private vessels. The USCG is busy doing the Homeland Security bit and that has adversely impacted the SAR mission they are so famous for in the past.
Every single day....thousands of passengers are flying in the GOM without survival suits or any viable SAR helicopter service to assist in an emergency. If you go down at night.....you are in big, big trouble.
This is the mindset over here.....bottomline numbers first....everything else second.
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Devil 49:
I think it is a part of the mindset that all helicopter operations are conducted under Part 135; this implies that they can be more exposed to risk. There is no question in my mind that helicopters should be operated under Part 135 I merely question whether that should mean a lower safety level - rather than a more flexible regulation. I'm not quite sure what "weeding out by their peers means" - but you are quite correct that there is a selection for twin engine command that is absent from 'single engine single pilot' operations. It is rather like the threads on training with the Robinson which reminds me of the Irish saying - if you want to go to there you shouldn't start from here.
SASSless:
The duty of care in the GOM should be more clearly focussed upon the Oil Industry as they have the means to alter the balance. You would be correct that flying at night in a single outside the survival time without some mitigating safety equipment should be frowned upon if that were the case - my understanding is that singles at night in the GOM is the exception rather than the rule (and, as oil company policy changes, becoming more so). We might also wish to bring to their attention that flying in adverse weather in singles also increases substantially the risk as some accidents in the last two years have shown.
I think it is a part of the mindset that all helicopter operations are conducted under Part 135; this implies that they can be more exposed to risk. There is no question in my mind that helicopters should be operated under Part 135 I merely question whether that should mean a lower safety level - rather than a more flexible regulation. I'm not quite sure what "weeding out by their peers means" - but you are quite correct that there is a selection for twin engine command that is absent from 'single engine single pilot' operations. It is rather like the threads on training with the Robinson which reminds me of the Irish saying - if you want to go to there you shouldn't start from here.
SASSless:
The duty of care in the GOM should be more clearly focussed upon the Oil Industry as they have the means to alter the balance. You would be correct that flying at night in a single outside the survival time without some mitigating safety equipment should be frowned upon if that were the case - my understanding is that singles at night in the GOM is the exception rather than the rule (and, as oil company policy changes, becoming more so). We might also wish to bring to their attention that flying in adverse weather in singles also increases substantially the risk as some accidents in the last two years have shown.
Sadly to me to write here, that one of the last single engine EMS helicopters in Germany chrashed tonight. The pilot died in the wreckage. A/c was backtracking to the base without patient. The AS 350 was operated under the note to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) " The Authority is empowered to decide which operation is a HEMS operation in the sense of this Appendix." In this federal country it's possible to operate the last single engine helicopters in this business in Germany.
The local CAA approved day operations as interhospital flights.
Of course i've no further informations at the moment available. The a/c is totally destroyed, debris is found on an area more than 300m away. The weather was difficult 400-600ft cloudbase, snow, limited visibility. Other operators canceled missions in this area before the crash. Must be in the last twilight time or it was already dark.
The local CAA approved day operations as interhospital flights.
Of course i've no further informations at the moment available. The a/c is totally destroyed, debris is found on an area more than 300m away. The weather was difficult 400-600ft cloudbase, snow, limited visibility. Other operators canceled missions in this area before the crash. Must be in the last twilight time or it was already dark.
Last edited by tecpilot; 25th Feb 2005 at 21:32.
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I've been flying at night in the GOM for a few years now, and I have a few observations.
Deaths from exposure are non-existant. If you do go in the water, it's not that hard to survive if you have a life vest, and exposure suits are simply excess baggage. You don't die quickly from 80 degree water.
Night flights aren't all that common, but there are a significant number of single-engine flights at night compared to the overall number. There are a few operators flying single-engine at night over water.
Given the choice between single-engine or single-pilot ops, I'll take single-engine every time. A second pilot is far more important than a second engine. Engines don't quit that often, especially turbines, and if they do, a reasonably competent pilot can get the helicopter down safely enough to get everyone out. What kills people is flying into the water inverted, hitting obstacles on landing, flying into thunderstorms, etc. A second pilot is, IMO, far more important than a second engine, and should be required for night flight whether over water or over land. Night EMS single-pilot flights will continue to kill people, as long as they are permitted. Night flight single-pilot flight anywhere will kill people. If I flew single-pilot all the time, I wouldn't be writing this, I would be feeding the fishes. I don't care if you have one engine or three, if it's dark or IMC you need two pilots active in the cockpit, and night flight will eventually become IMC, guaranteed.
Deaths from exposure are non-existant. If you do go in the water, it's not that hard to survive if you have a life vest, and exposure suits are simply excess baggage. You don't die quickly from 80 degree water.
Night flights aren't all that common, but there are a significant number of single-engine flights at night compared to the overall number. There are a few operators flying single-engine at night over water.
Given the choice between single-engine or single-pilot ops, I'll take single-engine every time. A second pilot is far more important than a second engine. Engines don't quit that often, especially turbines, and if they do, a reasonably competent pilot can get the helicopter down safely enough to get everyone out. What kills people is flying into the water inverted, hitting obstacles on landing, flying into thunderstorms, etc. A second pilot is, IMO, far more important than a second engine, and should be required for night flight whether over water or over land. Night EMS single-pilot flights will continue to kill people, as long as they are permitted. Night flight single-pilot flight anywhere will kill people. If I flew single-pilot all the time, I wouldn't be writing this, I would be feeding the fishes. I don't care if you have one engine or three, if it's dark or IMC you need two pilots active in the cockpit, and night flight will eventually become IMC, guaranteed.
Tecpilot,
I've no wish to hijack this thread but I think that the intent of the quoted remark needs to be clarified.
The first published version of JAR-OPS 3 had definitions of HEMS and SAR inside the Appendix; as SAR is not regulated under JAR-OPS 3 and as the clause was being used to subvert the intent of the Appendix, it was removed and replaced with the referenced text.
However, in view of an apparent misunderstanding of the scope of HEMS in some States (including Germany) a comprehensive ACJ was written and put into Section 2 of the JAR; this ACJ explained in fine detail the distinction between air ambulance operations, HEMS operations and SAR - principally that air ambulance could be conducted to the main body of JAR-OPS 3 (without the requirement for a HEMS approval), HEMS was to be conducted to the main body as varied by the Appendix and that SAR was under control of the State (whatever their rules may be - somewhat similar to public aircraft in the US). Inter-hospital flights can in no way be regarded as SAR and therefore fall within the scope of JAR-OPS 3 and, depending on the urgency, might take advantage of the alleviation of HEMS (for performance or in-flight conditions).
Contrary to the common (mis)understanding, HEMS operations can be conducted by helicopters operating in Performance Class 3 (single engine operations) - as specified in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) paragraph (c)(1); providing they are conducted over a non-hostile environment. However, CAT/HEMS flight at night is prohibited for helicopters operating in PC3 in accordance with JAR-OPS 3.540(a)(6). States manoeuvre their way round this by permitting PC3 at night when there is no carriage of passengers (for example when repositioning) - providing it is permitted in accordance with non-CAT regulations.
Because we do not know the circumstances of the flight, we should not presume that it was conducted outside the regulation (although it does appear that the Lände have discretion to exempt from regulations). I suppose that we can assume that these HEMS operations in PC3 are conducted in the former Eastern part of Germany.
Jim
The Authority is empowered to decide which operation is a HEMS operation in the sense of this Appendix.
The first published version of JAR-OPS 3 had definitions of HEMS and SAR inside the Appendix; as SAR is not regulated under JAR-OPS 3 and as the clause was being used to subvert the intent of the Appendix, it was removed and replaced with the referenced text.
However, in view of an apparent misunderstanding of the scope of HEMS in some States (including Germany) a comprehensive ACJ was written and put into Section 2 of the JAR; this ACJ explained in fine detail the distinction between air ambulance operations, HEMS operations and SAR - principally that air ambulance could be conducted to the main body of JAR-OPS 3 (without the requirement for a HEMS approval), HEMS was to be conducted to the main body as varied by the Appendix and that SAR was under control of the State (whatever their rules may be - somewhat similar to public aircraft in the US). Inter-hospital flights can in no way be regarded as SAR and therefore fall within the scope of JAR-OPS 3 and, depending on the urgency, might take advantage of the alleviation of HEMS (for performance or in-flight conditions).
Contrary to the common (mis)understanding, HEMS operations can be conducted by helicopters operating in Performance Class 3 (single engine operations) - as specified in Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.005(d) paragraph (c)(1); providing they are conducted over a non-hostile environment. However, CAT/HEMS flight at night is prohibited for helicopters operating in PC3 in accordance with JAR-OPS 3.540(a)(6). States manoeuvre their way round this by permitting PC3 at night when there is no carriage of passengers (for example when repositioning) - providing it is permitted in accordance with non-CAT regulations.
Because we do not know the circumstances of the flight, we should not presume that it was conducted outside the regulation (although it does appear that the Lände have discretion to exempt from regulations). I suppose that we can assume that these HEMS operations in PC3 are conducted in the former Eastern part of Germany.
Jim
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GLSNightPilot:
As always you present a logical argument but the likelihood of two pilot operations in a single engine helicopter is quite small and, because it would not be within the normal scope would likely suffer from CRM problems (which have been seen even in two crew helicopter operations).
However, I have to take issue with your contention that “deaths from exposure are non existent”; almost within the last two years (On February 16, 2003) there was a ditching in the GOM that resulted in the death of two of the occupants - which occured following a successful escape from the helicopter.
As always you present a logical argument but the likelihood of two pilot operations in a single engine helicopter is quite small and, because it would not be within the normal scope would likely suffer from CRM problems (which have been seen even in two crew helicopter operations).
However, I have to take issue with your contention that “deaths from exposure are non existent”; almost within the last two years (On February 16, 2003) there was a ditching in the GOM that resulted in the death of two of the occupants - which occured following a successful escape from the helicopter.
JimL
Germany is unfortunately still operating under the first version of JAR-OPS 3.
I've not affirmed the flight was outside the regulations and approvals.
In germany an operator needs an approval to do interhospital-flights independent from JAR-OPS, because it's a public operation, paid by public health insurancies and regulated by a public headquarter. Nearly all federal countries in germany have on this way limited the job to twins. But i don't also affirm the accident was caused by the single engine.
All i wrote is, that one of the last single EMS helicopters chrashed tonight. I'm shure the pilot wasn't aiming to a night flight. May be only one of the not abnormal delays in the EMS business.
Germany is unfortunately still operating under the first version of JAR-OPS 3.
I've not affirmed the flight was outside the regulations and approvals.
In germany an operator needs an approval to do interhospital-flights independent from JAR-OPS, because it's a public operation, paid by public health insurancies and regulated by a public headquarter. Nearly all federal countries in germany have on this way limited the job to twins. But i don't also affirm the accident was caused by the single engine.
All i wrote is, that one of the last single EMS helicopters chrashed tonight. I'm shure the pilot wasn't aiming to a night flight. May be only one of the not abnormal delays in the EMS business.
Water temperature at the location of the last 407 crash was approximatley 65 degrees F. The closer to shore you get in the Gulf of Mexico, the colder the water gets during the winter.
We wore Mustang Floater Jackets in the summer in Alaska and I have worn the same jacket while flying over the North Sea in the summer.
I found this excerpt in a discussion about the US Coast Guard Policy for their own crewmembers.
The United States Search and Rescue Task Force published data, which shows survival time in 73º water to be almost indefinite, but in 37º water, it ranges betweenº, 30 – 90 minutes. With such a small window of time, why would anyone venture out into the ocean without proper emergency equipment and be thoroughly familiar with how to wear it?
Such equipment consists of cold water immersion protective clothing. As with all emergency and survival equipment, improper storage, handling and failure to use it correctly or in time, diminishes the chances of survival.
The Coast Guard currently requires the use of anti-exposure coveralls when the water temperature or air temperature pose health threats, should a member get wet. According to one manufacturer’s published research, by wearing the anti-exposure suit, the survival time increases approximately 60 minutes, but only if the suit is properly maintained and donned. Dry suits, which prevent water from touching your body, increase your survival even longer.
Preparation
Coast Guard regulations (in the First Coast Guard District, Southern Region) require all of their crew members to don anti-exposure suits when the water temperature is between 50º and 60º. Should the water temperature drop lower than 50º, then dry-suits are mandated. This means, even if the air temperature is 80º, and the water temperature is less than 60º, members must still wear an anti-exposure suit, except if the local station commander applies an exception. Other Coast Guard Districts have procedures that are similar.
We wore Mustang Floater Jackets in the summer in Alaska and I have worn the same jacket while flying over the North Sea in the summer.
I found this excerpt in a discussion about the US Coast Guard Policy for their own crewmembers.
The United States Search and Rescue Task Force published data, which shows survival time in 73º water to be almost indefinite, but in 37º water, it ranges betweenº, 30 – 90 minutes. With such a small window of time, why would anyone venture out into the ocean without proper emergency equipment and be thoroughly familiar with how to wear it?
Such equipment consists of cold water immersion protective clothing. As with all emergency and survival equipment, improper storage, handling and failure to use it correctly or in time, diminishes the chances of survival.
The Coast Guard currently requires the use of anti-exposure coveralls when the water temperature or air temperature pose health threats, should a member get wet. According to one manufacturer’s published research, by wearing the anti-exposure suit, the survival time increases approximately 60 minutes, but only if the suit is properly maintained and donned. Dry suits, which prevent water from touching your body, increase your survival even longer.
Preparation
Coast Guard regulations (in the First Coast Guard District, Southern Region) require all of their crew members to don anti-exposure suits when the water temperature is between 50º and 60º. Should the water temperature drop lower than 50º, then dry-suits are mandated. This means, even if the air temperature is 80º, and the water temperature is less than 60º, members must still wear an anti-exposure suit, except if the local station commander applies an exception. Other Coast Guard Districts have procedures that are similar.
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Water temperature is not the only element that needs to be considered where survival is concerned - adequate clothing (whether or not survival suits are worn), survival suits and splash-hoods on the lifevest (or on the survival suit if it is integrated) also improve the chances of survival.
The 407 accident that led to the death of two of the occupants in February 2003 occured in seas of 5ft - 9ft and with winds of 25 - 40 mph. Existing guidance indicates that the survival time can be reduced by two thirds with winds above 25 mph. This would put the survival time at less than 30 minutes in sea temperatures of 13C.
Sea states with breaking waves can also reduce the survival time unless spray hoods are deployed (spray hoods, on lifevests or suvival suits, are mandatary for offshore flying in Europe).
You already know that there have been deaths due to exposure in the GOM. If the causal chain contains night flying, high seas, strong winds and single engine operations; one link that is preventing a hazardous event is the reliability of the engine (or any other cause of ditching). With the assumed engine reliability of 1:100,000 (if in fact that is achieved) and usage rates of 400,000 flying hours per year in the GOM, there is the potential for four fatal accidents a year due to engine failure (in addition to those which are not engine related).
The causal chain can be broken in a number of ways but the elimination of single engine night flying and the introduction of an adverse weather policy would be two which could have most effect.
The 407 accident that led to the death of two of the occupants in February 2003 occured in seas of 5ft - 9ft and with winds of 25 - 40 mph. Existing guidance indicates that the survival time can be reduced by two thirds with winds above 25 mph. This would put the survival time at less than 30 minutes in sea temperatures of 13C.
Sea states with breaking waves can also reduce the survival time unless spray hoods are deployed (spray hoods, on lifevests or suvival suits, are mandatary for offshore flying in Europe).
You already know that there have been deaths due to exposure in the GOM. If the causal chain contains night flying, high seas, strong winds and single engine operations; one link that is preventing a hazardous event is the reliability of the engine (or any other cause of ditching). With the assumed engine reliability of 1:100,000 (if in fact that is achieved) and usage rates of 400,000 flying hours per year in the GOM, there is the potential for four fatal accidents a year due to engine failure (in addition to those which are not engine related).
The causal chain can be broken in a number of ways but the elimination of single engine night flying and the introduction of an adverse weather policy would be two which could have most effect.
Too true Mars,
Also contained in an article I read while researching this topic is a statement to the effect that drowning deaths are often a result of hypothermia since the victim is unable to turn his back to on-coming waves and spray as he becomes weakened from exposure to cold.
Compound the exposure to cold water and cold air....with the lack of effective airborne SAR capability that now exists in the Gulf Of Mexico and you have a potential for disaster.
Middle of the summer, hot , clear sunny day, flat water, calm winds....immersion in the sea does not present nearly the hazard.
Also contained in an article I read while researching this topic is a statement to the effect that drowning deaths are often a result of hypothermia since the victim is unable to turn his back to on-coming waves and spray as he becomes weakened from exposure to cold.
Compound the exposure to cold water and cold air....with the lack of effective airborne SAR capability that now exists in the Gulf Of Mexico and you have a potential for disaster.
Middle of the summer, hot , clear sunny day, flat water, calm winds....immersion in the sea does not present nearly the hazard.
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I don't see anything that says they died from exposure. Apparently the helicopter capsized immediately upon landing, which is pretty much expected in 9-ft seas. From the NTSB report, it's impossible to attribute the deaths to anything. I don't have access to a coroner's report.
Flying single-engine helicopters when the seas are high isn't the brightest idea anyone ever came up with, but it is unfortunately perfectly legal. Some judgement is required.
Flying single-engine helicopters when the seas are high isn't the brightest idea anyone ever came up with, but it is unfortunately perfectly legal. Some judgement is required.
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GLS:
We are in total agreement but who is to exercise the judgement: the FAA; the customer; the operator; or the pilot.
In some States (and in fact in the current ICAO text), the regulation requires a safe-forced-landing to be carried out in the event of an engine failure. European regulations amplifies that by prohibiting (except in some risk assessed circumstances) flight over a hostile environment in singles (a hostile environment includes the surface conditions, protection of the occupants and survival beyond the search and rescue response/capability) - thus the State takes responsibility.
In the absence of action from the FAA (which is unlikely to change) only the last three are options - I would suggest that in the current climate, the pilot should not bear such a burden and it is therefore left to the operator or the customer - both of whom have corporate responsibility for duty of care.
We are in total agreement but who is to exercise the judgement: the FAA; the customer; the operator; or the pilot.
In some States (and in fact in the current ICAO text), the regulation requires a safe-forced-landing to be carried out in the event of an engine failure. European regulations amplifies that by prohibiting (except in some risk assessed circumstances) flight over a hostile environment in singles (a hostile environment includes the surface conditions, protection of the occupants and survival beyond the search and rescue response/capability) - thus the State takes responsibility.
In the absence of action from the FAA (which is unlikely to change) only the last three are options - I would suggest that in the current climate, the pilot should not bear such a burden and it is therefore left to the operator or the customer - both of whom have corporate responsibility for duty of care.
GLS,
Has any single-engine helicopter flight ever been cancelled due to "sea-state issues"....ever....in the Gulf of Mexico? I am not talking about wind or turbulence or rain but sea state alone?
Can a pilot look at the customer, tell them "NO" and get backing from his company safety, operations, and management?
Do you have first hand information that it ever happened? Do you have any second or third hand knowledge of that ever happening?
You are correct when you say it is legal....I decline to accept the statement that it is a matter of judgement. I would suggest the pursuit of money has put safety well down in priorities in this situation.
Has any single-engine helicopter flight ever been cancelled due to "sea-state issues"....ever....in the Gulf of Mexico? I am not talking about wind or turbulence or rain but sea state alone?
Can a pilot look at the customer, tell them "NO" and get backing from his company safety, operations, and management?
Do you have first hand information that it ever happened? Do you have any second or third hand knowledge of that ever happening?
You are correct when you say it is legal....I decline to accept the statement that it is a matter of judgement. I would suggest the pursuit of money has put safety well down in priorities in this situation.