Devil 49,
I agree with your statements. We usually do agree on these matters. My point is not that "engines" in any multiple are the cure-all. It would follow I think, that any operator (think combination here of hospital/vendor/insurance company/FAA/government agency) of a 24/7 EMS helicopter would strive to achieve the safest method of operation possible.
That would include sophisticated IFR equipped multi-engine aircraft, well trained IFR current and proficient crews, two pilot crews, medical crews trained in all aspects of the aviation task, a firm set of minimum standards, a very healthy safety culture that demands complete teamwork and encourages bonding of the aviation and medical teams into one cohesive and close knit group. Installation of additional equipment like Night suns, scene lights, IR filters for the nightsun, NVG's.....all would be standard equipment. Ground units would be trained in preparing LZ's....pre-planned LZ's would be set up all over the operating area and surveyed for changes over time.
All that sounds good....but we know the truth.
Training is only to minimum standards required. Those standards are not very demanding in reality. Shortage of Money and manpower resources prevent most of the other sought after improvements.
I question the data from the Army study, did night also include NVG flight where you can see something....that makes a heck of a change in safety? All these safe engine failures, etc at night...in single engine aircraft in the cruise or setting at a hover unmasking over a cleared area...again using NVG's?
The Army kills pilots and writes off Aircraft with great regularity as well....recall the crash in South Carolina along the interstate....killed three people in a BlackHawk. They recently lost one at Fort Hood, killing eleven troops.
The whole trend upwards in safety when one transitions from a single engine 206 or 350 to a twin engined IFR machine is undisputeable. But, as you clearly point out.....the vast number of fatal accidents are caused by the Human being and not the machine. We can never teach judgement....until we do....we will continue to have those kinds of accidents and deaths.
The key to drastically reducing the fatal crash rate is to improve the control measures to prevent bad judgement decisions. For example, a Risk Matrix system if used would help the pilot find a reason to say NO and have a defensible reason. Operators being held accountable in court for their actions (both civil and criminal...as well as certificate action by the FAA) for violations of the FAR's and other laws would go a long way towards reducing the pressure on pilots to fly in questionable weather.
We have to operate at a profit or the operations will fail for financial reasons....but the marginal operators that are only surviving by pushing the pilots would find themselves in other work.
It basically all comes down to the individual pilot....the old addage I learned in a different field of work...but so true here.
"Tea too hot to hold...Tea too hot to drink!" Know when to say NO and then stick to your guns....no waffling or going out to do a weather check. Weather checks are done in front of a computer or by telephone, not in the air. We are too fallible for that method.
One man's opinion here.