HEMS - Regulations and saving life
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Totally unscientific statistic
Reading this thread made me think… and count… and then get one of these sick feelings that are sometimes referred to as an epiphany.
I’ve been in the helicopter industry less than ten years, never flew EMS myself.
Of the dozens of pilots I’ve worked with (between 50 and 100) I can only recall 6 who worked EMS for at least some time.
Of those six, two (33%) were killed in night CFIT accidents while on EMS flights. One in bad weather (fog), the other on a clear but dark night over featureless terrain.
Of the other four, two told me stories of losing (and regaining) control of their basic night VFR equipped aircraft on dark nights over uninhabited terrain that made me want to puke.
The other two only flew IFR and autopilot equipped multis.
I’ve been in the helicopter industry less than ten years, never flew EMS myself.
Of the dozens of pilots I’ve worked with (between 50 and 100) I can only recall 6 who worked EMS for at least some time.
Of those six, two (33%) were killed in night CFIT accidents while on EMS flights. One in bad weather (fog), the other on a clear but dark night over featureless terrain.
Of the other four, two told me stories of losing (and regaining) control of their basic night VFR equipped aircraft on dark nights over uninhabited terrain that made me want to puke.
The other two only flew IFR and autopilot equipped multis.
Too true....and the FAA and NTSB want to form a partership with operators, NEMPSA, et al....to form a stuy panel to figure out ways to mitigate the death toll?
Yeah Right!
The same partnership that got where we are today.....making like Wildebeests at migration time....keep running and don't look back!
Never had a scare in the daylight doing EMS....but night time provided plenty....and I have danglers the size of BB's!
I love the advertisements for pilots...body weight equipped for flight not to exceed 215 pounds.....underpowered aircraft or CG problems here?
Sierra Vista ...206/407 pilot needed....ever been to Sierra Vista? Dark does not describe it adequately.
Seen West Texas when the fog rolls in.....
Been to West Virginia or around the Applachin Mountains when you fly cross grain over the valleys...DARK!
The Southeast...with the summer haze at night...over the forested areas....waiting for the fog to form?
Night VFR in marginal weather in a basic 206/407/350....with your annual checkride that might include one approach under the hood...and usually a surveillence radar approach at that. Pass the annual checkride and you are still good to go eleven months later.
Gee.....what could we do to improve things?
Yeah Right!
The same partnership that got where we are today.....making like Wildebeests at migration time....keep running and don't look back!
Never had a scare in the daylight doing EMS....but night time provided plenty....and I have danglers the size of BB's!
I love the advertisements for pilots...body weight equipped for flight not to exceed 215 pounds.....underpowered aircraft or CG problems here?
Sierra Vista ...206/407 pilot needed....ever been to Sierra Vista? Dark does not describe it adequately.
Seen West Texas when the fog rolls in.....
Been to West Virginia or around the Applachin Mountains when you fly cross grain over the valleys...DARK!
The Southeast...with the summer haze at night...over the forested areas....waiting for the fog to form?
Night VFR in marginal weather in a basic 206/407/350....with your annual checkride that might include one approach under the hood...and usually a surveillence radar approach at that. Pass the annual checkride and you are still good to go eleven months later.
Gee.....what could we do to improve things?
NTSB Accident Report on the Washington, DC EMS Crash
NTSB Identification: NYC05MA039
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, January 10, 2005 in Oxon Hill, MD
Aircraft: Eurocopter Deutschland EC 135 P2, registration: N136LN
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On January 10, 2005, at 2311 eastern standard time, N136LN, a Eurocopter EC135 P2, operated by Air Methods Corporation, d.b.a. LifeNet, was destroyed during an impact with the Potomac River near Oxon Hill, Maryland. The certificated commercial pilot and flight medic were fatally injured, and the flight nurse received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed for the flight. The flight originated at Washington Hospital Center (DC08), Washington, D.C., at 2304, and was destined for the Stafford Regional Airport (RMN), Stafford, Virginia. The air ambulance positioning flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The operator of the helicopter reported that the helicopter crew picked up a patient at the Frederick Hospital, Fredrick, Maryland, and transported the patient to Washington Hospital Center, arriving at 2219.
According to flight-following Global Positioning System (GPS) data recorded by the operator, the helicopter lifted from Washington Hospital Center at 2304, and proceeded southeast and then southwest, along a route consistent with Route 1, on a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Washington, D.C. Helicopter Route Chart. The helicopter turned to a southerly heading in the vicinity of Washington National Airport, and continued along a route consistent with Route 4, on the Washington, D.C. Helicopter Route Chart, towards the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
A review of the NOAA Chart revealed that it depicted a maximum altitude restriction of 200 feet north of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, and a maximum altitude restriction of 300 feet, south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
Preliminary radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed the helicopter flew southbound (180-degree flightpath) along the Potomac River, at an altitude of 200 feet. At 2311, the helicopter was observed just south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, maintaining its southbound heading and 200-foot altitude. Four seconds later, the helicopter was observed on an approximate 190-degree heading, and an altitude of 100 feet. The next and last recorded radar hit, was 5 seconds later, on an approximate 200-degree heading, at an altitude of zero feet.
A Safety Board investigator interviewed the flight nurse in the hospital. According to the flight nurse, he was seated in the left front (copilot) seat, the pilot was in the right front (pilot) seat, and the flight medic was seated immediately behind the flight nurse, in the left-side, aft-facing seat.
As the helicopter approached the Woodrow Wilson Bridge from the north, it passed abeam Washington National Airport at a "lower than normal altitude," but climbed 200 to 300 feet before reaching the Wilson Bridge. About 1 mile prior to the bridge, the helicopter appeared to be at the same, or higher altitude, than the marking lights on the cranes, which were positioned near the bridge. The flight nurse "called the lights," on both sides of the river, and the pilot acknowledged him.
As the helicopter climbed, the flight nurse noticed an airplane descending towards Washington National Airport, and wondered if there would be a conflict, or a wake turbulence hazard. Additionally, he stated he was not sure what the relationship was between the helicopter and the airplane, as the airplane passed overhead.
The flight continued along the river close to the Maryland shoreline; however, as the helicopter approached the bridge, the pilot maneuvered the helicopter to cross over the mid-span of the inner loop (westbound) bridge.
The flight nurse remembered being over the outer loop (eastbound) span of the bridge, and then being submerged in the water with his seatbelt on, and his helmet off. He stated, "I don't remember striking something, but my initial reaction was that we must have hit something."
The flight nurse also stated that at no time did the Master Caution lights, or the panel segment lights illuminate. He also did not hear any audio alarms sound. The helicopter was neither high nor low, but "on altitude," relative to other flights which he had been on in the past.
The pilot did not perform any evasive maneuvers, and did not communicate any difficulties either verbally or nonverbally in the vicinity of the bridge. The flight nurse did recall observing a large white bird fly up from the lower left towards the helicopter, but made no mention of striking it. When asked what he thought might have caused the accident to occur, the flight nurse stated, "We must have hit an unlit crane."
The helicopter came to rest in the Potomac River about 0.5 miles south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter. His most recent second-class FAA medical certificate was issued on May 28, 2004.
According to records maintained by the operator, the pilot was hired in June 2004, at which time he reported 2,750 hours of total flight experience, 2,450 of which were in helicopters.
Examination of maintenance records revealed that the helicopter was being maintained in accordance with an FAA Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP). The last AAIP 50-hour inspection was performed on the helicopter on December 17, 2004. The last 100-hour inspection was performed on November 23, 2004, at an aircraft time of 94.5 total flight hours. The maintenance log indicated that the radar altimeter was inoperative and included a listing of the malfunction in the Approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) record. As of January 10, 2005, the helicopter had accumulated 166.6 total flight hours.
Weather reported at Washington National Airport, at 2251, included calm winds, 10 miles visibility, broken clouds at 13,000 feet, broken clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 45 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 35 degrees Fahrenheit, and altimeter setting 30.25 inches of Hg.
The helicopter was recovered from approximately 5 feet of water in the Potomac River. Debris from the helicopter was recovered along a wreckage path oriented on a southbound heading, consistent with the helicopter's flight path prior to the Wilson Bridge.
The main fuselage section was separated into the lower cockpit area and upper cockpit area. The lower cockpit area contained the flightcrew floorboard section, anti-torque pedals, forward skid frame, and fragments of the ruptured fuel tank. The upper cockpit area contained the flight control tubes, the center electrical and flight control structure (broom closet), the upper flight control deck, the main rotor gearbox, rotor head, and engines.
The mechanical flight control system was assisted by hydraulic actuators and an automatic flight control system (AFCS). The system was controlled by two dual controllable pilot cyclics and collectives. For the EMS mission, the co-pilot controls had been removed. The anti-torque pedals were routed to the tail rotor servo via a Teleflex cable. The cyclic and collective controls were routed through mechanical linkages to an upper deck dual hydraulic servo control system, which controlled lateral, longitudinal, and collective control.
The cyclic, collective, and yaw controls were examined for evidence of malfunctions or pre-impact failures. Continuity could not be established due to breaks in the system and missing portions of the push-pull tubes; however, the breaks were matched and examined for evidence of pre-impact malfunction or failure. Examination of the breaks revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions, and the fractures were consistent with overload fractures and water impact.
The main rotor mast was in place and intact in the main transmission. All four main rotor blades remained attached to their respective mounting areas, which bolted directly to the mast. Three out of four of the pitch change links were integral to their two attach points, the fourth (red) pitch change link was fractured in the middle. The fracture was consistent with compression bending overload.
The root ends of all four main rotor blades remained attached to the main rotor hub. Portions of all four main rotor blade tips were accounted for, and matched to their respective blades. All four main rotor blades contained overload fractures between 6-12 inches from the blade hub, and chordwise scoring on the lower blade skin in the same area. The main rotor blades contained fractures along the span of the blade, consistent with impact damage. No indications of an object or bird strike were noted along the blades.
The main gearbox remained attached to the center section of the upper airframe structure. All four mounting points were intact. The main transmission turned freely, no chips were found on the detectors, and the transmission appeared intact and functional.
Both engines remained attached to the upper fuselage section. Both engines sustained relatively minor damage, and their N1 and N2 sections rotated freely.
The main fuselage was separated from the tail boom section at the aft fuselage frame. The tail section included the tail gearbox, the tail rotor assembly and the complete fenestron assembly.
The tail rotor driveshaft was shifted about 1.5 inches forward. The aft portion of the driveshaft (carbon composite) was found fractured and torsionally cracked and deformed. The tail rotor blades remained complete and attached to the fenestron structure. A rotational scrape was noted on the fenestron shroud structure at the 5 o'clock position corresponding with the blade width.
Several of the helicopter components were retained for further examination.
Safety Board investigators examined sites along the Potomac River that matched the coordinates recorded by ATC radar data and the operator's flight-following GPS. The projected track along these locations toward the accident site was about 300 feet from the nearest crane, and no additional obstructions were observed along the track.
Five of the closest cranes along the Potomac River, near the Wilson Bridge construction project (Maryland side) were examined, and no structural damage or aircraft strike indications were observed.
A Maryland Department of Transportation traffic surveillance video was secured and sent to the Safety Board's Video Laboratory for examination. Preliminary examination revealed an aircraft flying, and then descending, over the bridge about the time of the accident. According to the video, the aircraft passed above and beyond the cranes prior to beginning its descent.
Examination of additional ATC radar data revealed that a 70-passenger Canadair Regional Jet 700 (CRJ-7), passed over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge about 1 minute and 45 seconds before the accident helicopter passed over the bridge. The radar data indicated that the helicopter passed 900 feet directly beneath the flight path of the CRJ-7, while heading in the opposite direction.
Begins to raise the question of whether wake turbulence might have played a part in this crash.....cannot wait to hear the final report.
NTSB Identification: NYC05MA039
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, January 10, 2005 in Oxon Hill, MD
Aircraft: Eurocopter Deutschland EC 135 P2, registration: N136LN
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On January 10, 2005, at 2311 eastern standard time, N136LN, a Eurocopter EC135 P2, operated by Air Methods Corporation, d.b.a. LifeNet, was destroyed during an impact with the Potomac River near Oxon Hill, Maryland. The certificated commercial pilot and flight medic were fatally injured, and the flight nurse received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed for the flight. The flight originated at Washington Hospital Center (DC08), Washington, D.C., at 2304, and was destined for the Stafford Regional Airport (RMN), Stafford, Virginia. The air ambulance positioning flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The operator of the helicopter reported that the helicopter crew picked up a patient at the Frederick Hospital, Fredrick, Maryland, and transported the patient to Washington Hospital Center, arriving at 2219.
According to flight-following Global Positioning System (GPS) data recorded by the operator, the helicopter lifted from Washington Hospital Center at 2304, and proceeded southeast and then southwest, along a route consistent with Route 1, on a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Washington, D.C. Helicopter Route Chart. The helicopter turned to a southerly heading in the vicinity of Washington National Airport, and continued along a route consistent with Route 4, on the Washington, D.C. Helicopter Route Chart, towards the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
A review of the NOAA Chart revealed that it depicted a maximum altitude restriction of 200 feet north of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, and a maximum altitude restriction of 300 feet, south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
Preliminary radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed the helicopter flew southbound (180-degree flightpath) along the Potomac River, at an altitude of 200 feet. At 2311, the helicopter was observed just south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, maintaining its southbound heading and 200-foot altitude. Four seconds later, the helicopter was observed on an approximate 190-degree heading, and an altitude of 100 feet. The next and last recorded radar hit, was 5 seconds later, on an approximate 200-degree heading, at an altitude of zero feet.
A Safety Board investigator interviewed the flight nurse in the hospital. According to the flight nurse, he was seated in the left front (copilot) seat, the pilot was in the right front (pilot) seat, and the flight medic was seated immediately behind the flight nurse, in the left-side, aft-facing seat.
As the helicopter approached the Woodrow Wilson Bridge from the north, it passed abeam Washington National Airport at a "lower than normal altitude," but climbed 200 to 300 feet before reaching the Wilson Bridge. About 1 mile prior to the bridge, the helicopter appeared to be at the same, or higher altitude, than the marking lights on the cranes, which were positioned near the bridge. The flight nurse "called the lights," on both sides of the river, and the pilot acknowledged him.
As the helicopter climbed, the flight nurse noticed an airplane descending towards Washington National Airport, and wondered if there would be a conflict, or a wake turbulence hazard. Additionally, he stated he was not sure what the relationship was between the helicopter and the airplane, as the airplane passed overhead.
The flight continued along the river close to the Maryland shoreline; however, as the helicopter approached the bridge, the pilot maneuvered the helicopter to cross over the mid-span of the inner loop (westbound) bridge.
The flight nurse remembered being over the outer loop (eastbound) span of the bridge, and then being submerged in the water with his seatbelt on, and his helmet off. He stated, "I don't remember striking something, but my initial reaction was that we must have hit something."
The flight nurse also stated that at no time did the Master Caution lights, or the panel segment lights illuminate. He also did not hear any audio alarms sound. The helicopter was neither high nor low, but "on altitude," relative to other flights which he had been on in the past.
The pilot did not perform any evasive maneuvers, and did not communicate any difficulties either verbally or nonverbally in the vicinity of the bridge. The flight nurse did recall observing a large white bird fly up from the lower left towards the helicopter, but made no mention of striking it. When asked what he thought might have caused the accident to occur, the flight nurse stated, "We must have hit an unlit crane."
The helicopter came to rest in the Potomac River about 0.5 miles south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge.
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter. His most recent second-class FAA medical certificate was issued on May 28, 2004.
According to records maintained by the operator, the pilot was hired in June 2004, at which time he reported 2,750 hours of total flight experience, 2,450 of which were in helicopters.
Examination of maintenance records revealed that the helicopter was being maintained in accordance with an FAA Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP). The last AAIP 50-hour inspection was performed on the helicopter on December 17, 2004. The last 100-hour inspection was performed on November 23, 2004, at an aircraft time of 94.5 total flight hours. The maintenance log indicated that the radar altimeter was inoperative and included a listing of the malfunction in the Approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) record. As of January 10, 2005, the helicopter had accumulated 166.6 total flight hours.
Weather reported at Washington National Airport, at 2251, included calm winds, 10 miles visibility, broken clouds at 13,000 feet, broken clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 45 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 35 degrees Fahrenheit, and altimeter setting 30.25 inches of Hg.
The helicopter was recovered from approximately 5 feet of water in the Potomac River. Debris from the helicopter was recovered along a wreckage path oriented on a southbound heading, consistent with the helicopter's flight path prior to the Wilson Bridge.
The main fuselage section was separated into the lower cockpit area and upper cockpit area. The lower cockpit area contained the flightcrew floorboard section, anti-torque pedals, forward skid frame, and fragments of the ruptured fuel tank. The upper cockpit area contained the flight control tubes, the center electrical and flight control structure (broom closet), the upper flight control deck, the main rotor gearbox, rotor head, and engines.
The mechanical flight control system was assisted by hydraulic actuators and an automatic flight control system (AFCS). The system was controlled by two dual controllable pilot cyclics and collectives. For the EMS mission, the co-pilot controls had been removed. The anti-torque pedals were routed to the tail rotor servo via a Teleflex cable. The cyclic and collective controls were routed through mechanical linkages to an upper deck dual hydraulic servo control system, which controlled lateral, longitudinal, and collective control.
The cyclic, collective, and yaw controls were examined for evidence of malfunctions or pre-impact failures. Continuity could not be established due to breaks in the system and missing portions of the push-pull tubes; however, the breaks were matched and examined for evidence of pre-impact malfunction or failure. Examination of the breaks revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions, and the fractures were consistent with overload fractures and water impact.
The main rotor mast was in place and intact in the main transmission. All four main rotor blades remained attached to their respective mounting areas, which bolted directly to the mast. Three out of four of the pitch change links were integral to their two attach points, the fourth (red) pitch change link was fractured in the middle. The fracture was consistent with compression bending overload.
The root ends of all four main rotor blades remained attached to the main rotor hub. Portions of all four main rotor blade tips were accounted for, and matched to their respective blades. All four main rotor blades contained overload fractures between 6-12 inches from the blade hub, and chordwise scoring on the lower blade skin in the same area. The main rotor blades contained fractures along the span of the blade, consistent with impact damage. No indications of an object or bird strike were noted along the blades.
The main gearbox remained attached to the center section of the upper airframe structure. All four mounting points were intact. The main transmission turned freely, no chips were found on the detectors, and the transmission appeared intact and functional.
Both engines remained attached to the upper fuselage section. Both engines sustained relatively minor damage, and their N1 and N2 sections rotated freely.
The main fuselage was separated from the tail boom section at the aft fuselage frame. The tail section included the tail gearbox, the tail rotor assembly and the complete fenestron assembly.
The tail rotor driveshaft was shifted about 1.5 inches forward. The aft portion of the driveshaft (carbon composite) was found fractured and torsionally cracked and deformed. The tail rotor blades remained complete and attached to the fenestron structure. A rotational scrape was noted on the fenestron shroud structure at the 5 o'clock position corresponding with the blade width.
Several of the helicopter components were retained for further examination.
Safety Board investigators examined sites along the Potomac River that matched the coordinates recorded by ATC radar data and the operator's flight-following GPS. The projected track along these locations toward the accident site was about 300 feet from the nearest crane, and no additional obstructions were observed along the track.
Five of the closest cranes along the Potomac River, near the Wilson Bridge construction project (Maryland side) were examined, and no structural damage or aircraft strike indications were observed.
A Maryland Department of Transportation traffic surveillance video was secured and sent to the Safety Board's Video Laboratory for examination. Preliminary examination revealed an aircraft flying, and then descending, over the bridge about the time of the accident. According to the video, the aircraft passed above and beyond the cranes prior to beginning its descent.
Examination of additional ATC radar data revealed that a 70-passenger Canadair Regional Jet 700 (CRJ-7), passed over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge about 1 minute and 45 seconds before the accident helicopter passed over the bridge. The radar data indicated that the helicopter passed 900 feet directly beneath the flight path of the CRJ-7, while heading in the opposite direction.
Begins to raise the question of whether wake turbulence might have played a part in this crash.....cannot wait to hear the final report.
You certainly could be right Sasless, wake vortices persist for a long time in calm, stable conditions and there seems to be little evidence for any other cause - poor sods.
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This one has looked a bit of a mystery, with nothing at all been found to support the expectation that it hit an obstacle/crane at very low level at night.
I too saw the report on the NTSB site, and agree that wake turbulence perhaps looks the least unlikely at this point, as the investigation progresses.
Having said that, although winds were calm, 900ft below an RJ, which is not exactly huge, 1 min 45 sec after it, which I guess would approximate to say 5 miles spacing, doesn't seem too concerning I wouldn't have thought. Any other views on this?
Of course the other thing is that if that does end up being the most likely cause, the fact that it was a night EMS accident is irrelevant. Could have happened to anyone permitted on the route. More potential for statistics to mislead.
I too saw the report on the NTSB site, and agree that wake turbulence perhaps looks the least unlikely at this point, as the investigation progresses.
Having said that, although winds were calm, 900ft below an RJ, which is not exactly huge, 1 min 45 sec after it, which I guess would approximate to say 5 miles spacing, doesn't seem too concerning I wouldn't have thought. Any other views on this?
Of course the other thing is that if that does end up being the most likely cause, the fact that it was a night EMS accident is irrelevant. Could have happened to anyone permitted on the route. More potential for statistics to mislead.
Rotorspeed,
It could have happened to any helicopter that was there at the time (assuming it was Wake Turbulence...or any other cause in reality) but it was not any other kind of flight.
It was an EMS flight, it was an EMS helicopter, It was an EMS crew, It was assigned to an EMS operation, and it was operated by an EMS operator, and had just dropped off a patient at the hosptial and was heading home to its base with the EMS crew onboard.
Just why is this not an accident attributable to "EMS"?
Yesterday, I read a post by some wizard that said this year's EMS accident rate is actually lower than last years. That is an interesting observation....This year alone...and if we take the first two weeks rate as a base...we are looking at a total of about 48 fatal crashes for this year. Last years rate was more like one per month average.
We cannot use two weeks to judge the rate for the year.
We cannot judge this year to last so early in the year.
And for my two cents worth....we cannot accept a fatal crash per month as being "acceptable losses".
I am a realist....we will never have a "zero" rate of EMS crashes....but we can set a goal that tries to acheive that can we not.
It could have happened to any helicopter that was there at the time (assuming it was Wake Turbulence...or any other cause in reality) but it was not any other kind of flight.
It was an EMS flight, it was an EMS helicopter, It was an EMS crew, It was assigned to an EMS operation, and it was operated by an EMS operator, and had just dropped off a patient at the hosptial and was heading home to its base with the EMS crew onboard.
Just why is this not an accident attributable to "EMS"?
Yesterday, I read a post by some wizard that said this year's EMS accident rate is actually lower than last years. That is an interesting observation....This year alone...and if we take the first two weeks rate as a base...we are looking at a total of about 48 fatal crashes for this year. Last years rate was more like one per month average.
We cannot use two weeks to judge the rate for the year.
We cannot judge this year to last so early in the year.
And for my two cents worth....we cannot accept a fatal crash per month as being "acceptable losses".
I am a realist....we will never have a "zero" rate of EMS crashes....but we can set a goal that tries to acheive that can we not.
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SASless
I fear you are getting too agitated here in your understandable and valid zeal to see the EMS safety record improve. I have made no comment on this year's rate or what might be acceptable losses.
What I have said is that if this 135 accident turns out to be wake turbulence, the fact that the type of operation was EMS will probably not have been a contributary factor. Yes it was EMS, I know that perfectly well. But the accident could equally well have occurred to any corporate or private helo assuming they were entitled to use that route. This is quite unlike the extra risk of EMS operations landing at unimproved sites at night, for example, which is part of the territory for EMS ops. An accident involving that phase of flight, which many seem to be, clearly is related to the extra risk of EMS ops.
Understand my point now? It is important to try and differentiate which accidents occurring to EMS flights occur because of the specific type of operation, rather than despite it. And in my book, wake turbulence would be despite.
I fear you are getting too agitated here in your understandable and valid zeal to see the EMS safety record improve. I have made no comment on this year's rate or what might be acceptable losses.
What I have said is that if this 135 accident turns out to be wake turbulence, the fact that the type of operation was EMS will probably not have been a contributary factor. Yes it was EMS, I know that perfectly well. But the accident could equally well have occurred to any corporate or private helo assuming they were entitled to use that route. This is quite unlike the extra risk of EMS operations landing at unimproved sites at night, for example, which is part of the territory for EMS ops. An accident involving that phase of flight, which many seem to be, clearly is related to the extra risk of EMS ops.
Understand my point now? It is important to try and differentiate which accidents occurring to EMS flights occur because of the specific type of operation, rather than despite it. And in my book, wake turbulence would be despite.
Agitated....no.....did you say anything about this year's rate...no. Are you correct it could have happened to any aircraft that was there....yes. Was "EMS" a contributing factor to the accident...in my view ....yes. The reasons I say that is as stated in my previous post. I agree there was nothing special about the phase of flight but we do have to remember the front seat is reversed and faces aft instead of the normal configuration. That is also EMS specific here....could that have been a contributing factor? Maybe...maybe not.
If it were a corporate aircraft and crashed for exactly the same reason (whatever it turns out to be) under exactly the same circumstances.....it would still show up under the corporate helicopter crash column....and that is my point. If that same aircraft had just dropped off an executive at National Airport and then headed back to the office...and crashed.....we would clearly call it a corporate accident would we not?
No matter the actual cause...no matter how you slice it. This crash lands firmly and squarely in the EMS catagory. We have to chalk this one up to the EMS industry whether EMS operators want to or not.
How are we being mislead if we chalk this one up to the EMS industry?
If it were a corporate aircraft and crashed for exactly the same reason (whatever it turns out to be) under exactly the same circumstances.....it would still show up under the corporate helicopter crash column....and that is my point. If that same aircraft had just dropped off an executive at National Airport and then headed back to the office...and crashed.....we would clearly call it a corporate accident would we not?
No matter the actual cause...no matter how you slice it. This crash lands firmly and squarely in the EMS catagory. We have to chalk this one up to the EMS industry whether EMS operators want to or not.
How are we being mislead if we chalk this one up to the EMS industry?
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SASless
Have to say you've got me on this one. Just explain how the reversal of the front seat might have contributed to the effects of the wake turbulence we were talking about? Conversely, I can however see that it might have contributed to the fact that he survived the impact. Just clarify how the EMS type of operation might have contributed to a WT cause?
How are we being mislead if we chalk this one up to the EMS industry? Because it is the accidents that get chalked up to the EMS industry that will drive the extent, impact and cost of any changes to EMS operations. Inevitably emotion will overlay objectivity and simple statistics will be used to justify the changes. The more specific and relevant those statistics are, the more appropriate any changes will be.
This applies to any area of helo ops, whether private, corporate, offshore or EMS. There is a fine commercial line that needs to be - and is - trod not to burden any type of operation with more cost and legislation than optimal. The more the accident statistics are relevant to the added risks of a given type of operation the more optimal the conclusions should be.
Presuming (and it may well not turn out to be) this is wake turbulence, this is not an EMS accident; it's a helo accident that just happened to occur to an EMS acft. But of course the stats will say EMS.
SASless, you may well know the following data. What % of total helo hours flown in the US are for EMS? What % of landings are EMS? What % of accidents are EMS? Be interested to see that and any other relevant data you have/can find!
Have to say you've got me on this one. Just explain how the reversal of the front seat might have contributed to the effects of the wake turbulence we were talking about? Conversely, I can however see that it might have contributed to the fact that he survived the impact. Just clarify how the EMS type of operation might have contributed to a WT cause?
How are we being mislead if we chalk this one up to the EMS industry? Because it is the accidents that get chalked up to the EMS industry that will drive the extent, impact and cost of any changes to EMS operations. Inevitably emotion will overlay objectivity and simple statistics will be used to justify the changes. The more specific and relevant those statistics are, the more appropriate any changes will be.
This applies to any area of helo ops, whether private, corporate, offshore or EMS. There is a fine commercial line that needs to be - and is - trod not to burden any type of operation with more cost and legislation than optimal. The more the accident statistics are relevant to the added risks of a given type of operation the more optimal the conclusions should be.
Presuming (and it may well not turn out to be) this is wake turbulence, this is not an EMS accident; it's a helo accident that just happened to occur to an EMS acft. But of course the stats will say EMS.
SASless, you may well know the following data. What % of total helo hours flown in the US are for EMS? What % of landings are EMS? What % of accidents are EMS? Be interested to see that and any other relevant data you have/can find!
What catagory do you chalk this accident up to? Which sector of the industry?
I did not say the seat reversal had any thing to do with the accident...read my post. The seat reversal is just another EMS connection is all.
If we assume it was a part 91 operation due to the fact no patient was aboard....and having therefore to assume the nurse and paramedic were employees of Air Methods, Inc......and the aircraft was owned and operated by Air Methods, Inc.....and Air Methods,Inc. is one of the nation's largest EMS operators....
If the nurse and paramedic were not employees of Air Methods...the flight was Part 135 and was conducted under the Air Methods 135 Certificate and OPSPECS.....and the accident would fall under their insurance policy....which covers EMS operations.
My view is simply this....this crash is just another part of an EMS operational flight. One cannot seperate this crash from the EMS accident statistics no matter how you want to. This is just another unfortunate event that befell a crew out doing their jobs.
It has to be counted right along with all the other ways EMS crews get killed. That is what drives the insurance costs and flight rates being charged. It should also have some effect upon wages and other compensation for the crews. It should also have some effect upon FAA surviellence of EMS operations....and scrutiny by insurance carriers.
Right now the only folks that stand to lose by improving the accident rate are the insurance companies and morticians.
I
I did not say the seat reversal had any thing to do with the accident...read my post. The seat reversal is just another EMS connection is all.
If we assume it was a part 91 operation due to the fact no patient was aboard....and having therefore to assume the nurse and paramedic were employees of Air Methods, Inc......and the aircraft was owned and operated by Air Methods, Inc.....and Air Methods,Inc. is one of the nation's largest EMS operators....
If the nurse and paramedic were not employees of Air Methods...the flight was Part 135 and was conducted under the Air Methods 135 Certificate and OPSPECS.....and the accident would fall under their insurance policy....which covers EMS operations.
My view is simply this....this crash is just another part of an EMS operational flight. One cannot seperate this crash from the EMS accident statistics no matter how you want to. This is just another unfortunate event that befell a crew out doing their jobs.
It has to be counted right along with all the other ways EMS crews get killed. That is what drives the insurance costs and flight rates being charged. It should also have some effect upon wages and other compensation for the crews. It should also have some effect upon FAA surviellence of EMS operations....and scrutiny by insurance carriers.
Right now the only folks that stand to lose by improving the accident rate are the insurance companies and morticians.
I
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SASless
You'd better read your own posts a bit more accurately! You first said:
"we do have to remember the front seat is reversed and faces aft instead of the normal configuration. That is also EMS specific here....could that have been a contributing factor? Maybe."
But you now say:
"I did not say the seat reversal had any thing to do with the accident"
Sounds rather contradictory to me. And you also said:
"Was "EMS" a contributing factor to the accident...in my view ....yes"
But you still haven't answered my question as to how it might have been, given a wake turbulence cause?
You'd better read your own posts a bit more accurately! You first said:
"we do have to remember the front seat is reversed and faces aft instead of the normal configuration. That is also EMS specific here....could that have been a contributing factor? Maybe."
But you now say:
"I did not say the seat reversal had any thing to do with the accident"
Sounds rather contradictory to me. And you also said:
"Was "EMS" a contributing factor to the accident...in my view ....yes"
But you still haven't answered my question as to how it might have been, given a wake turbulence cause?
Some more stats taken from the link I posted earlier in this thread....
The EMS accident rate was lowest in 1996 and has climbed since...without a decrease in the trend and shows a marked spike in last year and this years numbers.
There are approximately 130,000 patients moved each year....16 are killed in crashes on average each year.
Death rates by occupation:
All US workers 5 per 100,000
Farmers 26 per 100,000
Miners 27 per 100,000
EMS Crew 74 per 100,000
Non-EMS Helicopters 18% are fatal crashes
EMS Helicopters 37% are fatal crashes
Non-EMS helicopter crashes....12 per 100,000 flight hours
EMS helicopter crashes............19 per 100,000 flight hours
38% of EMS flights are night flights.
82% of fatal EMS crashes occur at night
50% of EMS night crashes are fatal crashes.
Weather plays a role in 76% of fatal EMS crashes
The EMS accident rate was lowest in 1996 and has climbed since...without a decrease in the trend and shows a marked spike in last year and this years numbers.
There are approximately 130,000 patients moved each year....16 are killed in crashes on average each year.
Death rates by occupation:
All US workers 5 per 100,000
Farmers 26 per 100,000
Miners 27 per 100,000
EMS Crew 74 per 100,000
Non-EMS Helicopters 18% are fatal crashes
EMS Helicopters 37% are fatal crashes
Non-EMS helicopter crashes....12 per 100,000 flight hours
EMS helicopter crashes............19 per 100,000 flight hours
38% of EMS flights are night flights.
82% of fatal EMS crashes occur at night
50% of EMS night crashes are fatal crashes.
Weather plays a role in 76% of fatal EMS crashes
Last edited by SASless; 22nd Jan 2005 at 16:28.
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I've been flying at night for some time, and from what I've seen the Washington D.C. accident isn't that hard to figure out. After flying over a presumably well-lit bridge, over a presumably dark river, the pilot could well have just flown into the water. I've been flying offshore, and after flying by a well-lit rig, setting up for a return, at 500 feet, looked up and we were at 200 feet in a descent at >800 ft/min, diving at the water. The other pilot was trying to fly visually, and just lost orientation. If I hadn't taken the controls, the helicopter would have impacted the water at cruise speed in a few more seconds.
Flying VFR-equipped helicopters, using VFR pilots, at night, will always result in accidents. It's simply stupid to do it, but companies are greedy, and the insurance companies can deal with the expense. Of course this gets passed on, but it's spread out, so companies just keep on keeping on. IMO the only way the current levels of deaths will decrease is if the insurance companies stop insuring night VFR flights. The FAA isn't going to do anything about it, that's certain.
Flying VFR-equipped helicopters, using VFR pilots, at night, will always result in accidents. It's simply stupid to do it, but companies are greedy, and the insurance companies can deal with the expense. Of course this gets passed on, but it's spread out, so companies just keep on keeping on. IMO the only way the current levels of deaths will decrease is if the insurance companies stop insuring night VFR flights. The FAA isn't going to do anything about it, that's certain.
Third Fatal US EMS Helicopter Crash of the Year
Patient was killed.
DATE
February 21, 2005 13:39 CST
PROGRAM
Air Evac Lifeteam
VENDOR
Own Part 135
ADDRESS
P.O. Box 768
West Plains, MO 65775
WEATHER
Clear. Not a factor
AIRCRAFT_TYPE
BH 206L
TAIL#
N107AE
TEAM
Pilot, Flight Nurse, Flight Paramedic. Fatal injuries. Patient on
board.
DESCRIPTION
The aircraft had just taken off from the scene of an MVA with severely
traumatized patient, south of Maysville, Ark., with a patient on board
and landed hard in a field.
DATE
February 21, 2005 13:39 CST
PROGRAM
Air Evac Lifeteam
VENDOR
Own Part 135
ADDRESS
P.O. Box 768
West Plains, MO 65775
WEATHER
Clear. Not a factor
AIRCRAFT_TYPE
BH 206L
TAIL#
N107AE
TEAM
Pilot, Flight Nurse, Flight Paramedic. Fatal injuries. Patient on
board.
DESCRIPTION
The aircraft had just taken off from the scene of an MVA with severely
traumatized patient, south of Maysville, Ark., with a patient on board
and landed hard in a field.
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Considering no reported injuries from the other 3 healthy people on board, be interesting to know just how close to death the "severely traumatised" patient was anyway, and how much/little of an impact it took to be a fatal. Dare say we'll hear soon.
Rotorspeed,
Patients die enroute (never admitted to anyway.....due to legal issues with place of death and legal jurisdicitional issues) but no matter how you slice it....the patient was alive when loaded and dead when unloaded at the scene. Ergo....a fatal accident.
When we take people aboard our aircraft as passengers they expect to make it to their destination. If for some reason, we crash a helicopter and they die.....that is a lick on us and goes under the EMS Helicopter Fatal Crash column in the statistical data base.
Patients die enroute (never admitted to anyway.....due to legal issues with place of death and legal jurisdicitional issues) but no matter how you slice it....the patient was alive when loaded and dead when unloaded at the scene. Ergo....a fatal accident.
When we take people aboard our aircraft as passengers they expect to make it to their destination. If for some reason, we crash a helicopter and they die.....that is a lick on us and goes under the EMS Helicopter Fatal Crash column in the statistical data base.
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No doubt you're right, though this will make some, albeit small, contribution to the EMS fatal stats looking worse than other industries. Probably like road ambulances.
Any news on what accident was/cause etc?
No doubt you're right, though this will make some, albeit small, contribution to the EMS fatal stats looking worse than other industries. Probably like road ambulances.
Any news on what accident was/cause etc?
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Hey SASless....great arguement for the pro's and con's of multi-engine CAT A ' Performance One power and crew requirements as indicated in the JAR's. FAA could possibly regulate a little more stringently, and mandate basic Heli Ops requirements similar to the European and others when it comes to Air Ambulance or HEMS.........consider the makeup and profile of the cargo carried....entitled to the best levels of care.......which includes twin engined helicopters with two crew!!
I have flown BO-105's, BK-117's, and the Bell 412 on EMS work....you will never....you shall never (imperative tense) catch me in a JetRanger or 350 at night doing EMS work....ever. Promise....take your money to the bank on it. I did not like doing night work in an un-Sas'ed (non-Stab) BK-117 either.
The free enterprise system can be a bit too expensive in lives.
The second engine is no bar from power related accidents but if we operated with CAT A performance (which is a problem if you are doing scene work) at least enroute/cruise engine failures become fairly benign events.
The crux of what EMS operatons should be doing is "to do what is best for the patient" and not money driven alone. So many times, the patient is in a medical facility and stablized....thus delays of a few hours doesn't jeopardize the patients well being and oft times a delay till daylight or better weather would be the best course.
To throw Grandma into a JetRanger or 350 at night or bad weather (or both....worse case scenario) in such a situation borders upon criminal negligence in my view. I would love to be an attorney and specialize in suing EMS operators. It would be a lucrative business nowadays.
To make all the night operations two pilot IFR and Twin IFR machines is expensive but in my view the right thing to do at night outside the built up urban areas. I would accept single pilot IFR equipped twins at night over well light and defined urban areas.
All one man's opinion here....and I am sure there are lots of guys that would argue with my position.
The free enterprise system can be a bit too expensive in lives.
The second engine is no bar from power related accidents but if we operated with CAT A performance (which is a problem if you are doing scene work) at least enroute/cruise engine failures become fairly benign events.
The crux of what EMS operatons should be doing is "to do what is best for the patient" and not money driven alone. So many times, the patient is in a medical facility and stablized....thus delays of a few hours doesn't jeopardize the patients well being and oft times a delay till daylight or better weather would be the best course.
To throw Grandma into a JetRanger or 350 at night or bad weather (or both....worse case scenario) in such a situation borders upon criminal negligence in my view. I would love to be an attorney and specialize in suing EMS operators. It would be a lucrative business nowadays.
To make all the night operations two pilot IFR and Twin IFR machines is expensive but in my view the right thing to do at night outside the built up urban areas. I would accept single pilot IFR equipped twins at night over well light and defined urban areas.
All one man's opinion here....and I am sure there are lots of guys that would argue with my position.