Cirrus SR22 Chute Pull - (Post landing Video) Birmingham Alabama 6th Oct 2012
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But this in my view comes down to the age old problem that exercises 1-12 are not being taught properly or being understood.
Inevitably in that Journey a few fail in practice in the real world.
I am suggesting more enforced training or cost as that would likely kill of GA totally, our hobby has a risk and decision making is a key factor.
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Since we have gravitated back to the chute debate, I thought I might have a go at summing up my thoughts
Inevitably, when you follow this thread, there are contributions from very experienced pilots, inexperienced pilots and the whole gambit in between. It is not surprising the more experienced pilots are those that prefer to trust to their own skills when it comes to a forced landing. They also believe all pilots should be as skilled as they are. This is understandable; most of us look at the world based on our own experiences.
Instructors, and those that regularly fly with others, have the best chance of looking at things through the eyes of others. I have always said that most “amateur” pilots are not very good at forced landings. Many don’t practice PFLs and therefore rely on the last PFLs they did as part of their two yearly review.
I think there is a very real danger arguing what other pilots should do based on your own skills. That to me suggests a certain detachment from reality.
The skill of the pilot is therefore the first element in considering whether or not to deploy the chute. It is pointless arguing pilots should be more skilled and / or better trained, because that is a different argument. It may have merit, but we have to accept we are where we are and it will take along time to change.
There is some evidence to suggest skilled pilots consider themselves more infallible than less skilled pilots. There are numerous accounts of high time, highly experienced and current pilots killing themselves in situations you would least expect. The account in this thread regarding the instructor that hit wires is a very good example.
Pilots believing they are better than they really are, or more immune from bad luck than the rest of us is the second element.
And so I believe pilots must detach themselves from their preconceived ideas. There will be those pilots who believe they will almost always do a better job without the chute and there will be those that believe the contrary.
This seems and odd situation to have reached but I suspect one of which most of us are guilty.
If we can detach ourselves from these preconceived ideas we might do a better job of assessing when we should use the chute.
As this thread has so amply illustrates there are examples where using the chute is less likely to result in the best outcome. I have said many times before Cirrus cant offer certainty where none exists. Rightly or wrongly they did not conduct an exhaustive trial into chute deployments, undoubtedly because the cost and risks would have been prohibitive. Consider for a moment the cost of developing hot seats for the military. Rightly or wrongly our knowledge of chutes has evolved, as there have been growing examples of their deployment. Cirrus cant give definitive guidance without “doing the tests”. Imagine the extent to which Cirrus would be torn to threads in court if they included a SOP which could not be supported on the basis of a comprehensive test program.
The accumulated evidence is that chute deployments work pretty well. I don’t know the actual figures but my guess is that over 90% of chute deployments have been successful. By any reckoning that is pretty good odds. Should we compare those odds with conventional forced landings? That sounds a nice idea but in fact is fraught with difficulties. Aircraft impact the ground for all sorts of reasons, including loss of control in IMC, engine failure, structural damage, pilot incapacitation to mention just a few. Chute deployments have been associated with all of these. In some cases I suspect we would all agree the chute “saved the day”. If an aileron detaches chances are none of us is going to “land” the aircraft. The difficult is therefore comparing apples with apples and not pears. However it would be interesting to compare cases of engine failure in VMC followed by a dead stick landings with and without the chute. The results of such a comparison across a wide pilot population would be interesting.
This leaves me to make the following assessment:
1. I practice forced landings, but not as often as I should. I think I am a better pilot than I really am, and in my dreams I always imagine I will “make” that small field, but when I take a reality check I realise it’s just in my dreams. My experience of flying with other pilots is that there are many I would give very good odds they wouldn’t make that small field, and I mean odds of 50:1 or better. I know, because I watch them try.
2. If I look down at L2K beach when the tide is out, its winter and deserted, I know I can land on the beach in just about any conditions you like. I also understand the risks of ending up in the water even a short distance from shore with an off shore wind blowing.
3. I sail and I know what the sea can be like off shore in certain conditions. I have read a lot about ditching and I still don’t fancy it! I like the idea of landing on water vertically.
4. I am aware that in strong winds there will be a lot of drift with the chute deployed. I am also aware that strong winds are my friend when it comes to a forced landing, but also my enemy in that it is so much easier to end up short or incorrectly aligned.
5. I know there are some circumstances in which I wouldn’t use the chute.
6. The rest of the time I am going to take a long hard look not only at what I see out of the cockpit window but what I feel in my heart. I am going to set to one side how good a pilot I think I am and then try and assess whether I really believe I can pull off a perfect forced landing. I am going to remind myself if I get it wrong in almost all conditions the impact is going to be worse than under the chute. Then I will make my final decision.
Inevitably, when you follow this thread, there are contributions from very experienced pilots, inexperienced pilots and the whole gambit in between. It is not surprising the more experienced pilots are those that prefer to trust to their own skills when it comes to a forced landing. They also believe all pilots should be as skilled as they are. This is understandable; most of us look at the world based on our own experiences.
Instructors, and those that regularly fly with others, have the best chance of looking at things through the eyes of others. I have always said that most “amateur” pilots are not very good at forced landings. Many don’t practice PFLs and therefore rely on the last PFLs they did as part of their two yearly review.
I think there is a very real danger arguing what other pilots should do based on your own skills. That to me suggests a certain detachment from reality.
The skill of the pilot is therefore the first element in considering whether or not to deploy the chute. It is pointless arguing pilots should be more skilled and / or better trained, because that is a different argument. It may have merit, but we have to accept we are where we are and it will take along time to change.
There is some evidence to suggest skilled pilots consider themselves more infallible than less skilled pilots. There are numerous accounts of high time, highly experienced and current pilots killing themselves in situations you would least expect. The account in this thread regarding the instructor that hit wires is a very good example.
Pilots believing they are better than they really are, or more immune from bad luck than the rest of us is the second element.
And so I believe pilots must detach themselves from their preconceived ideas. There will be those pilots who believe they will almost always do a better job without the chute and there will be those that believe the contrary.
This seems and odd situation to have reached but I suspect one of which most of us are guilty.
If we can detach ourselves from these preconceived ideas we might do a better job of assessing when we should use the chute.
As this thread has so amply illustrates there are examples where using the chute is less likely to result in the best outcome. I have said many times before Cirrus cant offer certainty where none exists. Rightly or wrongly they did not conduct an exhaustive trial into chute deployments, undoubtedly because the cost and risks would have been prohibitive. Consider for a moment the cost of developing hot seats for the military. Rightly or wrongly our knowledge of chutes has evolved, as there have been growing examples of their deployment. Cirrus cant give definitive guidance without “doing the tests”. Imagine the extent to which Cirrus would be torn to threads in court if they included a SOP which could not be supported on the basis of a comprehensive test program.
The accumulated evidence is that chute deployments work pretty well. I don’t know the actual figures but my guess is that over 90% of chute deployments have been successful. By any reckoning that is pretty good odds. Should we compare those odds with conventional forced landings? That sounds a nice idea but in fact is fraught with difficulties. Aircraft impact the ground for all sorts of reasons, including loss of control in IMC, engine failure, structural damage, pilot incapacitation to mention just a few. Chute deployments have been associated with all of these. In some cases I suspect we would all agree the chute “saved the day”. If an aileron detaches chances are none of us is going to “land” the aircraft. The difficult is therefore comparing apples with apples and not pears. However it would be interesting to compare cases of engine failure in VMC followed by a dead stick landings with and without the chute. The results of such a comparison across a wide pilot population would be interesting.
This leaves me to make the following assessment:
1. I practice forced landings, but not as often as I should. I think I am a better pilot than I really am, and in my dreams I always imagine I will “make” that small field, but when I take a reality check I realise it’s just in my dreams. My experience of flying with other pilots is that there are many I would give very good odds they wouldn’t make that small field, and I mean odds of 50:1 or better. I know, because I watch them try.
2. If I look down at L2K beach when the tide is out, its winter and deserted, I know I can land on the beach in just about any conditions you like. I also understand the risks of ending up in the water even a short distance from shore with an off shore wind blowing.
3. I sail and I know what the sea can be like off shore in certain conditions. I have read a lot about ditching and I still don’t fancy it! I like the idea of landing on water vertically.
4. I am aware that in strong winds there will be a lot of drift with the chute deployed. I am also aware that strong winds are my friend when it comes to a forced landing, but also my enemy in that it is so much easier to end up short or incorrectly aligned.
5. I know there are some circumstances in which I wouldn’t use the chute.
6. The rest of the time I am going to take a long hard look not only at what I see out of the cockpit window but what I feel in my heart. I am going to set to one side how good a pilot I think I am and then try and assess whether I really believe I can pull off a perfect forced landing. I am going to remind myself if I get it wrong in almost all conditions the impact is going to be worse than under the chute. Then I will make my final decision.
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Another thing occured to me in this discussion is why more high end manufactuer's do not adopt BRS, I note Cessna now do on certain models and I wonder if that is only a "me to" marketing exercise to try and counteract Cirrus.
Looking at the last 12-18 months fatal's on TBM's for example there seems to be a big problem, you would assume a TBM driver is a pretty advanced pilot, had type training, has an IR, has a turbine reliable engine, FIKI etc etc, yet the 3 or 4 fatal's in the last months appear from memory Pilot Error and my thinking is a Chute could have likely saved them.
For a TBM owner buying a new aircraft the cost and weight implications would be Pea Nuts compared to the total ownership cost, just a thought.......
A&C Here is the official stand from the POH, I know the general thinking from COPA is that +1000ft it is pretty much guaranteed to inflate fully and stabalise, 500-1000ft it is worth a punt depending on what is straight ahead of you, some believe worth a go at below 500ft, my personal choice on take off that anything above 500ft the CAPS is active.
Deployment Altitude
No minimum altitude for deployment has been set. This is because the
actual altitude loss during a particular deployment depends upon the
airplane’s airspeed, altitude and attitude at deployment as well as
other environmental factors. In all cases, however, the chances of a
successful deployment increase with altitude. As a guideline, the
demonstrated altitude loss from entry into a one-turn spin until under a
stabilized parachute is 920 feet. Altitude loss from level flight
deployments has been demonstrated at less than 400 feet. With these
numbers in mind it might be useful to keep 2,000 feet AGL in mind as a
cut-off decision altitude. Above 2,000 feet, there would normally be
time to systematically assess and address the aircraft emergency.
Below 2,000 feet, the decision to activate the CAPS has to come
almost immediately in order to maximize the possibility of successful
deployment. At any altitude, once the CAPS is determined to be the
only alternative available for saving the aircraft occupants, deploy the
system without delay.
Deployment Attitude
The CAPS has been tested in all flap configurations at speeds ranging
from Vso to Va. Most CAPS testing was accomplished from a level
attitude. Deployment from a spin was also tested. From these tests it
was found that as long as the parachute was introduced to the free air
by the rocket, it would successfully recover the aircraft into its level
descent attitude under parachute. However, it can be assumed that to
minimize the chances of parachute entanglement and reduce aircraft
oscillations under the parachute, the CAPS should be activated from a
wings-level, upright attitude if at all possible.
Fuji I think you have a very balanced view, just to clarify in my own mind are you an instructor?
One point I would make re the L2K scenario or other beech landings, I have been on that Beech and the sand seemed soft, I assume tide out it is a real firm base?
But I do not know that for a fact so would still pull the chute given 1000ft and immediate and sudden engine failure.
I have never seen a plane land on anything other than firm hard sand, how would a Cirrus or other aircraft react on soft powdery sand?
Also I have seen an estuary that look nice and smooth but are in fact sludge or mud which could be a disaster, again I do not know if that exists around L2K when the tide is out.
I am again assuming as I genuinely do not know maybe a chance of digging in and kart Wheeling if the surface is soft?
I do agree with your point re most guys thinking they are better than they actually are and it may well be human nature that this attitude hardens the longer we do something successfully.
Looking at the last 12-18 months fatal's on TBM's for example there seems to be a big problem, you would assume a TBM driver is a pretty advanced pilot, had type training, has an IR, has a turbine reliable engine, FIKI etc etc, yet the 3 or 4 fatal's in the last months appear from memory Pilot Error and my thinking is a Chute could have likely saved them.
For a TBM owner buying a new aircraft the cost and weight implications would be Pea Nuts compared to the total ownership cost, just a thought.......
What is the minimum deployment height for the chute?
Deployment Altitude
No minimum altitude for deployment has been set. This is because the
actual altitude loss during a particular deployment depends upon the
airplane’s airspeed, altitude and attitude at deployment as well as
other environmental factors. In all cases, however, the chances of a
successful deployment increase with altitude. As a guideline, the
demonstrated altitude loss from entry into a one-turn spin until under a
stabilized parachute is 920 feet. Altitude loss from level flight
deployments has been demonstrated at less than 400 feet. With these
numbers in mind it might be useful to keep 2,000 feet AGL in mind as a
cut-off decision altitude. Above 2,000 feet, there would normally be
time to systematically assess and address the aircraft emergency.
Below 2,000 feet, the decision to activate the CAPS has to come
almost immediately in order to maximize the possibility of successful
deployment. At any altitude, once the CAPS is determined to be the
only alternative available for saving the aircraft occupants, deploy the
system without delay.
Deployment Attitude
The CAPS has been tested in all flap configurations at speeds ranging
from Vso to Va. Most CAPS testing was accomplished from a level
attitude. Deployment from a spin was also tested. From these tests it
was found that as long as the parachute was introduced to the free air
by the rocket, it would successfully recover the aircraft into its level
descent attitude under parachute. However, it can be assumed that to
minimize the chances of parachute entanglement and reduce aircraft
oscillations under the parachute, the CAPS should be activated from a
wings-level, upright attitude if at all possible.
Fuji I think you have a very balanced view, just to clarify in my own mind are you an instructor?
One point I would make re the L2K scenario or other beech landings, I have been on that Beech and the sand seemed soft, I assume tide out it is a real firm base?
But I do not know that for a fact so would still pull the chute given 1000ft and immediate and sudden engine failure.
I have never seen a plane land on anything other than firm hard sand, how would a Cirrus or other aircraft react on soft powdery sand?
Also I have seen an estuary that look nice and smooth but are in fact sludge or mud which could be a disaster, again I do not know if that exists around L2K when the tide is out.
I am again assuming as I genuinely do not know maybe a chance of digging in and kart Wheeling if the surface is soft?
I do agree with your point re most guys thinking they are better than they actually are and it may well be human nature that this attitude hardens the longer we do something successfully.
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I do agree with your point re most guys thinking they are better than they actually are and it may well be human nature that this attitude hardens the longer we do something successfully.
It has nothing at all to do with being better than you actually are but what is likely to be a succesful outcome and that is far from clear!!!
The pilot who wears a parchute and irretrievably looses control or breaks the aircraft has no choice but to abandon ship.
This is very different and many here including Fuji are failing to acknowledge the huge difference.
That is abandoning a perfectly flyable aircraft in preference to the chute both actions carry risk!
Say in your example that you are gliding down for a forced landing at 300 feet you decide there are unseen hazards on the landing strip you have selected.
You pull the chute and fall the 300 feet with the chute not fully deployed! You kill yourself while a collision under control you would have survived.
I am frankly amazed at the blind faith in the chute to save all situations and blind reluctance to discuss without feeling affronted.
Fuji I am amazed that Cirrus will detail and recommend the uncerainty of a forced landing but drop detailing the chute as if they have red hot coals in their hands.
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 17th Oct 2012 at 13:59.
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Say in your example that you are gliding down for a forced landing at 300 feet you decide there are unseen hazards on the landing strip you have selected.
You pull the chute and fall the 300 feet with the chute not fully deployed! You kill yourself while a collision under control you would have survived.
You pull the chute and fall the 300 feet with the chute not fully deployed! You kill yourself while a collision under control you would have survived.
I'm now thinking along the lines of setting a decision height after engine failure, at which point you look at what you can see, & either commit to continue to a landing, or pull the handle.
The biggest hazard could turn out to be prevarication. You need to have decided what you're going to do by minimum safe deployment altitude & then stick with it.
But if the donk quits at 5000 feet, you've time for evaluation & IMO it's poor airmanship to throw away the choice by sticking doggedly to a prepared plan, whatever that might be.
Stay flexible until you have to commit, but then stick wholeheartedly with your chosen option - in just the same way that I'd never try to land after commencing a go-around at decision height, even if the viz suddenly improved & I had good sight of the runway.
Last edited by Sillert,V.I.; 17th Oct 2012 at 14:12.
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It has nothing at all to do with being better than you actually are but what is likely to be a succesful outcome and that is far from clear!!!
The pilot who wears a parchute and irretrievably looses control or breaks the aircraft has no choice but to abandon ship.
This is very different and many here including Fuji are failing to acknowledge the huge difference.
That is abandoning a perfectly flyable aircraft in preference to the chute both actions carry risk
The pilot who wears a parchute and irretrievably looses control or breaks the aircraft has no choice but to abandon ship.
This is very different and many here including Fuji are failing to acknowledge the huge difference.
That is abandoning a perfectly flyable aircraft in preference to the chute both actions carry risk
In all seriousness I will have one more go - after that forgive me but we will have to disagree. First of, I just cant grasp your point. Of course I acknowledge there is a difference - in one instance you are relying entirely on luck if you like, in the other you are relying on luck and skill. That is to simplistic an analysis though. In the case of the chute you have no control (or perhaps very little) exactly where and how you land. In the case of a hand landing the point of landing is as good (or as bad) as the skill you exhibit. Both have a commonality - luck. In the case of the chute you have very little control where you will land and therefore what you will hit. In the case of the hand landing in most cases you probably cant be absolutely certain whether you will hit a ditch, a power line, a large rock or some other immovable object.
So of course both carry risks and both carry different risks. The pilot is therefore asked to make a risk assessment - based not on what Cirrus say (because I acknowledge they say very little) but based on the evidence. The evidence has been well rehearsed. Some conclude the evidence is persuasive that the chute justifies abandoning a perfectly serviceable aircraft, some don't and some prefer to determine this on the circumstances at the time.
I don't see that as too difficult a concept.
Fuji I am amazed that Cirrus will detail and recommend the uncerainty of a forced landing but drop detailing the chute as if they have red hot coals in their hands.
Again in all seriousness surely you are not. You must be well aware how litigious Americans are, and this is their main market. We aren't that far behind. You couldn't possibly give recommendations based on zero evidence. We all know that Cirrus did almost no testing of the chute to give a meaningful analysis of the extent you are likely to survive a chute landing compared with a hand landing. Cirrus would be torn to shreds the first time a chute landing went wrong. You must know that.
So of course they are going to be coy on the chute. Maybe in time when there have been enough deployments they might consider giving an analysis based on the field evidence but 30 odd deployments is not enough. You know yourself just how extensive the tests must be to market an aircraft with spin recoverability and that is an accepted test sequence where the outcome should involve no luck, unlike the chute where in every circumstance there is an element of luck involved.
For these reasons I just don't understand how you expect Cirrus to do anything different?
I also don't understand why you imply their solution is in some way a poor solution. Cirrus offer an alternative. Some would argue in the majority of cases the chute offers a better alternative based on the evidence to date than a hand landing, others would not. That is the problem - you must make up your own mind whether or not to pull the handle. In a way its no different from crossing oceans or channels in a single - some look at the evidence and wouldnt get of bed and some wouldnt give it a second thought. Neither is right or wrong they just perceive risk differently, are too stupid to assess the risk, or cant be bothered.
Simples really.
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Say in your example that you are gliding down for a forced landing at 300 feet you decide there are unseen hazards on the landing strip you have selected.
You pull the chute and fall the 300 feet with the chute not fully deployed! You kill yourself while a collision under control you would have survived.
You pull the chute and fall the 300 feet with the chute not fully deployed! You kill yourself while a collision under control you would have survived.
Also that really is the point of the discussion at 300ft you suddenly see the unseen hazards and it is all to late. Who is to say you would survive the unseen hazards?
I am frankly amazed at the blind faith in the chute to save all situations and blind reluctance to discuss without feeling affronted.
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6. The rest of the time I am going to take a long hard look not only at what I see out of the cockpit window but what I feel in my heart. I am going to set to one side how good a pilot I think I am and then try and assess whether I really believe I can pull off a perfect forced landing. I am going to remind myself if I get it wrong in almost all conditions the impact is going to be worse than under the chute. Then I will make my final decision.
Some pilots will inevitably reach different conclusions about what to do in a situation...this is because, in private flying at least, we can't "SOPise" all our reactions beyond following basic drills for things like engine failures; we have to think and then act based on our perception of the situation; this is the same for decision making that has nothing to do with chutes...
Some pilots may tend to be more 'pro-chute' in a situation, which yes may mean surrendering control of a perfectly flyable aircraft if it is deemed that for some reason a safe conventional landing is unlikely, or on balance less likely than a chute assisted one.
I really think we are over thinking the whole "chute" thing on this thread...it's just a device that gives one another option in an emergency.
And as for the "moral hazard" arguments about risk taking they have been done to death on here and I don't see anything on this thread to add to that discussion...
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You could as easily argue that if you'd pulled the 'chute at 1000 feet, it would deploy correctly & you'd survive, but that by choosing to continue, you could be killed by the hazards you couldn't have seen until it was too late to deploy the 'chute.
I'm now thinking along the lines of setting a decision height after engine failure, at which point you look at what you can see, & either commit to continue to a landing, or pull the handle.
I'm now thinking along the lines of setting a decision height after engine failure, at which point you look at what you can see, & either commit to continue to a landing, or pull the handle.
Why not just reduce the risk (not eliminate it) and pull the chute in an off airport landing?
You said somewhere else you would consider this bad airmanship, which I accept is a common thought, however in a hypothetical scenario if you were transporting my children and needed to do an off airport landing in an emergency I would prefer you pull the chute.
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Pace
Just one more thought.
I explained the luck involved in both hand and chute landings
It also occurred to me that as the element of luck increases with one it decreases with the other.
Take a beach landing on a wonderful hard sand beach, tide out, no people. There is very little luck involved with a hand landing. There is almost no judgement, you have miles of beach, all you have to do is manage to keep control of the aircraft and the landing should go well. On the other hand with the chute you might drift into the sea or on to the ground beyond the beach - there is more luck.
Take on the other hand a rock strewn area of the Scotland. There is a lot of luck involved with a hand landing. You have almost no control what you will hit. On the other hand with the chute you are pretty much assured whatever you hit it is much more likely to be a lot less hard than with the same hand landing. Chances are the outcome will be better with the chute, given that in both instances skill cant avoid you hitting something, just that without the chute it will probably be faster and therefore "harder".
As the element of luck increases with one it decreases with the other. For each pilot there is a meeting point which determines at which point you elect to pull and at which point you elect to hand land.
Just one more thought.
I explained the luck involved in both hand and chute landings
It also occurred to me that as the element of luck increases with one it decreases with the other.
Take a beach landing on a wonderful hard sand beach, tide out, no people. There is very little luck involved with a hand landing. There is almost no judgement, you have miles of beach, all you have to do is manage to keep control of the aircraft and the landing should go well. On the other hand with the chute you might drift into the sea or on to the ground beyond the beach - there is more luck.
Take on the other hand a rock strewn area of the Scotland. There is a lot of luck involved with a hand landing. You have almost no control what you will hit. On the other hand with the chute you are pretty much assured whatever you hit it is much more likely to be a lot less hard than with the same hand landing. Chances are the outcome will be better with the chute, given that in both instances skill cant avoid you hitting something, just that without the chute it will probably be faster and therefore "harder".
As the element of luck increases with one it decreases with the other. For each pilot there is a meeting point which determines at which point you elect to pull and at which point you elect to hand land.
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Take a beach landing on a wonderful hard sand beach, tide out, no people. There is very little luck involved with a hand landing. There is almost no judgement, you have miles of beach, all you have to do is manage to keep control of the aircraft and the landing should go well. On the other hand with the chute you might drift into the sea or on to the ground beyond the beach - there is more luck.
Sure if I knew the surface was as described in that specific situation I would not disagree a good option.
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You don't, or at least you might not, and I would agree. Equally you might have walked the beach and know.
Its all down to experience and yet another reason why you and I would argue if you don't know what the terrain is like the chute might be a better option.
We all know its worth taking in different sorts of terrain from the air and comparing them with the actual terrain on the ground just in case. We drive past or walk over different fields and think would we want to land in that - and it gives us a reference. I have a pretty good idea what most of the fields are like used for grazing on the Downs and I have walked across L2K beach many times at low tide.
To the extent that Pace argues I suspect we shouldn't lose sight that many fields do present pretty good landing sites and chances are most forced landings will be pretty successful - at least reading the reports that does seem to be reflected by the evidence.
You don't, or at least you might not, and I would agree. Equally you might have walked the beach and know.
Its all down to experience and yet another reason why you and I would argue if you don't know what the terrain is like the chute might be a better option.
We all know its worth taking in different sorts of terrain from the air and comparing them with the actual terrain on the ground just in case. We drive past or walk over different fields and think would we want to land in that - and it gives us a reference. I have a pretty good idea what most of the fields are like used for grazing on the Downs and I have walked across L2K beach many times at low tide.
To the extent that Pace argues I suspect we shouldn't lose sight that many fields do present pretty good landing sites and chances are most forced landings will be pretty successful - at least reading the reports that does seem to be reflected by the evidence.
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NTSB Identification: ERA13LA012
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, October 06, 2012 in Birmingham, AL
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N80KW
Injuries: 1 Serious,1 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On October 6, 2012, about 1215 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N80KW, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during deployment of the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), following a loss of control during a missed approach at Birmingham International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The private pilot incurred minor injuries and the passenger was seriously injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Charles B Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC), Kansas City, Missouri; destined for BHM.
The pilot stated that while on the instrument landing system approach to runway 6 at BHM, he reported missed approach at 2,000 feet to the BHM air traffic control tower. The tower controller instructed the pilot to fly the runway heading; however, the pilot reported to the controller that he was unable due to weather. The tower controller then instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 180 degrees and climb to 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the instruction and during the turn, lost control of the airplane. He then observed the altimeter indicating a descent through 1,700 feet and elected to deploy the CAPS. The airplane subsequently descended and came to rest in a commercial parking lot, about 2 miles south of BHM.
Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed damage to the fuselage and a puncture of the left wing near the left main landing gear.
The airplane was equipped with a remote data module (RDM), intended to record flight and engine parameters. The inspector recovered the RDM from the airplane and forwarded it to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, for data download.
The recorded weather at BHM, at 1153, included an overcast ceiling at 700 feet above ground level (1350 feet above mean sea level).
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, October 06, 2012 in Birmingham, AL
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N80KW
Injuries: 1 Serious,1 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On October 6, 2012, about 1215 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N80KW, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during deployment of the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), following a loss of control during a missed approach at Birmingham International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The private pilot incurred minor injuries and the passenger was seriously injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Charles B Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC), Kansas City, Missouri; destined for BHM.
The pilot stated that while on the instrument landing system approach to runway 6 at BHM, he reported missed approach at 2,000 feet to the BHM air traffic control tower. The tower controller instructed the pilot to fly the runway heading; however, the pilot reported to the controller that he was unable due to weather. The tower controller then instructed the pilot to fly a heading of 180 degrees and climb to 4,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the instruction and during the turn, lost control of the airplane. He then observed the altimeter indicating a descent through 1,700 feet and elected to deploy the CAPS. The airplane subsequently descended and came to rest in a commercial parking lot, about 2 miles south of BHM.
Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed damage to the fuselage and a puncture of the left wing near the left main landing gear.
The airplane was equipped with a remote data module (RDM), intended to record flight and engine parameters. The inspector recovered the RDM from the airplane and forwarded it to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, for data download.
The recorded weather at BHM, at 1153, included an overcast ceiling at 700 feet above ground level (1350 feet above mean sea level).
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In summary of this incident:
a) Probably most of us agree that a competent, prepared current pilot should not have lost control in this scenario.
b) Had he not pulled the chute, after losing control at that altitude there is a reasonable chance he would not have been able to recover and he and his pax would be dead.
a) Probably most of us agree that a competent, prepared current pilot should not have lost control in this scenario.
b) Had he not pulled the chute, after losing control at that altitude there is a reasonable chance he would not have been able to recover and he and his pax would be dead.
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Sounds like as well as being somewhat dishonest in the interview about the reasons for the crash he also downplayed what happened to his passenger...not sure he mentioned that she had been 'seriously injured' (as the report says...). 
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007
Totally agree without the chute both would have been dead! This pilot should not have been on an instrument approach as he was obviously totally incapable of flying intruments.
I would pull the chute over extensive forests if I had an engine failure or over mountains where my only landing was on a boulder shrewn river bed.
I would not pull the chute over a lush green English country side even if I took out a hedge in a subsequent forced landing.
As long as you keep the aircraft flying you are unlikely to kill yourself in a forced landing.
I would be cautious of pulling the chute on strong wind days.
007 I am not against the chute but am against its use as an answer to all ills
Pace
Totally agree without the chute both would have been dead! This pilot should not have been on an instrument approach as he was obviously totally incapable of flying intruments.
I would pull the chute over extensive forests if I had an engine failure or over mountains where my only landing was on a boulder shrewn river bed.
I would not pull the chute over a lush green English country side even if I took out a hedge in a subsequent forced landing.
As long as you keep the aircraft flying you are unlikely to kill yourself in a forced landing.
I would be cautious of pulling the chute on strong wind days.
007 I am not against the chute but am against its use as an answer to all ills
Pace
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Whilst agreeing totally that without the 'chute these guys would almost certainly be dead, the extent of the injuries to the occupants confirms that deploying the chute is by no means without risk.
We've concentrated here on the engine failure scenario, but remembering that this airplane was perfectly functional until the 'chute was deployed, I'm thinking about the merits of building additional functionality into the autopilot to recover the aircraft in this kind of situation. I suspect it would be technically straightforward to build in an emergency use only 'autoland' function which would recover the aircraft, climb to MSA, proceed to the nearest ILS & descend on it, squawking 7700 all the way. Whilst the cost/complexity/liability issues associated with certifying this would be horrendous, I'm betting even a crude implementation would statistically have a better outcome than pulling the 'chute.
However, if the pilot had obtained proper training & maintained currency in real-weather IFR flying before getting into this situation, all this would have been prevented.
We've concentrated here on the engine failure scenario, but remembering that this airplane was perfectly functional until the 'chute was deployed, I'm thinking about the merits of building additional functionality into the autopilot to recover the aircraft in this kind of situation. I suspect it would be technically straightforward to build in an emergency use only 'autoland' function which would recover the aircraft, climb to MSA, proceed to the nearest ILS & descend on it, squawking 7700 all the way. Whilst the cost/complexity/liability issues associated with certifying this would be horrendous, I'm betting even a crude implementation would statistically have a better outcome than pulling the 'chute.
However, if the pilot had obtained proper training & maintained currency in real-weather IFR flying before getting into this situation, all this would have been prevented.