I know many pilots that fly into icing conditions. They make an assessment about the aircrafts ability to climb into clear air on top without picking up too much ice. They havent made a mistake, they have made a risk assessment. I know many pilots that fly at night in singles. They also would claim they have made a risk assessment. Flying into icing conditions in a Cirrus is illegal - flying at night is legal. More often than not if you have made the correct assessment about the rate of accumulation of ice, the length of time the aircraft will be in icing conditions, and the ability of the "anti-ice" to cope you will do pretty well, however if the engine quits at night chances are the outcome will not be good. Your example is for that reason a poor one.
The great cry of justification. Risk management. Risk assessment. "
This is dangerous. I have assessed it, and determined I'll do it anyway"...risk assessment. "
This is dangerous and that is more dangerous, so I'll just do this, anyway"...risk management. Practice risk elimination, and neither of those other options are worth anything, because risk assessment (when used to justify taking a risk) and risk management both accept risk, and therefore supposition, guesswork, and invite disaster.
Justification is the narcotic of the soul. Many are addicts.
When someone tells you they know it's a risk, but it's a calculated risk...they've just made an excuse. Boiled down, it may best be paraphrased as "Yes, I know it's dangerous and stupid, but I'm going to do it anyway." It's "calculated" after all. Once it's been "calculated" and becomes a "calculated risk," then it's okay. This is called justification, more plainly described as an excuse. Don't make excuses.
I can tell you about ice, but your words suggest you won't hear it...after all, it's calculated, it's probably okay. I can tell you about experiencing rapid ice buildups in light airplanes (twins) that left me coming down in the mountains, I can tell you about aileron snatch and control problems that developed in large four engine piston airplanes...I can tell you about seeing 3" of ice buildupon the airplane so rapidly it couldn't be shed...all in places where no icing was anticipated, or very light trace icing...and all in cases where it built in less than 60 seconds. A case where the airplane lost 50 knots of airspeed immediately, went through best climb to best angle and then nearly to minimum controllable before settling there in a sustained descent. You don't want to hear that. You take calculated risks, that ignore that, apparently. It's what you don't "calculate" that can kill you.
Flying the airplane into ice is illegal you say...but flying over the mountains at night isn't...so that's okay. It's okay so long as it's not illegal, then? Justification, excuses, calculation, assessment. Even in Russian Roulette, one can calculate and assess the possibility of going at least five times before one pulls the trigger and shoots one's self in the head. This really doesn't make it the right thing to do. In aviation we don't play odds. We calculate, we know, we plan...we don't guess, and we don't take risks because we think the odds favor us.
You can let experience teach you this the hard way, or you can listen to others who have the experience to help you avoid having to learn the hard way. You would seem to be one who prefers to find out the hard way. I don't recommend it.
So, it's a dramatic theatrical trick to take the 14 known parachute activations and deduce that the parachute is the problem, or Cirrus pilots are a problem.
You've clearly missed the point, by more than a mile. The discussion was specifically regarding the parachute incidents, not about Cirrus in general, nor about other cirrus pilots. This is, after all, a discussion about parachutes and pilots. You're very stuck on the cirrus concept. It's a sidetrack to the true nature of this thread...you appear to take it very personally. Don't.
The vast majority of the cirrus parachute activations involved stupid pilot error; I said it before, I was dismissed, and proved I was right based on the stats. That's all. Don't try to carry the example to places it was never intended to go. When we speak of the few cirrus examples involving activations...thats 100% of the set in discussion...the discussion doesn't carry beyond those people, where the cirrus is concerned. If you are emotionally invested in the airplane or fly one yourself, deal with it. Be safe, don't crash...but my comments have nothing to do with you. These pertain the pilots and parachutes, and you're going a little (actually a lot) far afield.
Ft Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska. PB4Y along with a C-97G.
A typcial U.S. GA friendly welcome and tour of the aircraft with a crew member. They hadn't flown a mission for a while but were expecting to next day - July 4th 1998 - apparently the celebration fireworks usually managed to set something on fire!
I know who that was, but it wasn't me. Those were in Tanker 124 or 126 for the 4Y's, and Tanker 97 for the C97G. (The pilot on the 97G, incidentally, was the same one that did the flying for the recent remake of Flight of the Phoenix, using one of our C119's). I was in the lower 48 at the time...I believe I was in Florida on fires on that day, actually, also in a PB4Y.
Hopefully you survived the mosquitos in Ft. Wainwright.
Did the airplanes have their nose-art at the time? That turned into quite a saga.
I'm glad they treated you well. I always made sure that visitors got the full tour of the airplane, so long as we weren't about to launch on a fire. I hosted a lot of WWII veterans, many of whom cried when they got in the airplane. I had some follow me, or their sons drive them around to follow us, just so they could have a look. They would bring scrapbooks, and shoe boxes with pictures medals, mementos. They never cried because they missed the airplane, but for the friends of their youth who didn't get to come home.
One old man climbed into the left seat and stared pensively out the window. He finally said that the ground was a lot farther down than he remembered it. Then he allowed that the last time he climbed out of a B24 it was in Holland, and the airplane had been buried nearly up to the cockpit in mud as he crashed in soft earth; he climbed out the cockpit side window and the ground was only a couple of feet below the window.
Another old man flew P47's. He recalled flying up alongside a severely shot-up B24 over Germany. It clearly wasn't going to make it back to England, so he lead it over Switzerland. The nav station was shot out and the side of the airplane missing. One vertical stab detached and wildly spinning on the remains of the control cables, and one aileron separated. As he turned, the B24 followed him. He lead them back again, and then left them, hoping they got out okay. It was the most poignant memory for him of the B24.
A Canadian came to me one day to show me pictures of explosions behind his airplane as they bombed and torpedoed german U boats, shots taken out of the tail turret. I took him into the tail turret, where he hadn't been in many, many years.
I spent a lot of time researching the airplane. When I got typed in it, the flight manuals were old xerox copies. I got my own set of originals, and still have them. I really loved that airplane. The wings came off the one I got typed in, a few years ago, and the fleet was grounded. They've since been auctioned off. I'd love to fly one again one day, but doubt I ever will.