Never do something stupid fast.
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Modelman,
You were taught correctly. What keeping your hand on the throttle really does for you is not only keeps the throttle forward, but gives you immediate tactile or feel feedback if you have a problem. If the engine does fail on you, you know it's not because the throttle backed off...it's in your hand. You're "in the loop" with what's going on with the airplane.
In multi engine airplanes, other factors come into play. One of the things chuck referred to was directional control. If one engine quits, you lose not only power, but you have some powerful forces trying to turn the airplane. If it gets too slow while still on the ground, the ability to keep the airplane going straight is lost, and as a result, control is lost. In flight, if there's not enough rudder authority available to fight that turning, the airplane can roll over and control will be lost. Multi engine pilots learn from very early in their training that in some cases the only choice may be to pull back or reduce power on the good engine(s) when one fails. that's one consideration.
Another consideration, especially as airplanes get heavier and heavier, is both the amount of runway required to take off, and what to do with the airplane if that takeoff needs to be stopped. Unlike a single engine Cessna, for example, one may be nearly out of runway by the time one rejects the takeoff, and one may need a lot to get stopped. Certain additional calculations are needed, then, when planning a takeoff in a larger multi engine airplane. One doesn't just need to know one's takeoff roll, but other numbers too, such as the accelerate-stop distance, balanced field length, etc. Other numbers such as the engine-out climb gradient are very important, as are the minimum speeds with a failed engine at a given weight, for directional control.
As weight increases, the ability of the brakes to stop the airplane decreases. Brake energy, the ability of the brakes to absort heat before they fail, is an important issue. Many larger airplanes have brake energy charts, but the fact is that if you have to reject a takeoff, you can have brake fires, directional control issues, a host of different potential problems...including tires that explode or burst because of skidding, temperature, etc. Having tires burst or go flat on a rejected takeoff in a large airplane isn't uncommon, nor are brake fires.
In older large airplanes such as what chuck is describing, a lot of this data just isn't available. I also flew WWII era bombers doing firefighting, and while it would be nice to have data like accelerate-stop and climb gradient information, it wasn't available. Add to that the fact that one is often departing from less than ideal runways...many tanker bases used to be located at airports with only a few thousand feet of runway, and often we used every foot of it before the wheels left the ground...the decision to reject a takeoff is a critical one.
Certain speeds come into play. In large airplanes, one of those speeds, generally the first one reached, is refusal, or decision speed. This is commonly just called V1. As a very generic rule, anything that occurs prior to V1, you can reject the takeoff, anything after you can't...you MUST go fly. However, due to the high risk involved in a high-speed rejected takeoff, nearly universally the wisdom is broken down a little more fully. One can reject for anything at a lower speed, but at a higher speed one may reject only for very critical items such as engine fire, engine failure, or loss of directional control.
The speed usually chosen for that line is about 80 knots. When a takeoff is briefed in most large airplanes these days, ranging from business jets to airliners to air tankers, usually it's briefed as any problems that present a safety of flight issue upto 80 knots, we will reject. After 80 knots, we will reject only for the previously mentioned engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control. It's just too dangerous to reject the takeoff otherwise.
To give you an idea of how dangerous it is, the FAA used to require a high speed rejected takeoff as part of the demonstration a pilot must show when taking the checkride for his multi engine rating. However, due to the number of training accidents and fatalities, even in light twins, the FAA doesn't authorize their examiners or inspectors to allow it above 40 knots, now. Keep it slow, because even in a light twin, a high speed rejected takeoff can be very dangerous. Statistically it's one of the most dangerous things you can do in a multi engine airplane (especially a large airplane)...high speed, low control, close to or on the ground, high potential for loss of directional control, max brake energy and temperatures, your stopping distance largely behind you, obstacles ahead...you're better off taking it flying and bringing it back around under control to land.
In a single engine airplane, you don't have any choice; if the engine fails then you're coming down. You're often taught to land straight ahead or keep the airplane going straight ahead and accept what's there (or make slight turns to avoid obstacles, if you can). In a large airplane, there are other options and other considerations. Chuck's point that simply pulling one engine back in a reaction to the problem would have been a very bad choice, is a valid one. He uses that as an example to show that he didn't just pull one engine back as a knee jerk reaction; he considered the effects and shut down both engines. He did so with the added benifit that the engines were stopped, further reducing their hazard.
The reason I responded as I did, and do so again, is that while clearly he made a successful stop, rejecting a takeoff for two functioning engines at takeoff power is a bad choice. Why reject the takeoff when things are functioning as they should? You don't.
This is particularly true in an air tanker. I've spent a number of years flying air tankers doing firefighting in older WWII airplanes, turbine equipment such as the C-130, and even in single engine air tankers such as the 800 gallon Air Tractor AT-802F. When carrying retardant more than any other load (foam, water, etc), punching off the load during a rejected takeoff can do several bad things for you...one is that it can coat your brakes. It's very slick, reducing brake effectiveness. It's one of the things we teach not to do in the fire schools every year. It also coats the ground and can make directional controlan and braking difficult by reducing the coefficient of friction with the surface. If this occurs during an overrun onto grass, it's like operating on oil or ice. Very slick, possibly even no braking. Moreover, braking effectiveness is a function of speed, the brakes, and the weight on the wheels. Effectiveness is reduced when the weight is lost.
Older airplanes used what are called expander tube brakes. Unlike what's on your car or Cessna, these used a rubber-impregnated canvas bladder full of hydraulic fluid to expand and compress the brake assembly. These are susceptible to catching fire and with heat, the canvas and rubber breaks down and can fail. I've seen them burning and smoking on several occasions as a result of too much use on landing or a rejected takeoff. They lose efficiency much faster than most modern large airplanes, and have their own limitations. Once they warm up, they're done...unlike carbon fibre brakes found in say, a typical airliner today...which get more efficient the hotter they get.
In a tanker, during a takeoff emergency about the only time you'll be jettisoning the load is if you intend to take it airborne and need to get rid of the weight to do it. We strongly counsel pilots every year not to lose the load if they intend to remain on the ground and stop, especially if it's retardant. It's always a judgement call, and chuck made his judgement call. However, if you were to post that scenario in the tech forum and have it evaluated by professional pilots who understand the real significance of rejecting a takeoff with two functioning engines...you're going to get nearly universally the same response as I've provided here. Yes, he made it, yes, he made a good decision to kill both engines instead of just one...but he shouldn't have done it in the first place. With two good engines, rejecting the takeoff with two good operating engines and the runway behind, is the wrong choice...and he ended up off the runway as a result. It could have been much worse. Runway overruns and high speed rejected takeoffs, especially for fully functioning engines...are ill advised and have resulted in a lot of tragedy over the years. Lucky doesn't make it right.
Chuck's example so far as not moving a control before you think about it, is valid. His example of what occured, is not...and put that scenario before the many professionals who frequent the board and you'll get the same response. That it's not recognized in the private pilot forum is to be expected; it's not part of your training, and you're not expected to know that. Chuck knows that, too.
I fully agree that fast hands kill. I've seen pilots shut down the wrong engine. I've seen pilots panic and do things they really ought not. This may be such an occasion. Directional control wasn't lost, but the takeoff really shouldn't have been rejected, either...statistically speaking, and speaking in terms of proper training and procedure. My grip is the decision to post it in the private pilot forum and hide a good decision in a bad one, specifically chosen before a group that probably wouldn't recognize the fact...and then to defend that bad decision.
Chuck is right regarding acting too quickly. I've always taught that the first thing you should do in nearly all emergency situations is sit on your hands and count to ten. Not always literally, of course, but there are very few things that happen in an airplane which demand you act NOW...and whereas pilot error is the cause of the majority of mishaps, getting the pilot to slow down a little before he does something stupid (like reject a takeoff for two fully functioning engines) is a very wise thing to do.
You were taught correctly. What keeping your hand on the throttle really does for you is not only keeps the throttle forward, but gives you immediate tactile or feel feedback if you have a problem. If the engine does fail on you, you know it's not because the throttle backed off...it's in your hand. You're "in the loop" with what's going on with the airplane.
In multi engine airplanes, other factors come into play. One of the things chuck referred to was directional control. If one engine quits, you lose not only power, but you have some powerful forces trying to turn the airplane. If it gets too slow while still on the ground, the ability to keep the airplane going straight is lost, and as a result, control is lost. In flight, if there's not enough rudder authority available to fight that turning, the airplane can roll over and control will be lost. Multi engine pilots learn from very early in their training that in some cases the only choice may be to pull back or reduce power on the good engine(s) when one fails. that's one consideration.
Another consideration, especially as airplanes get heavier and heavier, is both the amount of runway required to take off, and what to do with the airplane if that takeoff needs to be stopped. Unlike a single engine Cessna, for example, one may be nearly out of runway by the time one rejects the takeoff, and one may need a lot to get stopped. Certain additional calculations are needed, then, when planning a takeoff in a larger multi engine airplane. One doesn't just need to know one's takeoff roll, but other numbers too, such as the accelerate-stop distance, balanced field length, etc. Other numbers such as the engine-out climb gradient are very important, as are the minimum speeds with a failed engine at a given weight, for directional control.
As weight increases, the ability of the brakes to stop the airplane decreases. Brake energy, the ability of the brakes to absort heat before they fail, is an important issue. Many larger airplanes have brake energy charts, but the fact is that if you have to reject a takeoff, you can have brake fires, directional control issues, a host of different potential problems...including tires that explode or burst because of skidding, temperature, etc. Having tires burst or go flat on a rejected takeoff in a large airplane isn't uncommon, nor are brake fires.
In older large airplanes such as what chuck is describing, a lot of this data just isn't available. I also flew WWII era bombers doing firefighting, and while it would be nice to have data like accelerate-stop and climb gradient information, it wasn't available. Add to that the fact that one is often departing from less than ideal runways...many tanker bases used to be located at airports with only a few thousand feet of runway, and often we used every foot of it before the wheels left the ground...the decision to reject a takeoff is a critical one.
Certain speeds come into play. In large airplanes, one of those speeds, generally the first one reached, is refusal, or decision speed. This is commonly just called V1. As a very generic rule, anything that occurs prior to V1, you can reject the takeoff, anything after you can't...you MUST go fly. However, due to the high risk involved in a high-speed rejected takeoff, nearly universally the wisdom is broken down a little more fully. One can reject for anything at a lower speed, but at a higher speed one may reject only for very critical items such as engine fire, engine failure, or loss of directional control.
The speed usually chosen for that line is about 80 knots. When a takeoff is briefed in most large airplanes these days, ranging from business jets to airliners to air tankers, usually it's briefed as any problems that present a safety of flight issue upto 80 knots, we will reject. After 80 knots, we will reject only for the previously mentioned engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control. It's just too dangerous to reject the takeoff otherwise.
To give you an idea of how dangerous it is, the FAA used to require a high speed rejected takeoff as part of the demonstration a pilot must show when taking the checkride for his multi engine rating. However, due to the number of training accidents and fatalities, even in light twins, the FAA doesn't authorize their examiners or inspectors to allow it above 40 knots, now. Keep it slow, because even in a light twin, a high speed rejected takeoff can be very dangerous. Statistically it's one of the most dangerous things you can do in a multi engine airplane (especially a large airplane)...high speed, low control, close to or on the ground, high potential for loss of directional control, max brake energy and temperatures, your stopping distance largely behind you, obstacles ahead...you're better off taking it flying and bringing it back around under control to land.
In a single engine airplane, you don't have any choice; if the engine fails then you're coming down. You're often taught to land straight ahead or keep the airplane going straight ahead and accept what's there (or make slight turns to avoid obstacles, if you can). In a large airplane, there are other options and other considerations. Chuck's point that simply pulling one engine back in a reaction to the problem would have been a very bad choice, is a valid one. He uses that as an example to show that he didn't just pull one engine back as a knee jerk reaction; he considered the effects and shut down both engines. He did so with the added benifit that the engines were stopped, further reducing their hazard.
The reason I responded as I did, and do so again, is that while clearly he made a successful stop, rejecting a takeoff for two functioning engines at takeoff power is a bad choice. Why reject the takeoff when things are functioning as they should? You don't.
This is particularly true in an air tanker. I've spent a number of years flying air tankers doing firefighting in older WWII airplanes, turbine equipment such as the C-130, and even in single engine air tankers such as the 800 gallon Air Tractor AT-802F. When carrying retardant more than any other load (foam, water, etc), punching off the load during a rejected takeoff can do several bad things for you...one is that it can coat your brakes. It's very slick, reducing brake effectiveness. It's one of the things we teach not to do in the fire schools every year. It also coats the ground and can make directional controlan and braking difficult by reducing the coefficient of friction with the surface. If this occurs during an overrun onto grass, it's like operating on oil or ice. Very slick, possibly even no braking. Moreover, braking effectiveness is a function of speed, the brakes, and the weight on the wheels. Effectiveness is reduced when the weight is lost.
Older airplanes used what are called expander tube brakes. Unlike what's on your car or Cessna, these used a rubber-impregnated canvas bladder full of hydraulic fluid to expand and compress the brake assembly. These are susceptible to catching fire and with heat, the canvas and rubber breaks down and can fail. I've seen them burning and smoking on several occasions as a result of too much use on landing or a rejected takeoff. They lose efficiency much faster than most modern large airplanes, and have their own limitations. Once they warm up, they're done...unlike carbon fibre brakes found in say, a typical airliner today...which get more efficient the hotter they get.
In a tanker, during a takeoff emergency about the only time you'll be jettisoning the load is if you intend to take it airborne and need to get rid of the weight to do it. We strongly counsel pilots every year not to lose the load if they intend to remain on the ground and stop, especially if it's retardant. It's always a judgement call, and chuck made his judgement call. However, if you were to post that scenario in the tech forum and have it evaluated by professional pilots who understand the real significance of rejecting a takeoff with two functioning engines...you're going to get nearly universally the same response as I've provided here. Yes, he made it, yes, he made a good decision to kill both engines instead of just one...but he shouldn't have done it in the first place. With two good engines, rejecting the takeoff with two good operating engines and the runway behind, is the wrong choice...and he ended up off the runway as a result. It could have been much worse. Runway overruns and high speed rejected takeoffs, especially for fully functioning engines...are ill advised and have resulted in a lot of tragedy over the years. Lucky doesn't make it right.
Chuck's example so far as not moving a control before you think about it, is valid. His example of what occured, is not...and put that scenario before the many professionals who frequent the board and you'll get the same response. That it's not recognized in the private pilot forum is to be expected; it's not part of your training, and you're not expected to know that. Chuck knows that, too.
I fully agree that fast hands kill. I've seen pilots shut down the wrong engine. I've seen pilots panic and do things they really ought not. This may be such an occasion. Directional control wasn't lost, but the takeoff really shouldn't have been rejected, either...statistically speaking, and speaking in terms of proper training and procedure. My grip is the decision to post it in the private pilot forum and hide a good decision in a bad one, specifically chosen before a group that probably wouldn't recognize the fact...and then to defend that bad decision.
Chuck is right regarding acting too quickly. I've always taught that the first thing you should do in nearly all emergency situations is sit on your hands and count to ten. Not always literally, of course, but there are very few things that happen in an airplane which demand you act NOW...and whereas pilot error is the cause of the majority of mishaps, getting the pilot to slow down a little before he does something stupid (like reject a takeoff for two fully functioning engines) is a very wise thing to do.
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Interesting discussion.
Fast hands may frequently be dangerous.
However, equally are there occasions when fast hands can save the day?
How fast do you hands have to be to get the collective down in a light helicopter with little inertia in the blades following a catastrophic engine failure?
How fast do your hands need to be when the engines fails at max climb after departure?
Perhaps some other cases come to mind.
When one of my engines failed recently however I was very glad to take some time to assess what had happened and what I should do next. Time on your side is always good.
Fast hands may frequently be dangerous.
However, equally are there occasions when fast hands can save the day?
How fast do you hands have to be to get the collective down in a light helicopter with little inertia in the blades following a catastrophic engine failure?
How fast do your hands need to be when the engines fails at max climb after departure?
Perhaps some other cases come to mind.
When one of my engines failed recently however I was very glad to take some time to assess what had happened and what I should do next. Time on your side is always good.
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I would like to take the opportunity to apologize to all the private pilots here on Pprune for making a post regarding PDM that was beyond your ability to comprehend due to your not having either the neurons to examine my message or the vast experience of some of your other contributers here to understand said message.
I do however find it rather strange that someone would criticize me for talking above your heads regarding how airplanes work then launch into a long lecture about how airplanes work.
I do not need total strangers insulting me because I wrote something for the express purpose of suggesting that it is better to take the time to make a good decision rather than act like one of Pavlovs dogs and do something stupid because you learned to react by rote.
Therefore I shall try and refrain from insulting all you unwashed peons with a lowly PPL in the future and leave it to the experts to keep you from harm.
Now I would like to take the opportunity to respond to you experts who have flatly stated I made the wrong decision.
Here are the facts.
(1) Before take off I always have a plan regarding where I will reject should something go wrong.
(2) I had been flying off that runway for some time and " KNEW " that the over run past the gravel runway was smooth grass and there was at least a thousand feet from the end of the runway and the airport boundry.
(3) I do not need you to explain what V1 is nor do I need you to tell me how I should have handled that situation.
(4) As I explained I rejected before the nose wheel lifted off the runway, which means I was below 65 knots with sufficient " SAFE " runway and grass over run to stop.
(5) I have been flying for just short of 55 years and my career has included most every type of flying machine from light and heavy helicopters to
heavy transport catgory piston and jet engine powered airplanes.
(6) I have never had an accident nor a violation of the regulations during my time in aviation.....
....oh by the way I was chief pilot for not only a water bombing company but also for an airline.
.....oh and I worked with Airbus Industries who taught me a few things about CRM and PDM and V1 and all those things ........
Once again....sorry for trying to relate a story where thinking trumped acting by rote.
Now back to the experts.....
I do however find it rather strange that someone would criticize me for talking above your heads regarding how airplanes work then launch into a long lecture about how airplanes work.
I do not need total strangers insulting me because I wrote something for the express purpose of suggesting that it is better to take the time to make a good decision rather than act like one of Pavlovs dogs and do something stupid because you learned to react by rote.
Therefore I shall try and refrain from insulting all you unwashed peons with a lowly PPL in the future and leave it to the experts to keep you from harm.
Now I would like to take the opportunity to respond to you experts who have flatly stated I made the wrong decision.
Here are the facts.
(1) Before take off I always have a plan regarding where I will reject should something go wrong.
(2) I had been flying off that runway for some time and " KNEW " that the over run past the gravel runway was smooth grass and there was at least a thousand feet from the end of the runway and the airport boundry.
(3) I do not need you to explain what V1 is nor do I need you to tell me how I should have handled that situation.
(4) As I explained I rejected before the nose wheel lifted off the runway, which means I was below 65 knots with sufficient " SAFE " runway and grass over run to stop.
(5) I have been flying for just short of 55 years and my career has included most every type of flying machine from light and heavy helicopters to
heavy transport catgory piston and jet engine powered airplanes.
(6) I have never had an accident nor a violation of the regulations during my time in aviation.....
....oh by the way I was chief pilot for not only a water bombing company but also for an airline.
.....oh and I worked with Airbus Industries who taught me a few things about CRM and PDM and V1 and all those things ........
Once again....sorry for trying to relate a story where thinking trumped acting by rote.
Now back to the experts.....
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So basically what you are saying is Chuck "I'm the best pilot out there. The emergency I'm telling you about shows how great I am. You, the Pprune audience, should only post your messages of admiration, as there's nothing else that needs to be discussed about this situation".
Or have I got it wrong?
Or have I got it wrong?
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artist,
I'd have disagreed with you very heartily until Chuck's last post. Now, sorry to say, I think you've got a very valid point. His decision to reject was wrong, but his decision to post the nonsense in his last contribution knocks it into a cocked hat.
I'd have disagreed with you very heartily until Chuck's last post. Now, sorry to say, I think you've got a very valid point. His decision to reject was wrong, but his decision to post the nonsense in his last contribution knocks it into a cocked hat.
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Chuck is relating an incident as illustrative of why taking time to think is a good idea and a discussion worth commenting on (see my post above).
Clearly he was not looking for a critique of his specific decision making process in respect of this incident.
A critique he has got and it is not the first nor the last time a thread drifts from the posters original intention.
Chuck - I think everyone agrees with your sentitments that taking time to think is vital. Other than to post "I agree", I suspect that is partly why the thread has "drifted" becasue other wise there was not a whole lot to add.
That said it would be interesting to drag the debate back to occasions when quick hands might be a good idea.
Clearly he was not looking for a critique of his specific decision making process in respect of this incident.
A critique he has got and it is not the first nor the last time a thread drifts from the posters original intention.
Chuck - I think everyone agrees with your sentitments that taking time to think is vital. Other than to post "I agree", I suspect that is partly why the thread has "drifted" becasue other wise there was not a whole lot to add.
That said it would be interesting to drag the debate back to occasions when quick hands might be a good idea.
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it would be interesting to drag the debate back to occasions when quick hands might be a good idea.
to get the collective down in a light helicopter with little inertia in the blades following a catastrophic engine failure?
Years ago, low hours pilots were crashing R22s by throwing them into autorotation and messing it up, and investigation was showing that an auto wasn't required. The Robinson Safety Course now teaches that if the low rotor RPM warning horn goes off, you open the throttle and make sure you have an engine failure before you throw the machine into auto in a panic.
Think first. Don't do something stupid by acting too fast. BUT there are different ways of doing that, and depending on your emergency, you have different amounts of time in which to do it.
Enough food for thought there?
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Strange... I got completely the other end of the stick, Artist.
There's only one person that looks like a chestbeater (or another word beginning with C) everytime Chuck posts. And it's not Chuck.
There's only one person that looks like a chestbeater (or another word beginning with C) everytime Chuck posts. And it's not Chuck.
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His decision to reject was wrong, but his decision to post the nonsense in his last contribution knocks it into a cocked hat.
Zorst, would you be kind enough to clarify for me why my decision to safely reject a take off at the point in time that I rejected was wrong?
Are you suggesting that with sufficient room to stop ahead of me I should have kept accelerating to lift off speed and chanced flying a very heavy low performance airplane with an uncontrollable engine?
By the way regardless of my personality and or flying skills.... or in your opinion the lack thereof ....at least I have the self worth to post using my real name so when you see me walking around an airport you can say there goes that as.hole who posts on Pprune.
However I don't have that privilege with you because there is that problem of figuring out who Zorst is.
Zorst, would you be kind enough to clarify for me why my decision to safely reject a take off at the point in time that I rejected was wrong?
Are you suggesting that with sufficient room to stop ahead of me I should have kept accelerating to lift off speed and chanced flying a very heavy low performance airplane with an uncontrollable engine?
By the way regardless of my personality and or flying skills.... or in your opinion the lack thereof ....at least I have the self worth to post using my real name so when you see me walking around an airport you can say there goes that as.hole who posts on Pprune.
However I don't have that privilege with you because there is that problem of figuring out who Zorst is.
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Just to clear something up here, my referring to PPL's as somehow to stupid to understand these PDM issues was meant to be tounge in cheek and not to belittle PPL's .
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Just to clear something up here, my referring to PPL's as somehow to stupid to understand these PDM issues was meant to be tounge in cheek and not to belittle PPL's .
Right decision if you ask me, you obviously know or knew the aircraft and location you were in very well and took time and made decent decision and walked away. I definately think that 'doing it by the book' isn't always the best idea, no two situations are ever the same and hence the book cannot always be right. Talking or reading about something is very different to actually doing it.
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It seems to me that we have two schools of thought here.
I don't have anywhere near enough experience to contribute by critiquing Chuck's decision, although I thank him for sharing it.
Likewise, I can't begin to challenge Guppy's view either.
However, even with a few hours only, it seems to me that there is a paradox illstrated by
Given this data, I think that Chuck argues one case (and is here to tell the tale after taking that action) and Guppy argues another (which has logic and rationality.)
I am wondering if there is a bush flying pragmatism versus line operation desire for consistency perspective to their positions?
Before either Chuck or SNS beats me up here, I am not taking sides, just trying to understand what is driving the argument.
- Follow SOP
- Make experience based decision
I don't have anywhere near enough experience to contribute by critiquing Chuck's decision, although I thank him for sharing it.
Likewise, I can't begin to challenge Guppy's view either.
However, even with a few hours only, it seems to me that there is a paradox illstrated by
- The DC10 at O'Hare that augured in when the crew followed SOPS
- Many other events where following rigorous SOPS saved the day
Given this data, I think that Chuck argues one case (and is here to tell the tale after taking that action) and Guppy argues another (which has logic and rationality.)
I am wondering if there is a bush flying pragmatism versus line operation desire for consistency perspective to their positions?
Before either Chuck or SNS beats me up here, I am not taking sides, just trying to understand what is driving the argument.
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Interesting thread folks, although unfortunately it seems to have been spoiled somewhat by the usual PPRuNE Egoism.
I think it's a good idea to discuss these things and share experiences, good and bad. Perhaps we should consider making a dedicated thread, e.g. an "ILAFFT thread", perhaps made as a sticky, where we could all share these sorts of experiences and learn from each other?
Smithy
I think it's a good idea to discuss these things and share experiences, good and bad. Perhaps we should consider making a dedicated thread, e.g. an "ILAFFT thread", perhaps made as a sticky, where we could all share these sorts of experiences and learn from each other?
Smithy
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Excellent idea Smithy:
We can always wade through the " ego " thing because it is part of the DNA of most pilots.
My position on these issues is to discuss the way we do things in aviation.
I am of course getting past the time in my life where I can be a part of the segment of aviation that sits behind the controls of commercial aircraft due to being time expired by age.
However I have been fortunate to have started in an era when aviation was just really beginning to evolve into the concept of multi crew SOP's we now have in the airline end of flying.
Remember SOP's were put into place by trial and error and designed to enable crews to fly with each other in specific aircraft and specific flight regimes.
These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....
.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.
I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.
What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.
Anyhow I am willing to discuss these issues and maybe, just maybe pass on something that may save some poor souls ass some day.
Don't worry about hurting my feelings because I am not that old yet that I have become unable to defend myself.....you know that saying...
...I'm to old a cat to be screwed by a kitten?
We can always wade through the " ego " thing because it is part of the DNA of most pilots.
My position on these issues is to discuss the way we do things in aviation.
I am of course getting past the time in my life where I can be a part of the segment of aviation that sits behind the controls of commercial aircraft due to being time expired by age.
However I have been fortunate to have started in an era when aviation was just really beginning to evolve into the concept of multi crew SOP's we now have in the airline end of flying.
Remember SOP's were put into place by trial and error and designed to enable crews to fly with each other in specific aircraft and specific flight regimes.
These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....
.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.
I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.
What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.
Anyhow I am willing to discuss these issues and maybe, just maybe pass on something that may save some poor souls ass some day.
Don't worry about hurting my feelings because I am not that old yet that I have become unable to defend myself.....you know that saying...
...I'm to old a cat to be screwed by a kitten?
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Chuck,
My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.
Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer. I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend. I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.
I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.
My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.
Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer. I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend. I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.
I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.
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Two schools.....
1. Below VR reject regardless.
2. 0 to xkts, stop for everything. xKts to the mark, stop for fires and failures. VR and above, take the problem into the air.
My reading, this falls into both camps. The aircraft was below reject. It then had a control function failure.
Chuck walked away. What's more, used the aeroplane again. Bonus.
As an aside, I try not to do anything stupid slowly either.
1. Below VR reject regardless.
2. 0 to xkts, stop for everything. xKts to the mark, stop for fires and failures. VR and above, take the problem into the air.
My reading, this falls into both camps. The aircraft was below reject. It then had a control function failure.
Chuck walked away. What's more, used the aeroplane again. Bonus.
As an aside, I try not to do anything stupid slowly either.
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frontlefthamster:
We , you and I can sort this out because your response is civil and polite.
In fact it will be to everyones benefit to sort this out and make it easy for everyone here to understand what my message was meant to be and why I feel the private pilot forum is just fine to discuss these issues.
So please allow me to respond to each part of your concerns.
Chuck,
My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.
Fair enough the example may seem to be poor because I related the story in to brief a manner for most here to really understand.......
......the main point that I was attempting to make was had I reacted in the manner all pilots are programmed to react when rejecting a take off is that to reduce power from take off power to zero power you move both throttles to idle at the same time in a twin engine aircraft......
When the throttle broke off it was still in my hand and therefore when the decision to reject was made habit and training would dictate that I would move both throttles to the idle position.......which would have resulted in one engine going from take off power to idle immediately and the one with no throttle attached to it would have still been at full power which would have resulted in immediate yaw into the dead engine with full power on the engine with no throttle control.
Taking that very short time to recognize that fact allowed me to shut down both engines together by using a combination of ignition off and idle cut off basically together.
Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer.
With all due respect it would not really have made any difference what kind of engine it was, when you shut off ignition and fuel it quits and that was what I wanted those two engines to do.
I had good cause to reject that take off and I was also in a speed range that dictated to reject was the best course of action.
But lets have a look at what I would have had to deal with had I chosen to accelerate to flying speed and become airborne.
First you must remember I was not flying an Airbus where all I had to do was step on the icon on the PFD to control yaw and fly the airplane by the numbers for an engine out take off and climb.
The PBY has a time limit of four minutes at full power and considering the x/wind and the climb profile I would have had to contend with to get enough altitude to safely deal with how to shut down and feather an engine that had no throttle connected to it my decision to reject that take off was correct.
I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend.
You have a valid point and by us continuing this discussion I'm betting there are not many here who are unable to understand the physics and the reason why the take off was rejected. Most here are pilots and most are smart enough to grasp basic airplane handling procedures and understand that doing things by rote without first trying to examine what is really happening can sometimes be a risky way to act.
Therefore I will once again suggest that had I acted by instinct and pulled both throttles back it would have been doing something stupid in that particular case.
I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.
You may well be correct....but we are into it now and it's to late to wish I had not started this.
I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.
I do not quite know how to respond to this as I am not sure what a " grown up, by invitation only, forum " is.
No offence meant, but I need time to think about your offer .
We , you and I can sort this out because your response is civil and polite.
In fact it will be to everyones benefit to sort this out and make it easy for everyone here to understand what my message was meant to be and why I feel the private pilot forum is just fine to discuss these issues.
So please allow me to respond to each part of your concerns.
Chuck,
My difficulty with this is that you made a very good point, but you illustrated it with a poor example.
Fair enough the example may seem to be poor because I related the story in to brief a manner for most here to really understand.......
......the main point that I was attempting to make was had I reacted in the manner all pilots are programmed to react when rejecting a take off is that to reduce power from take off power to zero power you move both throttles to idle at the same time in a twin engine aircraft......
When the throttle broke off it was still in my hand and therefore when the decision to reject was made habit and training would dictate that I would move both throttles to the idle position.......which would have resulted in one engine going from take off power to idle immediately and the one with no throttle attached to it would have still been at full power which would have resulted in immediate yaw into the dead engine with full power on the engine with no throttle control.
Taking that very short time to recognize that fact allowed me to shut down both engines together by using a combination of ignition off and idle cut off basically together.
Without knowing quite a lot more about the aircraft you were flying (means of powerplant control, the manner of the failure to the throttle, VMCG, etc), further critique is difficult, but the point remains that rejecting a takeoff without good cause is a regular killer.
With all due respect it would not really have made any difference what kind of engine it was, when you shut off ignition and fuel it quits and that was what I wanted those two engines to do.
I had good cause to reject that take off and I was also in a speed range that dictated to reject was the best course of action.
But lets have a look at what I would have had to deal with had I chosen to accelerate to flying speed and become airborne.
First you must remember I was not flying an Airbus where all I had to do was step on the icon on the PFD to control yaw and fly the airplane by the numbers for an engine out take off and climb.
The PBY has a time limit of four minutes at full power and considering the x/wind and the climb profile I would have had to contend with to get enough altitude to safely deal with how to shut down and feather an engine that had no throttle connected to it my decision to reject that take off was correct.
I think it's important to get that message across to some of those here who find this perhaps, in your words, beyond [their] ability to comprehend.
You have a valid point and by us continuing this discussion I'm betting there are not many here who are unable to understand the physics and the reason why the take off was rejected. Most here are pilots and most are smart enough to grasp basic airplane handling procedures and understand that doing things by rote without first trying to examine what is really happening can sometimes be a risky way to act.
Therefore I will once again suggest that had I acted by instinct and pulled both throttles back it would have been doing something stupid in that particular case.
I am also of the opinion that this should not be 'up for discussion'.
You may well be correct....but we are into it now and it's to late to wish I had not started this.
I would also agree this was the wrong forum to post that in. It might have gone down a lot better in Tech Log, or better still, why not join a proper grown up, but invitation-only, forum. PM me for details if you wish.
I do not quite know how to respond to this as I am not sure what a " grown up, by invitation only, forum " is.
No offence meant, but I need time to think about your offer .
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http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aai...1%20G-OJEM.pdf
See section 1.1 of this well known crash. You can't second guess a non-standard action which turns out well. Or put it another way:
Being wrong and alive beats being right and dead.
See section 1.1 of this well known crash. You can't second guess a non-standard action which turns out well. Or put it another way:
Being wrong and alive beats being right and dead.
V1, Vr and V2 were developed as part of the certification basis for civil transport category aircraft. The main factors behind this triad were accelerate/stop distance and some guarantee of a reasonable climb gradient with one engine failing at or after V1.
The Canso/Catalina is a military aircraft. While quite capable, anybody who imagines that its engine out climb gradient meets civil transport certification criteria needs to have another look at the paperwork.
As far as I'm concerned, not quite enough runway/stopway to complete a reject is not nearly as bad as finding out in the air that you can't make it back to the runway.
The Canso/Catalina is a military aircraft. While quite capable, anybody who imagines that its engine out climb gradient meets civil transport certification criteria needs to have another look at the paperwork.
As far as I'm concerned, not quite enough runway/stopway to complete a reject is not nearly as bad as finding out in the air that you can't make it back to the runway.
Usual caveats here- not a multi engine pilot, don't fly heavies. However I do work with a crew when I fly a balloon and yes we do have something like SOPs at least for the take-off. After that it's solo pilot until the retrieve.
I don't want to comment on whether the decision was right or wrong. I just want to say how strongly I agree that common sense has a huge place (or should have a huge place) in flying. How many people let themselves make stupid decisions because they have been hammered into doing it by the book? And to get back to the poster's original point - how often do you need to do anything in a hurry? If the aeroplane, or glider, or ballon or whatever is ahead of you and you are reacting instantly then you are not far short of panicking, and that is what will kill you. Like he says, slow down! Take a deep breath and THINK before you move. And if the decision you make enables you to be around later to argue about it, then it was probably the right one
Remember SOP's were put into place by trial and error and designed to enable crews to fly with each other in specific aircraft and specific flight regimes.
These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....
.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.
I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.
What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.
These SOP's are designed to take advantage of the machinery they are written for and to achieve the best all around end result.....
.....they are not however written stone nor are they always the best actions to take, because occassionally one must be creative and do something that will save your day that are not written in the SOP's.
I may be old fashioned and even wrong in many of my methods and my decisions regarding how to fly aircraft, but for me it has worked well enough for me to have survived without wrecking any flying devices for a long time.
What does bother me is the mindset that is molded into doing everything by the book with no room for using common sense when it is required.