Light plane missing in blizzard in Scotland (Merged)
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“So, hypothetically, what are the chances of surviving a PA32 forced landing on the side of a Scottish mountain, regardless of weather?”
If you were at 10,000 ft over the mountains on a gin clear summers day your chances of surviving the force landing would be 90%+ assuming you were in reasonable practice. This would not involve hitting the side of a mountain, as obviously you would see it and chose a better location.
Rod1
If you were at 10,000 ft over the mountains on a gin clear summers day your chances of surviving the force landing would be 90%+ assuming you were in reasonable practice. This would not involve hitting the side of a mountain, as obviously you would see it and chose a better location.
Rod1
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However, your chances of surviving CFIT because you can't even see the mountain are even more slim!
None of us know yet why Gary hit the side of that mountain, but given the weather there on that day his likelihood of having a problem was dramatically increased and his potential for surviving that problem dramatically decreased.
I knew the pilot, and I liked him - we would chat and pass the time of day, even if we were not "mates" as such. I therefore have no particular desire to criticise him. However, I also knew him well enough to know that he was a risk taker and that I am not alone in thinking that there was a certain inevitability to this sad event.
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A forced landing on the side of a Scottish mountain should be very survivable. Landing on the upslope should mean your ground speed is very low - with fixed gear it will either tear off or spin or tumble the aircraft but with a bit of skill I'd be very disappointed not to get out of the wreckage in one piece. A lot of the time you can virtually hover of the peaks but it the wind in that strong then it may not ease sufficiently on the ground not to tumble you.
Of course surviving means having shelter and good clothing. That day was pretty nasty even on the coast, flying over the massif would have been horrid, the up and downdrafts alone would have caused real difficulties. I'll be interested to see at what height the wreck is.
The Norwegian who was rescued from his C150 when he flew it into the base of Mount Keen was nearly 1000' below the summit. He was so low that the slope was pretty mild and with doubtless a last minute pull-up the airframe wasn't badly damaged.
Forced landings in these areas are not about finding a decent field, they are about arriving at the crash with the minimum energy.
Of course surviving means having shelter and good clothing. That day was pretty nasty even on the coast, flying over the massif would have been horrid, the up and downdrafts alone would have caused real difficulties. I'll be interested to see at what height the wreck is.
The Norwegian who was rescued from his C150 when he flew it into the base of Mount Keen was nearly 1000' below the summit. He was so low that the slope was pretty mild and with doubtless a last minute pull-up the airframe wasn't badly damaged.
Forced landings in these areas are not about finding a decent field, they are about arriving at the crash with the minimum energy.
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I had planned to spend last weekend in Glasgow, Scotland - a colleague who had been very good to me was retiring, big party etc...
The plan was from Plymouth to Cumbernauld with an ETA at around 1730 LCL, hotel + transport booked, eager newly qualified PPL friend coming along for the "experience".
If Cumbernauld had been on the other side of the trough (that caught the Lance in the Cairngorms earlier in the day) in relatively ice-free air then I probably would have gone and taken the small chance of an engine failure while crossing over the tops, as IO540 states, this is the essence of IFR . However, by the time I was due to arrive there the trough had passed further South and the worst weather was right around my destination options.
As Cumbernauld has no Instrument procedure I could have gone to Glasgow or Prestwick if things looked impossible for a visual approach when I got up to the central belt, but by that time I would have descended from clear air (say Fl100-FL160) to be at a couple of thousand feet looking around for an 800m tarmac strip in freezing conditions (while being tossed around in a strong blustery wind, chunks of ice being flung off the prop, having to deice the windscreen every couple of minutes and unable to extend my speedbrakes (not advisable in icing conditions) and even with my TKS deicing I may not have been able to climb to accept arrival instructions for Glasgow. Even going straight for Glasgow or Prestwick from the outset would have had its risks.
Options diminish very rapidly in weather as poor as this.
Crossing over the top of it is one level of risk but ascending or descending through it, even with deicing and O2 puts a whole different perspective on things.
I didn't go.
As somebody already commented early in the thread, Saturday was not a day for flying light aircraft in Scotland.
RIP,
SB
The plan was from Plymouth to Cumbernauld with an ETA at around 1730 LCL, hotel + transport booked, eager newly qualified PPL friend coming along for the "experience".
If Cumbernauld had been on the other side of the trough (that caught the Lance in the Cairngorms earlier in the day) in relatively ice-free air then I probably would have gone and taken the small chance of an engine failure while crossing over the tops, as IO540 states, this is the essence of IFR . However, by the time I was due to arrive there the trough had passed further South and the worst weather was right around my destination options.
As Cumbernauld has no Instrument procedure I could have gone to Glasgow or Prestwick if things looked impossible for a visual approach when I got up to the central belt, but by that time I would have descended from clear air (say Fl100-FL160) to be at a couple of thousand feet looking around for an 800m tarmac strip in freezing conditions (while being tossed around in a strong blustery wind, chunks of ice being flung off the prop, having to deice the windscreen every couple of minutes and unable to extend my speedbrakes (not advisable in icing conditions) and even with my TKS deicing I may not have been able to climb to accept arrival instructions for Glasgow. Even going straight for Glasgow or Prestwick from the outset would have had its risks.
Options diminish very rapidly in weather as poor as this.
Crossing over the top of it is one level of risk but ascending or descending through it, even with deicing and O2 puts a whole different perspective on things.
I didn't go.
As somebody already commented early in the thread, Saturday was not a day for flying light aircraft in Scotland.
RIP,
SB
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According to Flyer the pilot got lost on his flight the previous day (to Carlisle) and had to call D&D. I am starting to get the feeling this accident may have a sting in the tail…
Rod1
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Having read the thread from start to finish just now it is interesting to see the 'facts' change. It appears to be fact that
1 - The aircraft was G-Reg
2 - It was a non-turbocharged PA-32R-300 (not deiced either)
3 - The pilot has a 'based on' FAA PPL (no IR) with a no night flight restriction. It is unclear if the pilot had a UK IR or IMCr.
4 - There was no airspace restriction for a climb up to FL195 at his location (have not looked at a real chart this could be wrong)
It seems reasonable to assume
1 - The pilot still did not have an IR/IMC
2 - Given the lack of IR and turbocharging it is unlikely the pilot had O2
3 - Given the above, the pilot would be unlikely to have planned to operate above the clouds at say FL130-150
It seems very odd that
1 - A pilot unlikley to have an IR (removed comment re previous ferry experience) would be planning a transatlantic trip (maybe he was meeting a ferry pilot in Wick)
2 - A pilot would plan a VFR or IFR with no rating flight through the mountains in some very bad surface weather conditions.
1 - The aircraft was G-Reg
2 - It was a non-turbocharged PA-32R-300 (not deiced either)
3 - The pilot has a 'based on' FAA PPL (no IR) with a no night flight restriction. It is unclear if the pilot had a UK IR or IMCr.
4 - There was no airspace restriction for a climb up to FL195 at his location (have not looked at a real chart this could be wrong)
It seems reasonable to assume
1 - The pilot still did not have an IR/IMC
2 - Given the lack of IR and turbocharging it is unlikely the pilot had O2
3 - Given the above, the pilot would be unlikely to have planned to operate above the clouds at say FL130-150
It seems very odd that
1 - A pilot unlikley to have an IR (removed comment re previous ferry experience) would be planning a transatlantic trip (maybe he was meeting a ferry pilot in Wick)
2 - A pilot would plan a VFR or IFR with no rating flight through the mountains in some very bad surface weather conditions.
Last edited by mm_flynn; 8th Apr 2008 at 13:56. Reason: Fixed factual error on pilot qualifications
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1 - A pilot with no IR (or previous crossing experience) would be planning a transatlantic trip (maybe he was meeting a ferry pilot in Wick)
(assuming no change of ownership since a 2005 incident)
I knew the pilot, and I liked him - we would chat and pass the time of day, even if we were not "mates" as such. I therefore have no particular desire to criticise him. However, I also knew him well enough to know that he was a risk taker and that I am not alone in thinking that there was a certain inevitability to this sad event.
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PKPF I agree with you. Why are these forums always infested with "wait for the AAIB report and don't speculate" comments? As long as there is nothing derogatory or insulting directed to those involved or their families, and no confidences are broken, I am at a loss to see just why commenting is so taboo.
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I should have looked the owner up in G-info. I would have noticed that the owner was not the pilot. Also, that would suggest the qualifications reported for the owner in 2005 are not those of the pilot. Hence, it is unclear if the pilot did or did not have an IMCr or UK-IR.
scooterboy
Your analysis is interesting and I'm not surprised you cancelled your flight. However, the aircraft in question was bound for Wick, which has an IAP over the sea, and is in an area of low traffic density. That's very different from a 800 m strip with no approach aids in the middle of the Scottish TMA.
I'm not suggesting that a flight over the weather into Wick would have been easy, but I don't believe it would have been impossible. Until we know more about the route and level at which the flight was planned and executed, I don't see how we can second-guess the weather decision.
Your analysis is interesting and I'm not surprised you cancelled your flight. However, the aircraft in question was bound for Wick, which has an IAP over the sea, and is in an area of low traffic density. That's very different from a 800 m strip with no approach aids in the middle of the Scottish TMA.
I'm not suggesting that a flight over the weather into Wick would have been easy, but I don't believe it would have been impossible. Until we know more about the route and level at which the flight was planned and executed, I don't see how we can second-guess the weather decision.
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Hi Bookworm,
I agree that the circumstances of our flights are a bit different but they also involved crossing the same bit of weather albeit a few hours later and in a different place. I also had the option of going to Glasgow or Prestwick and following the instrument procedure but also felt this hazardous in the prevailing weather conditions.
It seems that the pilot in question held no IR or IMC and was making the trip in a non-deiced aircraft. If there were going to be any insurmountable areas of cloud (CB) they would have been close to the trough which was at around the accident area at around the accident time (I was watching the weather closely that morning hoping for good news). ATC Analysis may show whether the pilot concerned attempted to go over the top of the weather (the only feasible way to get to Wick on that day in a light single deiced or not) and entered cloud with a high chance of finding an embedded CB and freezing precip causing sudden severe icing or whether he soldiered on through it, but icing seems likely to have been a factor. My TKS deicing buys me a little time (to turn around climb or descend in light or moderate icing conditions), in my opinion severe icing conditions were almost certainly present in the region of the trough as it passed Southwards. This is the part that really scared me and made me bin the flight.
SB
I agree that the circumstances of our flights are a bit different but they also involved crossing the same bit of weather albeit a few hours later and in a different place. I also had the option of going to Glasgow or Prestwick and following the instrument procedure but also felt this hazardous in the prevailing weather conditions.
It seems that the pilot in question held no IR or IMC and was making the trip in a non-deiced aircraft. If there were going to be any insurmountable areas of cloud (CB) they would have been close to the trough which was at around the accident area at around the accident time (I was watching the weather closely that morning hoping for good news). ATC Analysis may show whether the pilot concerned attempted to go over the top of the weather (the only feasible way to get to Wick on that day in a light single deiced or not) and entered cloud with a high chance of finding an embedded CB and freezing precip causing sudden severe icing or whether he soldiered on through it, but icing seems likely to have been a factor. My TKS deicing buys me a little time (to turn around climb or descend in light or moderate icing conditions), in my opinion severe icing conditions were almost certainly present in the region of the trough as it passed Southwards. This is the part that really scared me and made me bin the flight.
SB
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After accidents like this it is often the case that most of us make comments and speculate, not in any form of disrespect for the lost pilot or his family but indeed in the hope that someone may learn and hopefully not make the same mistake( if a mistake was made in the first place?) for those of you that know me it would be wrong of me to report on this BB the facts that I know. However I would like to pass on my respects and thoughts to the deceased, his family and also to my colleague who was talking to the flight shortly before contact was lost. In the fullness of time the facts will be reported from the appropriate authorities and hopefully from that we will all learn. We all go through life making mistakes, but more often the case we escape with no more than a scratch or two, gaining along the way a huge ammount of learning!!!. With that in mind I for one will be happy to continue to listen to the speculation and reason that may have lead to this fatality. We must all understand though that flight over inhospitable and high terrain in wintery conditions will always have its hazards, it is often not possible to climb above the cloud as at this altitude as in the wrong conditions ice build up will be a real hazard.
in my opinion severe icing conditions were almost certainly present in the region of the trough as it passed Southwards
While there may be the odd CB sticking a few thousand feet above, I would expect them to be well scattered in clear air, and clearly glaciated. I can imagine picking up a lot of ice in a climb in such an area, or in a descent. But I can't imagine someone icing up in an embedded CB.
You may think this is academic but if it turns out that the pilot couldn't choose to fly above the weather because of the letter at the start of his registration, I think there may be some interesting issues raised.
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No.
A pilot should know his capabilities, and those of his aircraft, before departure. He should take them into account in deciding whether to depart, in selecting a route, and in balancing risk versus the benefit of completing the flight.
A pilot restricted by his qualifications, or the aircraft he flies, must bear those restrictions in mind before setting off; the restrictions are not a cause for catastrophe, though poor decisions or bad judgment may be.
IO540's earlier rant warrants a short reply; it demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the work that is done in the UK by both a large number of CAA staff who exercise their powers to administer and enforce regulation, and a very small number of FAA staff, who have no powers to speak of, and have no interest in small aircraft other than in a very few limited circumstances. I deal regularly with both sets of people, and I'm very glad to confirm that IO540 is not firing on all cylinders, on this one.
A pilot should know his capabilities, and those of his aircraft, before departure. He should take them into account in deciding whether to depart, in selecting a route, and in balancing risk versus the benefit of completing the flight.
A pilot restricted by his qualifications, or the aircraft he flies, must bear those restrictions in mind before setting off; the restrictions are not a cause for catastrophe, though poor decisions or bad judgment may be.
IO540's earlier rant warrants a short reply; it demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the work that is done in the UK by both a large number of CAA staff who exercise their powers to administer and enforce regulation, and a very small number of FAA staff, who have no powers to speak of, and have no interest in small aircraft other than in a very few limited circumstances. I deal regularly with both sets of people, and I'm very glad to confirm that IO540 is not firing on all cylinders, on this one.
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IO540's earlier rant warrants a short reply; it demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the work that is done in the UK by both a large number of CAA staff who exercise their powers to administer and enforce regulation, and a very small number of FAA staff, who have no powers to speak of, and have no interest in small aircraft other than in a very few limited circumstances. I deal regularly with both sets of people, and I'm very glad to confirm that IO540 is not firing on all cylinders, on this one.
The evidence for the level of enforcement is on their website. Do a search on 'prosecutions' and you will find a few PDF lists. This is how it should be; the vast majority of pilots obey the regs.
I would agree the FAA does little enforcement in Europe (of pilots; they do regularly turn over FAA maintenance facilities over here) but the CAA does just as little.
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IO540,
The folk at Kingsway do a lot more than pushing through the odd case in front of a magistrate. I don't need pdf files, I ring IW and talk direct. Their action against those engaged in unlawful public transport is a great deal more significant than you say, and does not depend upon complaints from other organisations. Sorry, on this one you need to concede that you don't know what you're talking about. That said, Enforcement, of necessity, keep many of their cards very close to their chests.
The folk at Kingsway do a lot more than pushing through the odd case in front of a magistrate. I don't need pdf files, I ring IW and talk direct. Their action against those engaged in unlawful public transport is a great deal more significant than you say, and does not depend upon complaints from other organisations. Sorry, on this one you need to concede that you don't know what you're talking about. That said, Enforcement, of necessity, keep many of their cards very close to their chests.
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Well I am delighted that the discussion has been narrowed down essentially to the pursuit of illegal AOC ops, Mr Hamster. I have been in contact with IW too 
Anyway, illegal PT has no bearing on people ending up in mountains.
Anyway, illegal PT has no bearing on people ending up in mountains.
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And the question of relative activity of the CAA and FAA in the UK GA sector has no relevance to an accident in the UK, in a G Reg aircraft, flown by a UK national, with a UK licence (which we are still not clear if it had an IMCr or IR attached to it).
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IMHO having witnessed the last moments of this flight first hand(Skiing not controlling) and as a practising ATCO AND not knowing the background to the flight my first reaction was one of disbelief that anyone was there intentionally in those conditions; they were indeed extreme - vis var 25-100m, solid cloud with prolonged hail and snow showers passing through on a NE airstream. God only knows the events leading up to the tragic ending; over to AAIB. What I can say having some experience of the "industry" is it is not an experience that I would wish to repeat for a long time; hopefully never again!
My heart goes out to the pilots family and friends.
As soon as I heard the engine noise (which incidentally, sounded perfectly normal) my blood ran cold. Strangely I tried to think of ludicrously irrational reasons as to why the situation was all OK, yet knowing that the aircraft was probably doomed.
He passed overhead at what I estimate was well below 200' agl on roughly a southerly track(very briefly made out a shape through the clag!) heading to what I know was gently rising terrain above the Ski area. My location was about 100m E of the Cairngorm Ptarmigan restaurant which sits at an elev amsl of 1097m and I reckon the A/C passed just to the west of my position between the building and me.
Retrospectivly I reckon CFIT almost definitely. If he did see the terrain it would have been too late to reconfig. and lessen any impact. A substantial tailwind component probably compounded this situation(but I am no expert!).
I did listen for any impact after first sighting but given the following wind it wasn't surprising that I heard nothing!
It was only later that my worst fears were realised when speaking to Ski Patrol staff and they informed me that a Light A/C was indeed missing at which point I told them of my sighting.
I only hope that it was of some assistance in eventually locating the crash site.
RIP.
My heart goes out to the pilots family and friends.
As soon as I heard the engine noise (which incidentally, sounded perfectly normal) my blood ran cold. Strangely I tried to think of ludicrously irrational reasons as to why the situation was all OK, yet knowing that the aircraft was probably doomed.
He passed overhead at what I estimate was well below 200' agl on roughly a southerly track(very briefly made out a shape through the clag!) heading to what I know was gently rising terrain above the Ski area. My location was about 100m E of the Cairngorm Ptarmigan restaurant which sits at an elev amsl of 1097m and I reckon the A/C passed just to the west of my position between the building and me.
Retrospectivly I reckon CFIT almost definitely. If he did see the terrain it would have been too late to reconfig. and lessen any impact. A substantial tailwind component probably compounded this situation(but I am no expert!).
I did listen for any impact after first sighting but given the following wind it wasn't surprising that I heard nothing!
It was only later that my worst fears were realised when speaking to Ski Patrol staff and they informed me that a Light A/C was indeed missing at which point I told them of my sighting.
I only hope that it was of some assistance in eventually locating the crash site.
RIP.
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But moggiee, ........... go and read the ANO.
Lurking! You know not to whom you are speaking. Moggiee probably has a FAR better idea of the contents of the ANO than many on here.Angus, that cannot have been a pleasant experience for you, thank you for posting it.