Light plane missing in blizzard in Scotland (Merged)

[BigEndBob]

I said this was going to happen.
RIP Gary.

[XL319]

We have to remember it was reported that the pilot was heading south, so my theory is that he decided to turn around when the weather became severe. Something which an experienced pilot would do. My thoughts are with his family at this sad time.

[moggiee]

Angusmunros - thank you for your input. Sadly, it pretty much confirms what most of who knew Gary expected.

As an expert eyewitness, your evidence will no doubt go quite some way towards helping the AAIB put all the pieces together.

[neilmac]

Every pilot should read Angusmunros account

Angusmunros account:

Very powerful and honest account, can only imagine what went through the Pilots thoughts. But AMs account should be a lesson into a pilots worse case scenerio off what ifs!! Forums are here to discuss points and leave the true investigations to the experts. I myself by the grace of God 15 years ago as a solo U/T PPL sent of on his qualifying cross country almost hit Duncansby Head southbound descending out of cloud which engulfed me, believe you me I thought I was going to die. Landed Wick cloud base 500ft with a Pan, still wanna hit the FI who sent me solo!!
RIP and thoughts with his family and friends at this time


NM

[scooter boy]

Angusmonros,
Thanks for your input. CFIT while trying to maintain VMC in near impossible conditions would seem to be the gist, but the AAIB will confirm or refute.
A tragic loss.

SB

[mad_jock]

Just to throw some local experence into the discussion.

With a northly 15 knts at INS I would expect some pretty horrible mountain wave around that area getting towards +- 1000ft/min if not more.

Sub 5.0A - 2.5A in Deeside would have been pretty horrible for rotar.


Over the Cairngorms it can be quite deceptive with slots between the hill tops and cloud. With a northerly it would be quite possible to have 300ft of slot between the clouds and the tops. If you routed Glen Esk, Driesh over into Deeside it might not look to bad as the air will have lost alot of its moisture on its first lift at Cairngorm / Macdui if you didn't know there was going to be a wall of cloud in the Spey valley it would be very easy to presume the conditions were similar to deeside. It would have been quite good fun up up to that point.

Sad thing is if he had bitten the bullet and climbed on a northerly track he was already past the peaks and proberly would only have had 3-4 mins of IMC while benefiting from the lift from the mountain wave before breaking clear of it.

Its not the first time pilots (myself included) have been caught out by the conditions in the area which intially look quite good but quicky turn to poo.

I wouldn't be suprised if he crashed very close to where the american planes went in.

[moggiee]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/...ds/7336662.stm


Gary Key

It seems more "real" with a name and picture.

[IO540]

If he was below radar in his last moments, I doubt the AAIB will have much more clue as to what happened. Many AAIB reports on GA accidents (and I have read many) are little more than informed speculation. That's why this kind of discussion is valuable.

[bookworm]

A pilot should know his capabilities, and those of his aircraft, before departure. He should take them into account in deciding whether to depart, in selecting a route, and in balancing risk versus the benefit of completing the flight.

Of course. Pilots certainly have that responsibility too.

A pilot restricted by his qualifications, or the aircraft he flies, must bear those restrictions in mind before setting off; the restrictions are not a cause for catastrophe, though poor decisions or bad judgment may be.

It's not quite as simple as that. Regulators, who are effectively safety managers, also have responsibilities. In my opinion, there is reason to question the efficacy of any regulation that encourages a pilot to adopt a plan that is legal but less safe and reject one which is safer but prohibited by regulation. The balance of overall risk is often difficult to assess in issues of training and licence privilege, but that doesn't invalidate the question.

If the authorities make the instrument rating more difficult and expensive to acquire than is justified by safety requirements, then those authorities must take some of the responsibility for accidents where pilots without valid IRs have come to grief in circumstances where they were capable of executing the flight safely but unable to do so because of regulation. On the flip-side, those who argue for an easier IR might bear some responsibility for the accidents involving pilots who attempted to exercise the privileges of an IR but who came to grief because of insufficient training.

This accident may or may not be relevant to that debate. It may be that the pilot was licensed to fly above the weather but chose not to do so. It may be that the pilot would have come to grief anyway -- though I stick to my assertion that a flight over the weather on a day like that was vastly lower risk than trying to go through it, and that that risk was reasonable in the circumstances of the flight. It may even be that the pilot elected to fly above the weather but some failure brought him down anyway. But this accident may also offer useful evidence to inform the debate that responsible safety managers should be engaged in.

[Fuji Abound]

If the authorities make the instrument rating more difficult and expensive to acquire than is justified by safety requirements, then those authorities must take some of the responsibility for accidents where pilots without valid IRs have come to grief in circumstances where they were capable of executing the flight safely but unable to do so because of regulation.

Well said.

If I didnt have an IR but conditions were such that the only way of ensuring the continued safety of the flight was to climb in CAS I would declare a pan and and tell AT that I was climbing into CAS without further thought.

[Cactus99]

Around the crash site, there is no controlled airspace (EGPE ATZ) being the closest at around 20 nm or so. It is all open FIR, therefor not preventing any climb or lateral movement to avoid WX.

I think it would be wrong to assume there was no alternative route but over the Cairngorms, a much safer (much lower MSA) exists to the east towards Dundee, Aberdeen and then onto Wick, with the obvious advantages of ABZ radar for most of that route.

The A9 valley (5 NM to West of crash site) was another very obvious low level route which would have avoided the very worst of the WX, and kept him well clear of the mountains with excellent line features to take him safely north towards the lower ground.

IMHO there was no reason why the flight should have been where it was, flying in probably the worst weather conditions in the UK on that particular day.

We all have to RESPECT the big lumps of granite, especially on days like that. They take no prisoners!!

[mm_flynn]

Originally Posted by IO540

If he was below radar in his last moments, I doubt the AAIB will have much more clue as to what happened

There are a couple of facts the AAIB will dig out which could help illuminate the issues.

1 - What were the pilot's qualifications
2 - At what altitude had the pilot planned to fly (At least was there indication of a plan to go over the weather - it is would be surprising if someone planned to fly above FL100 and not use a radar service, or at least painting Mode C - even in Northern Scotland)
3 - If, as has been implied in this thread, the pilot was in radio contact there will be some indication of what his intentions were and how they might have changed (due to weather, equipment, etc).
4 - Is the Flyer rumour correct that the plane (and by implication the pilot) was temporarily unsure of position the previous day? Would that have any bearing on the mind set of the pilot?
5 - What was the overall context of the flight (i.e. was it the start of a transatlantic journey, was there some 'compelling need' to be in Wick).

I am always surprised at incidents where pilots fly low level VFR in mountains during weather in which there is a substantial risk of encountering proper IMC. While this is only a possible explanation in this case, it seems certain to have been the case in the North Wales crash recently discussed and the Seneca that went down in the French Alps. I worry about what context caused the pilot to make the decision and what I need to be aware of to make sure that someday it isn't me being debated on this board.

[gasax]

Interesting picture. The weather just ot eh south of Aberdeen was significantly worst. Most of the time at least half the horizon was obscured. It would probably have been possible to maintain VFR given 90 degree plus changes of direction from the planned course on the coast.

Just a couple of miles inland this was not the case.

The central massif is a major chunk of high ground and most of the time it creates both its own conditions and delinates differing weather. In the usual SW airstream it is pretty common to have good flying conditions on the east side of the massif and 8/8 cloud on the west.

On the day in question there were significant squalls making their way south right across the massif. There may not have been pure wave but there would have been really nasty turbulence up to at least FL60 and in places a lot higher. Approaching the northern flank of the massif the weather would have been 'piling' up on the windward face and probably pretty much solid low cloud, squalls and snow which ties in with the observed conditions at Cairngorm.

A point to bear in mind though is that the weather shadow from the massif quite often allows you to fly almost up the windward edge. In settled conditions this often means there is a clearly defined edge to the cloud.
Now on the day that was not the case but conditions downwind (i.e. to the south) would have been significantly better than those to the north. Classic conditions to sucker people into continuing and possibly explaining the about course?

[IO540]

That CB tops out at FL100, no more.

[mad_jock]

PKPF I was basing it on my experences ferrying planes for maint down and back to DND from INV 1-2 times a week for 18months.

I was either don't go or A9. Did the east coast a couple times and ended up at sub 500ft dodging ****e hawks. At least with the A9 you have a chance if the donk goes and you can follow the road to stop you getting caught in blind glens

[stocker]

one of my mates was up on the hill watching the wreckage being removed on a piste-basher. He reckons impact was nose first and estimated the impact point to be less than a couple hundred metres from the Ptarmigan restaraunt which was pretty full due to the poor weather and skiers taking shelter, close to the tourist route up to the top of Cairngorm.(speculation of course as I did not see it firsthand)

Thankfully no one else was involved.

[stocker]

I would just like to add a comment to cactus99 about routing along A9. This is not a good idea during this type of weather as the road passes through a very high pass at Drumochter (approx 1000ft) where you have Munroes (hills of 3000ft +) in very close proximity, less than a mile at the narrowist point. The pass is quite often clagged in.

[IO540]

Thankfully no one else was involved.

Pretty unlikely for somebody else to be involved. Last unrelated ground fatal caused by powered aircraft in the UK was Lockerbie...

[stocker]

Regardless of previous statistics you have to admit that it was a close call.

[mad_jock]

Its maybe not a wave but its more like a stream hitting a weir and getting deflected up sharply. the resulting flow undulates a couple of times befor dampening out.

In this case when it does happen it usually can't be really felt south of the campsies

It almost seems like a right of passage to the instructors up north. The old hands who have moved on warn them about what can happen. Three months later in the pub you listen to the next instructor to discover that a C172 can fly with ice hanging off the spars to past the door. And you can go up at 700ft/min while at idle and Vne. And if you poo yourself then you better wait for the follow through when it starts taking you down at 1000ft/min at max power and best rate climb speed.

And the most important lesson that flying IFR in IMC in a PA38 or C172 over the Cairngorms really is a F***ing stupid idea.