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Rossair accident in 2017 - training and checking assessment

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Rossair accident in 2017 - training and checking assessment

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Old 19th Jul 2018, 09:24
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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the left seat pilot

The pilot in the left seat was the former chief pilot Bruce Hartwig Flight School.

There is an ongoing legal process involving numerous regulatory bodies, certifying agencies, tertiary education funders and Bruce Hartwig Flying School; the substance of which is that BHFS failed to provide govt funded Batchelor of Aviation course modules, falsified records and claimed monies from individual pilots who are contesting the $100,000 bill's they now have.

This action had been going on for years and culminated recently in two weeks in court only to be adjourned for six weeks for more discovery.

Throughout this CASA has been appraised yet is incredibly not involved in the proceedings saying that are not involved.
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Old 19th Jul 2018, 18:14
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Originally Posted by Maisk Rotum
The pilot in the left seat was the former chief pilot Bruce Hartwig Flight School.

There is an ongoing legal process involving numerous regulatory bodies, certifying agencies, tertiary education funders and Bruce Hartwig Flying School; the substance of which is that BHFS failed to provide govt funded Batchelor of Aviation course modules, falsified records and claimed monies from individual pilots who are contesting the $100,000 bill's they now have.

This action had been going on for years and culminated recently in two weeks in court only to be adjourned for six weeks for more discovery.

Throughout this CASA has been appraised yet is incredibly not involved in the proceedings saying that are not involved.
Wasn’t the gentleman in the left hand seat the CP at Hartwig Air, a charter company that is a sister company to the Bruce Hartwig Flying School?

If the legal proceedings you describe are ongoing, how is it that BHFS can advertise a partnership with RMIT and offer “fee help available”? Surely the Education Minister would / should have something to say on the matter if public money is involved?
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Old 19th Jul 2018, 21:18
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Clearly it would have been the Right seat pilot who was conducting the training of the Left seat pilot.
But the Right seat pilot was "...under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft..." by "...a flying operations inspector from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority."

Was the primary purpose of the flight to undergo a proficiency check of an inductee pilot, or conduct an assessment of the Chief Pilot for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft? Was the flight being directed by the pilot in the Right hand seat, or the FOI?

I tend to agree with your response, but I have known of at least one FOI who would disagree with your opinion and his Log Book would prove that.
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Old 19th Jul 2018, 22:31
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Originally Posted by tail wheel
But the Right seat pilot was "...under assessment for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft..." by "...a flying operations inspector from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority."

Was the primary purpose of the flight to undergo a proficiency check of an inductee pilot, or conduct an assessment of the Chief Pilot for the company training and checking role for Cessna 441 aircraft? Was the flight being directed by the pilot in the Right hand seat, or the FOI?

I tend to agree with your response, but I have known of at least one FOI who would disagree with your opinion and his Log Book would prove that.
As I understand it, the CP was being assessed whilst conducting the functions of an Examiner/Check Pilot during a real Prof Check/IPC (ie. candidate in other operating seat was not operating with a valid Prof Check/IPC for the operation type) for the purposes of the CP gaining either a testing endorsement on their Flight Examiner Rating (or 61.040) OR a CAO 82.0 Company Check Pilot approval. The CASA Inspector conducting the assessment was seated in row 1 with no access to flight controls.

This is how the activity being undertaken was described to me; however I have no direct knowledge, and given the bizarre nature of the aforementioned, hope to be corrected.

If it were the case:
1. How can it be argued that either Pilot at the controls were qualified to be conducting the activity being undertaken?
2. If CASA were unable to provide a qualified SME to act as candidate occupying a control seat and assuming PIC responsibilities for the conduct of the assessment, why would you not engage the services of a suitably qualified industry Flight Examiner to occupy the candidate control seat and act as pseudo candidate under test? CASA Inspectorate then safely occupies an observers seat.

This would not only strike me as the only legal option but certainly the safest.

Last edited by FOI; 19th Jul 2018 at 23:00.
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Old 19th Jul 2018, 23:45
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If CASA were unable to provide a qualified SME to act as candidate occupying a control seat and assuming PIC responsibilities for the conduct of the assessment, why would you not engage the services of a suitably qualified industry Flight Examiner to occupy the candidate control seat and act as pseudo candidate under test? CASA Inspectorate then safely occupies an observers seat.
FOI
I am led to believe (but I am in no way certain) that there was training booked for the Chief Pilot with an industry expert flight examiner to get some C&T principles covered off. This was cancelled when the assessing FOI offered to manage the assessment as it was flown to save Rossair some time and money. I know SG was a CASA SME on type but I also have a feeling he was himself an ex Rossair pilot (not sure if this is correct however).
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 05:46
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FOI is absolutely right, and I would guess future litigants may well press this point. CASA working outside the envelope, so to speak.
The days when CASA Inspectors could make decisions in the field to help operators are gone forever. Much as some of the 'good guys' in CASA (there are a few) would like to be helpful, the fully legal option is the only choice.
Expect yet more CASA limitations on how training can be conducted, and by whom, to follow this tragedy.
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 09:01
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Originally Posted by Mach E Avelli
Expect yet more CASA limitations on how training can be conducted, and by whom, to follow this tragedy.
Folks,
I could nominate more than one gung-ho FOI, (and their industry disciples) to whom the various asymmetric training fatalities mean nothing, and who are still demanding actions/operations, for which the aircraft is not certified, and/or directly contrary to instructions in the AFM.
These individuals are quite convinced that CASA are legally exempt from limitations imposed by certification, ie: in the AFM, and have the "authority" to impose wide variations to AFM imposed SOPs, by "instructions" in the Operations Manual/FCTM (by whatever name).
Tootle pip!!
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 09:28
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Originally Posted by FOI
How:
1. Can a situation be tolerated where neither pilot operating in a control seat be qualified (as in deemed proficient) for the activity being undertaken?
Why:
1. Would you not for the purposes of assessment, have a qualified Examiner operating as pseudo student.
I put this exact question to CASA shortly after the accident. My partner was Martin Scott, the Chief Pilot flying from the right hand seat that day. CASA's response was that if they used pseudo students it made it too easy for the person being assessed. They also stated that it is perfectly acceptable practice for CASA to be assessing the right hand seat pilot, whilst that pilot is assessing the left hand seat pilot.
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 11:37
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Originally Posted by Captain Nomad
Having been part of a check recently which involved CASA, it seems they have adopted this approach somewhat. There was a strict stipulation that there were to be no engine failure emergencies conducted below 1,000 feet AGL and I believe this was a reaction to this particular accident.
Again, I questioned CASA regarding the rationale behind conducting simulated engine failures at low altitude. Their response was that they have to recreate an engine failure as closely as possible to the real thing, and as aerodynamics change at higher altitudes, this would not be appropriate. I somewhat naively believed that CASA would issue an official ban on simulated engine failures at low altitide, and was very disappointed when they didn't. Maybe they are doing it unofficially after all. Has anyone been expected to do low level engine failures since this accident?
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 12:04
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Originally Posted by ChoppaGirl
I put this exact question to CASA shortly after the accident. My partner was Martin Scott, the Chief Pilot flying from the right hand seat that day. CASA's response was that if they used pseudo students it made it too easy for the person being assessed. They also stated that it is perfectly acceptable practice for CASA to be assessing the right hand seat pilot, whilst that pilot is assessing the left hand seat pilot.
ChoppaGirl, I’m sure I speak for all here when I express our genuine sympathy for you and all those so directly affected by this tragic event.

Im frankly staggered by the galactically “basic” rationale relayed to you by a statutory authority. I sincerely hope this triggers an appropriate investigation beyond that of simply the accident itself.
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 13:18
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Thank you FOI. I have to say that I have been staggered by many things since this accident occurred. My only aim is to ensure this never happens to anyone else, but it is proving a difficult task.
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Old 20th Jul 2018, 14:16
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My only aim is to ensure this never happens to anyone else, but it is proving a difficult task.
Anecdotal only, but I understand that mixture cuts to simulate engine failure in a multi engine aircraft after take off, are still used at some flying schools. The theory apparently being it is more "realistic" rather than throttle closure to zero thrust and another theory is that mixture cuts are "better" for the engine. Not sure they are "better" for the pilot if mis-handling occurs at this low altitude.
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 01:24
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Their response was that they have to recreate an engine failure as closely as possible to the real thing
Not a multi FW rated guy, but any single engine work means keeping Vmca uppermost in mind. Manuals I've read suggest 5,000 as the minimum altitude for Vmca demonstration. Is that not telling us something with regard to single engine work? I'm fully aware of, and the necessity for, good training, but there must be a better way. Simulators are the only answer. Far too many folk have been lost practising this black art, some I know. Anyone practice bleeding?

Queen Air engine failure.

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Old 21st Jul 2018, 01:56
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Anyone practice bleeding?
not exactly but point taken . . . . (To watch that Qair spear in that catastrophic way
does chill the blood though. Too graphic for me Mr Megan, on a full stomach.)
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 02:45
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Originally Posted by ChoppaGirl
Thank you FOI. I have to say that I have been staggered by many things since this accident occurred. My only aim is to ensure this never happens to anyone else, but it is proving a difficult task.
ChoppaGirl,
To succeed, you have to overcome a very resilient and enduring "culture" in CASA and the "industry", that no history of fatal accidents in asymmetric training seems to dent.

Sadly, the alleged need for realism includes the "realism" of people dying in the name of simulating realism.

CASA prints various "educational material", then "some" FOIs "informally" makes it abundantly clear that "V1 cuts" (in an aeroplane where a V1 performance simply does not exist) will continue to be conducted, as will landings with one engine feathered, as opposed to zero thrust. The "educational material" will be ignored.

CASA and its predecessors are not wholly to blame, there is no shortage of individuals in industry, whose combination of over-confidence and under education and experience make them impervious to the avoidable risks they demand "must be taken" in training.

The bottom line ---- when was the last fatality as a result of a critical engine failure in a light twin, versus a fatality in training for the event. Yes, there have been several, spread over many years, but a fraction of the number in "training".

And ATSB decline to properly investigate, when they have the chance, thus once again making no useful contribution to improving air safety outcomes.

Tootle pip!!
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 02:59
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ATSB decline to properly investigate, when they have the chance, thus once again making no useful contribution to improving air safety outcomes.
Deaths by misadventure? Deaths by mismanagement? Show that video of the Queenair crashing in a funeral pyre to every person twin-rated in Australia, or who is about to qualify. ("When will they ever learn . .. ")
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 03:00
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Originally Posted by LeadSled
ChoppaGirl,
impervious to the avoidable risks they demand "must be taken" in training.

The bottom line ---- when was the last fatality as a result of a critical engine failure in a light twin, versus a fatality in training for the event. Yes, there have been several, spread over many years, but a fraction of the number in "training".

And ATSB decline to properly investigate, when they have the chance, thus once again making no useful contribution to improving air safety outcomes.

Tootle pip!!
A very salient point. We seem to kill more in an old-fashioned view on training for / being tested on, the V1-cut “Black Swan”, than have ever died from the event itself.
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 03:05
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FOI,
Exactly.
Tootle pip!!
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 04:07
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The RAF gave up low level EFATO exercises after this...


https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/cras...rford-6-killed
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Old 21st Jul 2018, 04:46
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CASA prints various "educational material", then "some" FOIs "informally" makes it abundantly clear that "V1 cuts" (in an aeroplane where a V1 performance simply does not exist) will continue to be conducted, as will landings with one engine feathered, as opposed to zero thrust. The "educational material" will be ignored.
This subject goes back well over sixty years. A DH Dove crashed at Camden during a supposed "simulated" engine failure at lift off. The pilot was a DCA Examiner who was being supervised by a Bankstown factory representative who was a demonstration pilot. The Examiner proceeded to fail one engine on himself just after lift off and feathered the prop. The demo pilot expressed his grave reservations about this intention especially as Camden Runway 06 had rising ground in the take off splay but the Examiner went ahead and feathered the prop anyway. Control was immediately lost and the Dove went in killing the Examiner and severely injured the demo pilot. See:https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/cras...amden-1-killed
For many years in the late 1940 and 1950's the RAAF practiced engine failures after take off in the Avro Lincoln four engine bomber and other twins as well as practice feathered landings. Then circa 1953 a Lincoln was carrying out a practice asymmetric landing at Townsville with No 1 engine prop feathered when it began to drift towards the side of the runway due crosswind.

The instructor attempted to go-around on three engines but got into Vmca difficulties and the Lincoln crashed and burnt. Luckily, the crew of three escaped before the aircraft was destroyed by fire. Five years later at Townsville a similar accident happened to a Lincoln during a practice feathered landing. This time a new pilot was being checked out by an instructor. Again No 1 prop was feathered. The aircraft bounced heavily on touch down and the instructor took control to go-around on three engines.
Same old problem when the Lincoln ran into a Vmca situation and control was lost, crashing near the then civil terminal building. The crew were lucky to escape before the aircraft blew up.
Soon after, the RAAF banned practice feathered landings and after that zero thrust throttle closures were mandated for practice engine failures after take off and for practice asymmetric landings. The DCA did not follow suit and continued to permit simulated engine failures in civilian registered light piston twins by use of mixture lever cuts after lift off. In fact it is not unknown for some instructors to cut the mixture on piston twin during the take off roll for practice abort. Instant correct corrective action is required if that happens since no delay in closing the throttle of the operating engine is vital to prevent loss of control on the runway.

Finally, it is worth studying the ATSB report on the 2003 accident at Camden NSW to a Duchess where the instructor cut the mixture at lift off during a touch and go.
That aircraft crashed and caught fire and the instructor lost his life. Both pilots were highly experienced former airline pilots. See:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...aair200300224/

Last edited by Centaurus; 21st Jul 2018 at 05:28.
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