DHC Beaver down in Hawkesbury
Except they were neatly piled up in the front end of the fuselage...
There's an elderly LAME at YCWR who's slowly building a Beaver from scratch.
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Desert Flower . . . . . if you knew the man, his 'circumstances', and what he has achieved in a long, long involvement at a professional level in aircraft maintenance, you would be a trifle less smart-arse. Methinks.
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The breaver in standard form is not fitted with a stall warning system. It also dose not have a pilot operating manual or handbook.
Robbies, air ag, superspread had the worlds largest operating fleet of these aircraft , approx 85.
Large superphosphate heaps of over 1500 ton (imperial)
A breaver on a good day strip etc will lift a ton and will do 100 ton a day.
Awt wings where fitted with a stall warning. Awt where a aftermarket wing shaped like a c185 of sorts.
What i am saying for the ill informed is a stall warning will not provide anything and is proven with the amount of flying hours that just thoose 3 companys record would show.
And as for the seats once again irrelevant. The floats show damage back approx 5 feet. The prop blades are pushed back and are around the engine.
The front screens would have pop out and provided zero resistance to the inflow of water. No seat would have provided any protection with the force of water going into the cabin.
One has to feel for all thoose involved in this accident. The ceo and owner interview was extremely moving and heart felt. To stop all operations shows what a quality operation this is. To the maintenance personal who also must be worried sick.
Having been placed in this position myself with a similar accident i feel for all thoose involved.
The familys of Vh hts who,s have had all thoose memeroies revisted one cannot say words in your pain.
Robbies, air ag, superspread had the worlds largest operating fleet of these aircraft , approx 85.
Large superphosphate heaps of over 1500 ton (imperial)
A breaver on a good day strip etc will lift a ton and will do 100 ton a day.
Awt wings where fitted with a stall warning. Awt where a aftermarket wing shaped like a c185 of sorts.
What i am saying for the ill informed is a stall warning will not provide anything and is proven with the amount of flying hours that just thoose 3 companys record would show.
And as for the seats once again irrelevant. The floats show damage back approx 5 feet. The prop blades are pushed back and are around the engine.
The front screens would have pop out and provided zero resistance to the inflow of water. No seat would have provided any protection with the force of water going into the cabin.
One has to feel for all thoose involved in this accident. The ceo and owner interview was extremely moving and heart felt. To stop all operations shows what a quality operation this is. To the maintenance personal who also must be worried sick.
Having been placed in this position myself with a similar accident i feel for all thoose involved.
The familys of Vh hts who,s have had all thoose memeroies revisted one cannot say words in your pain.
DF.
The 1st responders were true heroes if they entered the water fearing a fuel fire.
Based on Ppruners experiences, should the risk of post crash ignition of floating fuel be considered “low”
by first responders?
Yes consequences are severe but risk is low?
Mjb
Based on Ppruners experiences, should the risk of post crash ignition of floating fuel be considered “low”
by first responders?
Yes consequences are severe but risk is low?
Mjb
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The fire risk may have been low but the risk of cemical burns remain high.
It also dose not have a pilot operating manual or handbook
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I would have thought that a very high value of longitudinal deceleration would have been against it. More damage to the fuselage would have been desirable.
Concur with those thoughts.
And of course the vintage of the seats and restraints (9G longitudinal).
I have no idea what standards applied to the original Beaver certification (and am not overly interested in searching them out) but, being of ancient vintage, it might even predate the 9G static restraint.
re the seats... they may be of a rated G but what are the floor tracks?
Depending on the seat certification, one would expect that the seats are matched to the more restrictive of the aeroplane certification requirements and the seating standards of the day. Certainly that was the process at Ansair (an Ansett subsidiary, now long defunct) when, for many years, I was the certification delegate for aircraft seat manufacture.
accident (turbine DC3) that stalled on takeoff in ground effect and slid across the snow to a halt. Everyone survived, still safely in their seats. Except they were neatly piled up in the front end of the fuselage...
Again, one would need to know the relevant standards for the particular aircraft. The original DC3s had 6g static seats.
Concur with those thoughts.
And of course the vintage of the seats and restraints (9G longitudinal).
I have no idea what standards applied to the original Beaver certification (and am not overly interested in searching them out) but, being of ancient vintage, it might even predate the 9G static restraint.
re the seats... they may be of a rated G but what are the floor tracks?
Depending on the seat certification, one would expect that the seats are matched to the more restrictive of the aeroplane certification requirements and the seating standards of the day. Certainly that was the process at Ansair (an Ansett subsidiary, now long defunct) when, for many years, I was the certification delegate for aircraft seat manufacture.
accident (turbine DC3) that stalled on takeoff in ground effect and slid across the snow to a halt. Everyone survived, still safely in their seats. Except they were neatly piled up in the front end of the fuselage...
Again, one would need to know the relevant standards for the particular aircraft. The original DC3s had 6g static seats.
A regulatory authority will not certify an aircraft type without a flight manual. The Australian (CASA) type acceptance certification for the DHC-2 (Number A129 Issue 2) is based on Canada's original certification (Aircraft Type Approval A-22). The De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited DHC-2 Beaver Flight Manual of 31 March 1956 is listed as the approved document in Canadian certification; you can source copies of the flight manual online.
Last edited by MickG0105; 5th Jan 2018 at 04:24. Reason: Correction
Moderator
suffice to say the pax I met weren’t subjected to anything like 6 G and the seats pulled out of the floor.
The typical problem associated with seat separation with static design seats relates to seat and/or aircraft structure deformation which leads to the leg buttons being loaded asymmetrically, failing and away it goes. Hence the better situation with static seats bolted to structure in one way or another.
Some may recall that delightful ANR 40 chap, Rudy Paspa. One of his efforts involved designing and patenting (as I recall) an ellipsoid button which rotated on seat installation into the seat track so that the restraint capability was improved.
It was this deformation problem in mishaps which led to the requirement with newer dynamic seat certifications that the sled test required a preset misalignment of the seat to floor attachment to provide some comfort.
BCAR dated 1947 with a technical letter
Thank you, good sir .. saves me some trouble in researching the matter.
The typical problem associated with seat separation with static design seats relates to seat and/or aircraft structure deformation which leads to the leg buttons being loaded asymmetrically, failing and away it goes. Hence the better situation with static seats bolted to structure in one way or another.
Some may recall that delightful ANR 40 chap, Rudy Paspa. One of his efforts involved designing and patenting (as I recall) an ellipsoid button which rotated on seat installation into the seat track so that the restraint capability was improved.
It was this deformation problem in mishaps which led to the requirement with newer dynamic seat certifications that the sled test required a preset misalignment of the seat to floor attachment to provide some comfort.
BCAR dated 1947 with a technical letter
Thank you, good sir .. saves me some trouble in researching the matter.
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Connedrod said No Australian manual. I am not saying ther is a problem but the one you are quoting is US and Canadian. It is usual for the Certifying agency to either issue their own or Reference the manufacturers one.There are many aircraft ( like HS125) that have different speeds between the UK and the FAA manuals.
The breaver in standard form is not fitted with a stall warning system. It also dose not have a pilot operating manual or handbook.
Robbies, air ag, superspread had the worlds largest operating fleet of these aircraft , approx 85.
Large superphosphate heaps of over 1500 ton (imperial)
A breaver on a good day strip etc will lift a ton and will do 100 ton a day.
Awt wings where fitted with a stall warning. Awt where a aftermarket wing shaped like a c185 of sorts.
What i am saying for the ill informed is a stall warning will not provide anything and is proven with the amount of flying hours that just thoose 3 companys record would show.
And as for the seats once again irrelevant. The floats show damage back approx 5 feet. The prop blades are pushed back and are around the engine.
The front screens would have pop out and provided zero resistance to the inflow of water. No seat would have provided any protection with the force of water going into the cabin.
One has to feel for all thoose involved in this accident. The ceo and owner interview was extremely moving and heart felt. To stop all operations shows what a quality operation this is. To the maintenance personal who also must be worried sick.
Having been placed in this position myself with a similar accident i feel for all thoose involved.
The familys of Vh hts who,s have had all thoose memeroies revisted one cannot say words in your pain.
Robbies, air ag, superspread had the worlds largest operating fleet of these aircraft , approx 85.
Large superphosphate heaps of over 1500 ton (imperial)
A breaver on a good day strip etc will lift a ton and will do 100 ton a day.
Awt wings where fitted with a stall warning. Awt where a aftermarket wing shaped like a c185 of sorts.
What i am saying for the ill informed is a stall warning will not provide anything and is proven with the amount of flying hours that just thoose 3 companys record would show.
And as for the seats once again irrelevant. The floats show damage back approx 5 feet. The prop blades are pushed back and are around the engine.
The front screens would have pop out and provided zero resistance to the inflow of water. No seat would have provided any protection with the force of water going into the cabin.
One has to feel for all thoose involved in this accident. The ceo and owner interview was extremely moving and heart felt. To stop all operations shows what a quality operation this is. To the maintenance personal who also must be worried sick.
Having been placed in this position myself with a similar accident i feel for all thoose involved.
The familys of Vh hts who,s have had all thoose memeroies revisted one cannot say words in your pain.
who reckons the beaver would meet the flight requirements of FAR23 (let's say at amendment 45)?
One aspect of stalling requirements for part 23 certification that needs to be taken into account is that stall tests are flown wings level and with 30 deg AoB in both directions, and all are flown with idle power and 75% max continuous power. Stalling characteristics at higher power settings and greater bank angles/normal accelerations are not tested and, therefore, some aircraft may demonstrate adverse stalling characteristics at high power and high g and still be certificated.
#78 provides a link to a Beaver Flight Manual in which, on page 36 of Section IV, it gives values for stall speeds at different bank angles/normal accelerations. There are two interesting points about this data. First, does it relate to aircraft with wheels, skis or floats? I would expect a difference between, say, wheels and floats due to the floats reducing overall directional and longitudinal static stability (resulting from surface area forward of the c.g). Secondly, Vs@>1g = Vs@1g x sq rt(load factor). From the Manual, Vs@1g = 60 mph and Vs@2g = 105 mph. Theoretically, Vs@2g should be 84 mph. Can any Beaver operators explain this discrepancy? It is not uncommon for accelerated stall speeds to be lower than theoretical (usually due to Reynolds' number effects) but I have never before come across an aircraft where they are greater.
Please note that my comments above are not a comment on the accident but points of interest resulting from other posts on this thread.