Winter is here and so are the dangers of icing to unprotected aircraft
Thread Starter
Winter is here and so are the dangers of icing to unprotected aircraft
A friend of mine recently moved into a retirement home in Melbourne. He asked if I would like a bunch of Aviation Heritage magazines he had stored in his shed. They were titled the journal of the Aviation Historical Society of Australia. Because it would be a shame to see his treasures dumped into the Monday morning council rubbish pick-up, I somewhat reluctantly agreed to accept them; along with his pair of WW2 fur lined flying boots he had from the days when he was an air gunner on Lincoln bombers. I couldn’t see me tramping around the house in fur lined flying boots so by now my local Op shop has probably sold them for ten dollars. .
I figured if I read the Aviation Heritage magazines one each week, it would take nearly two years to get through the lot. The first to be read was Aviation Heritage, Volume 39 – Number 2, June 2008. Among the stories, was an interview conducted by Greg Banfield with Captain Graham Lance (born in 1924) and recorded on 29 September 2004.
Graham enlisted in the RAAF in 1943 and after graduating as a Sergeant Pilot was sent to England where he flew Handley Page Halifax bombers on operations over Europe. After the war he returned home to Australia and flew as a First Officer on DC-3’s and DC-4’s. He later moved to Qantas flying Boeing 707’s.
It would be impractical to scan his full story to Pprune, even though it makes fascinating reading. However one short paragraph on page 37 of the magazine, struck a chord with me. It said: “On 8 August 1951 I was scheduled to fly with a new captain on a TAA DC-3 freighter VH-TAT to Hobart, but at the last moment I was pulled off that to do a Perth trip instead, because someone had gone sick. The DC-3 I should have been on, crashed into the sea in Barilla Bay, near Cambridge, when it developed underwing icing and the new captain didn’t realise what was happening. That was TAA’s first crash, although, being a freighter, it didn’t get the same publicity that a passenger aircraft crash would have”. The crew was Captain J. Haslope and First Officer T. Bennetts.
One report stated the aircraft took off from Cambridge and one mile north flew into the waters of Barilla Bay and was destroyed. The accident was caused by loss of control during a low altitude turn. The loss of control was attributed in the official accident report, to the presence of ice on the aircraft surfaces.
In those days, all RAAF Dakota’s were equipped with de-icing equipment that included inflatable rubber de-icing boots attached to almost the full length of the leading edge of the wings, the tail-plane and rudder fin. On the other hand, all Australian registered civilian DC-3’s had Regulator approval to operate with de-icer boots removed to save weight and maintenance costs. Operators were required to keep clear of icing conditions.
Of course that was impossible to police and it was left to operators to self-regulate in that regard. We can all guess the result. In winter, icing was invariably prevalent on the Melbourne to Tasmania route, yet it seemed that the Regulator looked the other way.
Sixty five years on from the 1951 crash of the TAA DC-3 night freighter into Barilla Bay, there are sure to be general aviation light twins with no wing anti-icing equipment still running freight in icing conditions between the mainland and Tasmania. Many of these do not have weather radar for which to avoid ice-filled clouds at night, so their pilots simply cross their fingers and hope for the best regardless of the threat of icing.
While there is no shortage of educational material for pilots on the perils of icing, complacency can easily set in. The more often we do something dangerous and get away with it, the less we perceive the danger. Eventually, our mind fools us into thinking there's no danger. A risky activity done many times begins to feel safe. This is a human trait that is in all of us.
This writer saw the light on how contamination of wing surfaces while flying at slow speeds, typically shortly after lift-off, can catch a pilot completely off guard. In this incident, which was in a RAAF C47 Dakota (DC3) at Townsville, the OAT was warm so there was no chance of icing.
Undergoing an instrument rating test was the Commanding Officer of RAAF Base Townsville. He had flown Martin Baltimore light bombers against the Germans during the WW2 campaign in North Africa. Desk-bound now, he was still a keen and enthusiastic pilot who flew both the Lincoln and Dakota whenever he could get away from his HQ office.
In those days, for in-flight instrument flying simulation, the RAAF used two-way amber screens installed on the inside of the Dakota windscreen. The pilot flying wore blue goggles and the combination of the amber screen and looking through blue tinted goggles made it look completely black outside. The instructor could see outside easily since he did not wear blue goggles. The take-off run was on instruments with the instructor giving verbal corrections to the other pilot in order to maintain the centreline of the runway.
In this incident and shortly after becoming airborne, the instructor selected the undercarriage lever to up and reaching over to the pilots instrument panel, caged the pilot’s artificial horizon to simulate its failure; the aim being to climb out on limited panel. In those days artificial horizons were not as reliable as today and AH failure was not unknown. This was one reason why RAAF flying training accented skill at flying on limited panel.
Seconds later, the Wing Commander under test called that the starboard engine had failed. Certainly the Dakota was yawing and rolling and the Wingco was using almost full controls to keeps the wings level. As he was on instruments, in fact he was doing a very good job. There was one problem, however. The instructor could see that both engines were delivering full power yet obviously the pilot was struggling to fly the aircraft.
Then, to the surprise of the instructor in the right hand seat, the Wing Commander, convinced that the starboard engine had failed and with the altitude a bare 200 feet, reached to the overhead panel and tried to press the starboard engine feathering button. Fortunately, the instructor managed to block his hand to stop him touching the feathering button and informed the Wingco that he (the instructor) was taking control. The Wingco let go of the controls causing the aircraft to yaw strongly to the right and the starboard wing dropped sharply.
The instructor now had control using almost full aileron and considerable rudder pressure to raise the starboard wing. Another glance at the engine instruments revealed both engines still operating at take-off power, so clearly an engine failure had not occurred. The instructor then looked out at the starboard wing and was dismayed to see the de-icer rubber boot stretching from the landing light to the wing tip, had split in half with the top part flapping over the wing leading edge. The effect on the lift of the wing was quite dramatic.
The instructor was able to complete a circuit using almost full aileron and considerable rudder to keep the wings level. He decided not to lower flaps for the landing because of the risk of further controllability problems. A successful flapless landing was made with full aileron reached due to the slowing airspeed, just as touch-down occurred.
The failure of the wing de-icing boot was due to perishing of the rubber material over time in the tropics.
The incident left an indelible impression on the instructor as to the effect of contamination of the upper surface of a wing caused by icing; or in this case, an airframe defect.
Without having experienced severe icing, and the control problems it can cause, it is understandable that pilots may become complacent; especially if they cannot be bothered to study the subject. They would be wise to take time to read the following link to the Flight Safety Foundation report on icing accidents and maybe afterwards ponder “There but for the Grace of God, go I.”
http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jun-sep97.pdf
With winter in full swing and particularly the chances of encountering icing on the Tasmanian route quite high, I invite readers to contribute to this thread and describe their own encounters in icing where control problems have occurred. We can thus all learn from the experiences of others.
I figured if I read the Aviation Heritage magazines one each week, it would take nearly two years to get through the lot. The first to be read was Aviation Heritage, Volume 39 – Number 2, June 2008. Among the stories, was an interview conducted by Greg Banfield with Captain Graham Lance (born in 1924) and recorded on 29 September 2004.
Graham enlisted in the RAAF in 1943 and after graduating as a Sergeant Pilot was sent to England where he flew Handley Page Halifax bombers on operations over Europe. After the war he returned home to Australia and flew as a First Officer on DC-3’s and DC-4’s. He later moved to Qantas flying Boeing 707’s.
It would be impractical to scan his full story to Pprune, even though it makes fascinating reading. However one short paragraph on page 37 of the magazine, struck a chord with me. It said: “On 8 August 1951 I was scheduled to fly with a new captain on a TAA DC-3 freighter VH-TAT to Hobart, but at the last moment I was pulled off that to do a Perth trip instead, because someone had gone sick. The DC-3 I should have been on, crashed into the sea in Barilla Bay, near Cambridge, when it developed underwing icing and the new captain didn’t realise what was happening. That was TAA’s first crash, although, being a freighter, it didn’t get the same publicity that a passenger aircraft crash would have”. The crew was Captain J. Haslope and First Officer T. Bennetts.
One report stated the aircraft took off from Cambridge and one mile north flew into the waters of Barilla Bay and was destroyed. The accident was caused by loss of control during a low altitude turn. The loss of control was attributed in the official accident report, to the presence of ice on the aircraft surfaces.
In those days, all RAAF Dakota’s were equipped with de-icing equipment that included inflatable rubber de-icing boots attached to almost the full length of the leading edge of the wings, the tail-plane and rudder fin. On the other hand, all Australian registered civilian DC-3’s had Regulator approval to operate with de-icer boots removed to save weight and maintenance costs. Operators were required to keep clear of icing conditions.
Of course that was impossible to police and it was left to operators to self-regulate in that regard. We can all guess the result. In winter, icing was invariably prevalent on the Melbourne to Tasmania route, yet it seemed that the Regulator looked the other way.
Sixty five years on from the 1951 crash of the TAA DC-3 night freighter into Barilla Bay, there are sure to be general aviation light twins with no wing anti-icing equipment still running freight in icing conditions between the mainland and Tasmania. Many of these do not have weather radar for which to avoid ice-filled clouds at night, so their pilots simply cross their fingers and hope for the best regardless of the threat of icing.
While there is no shortage of educational material for pilots on the perils of icing, complacency can easily set in. The more often we do something dangerous and get away with it, the less we perceive the danger. Eventually, our mind fools us into thinking there's no danger. A risky activity done many times begins to feel safe. This is a human trait that is in all of us.
This writer saw the light on how contamination of wing surfaces while flying at slow speeds, typically shortly after lift-off, can catch a pilot completely off guard. In this incident, which was in a RAAF C47 Dakota (DC3) at Townsville, the OAT was warm so there was no chance of icing.
Undergoing an instrument rating test was the Commanding Officer of RAAF Base Townsville. He had flown Martin Baltimore light bombers against the Germans during the WW2 campaign in North Africa. Desk-bound now, he was still a keen and enthusiastic pilot who flew both the Lincoln and Dakota whenever he could get away from his HQ office.
In those days, for in-flight instrument flying simulation, the RAAF used two-way amber screens installed on the inside of the Dakota windscreen. The pilot flying wore blue goggles and the combination of the amber screen and looking through blue tinted goggles made it look completely black outside. The instructor could see outside easily since he did not wear blue goggles. The take-off run was on instruments with the instructor giving verbal corrections to the other pilot in order to maintain the centreline of the runway.
In this incident and shortly after becoming airborne, the instructor selected the undercarriage lever to up and reaching over to the pilots instrument panel, caged the pilot’s artificial horizon to simulate its failure; the aim being to climb out on limited panel. In those days artificial horizons were not as reliable as today and AH failure was not unknown. This was one reason why RAAF flying training accented skill at flying on limited panel.
Seconds later, the Wing Commander under test called that the starboard engine had failed. Certainly the Dakota was yawing and rolling and the Wingco was using almost full controls to keeps the wings level. As he was on instruments, in fact he was doing a very good job. There was one problem, however. The instructor could see that both engines were delivering full power yet obviously the pilot was struggling to fly the aircraft.
Then, to the surprise of the instructor in the right hand seat, the Wing Commander, convinced that the starboard engine had failed and with the altitude a bare 200 feet, reached to the overhead panel and tried to press the starboard engine feathering button. Fortunately, the instructor managed to block his hand to stop him touching the feathering button and informed the Wingco that he (the instructor) was taking control. The Wingco let go of the controls causing the aircraft to yaw strongly to the right and the starboard wing dropped sharply.
The instructor now had control using almost full aileron and considerable rudder pressure to raise the starboard wing. Another glance at the engine instruments revealed both engines still operating at take-off power, so clearly an engine failure had not occurred. The instructor then looked out at the starboard wing and was dismayed to see the de-icer rubber boot stretching from the landing light to the wing tip, had split in half with the top part flapping over the wing leading edge. The effect on the lift of the wing was quite dramatic.
The instructor was able to complete a circuit using almost full aileron and considerable rudder to keep the wings level. He decided not to lower flaps for the landing because of the risk of further controllability problems. A successful flapless landing was made with full aileron reached due to the slowing airspeed, just as touch-down occurred.
The failure of the wing de-icing boot was due to perishing of the rubber material over time in the tropics.
The incident left an indelible impression on the instructor as to the effect of contamination of the upper surface of a wing caused by icing; or in this case, an airframe defect.
Without having experienced severe icing, and the control problems it can cause, it is understandable that pilots may become complacent; especially if they cannot be bothered to study the subject. They would be wise to take time to read the following link to the Flight Safety Foundation report on icing accidents and maybe afterwards ponder “There but for the Grace of God, go I.”
http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jun-sep97.pdf
With winter in full swing and particularly the chances of encountering icing on the Tasmanian route quite high, I invite readers to contribute to this thread and describe their own encounters in icing where control problems have occurred. We can thus all learn from the experiences of others.
Last edited by Centaurus; 27th Jun 2015 at 11:39.
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I was flying a Cheiftain on a night freight run from MB to WYY. The freezing level was around 4500 so I'd planned 4000. I departed, there was no moon but a few stars & plenty of city light so I could see there was no cloud. I decided stuff it, I'll go at 6000. I got about halfway down, 'bang' sounded like I'd hit a concrete wall. If I didn't have the harness on I'd have gone through the roof, scared me that much. The windscreen was covered in ice, the leading edge was thick with it & the props were throwing ice off. I descended to 4000ft, at that level it still took some time for the ice to melt. I was crapping myself thinking that the ice wouldn't melt off the windscreen in time to see outside for the approach. Never did that again.
Military training base in the tropics. Two gentlemen in full flight clobber walked up to the guard at the entrance to gain admittance to said base. The wearing of flight gear off base was an absolute no no. Instructor and partner in crime had taken off in a single engine Beech product and found themselves unable to remain airborne, resulting in forced landing. Frost on wings.
In my 15 months there never saw frost. Lack of familiarity, complacency or........
In my 15 months there never saw frost. Lack of familiarity, complacency or........
Thanks Centaurus.
You've got to wonder how CASA, in its variou iterations, could allow Day/Night/Winter RPT between FLI and LT in clapped out old bangers without Deice or antiicing.
The old 404s had pretty black stripes that looked like boots, but we're not. I'm told the Do228 had its cold weather gear removed. What was CASA thinking?
There are some interesting posts in this forum.
You've got to wonder how CASA, in its variou iterations, could allow Day/Night/Winter RPT between FLI and LT in clapped out old bangers without Deice or antiicing.
The old 404s had pretty black stripes that looked like boots, but we're not. I'm told the Do228 had its cold weather gear removed. What was CASA thinking?
There are some interesting posts in this forum.
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The very first Flight I did as PIC after gaining my MECIR back in 1988 (Total flying time then was around 600hrs) was a charter for the Flying School, flying the same aircraft in which I had done all the MECIR training, a Seneca 1
The flight was in mid July, from YPAD to YMTG with 4pax and the forecast was not very encouraging.
30 to 45 kt winds from abeam between 3000` and 8000,` rain, possible embedded TS activity and icing in cloud. Amongst various other things but I`m sure you get the picture!
I had passed the flight test only about a week previously, which was a retest as I had actually failed the first flight test ( got out of tolerance on a NDB approach) because it was flown in weather conditions virtually identical to those I faced on the day of the charter.
Suffice it to say I was slightly apprehensive, but decided that I would not have been given the job if I could not handle it, and so off we went.
The `Readers Digest Abridged and Condensed` verion of the story;
I was IMC for about 85% of the leg YPAD to YMTG and with a certain amount of interest watched rime ice form on the wings and windscreen! I became visual on descent into YMTG well above LSALT but with a windscreen completely iced over! It thankfully cleared within a few minutes but the occasional sound of what I assumed (correctly) was rime ice coming off the propellors and hitting the fuselage was somewhat disconcerting!
The remainder of the flight was somewhat of an anti-climax really. The waether cleared somewhat during the day and I was visual for most of the late afternoon/evening flight back.
A few years later I found myself in a Bongo Van in PNG, up at 17,000,` IMC crossing the Owen Stanleys from Wewak to Port Morbid, and after a while noticed that my shirt and shorts were sprinkled in what appeared to be a white powder which disappeared after a few minutes, but that is another story!
The flight was in mid July, from YPAD to YMTG with 4pax and the forecast was not very encouraging.
30 to 45 kt winds from abeam between 3000` and 8000,` rain, possible embedded TS activity and icing in cloud. Amongst various other things but I`m sure you get the picture!I had passed the flight test only about a week previously, which was a retest as I had actually failed the first flight test ( got out of tolerance on a NDB approach) because it was flown in weather conditions virtually identical to those I faced on the day of the charter.
Suffice it to say I was slightly apprehensive, but decided that I would not have been given the job if I could not handle it, and so off we went.
The `Readers Digest Abridged and Condensed` verion of the story;
I was IMC for about 85% of the leg YPAD to YMTG and with a certain amount of interest watched rime ice form on the wings and windscreen! I became visual on descent into YMTG well above LSALT but with a windscreen completely iced over!
It thankfully cleared within a few minutes but the occasional sound of what I assumed (correctly) was rime ice coming off the propellors and hitting the fuselage was somewhat disconcerting!The remainder of the flight was somewhat of an anti-climax really. The waether cleared somewhat during the day and I was visual for most of the late afternoon/evening flight back.
A few years later I found myself in a Bongo Van in PNG, up at 17,000,` IMC crossing the Owen Stanleys from Wewak to Port Morbid, and after a while noticed that my shirt and shorts were sprinkled in what appeared to be a white powder which disappeared after a few minutes, but that is another story!
Thread Starter
Re icing stories. Had to fly a doctor on urgent mission Essendon to Mt Gambier in a C172. Cloud forecast and temps indicated possibility of airframe icing but destination clear. In and out of cloud initially then abeam BCS the IAS fell from 105 knots to 75 knots over a two minute period because of rapid build up of rime ice on the wings and struts and windscreen. I had never experienced such a rapid airspeed loss such as this before. Did a very careful 180 at 10 degrees angle of bank just in case it stalled and returned to EN.
Some years after this incident I heard the news that a C172 operating direct track Merimbula to EN over the hills had gone in but everyone survived. The pilot said he got iced up and unable to maintain height and hit trees at low airspeed still in IMC. He rang his wife on his mobile phone and she contacted relevant SAR authorities.
Some years after this incident I heard the news that a C172 operating direct track Merimbula to EN over the hills had gone in but everyone survived. The pilot said he got iced up and unable to maintain height and hit trees at low airspeed still in IMC. He rang his wife on his mobile phone and she contacted relevant SAR authorities.
You've got to wonder how CASA, in its variou iterations, could allow Day/Night/Winter RPT between FLI and LT in clapped out old bangers without Deice or antiicing.
The old 404s had pretty black stripes that looked like boots, but we're not. I'm told the Do228 had its cold weather gear removed. What was CASA thinking?
The old 404s had pretty black stripes that looked like boots, but we're not. I'm told the Do228 had its cold weather gear removed. What was CASA thinking?
It's possible that I was "told wrong" about the equipment on the Dornier and, Shannon, if you are saying that ATZ was properly equipped then I accept that. A deiced Dornier 228 has got to be a step up from the 404s that ran the RPT service and did not have deice boots.
My remark still stands, where was the regulator in all the years of winter operations across Bass Straight (and into Canberra & elsewhere) in ill equipped aeroplanes?
As the OP notes, flying in ice is no new thing, but in Australia we often don't give it the weight it deserves.
My remark still stands, where was the regulator in all the years of winter operations across Bass Straight (and into Canberra & elsewhere) in ill equipped aeroplanes?
As the OP notes, flying in ice is no new thing, but in Australia we often don't give it the weight it deserves.
War story
There I was...
Some time back around the turn of the Century I was in a Chieftain at about 7000' in VMC and well above the FZL. There was a layer of cloud maybe 1500-2000' above.
By this time I was a veteran
of over 1500 hours and maybe 6-700 hours on type. We had flown above the FZL over the Blue Mtns on Heron tours and bank runs as a matter of course, picking up frost and losing 15-20 knots. All in a day's work, right?
On this occasion I think the OAT might have been about MS05 and I was in those conditions for about 20-30 minutes. Icing was not really on my mind, as we were VMC and looked like we would maintain that all the way to the destination. Life was good.
I remained cruising - fat dumb and happy - until it rained on me.
Big, fat super-cooled droplets falling on a cold-soaked airframe and turning into thick, hairy frosty ice instantly.
It didn't have de-ice boots but it did have black stripes along the leading edge....
The aeroplane decellerated so rapidly I fell forward against the harness, and I had to apply climb power to maintain speed while descending below the FZL.
It was a bit of a "there but for the grace of Lycoming..." moment.
Some time back around the turn of the Century I was in a Chieftain at about 7000' in VMC and well above the FZL. There was a layer of cloud maybe 1500-2000' above.
By this time I was a veteran
of over 1500 hours and maybe 6-700 hours on type. We had flown above the FZL over the Blue Mtns on Heron tours and bank runs as a matter of course, picking up frost and losing 15-20 knots. All in a day's work, right?On this occasion I think the OAT might have been about MS05 and I was in those conditions for about 20-30 minutes. Icing was not really on my mind, as we were VMC and looked like we would maintain that all the way to the destination. Life was good.
I remained cruising - fat dumb and happy - until it rained on me.
Big, fat super-cooled droplets falling on a cold-soaked airframe and turning into thick, hairy frosty ice instantly.
It didn't have de-ice boots but it did have black stripes along the leading edge....
The aeroplane decellerated so rapidly I fell forward against the harness, and I had to apply climb power to maintain speed while descending below the FZL.
It was a bit of a "there but for the grace of Lycoming..." moment.
Could someone tell me how much frost/ice is acceptable on a 737 taxiing for departure?
I flew on an early departure out of Melbourne recently, on a cold clear morning.The aircraft had been in the shade of the terminal, and the outer portion of the wing was coated in frost, with a visibly rough texture to the surface.
I was hoping the frost would melt in the sunlight as we taxied to the threshold, but there was still some remaining as we began the takeoff roll.
From my modest flying experience, I remember that all ice and frost had to be removed before flight. I have confidence in the crew's decision, but I'd feel a bit more comfortable if I knew what was acceptable and what wasn't.
Thanks in anticipation.
I flew on an early departure out of Melbourne recently, on a cold clear morning.The aircraft had been in the shade of the terminal, and the outer portion of the wing was coated in frost, with a visibly rough texture to the surface.
I was hoping the frost would melt in the sunlight as we taxied to the threshold, but there was still some remaining as we began the takeoff roll.
From my modest flying experience, I remember that all ice and frost had to be removed before flight. I have confidence in the crew's decision, but I'd feel a bit more comfortable if I knew what was acceptable and what wasn't.
Thanks in anticipation.
Thread Starter
the outer portion of the wing was coated in frost, with a visibly rough texture to the surface.
I was hoping the frost would melt in the sunlight as we taxied to the threshold, but there was still some remaining as we began the takeoff roll
I was hoping the frost would melt in the sunlight as we taxied to the threshold, but there was still some remaining as we began the takeoff roll
Quote: "Take off with light coatings of frost, up to 3mm in thickness on lower surfaces due to cold fuel is allowable; however, all leading edge devices, all control surfaces, tab surfaces upper wing surfaces and control balance cavities must be free of snow, ice and frost".
Seems someone was pushing his luck?
One of the most knowledgeable blokes on icing in GA twins is a bloke by the name of Lance Scott. He spent a fair bit of his time flying Chieftains and Bandeirantes in Tasmania for Air Tasmania and Airlines of Tasmania then did a stint flying BSF a Pressurised Navajo on rain making for Don Wells over the Victorian high country.
Plenty of blokes at Airlines of Tasmania were lucky enough to have Lance pass on his knowledge on icing, how Chieftains handled ice, escape plans and techniques to use when encountering ice etc.
Considering that Airlines of Tasmania had a fleet of Chieftains and Herons that did not have any de icing boots or weather radar, and they operated RPT out of Hobart to Strahan with a LSALT of 6800', Launceston to Hobart on the nightly paper run, TNT freighters out of Hobart to Melbourne in Chieftains, Launceston to Flinders Island with a LSALT of 6100' along with with charters to places like Canberra etc. Lances experience and knowledge on ice was of great benefit to us newbies.
Plenty of industry gurus will prattle on about ice, but when you ask a question or two, you realise they either don't have a real lot of experience in icing conditions or their knowledge is gained from the met book. Plenty of IFR instructors have never seen ice, but will happily tell you all about it!
The old story about the grand military pooh bar, who showed every one how good he was(after all the military pilots are the best) blasting off in a Baron out of Canberra on a very nasty day with a segment for severe ice and a low freezing level! Apparently the Baron doesn't perform that well covered in ice and at full power below the high LSALT around Canberra, something was mentioned about going via a different route with a lower LSALT, but the military man was a proud man and decided to go with the route as planned. After all military aviators are the creme de la creme!
I don't agree with your theory on underwing ice on the DC-3 at Hobart Centaurus, normally Hobart wouldn't get that cold for ice to form. Wasn't the accident supposed to been caused by cargo shifting!
Last time I saw Lance he was chief pilot for Heron Airlines, but then I had heard that he retired back to Hobart and was doing some casual work for Don Wells.
Plenty of blokes at Airlines of Tasmania were lucky enough to have Lance pass on his knowledge on icing, how Chieftains handled ice, escape plans and techniques to use when encountering ice etc.
Considering that Airlines of Tasmania had a fleet of Chieftains and Herons that did not have any de icing boots or weather radar, and they operated RPT out of Hobart to Strahan with a LSALT of 6800', Launceston to Hobart on the nightly paper run, TNT freighters out of Hobart to Melbourne in Chieftains, Launceston to Flinders Island with a LSALT of 6100' along with with charters to places like Canberra etc. Lances experience and knowledge on ice was of great benefit to us newbies.
Plenty of industry gurus will prattle on about ice, but when you ask a question or two, you realise they either don't have a real lot of experience in icing conditions or their knowledge is gained from the met book. Plenty of IFR instructors have never seen ice, but will happily tell you all about it!
The old story about the grand military pooh bar, who showed every one how good he was(after all the military pilots are the best) blasting off in a Baron out of Canberra on a very nasty day with a segment for severe ice and a low freezing level! Apparently the Baron doesn't perform that well covered in ice and at full power below the high LSALT around Canberra, something was mentioned about going via a different route with a lower LSALT, but the military man was a proud man and decided to go with the route as planned. After all military aviators are the creme de la creme!
I don't agree with your theory on underwing ice on the DC-3 at Hobart Centaurus, normally Hobart wouldn't get that cold for ice to form. Wasn't the accident supposed to been caused by cargo shifting!
Last time I saw Lance he was chief pilot for Heron Airlines, but then I had heard that he retired back to Hobart and was doing some casual work for Don Wells.
Thread Starter
I don't agree with your theory on underwing ice on the DC-3 at Hobart Centaurus, normally Hobart wouldn't get that cold for ice to form
) when I read the record of interview since I had never heard of underwing ice in a DC3 which is normally caused by very cold fuel in jet aircraft either during a long flight or sometimes by the temperature of fuel from a tanker or above ground source. Search of various files dealing with that particular incident revealed nothing that suggested a loading problem. If it had turned out to be a loading problem, I would have thought the interview with the former captain would have revealed that.
Last edited by Centaurus; 25th Jul 2015 at 12:39.
It was a from quoted interview conducted on the captain by Greg Banfield. My eyebrows were raised (like yours, no doubt) when I read the record of interview since I had never heard of underwing ice in a DC3 which is normally caused by very cold fuel in jet aircraft either during a long flight or sometimes by the temperature of fuel from a tanker or above ground source.
) when I read the record of interview since I had never heard of underwing ice in a DC3 which is normally caused by very cold fuel in jet aircraft either during a long flight or sometimes by the temperature of fuel from a tanker or above ground source.
I have never heard of "underwing ice" on a DC-3/C-47 either. Underwing ice generally refers to a characteristic of some aircraft (L-188 Electra was one) to accumulate ice where you would not normally expect it. Ex- Electra pilots might like to comment on the sudden increase in cruise performance when said accumulated ice suddenly departed the aircraft.
This was nothing to do with frost forming on underwing surfaces due cold fuel.
Some other aircraft have a reputation for collecting ice in odd (less traditional) places, the MU-2 was good at collecting ice under fuselage between the undercarriage sponsons, it also used to depart "with a bang" -- and an immediate increase in performance.
Knowing Greg very well, who would have quite reasonably accepted what Lance said, and also the late G. Lance, I would want to have a look at the original accident report of the Dak. into the water that night.
Lost to accumulated ice, quite probably, due to "underwing ice" --- ????
Tootle pip!!
PS: Just a tip for the "newcomer", certified for flight in icing conditions does NOT mean certified for continuous flight in continuous icing. All it means is you can keep control of the situation as you work out how to get out of said continuous icing ASAP.
If your aircraft is not so equipped and certified --- and serviceable --- it is seriously dumb to fly in conditions where ice is probable, the "young player" will never believe how fast it builds, until it happens. Learning all about icing from a book beats the hell out of learning the hard way, but the result is (hopefully in the latter case) the same, you avoid it next time.
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A deiced Dornier 228 has got to be a step up from the 404s that ran the RPT service and did not have deice boots.
HL, thanks for that post. That one goes straight to the pool room of memory to be recalled to save my fat arse from my puny mind
ABV FZL, supercooled rain and a cold soaked airframe...complete with vivid description on loss of performance...thank you.
ABV FZL, supercooled rain and a cold soaked airframe...complete with vivid description on loss of performance...thank you.
