Merged: The Ambidji Report CASA should get their money back!
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Werbil 100% correct. However, if the cloudbase is such that a SVFR clearance is required, then you can reasonably expect delays for separation with arriving IFR who of course will be in IMC due said cloudbase.
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Redleader- some of us have been trying to have the charging regime addressed as part of the "system" (US or other) for a long time. Of course it is inextricably attached! Forget about trying to get Dick involved in that argument, though. On the very few occasions he has ever acknowledged comments/argument to this effect, he simply says "it's too hard" (read: "I believe in user pays and helped introduce it, and often use 'cost' arguments- when they suit me"), and continues to tilt at small windmills (like airspace) which have so little actual effect (comparatively) on GA (and the industry as a whole).
But that's a whole other thread.
But that's a whole other thread.
CASA must have foreseen this breakdown in safety when they refused the RAAus application for access to CTA / GAAP. More aircraft are needed like the proverbial hole-in-the-head.
This whole schemozzle just re-inforces that wonderful maxim...if it ain't broke - don't fix it!
happy days,
This whole schemozzle just re-inforces that wonderful maxim...if it ain't broke - don't fix it!
happy days,
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One of my dstaff was at SIXS at the time
I seriously believe its only a matter of time before there is an accident. Something needs to be done immediately to reverse the decision to cap the numbers allowed in the circuit.
Thread Starter
If you look at the NAS document as approved by cabinet you will see that it clearly states that we will have different cloud clearance requirements than ICAO and that Australia will notify a difference.
Why doesn't someone from the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation tell us why they have directed AsA to move to Class D ?
Or are they actually against the decision and therefore they will undermine it in every way?
Yes, I agree that you do not need to know a persons name to judge if their argument is valid or not- however isn't a little bit strange that all those from AsA and CASA who are against NAS never ever put their real name to their beliefs.
What is going on?
Why doesn't someone from the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation tell us why they have directed AsA to move to Class D ?
Or are they actually against the decision and therefore they will undermine it in every way?
Yes, I agree that you do not need to know a persons name to judge if their argument is valid or not- however isn't a little bit strange that all those from AsA and CASA who are against NAS never ever put their real name to their beliefs.
What is going on?
Thread Starter
Etrust, I don't accept what you are saying.
Surely if these people were genuine they would organise a spokesman, say someone who is a retired ATC or CASA employee.
Nup, I don't believe that is the reason these cowards hide their names - more about not being really confident about their belief's.
Surely if these people were genuine they would organise a spokesman, say someone who is a retired ATC or CASA employee.
Nup, I don't believe that is the reason these cowards hide their names - more about not being really confident about their belief's.
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If you look at the NAS document as approved by cabinet you will see that it clearly states that we will have different cloud clearance requirements than ICAO and that Australia will notify a difference
If yes, we'll only have to make a couple more tweeks to the Class D model and the result will be something eerily simlar to GAAP.
But hey, the wheel worked, lets re-invent it.
FFS Mr Smith.
Surely if these people were genuine they would organise a spokesman, say someone who is a retired ATC or CASA employee.
Nup, I don't believe that is the reason these cowards hide their names - more about not being really confident about their belief's.
Just because someone dares to disagree with you that is not a sufficient reason to brand them cowards.
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Being a low houred ('bout 200 hrs) PPL pilot that uses BSK and MAY. I think Albury's D is an over kill for the traffic using it but I look forward to those procedures being adopted at BSK and stardardized. At the moment 2RN at 1500ft on a nice clear Friday at 13.00 is not the safest environment I have experienced.
Reporting position and tracking control instructions with more traffic information from further out sounds appealing. Is this what is proposed... If so great!
Reporting position and tracking control instructions with more traffic information from further out sounds appealing. Is this what is proposed... If so great!
Folkss
Sadly, but hardly unexpectedly, this thread has deteriorated into all the usual suspects slagging off Dick Smith.
A fixture of the aviation scene, and unlikely to change, is the brigade who will never agree with Dick, but let's try to get back to the original subject, the Ambifjii Report and/or it's aftermath.
Flying Schools are going broke at the GAAPs, with planned and realisable utilisation through the floor. What is going on just to the west of the YSBK zone is scary, most of us think (intuitively, based on years of experience) that YSBK (including the vicinity) is less safe now.
The Ambidjii Report is/was only part of the problem faced by John McCormick, brand new in the Director of Aviation Safety/CEO job. Arguably , what he was presented with, in the ICAO audit, and in particular the matter of airspace management, was overwhelming pressure to at least make a start.
With the double whammy of the ICAO audit and the Ambidjii Report, he was left with little choice as to a starting point.
What he could not have known, in the recommendations with which he was presented, was the serious and longstanding shortcomings of risk analysis, and presentation of such, which has generated so much argument, over airspace management, over so many years.
I would point out that Dick Smith has played no part in what I am referring to. As he has so often pointed out, he prefers the "common sense" test --- also accepted (in effect) by ICAO, as adoption by reference ----- showing a proposed change is essentially (but not exactly) the same as a proven working system.
"Adoption by Reference" leaves the proponent of change (in ICAO terms, and Australian Government risk management policy, AS/NZ 4360 etc.) to deal with the risk assessment of the difference, a far easier task than "whole system" analysis. This was how differences between the FAA NAS and the Australia NAS were handled, many of us spent many long hours grinding through the risk assessment processes, with the differences considered in fine detail, including the inherent risks of the "cultural shift" needed to make AUS/NAS work.
Unfortunately, the methodology long used in aviation regulatory circles ( as CASA has inherited from Airservices) has had long standing and major flaws, not limited to the "garbage in = garbage out" constant.
There are two essentially flawed areas, firstly how the F-N curves of societal risk are derived, and how they are presented on the risk diagram.
The F-N curves,as the process is worked, have a result that is very (unrealistically) conservative, or put another way, greatly overstates risk (fatalities per year) and produces an "acceptable risk" that is, in fact, a trivial ( trivial as a statistical term) risk , orders of magnitude below ALARP --- As Low As Reasonably Practical ----- where we should be at, a level of risk that is acceptable, below which lower risk is not attainable at a cost/benefit justified effort.
There is nothing particularly wrong with the Det Norske Veritas document re. societal risk, referred to in the Ambidjii Report, and Ambidjii has followed what they were given, a seriously flawed process, with which to work.
It is the process that is wrong, to come to the conclusion that YSBK operations, ( or any) GAAP for twenty or so years, presents as an "intolerable risk", it fails the "common sense"test.
For the first ten or so years of GAAP, there were nil/none/nought/zero MAC ---- Intolerable risk??
Anybody who read the O'Neil report into matters NAS, as commissioned by CASA (including the inputs of a number of acknowledged professional risk management persons - as in PhDs, etc., from other branches of the Commonwealth Public Service) gives a far more detailed insight into the shortcomings of the process ---- as still used by CASA and Airservices.
What Professor O'Neil (ANU) had to say is echoed by the three reports arranged here, by Dick Smith, and several more, yet to be published.
The message we have to get across the John McCormick is that he has been the victim of a seriously flawed process.
Fix the process, and we have fixed the GAAP "intolerable risk" problem.
After all, Ambidjii did not recommend the changes put in place. Who, in CASA, recommended the "final solution" (which is what it is for flying training, if we don't do something fast) to the DAS/CEO, I will bet he didn't think it up himself ??
Just go to the ATSB web site, have a look at all the consolidated accident data, and see how good the overall training rate is, compared to other GA sectors, or GA as a whole, then look at Avstats for the places much of the training hours operations occur, then try and convince yourself that the GAAP "intolerable risk", based on MAC only, is the overwhelming risk ---- is reasonable ---- and see how badly it fails the commons sense test -- let alone proper analysis.
The differences between GAAP and FAA D are marginal. For "cultural" reasons I would argue to maintain the current Australian system, but I acknowledge what Dick says about IFR protection, but this is an entirely different proposition to the fundamental flaw that brought about the present GAAP disaster.
As for ICAO D, forget it if you want to preserve any elementary flying training at the GAAPs.
Tootle pip!!
Sadly, but hardly unexpectedly, this thread has deteriorated into all the usual suspects slagging off Dick Smith.
A fixture of the aviation scene, and unlikely to change, is the brigade who will never agree with Dick, but let's try to get back to the original subject, the Ambifjii Report and/or it's aftermath.
Flying Schools are going broke at the GAAPs, with planned and realisable utilisation through the floor. What is going on just to the west of the YSBK zone is scary, most of us think (intuitively, based on years of experience) that YSBK (including the vicinity) is less safe now.
The Ambidjii Report is/was only part of the problem faced by John McCormick, brand new in the Director of Aviation Safety/CEO job. Arguably , what he was presented with, in the ICAO audit, and in particular the matter of airspace management, was overwhelming pressure to at least make a start.
With the double whammy of the ICAO audit and the Ambidjii Report, he was left with little choice as to a starting point.
What he could not have known, in the recommendations with which he was presented, was the serious and longstanding shortcomings of risk analysis, and presentation of such, which has generated so much argument, over airspace management, over so many years.
I would point out that Dick Smith has played no part in what I am referring to. As he has so often pointed out, he prefers the "common sense" test --- also accepted (in effect) by ICAO, as adoption by reference ----- showing a proposed change is essentially (but not exactly) the same as a proven working system.
"Adoption by Reference" leaves the proponent of change (in ICAO terms, and Australian Government risk management policy, AS/NZ 4360 etc.) to deal with the risk assessment of the difference, a far easier task than "whole system" analysis. This was how differences between the FAA NAS and the Australia NAS were handled, many of us spent many long hours grinding through the risk assessment processes, with the differences considered in fine detail, including the inherent risks of the "cultural shift" needed to make AUS/NAS work.
Unfortunately, the methodology long used in aviation regulatory circles ( as CASA has inherited from Airservices) has had long standing and major flaws, not limited to the "garbage in = garbage out" constant.
There are two essentially flawed areas, firstly how the F-N curves of societal risk are derived, and how they are presented on the risk diagram.
The F-N curves,as the process is worked, have a result that is very (unrealistically) conservative, or put another way, greatly overstates risk (fatalities per year) and produces an "acceptable risk" that is, in fact, a trivial ( trivial as a statistical term) risk , orders of magnitude below ALARP --- As Low As Reasonably Practical ----- where we should be at, a level of risk that is acceptable, below which lower risk is not attainable at a cost/benefit justified effort.
There is nothing particularly wrong with the Det Norske Veritas document re. societal risk, referred to in the Ambidjii Report, and Ambidjii has followed what they were given, a seriously flawed process, with which to work.
It is the process that is wrong, to come to the conclusion that YSBK operations, ( or any) GAAP for twenty or so years, presents as an "intolerable risk", it fails the "common sense"test.
For the first ten or so years of GAAP, there were nil/none/nought/zero MAC ---- Intolerable risk??
Anybody who read the O'Neil report into matters NAS, as commissioned by CASA (including the inputs of a number of acknowledged professional risk management persons - as in PhDs, etc., from other branches of the Commonwealth Public Service) gives a far more detailed insight into the shortcomings of the process ---- as still used by CASA and Airservices.
What Professor O'Neil (ANU) had to say is echoed by the three reports arranged here, by Dick Smith, and several more, yet to be published.
The message we have to get across the John McCormick is that he has been the victim of a seriously flawed process.
Fix the process, and we have fixed the GAAP "intolerable risk" problem.
After all, Ambidjii did not recommend the changes put in place. Who, in CASA, recommended the "final solution" (which is what it is for flying training, if we don't do something fast) to the DAS/CEO, I will bet he didn't think it up himself ??
Just go to the ATSB web site, have a look at all the consolidated accident data, and see how good the overall training rate is, compared to other GA sectors, or GA as a whole, then look at Avstats for the places much of the training hours operations occur, then try and convince yourself that the GAAP "intolerable risk", based on MAC only, is the overwhelming risk ---- is reasonable ---- and see how badly it fails the commons sense test -- let alone proper analysis.
The differences between GAAP and FAA D are marginal. For "cultural" reasons I would argue to maintain the current Australian system, but I acknowledge what Dick says about IFR protection, but this is an entirely different proposition to the fundamental flaw that brought about the present GAAP disaster.
As for ICAO D, forget it if you want to preserve any elementary flying training at the GAAPs.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 30th Aug 2009 at 14:31.
Moderator
I have been doing a bit of research into J McCormick's resume to prepare me for the phone call I plan to make to him tomorrow. I hope he had a better weekend than we did at Jandakot.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority - CASA's Director
All I can see is that he left Australia 22 years ago and seems to have been in Hong Kong pretty much since then apart from some time in France. I see he has about the same total time as Pilot In Command as I have as Pilot In Command just in GAAP airspace... You don't get a lot of ex-Honkers airbuses and boeings around YPJT so I doubt he has as much as me, or any of the other folks who work here. There is no mention of any experience whatsoever in GA flying in Australia unless I am missing something.
Can anyone tell me what qualifies him to dictate to me and my colleagues what is and isn't safe around a GAAP and why our opinion wasn't even worth seeking?
Because the issue I see with whatever letters of the alphabet you want to use for your airspace, you need to get rid of conflict of interest, consult , research, peer review of research, implement, trial and review. Not dictate from on high and then wait for someone to get killed in a MAC at an IRP to see if you were right or not.
Maybe the reasoning is that if the insurance companiues get wind of how much the risks have increased they will stop covering our aircraft to go within 50nm of a GAAP approach point and we'll all be grounded but at least we will be safe.
And broke.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority - CASA's Director
All I can see is that he left Australia 22 years ago and seems to have been in Hong Kong pretty much since then apart from some time in France. I see he has about the same total time as Pilot In Command as I have as Pilot In Command just in GAAP airspace... You don't get a lot of ex-Honkers airbuses and boeings around YPJT so I doubt he has as much as me, or any of the other folks who work here. There is no mention of any experience whatsoever in GA flying in Australia unless I am missing something.
Can anyone tell me what qualifies him to dictate to me and my colleagues what is and isn't safe around a GAAP and why our opinion wasn't even worth seeking?
Because the issue I see with whatever letters of the alphabet you want to use for your airspace, you need to get rid of conflict of interest, consult , research, peer review of research, implement, trial and review. Not dictate from on high and then wait for someone to get killed in a MAC at an IRP to see if you were right or not.
Maybe the reasoning is that if the insurance companiues get wind of how much the risks have increased they will stop covering our aircraft to go within 50nm of a GAAP approach point and we'll all be grounded but at least we will be safe.
And broke.
I SAY AGAIN....NOWHERE IN THE AMBIDJI REPORT DOES IT RECOMMEND CHANGES TO THE OPERATIONS OF GAAP IN THE SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM!
Make GAAP ICAO D and it is all over. Just revert back to the tried and true procedures that have done this country well for the last 28 years or more.
GAAP doesn't mean it is OK to change to FAA D just leave us with what we have got...it works!
Philosophy...regulation and training...instill a culture of safety....AIRMANSHIP.
Something I have always thought... AIRMANSHIP begins and ends in the command seat....it is not the responsibility of the Minister...no matter how hard the safety managers try to spin it.
Current situation is crazy but....Airmanship is prevailing...and who is responsible for that?
Leadsled, in a way, I agree with you. Airmanship is hard to judge on risk assesments....Put it another way, you can asses the risk of using a piece of hardware...you cannot asses the risk of the operator using the hardware because you cannot possibly come up with every outcome of how a person reacts to a situation...you can only trust their training.
Ultimately parachuting is an intolerable risk because a single failure can have a guaranteed catstrophic outcome...yet common sense and airmanship says otherwise...you trust the training of the skydiver to follow the procedure.
Make GAAP ICAO D and it is all over. Just revert back to the tried and true procedures that have done this country well for the last 28 years or more.
GAAP doesn't mean it is OK to change to FAA D just leave us with what we have got...it works!
Philosophy...regulation and training...instill a culture of safety....AIRMANSHIP.
Something I have always thought... AIRMANSHIP begins and ends in the command seat....it is not the responsibility of the Minister...no matter how hard the safety managers try to spin it.
Current situation is crazy but....Airmanship is prevailing...and who is responsible for that?
Leadsled, in a way, I agree with you. Airmanship is hard to judge on risk assesments....Put it another way, you can asses the risk of using a piece of hardware...you cannot asses the risk of the operator using the hardware because you cannot possibly come up with every outcome of how a person reacts to a situation...you can only trust their training.
Ultimately parachuting is an intolerable risk because a single failure can have a guaranteed catstrophic outcome...yet common sense and airmanship says otherwise...you trust the training of the skydiver to follow the procedure.
Thread Starter
I will say it again, FAA NAS style class D has no measurable differences to our present GAAP for VFR aircraft.
For IFR aircraft the pilot can remain IFR and get a separation service from other IFR aircraft in VMC-- if the pilot so desires.
This clearly has a safety advantage.
At no FAA class D airport is there a prescribed limit on the number of aircraft being given a service by ATC.
Why doesn't someone from the CASA OAR tell us why they are changing GAAP to D?
I dare someone to phone them and place the answer here!
For IFR aircraft the pilot can remain IFR and get a separation service from other IFR aircraft in VMC-- if the pilot so desires.
This clearly has a safety advantage.
At no FAA class D airport is there a prescribed limit on the number of aircraft being given a service by ATC.
Why doesn't someone from the CASA OAR tell us why they are changing GAAP to D?
I dare someone to phone them and place the answer here!
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The last 3 posts have been the best in this whole debate. (before the one above).
As far as the report goes, I have read every page and most of what it has said I agree with.
As far as it being flawed? We every report commissioned by anyone is flawed in some way and is always interpreted differently by different people.
I remember reading the Access Economics report on NAS 2b and it stated that 2 hours flight time will be saved by every pilot in his CPL training! Yeh right!
What the Amdidji report did say in its conclusions was for a staggered approach to change with a lot of checks and balances.
Unfortunately this has not happened. Change has been railroaded by the new Boss has done what he has all his career - issued and ORDER.
This comes from his Military and International Airline experience. I have not seen anywhere in his resume where he has even set foot on a GA airport.
So we get what we get. Hopefully, someone is Man enough to say "I was wrong"!!
I don't think the Ambidji report should be attached like it has been but the knee jerk reaction from political pressure and a new person at the helm who thinks he needs to be seen to be doing something. (my opinion from afar)
Once again we are railroaded by politics and special interested political savvy individuals.
As far as the report goes, I have read every page and most of what it has said I agree with.
As far as it being flawed? We every report commissioned by anyone is flawed in some way and is always interpreted differently by different people.
I remember reading the Access Economics report on NAS 2b and it stated that 2 hours flight time will be saved by every pilot in his CPL training! Yeh right!
What the Amdidji report did say in its conclusions was for a staggered approach to change with a lot of checks and balances.
Unfortunately this has not happened. Change has been railroaded by the new Boss has done what he has all his career - issued and ORDER.
This comes from his Military and International Airline experience. I have not seen anywhere in his resume where he has even set foot on a GA airport.
So we get what we get. Hopefully, someone is Man enough to say "I was wrong"!!
I don't think the Ambidji report should be attached like it has been but the knee jerk reaction from political pressure and a new person at the helm who thinks he needs to be seen to be doing something. (my opinion from afar)
Once again we are railroaded by politics and special interested political savvy individuals.
Moderator
Agree the Ambidji report is mostly accurate but has it's limitations, and it acknowledges them. Mostly good apart from the nonsense that the MAC at Jandakot that happenned after the tower closed was a GAAP event. The casa societal risk thingo isn't thiers and deosn't seem to have any statistcal credibility at all.. Their recommendations are good, particularly 1,3 and 4 but CASA have completely ignored them!
Statistically based on past events in the time frame they use you actually are more likely to have a mid-air at Gascoyne Junction than Jandakot.
Statistically based on past events in the time frame they use you actually are more likely to have a mid-air at Gascoyne Junction than Jandakot.
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Lead, I disagree with you on the 'Dick-hating' thing. Most people on this forum try to be objective and most would admit that Dick's done some extraordinary stuff. In my opinion your posts are objective, as are many others; but there are non-objective contributions from both sides of the house.
I give you this from the other thread:
An emotive generalisation. What did the RAAF actually do to contribute to the current problem; and where's the relevance- last time I looked RAAF didn't run GAAP.? This sort of stuff does no one any favours.
Moving on, your comment that:
Well yes, I agree. There is inordinate pressure for 'something' (anything) to be done.
However, what you don't acknowledge is that it's actually a Holy Trinity - a triple-whammy. I'll leave you to join the dots.
My sympathies are with CFI (and his compatriots) on the receiving end of the Trinity.
I give you this from the other thread:
AH Dick, The entrenched ex RAAF fly boys of the 1960/1970 era in the bureacracy now set the standard, (a) They don't like light aircraft , period and (b) they absolutely believe in sterile controlled airspace no matter what the risk assesment is or how much it might cost.
There is not a commercial bone in their bodies and they really don't care if the flying schools grind to a halt.
The notion that holding early low time pilots OCTA in the concentrated space adjacent to designated GAAP airports is safe defies logic, and to be then assured after clearance is granted to the GAAP that they are mystically separated is fallacy.
There is not a commercial bone in their bodies and they really don't care if the flying schools grind to a halt.
The notion that holding early low time pilots OCTA in the concentrated space adjacent to designated GAAP airports is safe defies logic, and to be then assured after clearance is granted to the GAAP that they are mystically separated is fallacy.
Moving on, your comment that:
The Ambidj Report is/was only part of the problem faced by John McCormick, brand new in the Director of Aviation Safety/CEO job. Arguably , what he was presented with, in the ICAO audit, and in particular the matter of airspace management, was overwhelming pressure to at least make a start.
With the double whammy of the ICAO audit and the Ambidjii Report, he was left with little choice as to a starting point.
With the double whammy of the ICAO audit and the Ambidjii Report, he was left with little choice as to a starting point.
However, what you don't acknowledge is that it's actually a Holy Trinity - a triple-whammy. I'll leave you to join the dots.
My sympathies are with CFI (and his compatriots) on the receiving end of the Trinity.
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I must say that the Military have played a very prominent role in prescriptive aviation regulation in this country since about 1945, and certainly from 1949 when AOPA Australia 
was formed to give voice to private GA people who believed they had sufficient brains to make decisive impacts upon their own life and death situations.
Subsequent to the DCA days we now have box's to tick for students who masturbate in flying schools.
It's not that this is normal behaviour which could be addressed in the general comments section,
but "big brother" has deemed us all suspect masturbators
and a box has to be ticked. Usually at a cost to the applicant who probably has never had the need to masturbate in his life, (being a pilot and all).
This mentality has flourished to what it is today, from when a medical, (for example) was a means of "washing out" somebody that the Flight Commander didn't like how his Jib was cut.
In the Army we just gave them hats that were too big so a Corporal would pick on them for looking like an idiot.
Of note and possibly something that has escaped everybody's attention is the "plethora" of "Cathay Club" individuals in senior positions of recent.
The two regulatory infected, and in concert, make for a very non friendly environment for the majority of GA who can be summed up as a rapidly but unprotected, environmentally fragile species verging on extinction.
Perhaps some bureaucratic peon can make another prescriptive regulation to make this illegal.
(The Cathay/ Military thing that is).
As for Dick bashing, I think it is a measure of the man that he doesn't resort to what he is often accused of by those who vilify him. Something That is peculiar only to "rock throwing" Australians who live in "glass houses"
If I have offended anyone by the use of the masturbate word, please delete that and insert word of your choice. "Cool laconic Dude" would probably be tolerated.
EDIT: Caught by the "spelling Police".
was formed to give voice to private GA people who believed they had sufficient brains to make decisive impacts upon their own life and death situations.Subsequent to the DCA days we now have box's to tick for students who masturbate in flying schools.
It's not that this is normal behaviour which could be addressed in the general comments section, but "big brother" has deemed us all suspect masturbators and a box has to be ticked. Usually at a cost to the applicant who probably has never had the need to masturbate in his life, (being a pilot and all).This mentality has flourished to what it is today, from when a medical, (for example) was a means of "washing out" somebody that the Flight Commander didn't like how his Jib was cut.
In the Army we just gave them hats that were too big so a Corporal would pick on them for looking like an idiot.
Of note and possibly something that has escaped everybody's attention is the "plethora" of "Cathay Club" individuals in senior positions of recent.
The two regulatory infected, and in concert, make for a very non friendly environment for the majority of GA who can be summed up as a rapidly but unprotected, environmentally fragile species verging on extinction.
Perhaps some bureaucratic peon
can make another prescriptive regulation to make this illegal.(The Cathay/ Military thing that is).
As for Dick bashing, I think it is a measure of the man that he doesn't resort to what he is often accused of by those who vilify him. Something That is peculiar only to "rock throwing" Australians who live in "glass houses"
If I have offended anyone by the use of the masturbate word, please delete that and insert word of your choice. "Cool laconic Dude" would probably be tolerated.
EDIT: Caught by the "spelling Police".
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 31st Aug 2009 at 22:28.
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I think it is a measure of the man that he doesn't resort to what he is often accused of by those who vilify him.
Nup, I don't believe that is the reason these cowards hide their names - more about not being really confident about their belief's.
BTW- good luck with trying to get anyone
Man enough to say "I was wrong"!!
My sympathies are with CFI (and his compatriots) on the receiving end of the Trinity.
As for Dick bashing, I think it is a measure of the man that he doesn't resort to what he is often accused of by those who vilify him. Something That is peculiar only to "rock throwing" Australians who live in "glass houses"