Lead, I disagree with you on the 'Dick-hating' thing. Most people on this forum try to be objective and most would admit that Dick's done some extraordinary stuff. In my opinion your posts are objective, as are many others; but there are non-objective contributions from both sides of the house.
I give you this from the other thread:
AH Dick, The entrenched ex RAAF fly boys of the 1960/1970 era in the bureacracy now set the standard, (a) They don't like light aircraft , period and (b) they absolutely believe in sterile controlled airspace no matter what the risk assesment is or how much it might cost.
There is not a commercial bone in their bodies and they really don't care if the flying schools grind to a halt.
The notion that holding early low time pilots OCTA in the concentrated space adjacent to designated GAAP airports is safe defies logic, and to be then assured after clearance is granted to the GAAP that they are mystically separated is fallacy.
An emotive generalisation. What did the RAAF actually do to contribute to the current problem; and where's the relevance- last time I looked RAAF didn't run GAAP.? This sort of stuff does no one any favours.
Moving on, your comment that:
The Ambidj Report is/was only part of the problem faced by John McCormick, brand new in the Director of Aviation Safety/CEO job. Arguably , what he was presented with, in the ICAO audit, and in particular the matter of airspace management, was overwhelming pressure to at least make a start.
With the double whammy of the ICAO audit and the Ambidjii Report, he was left with little choice as to a starting point.
Well yes, I agree. There is inordinate pressure for 'something' (anything) to be done.
However, what you don't acknowledge is that it's actually a Holy Trinity - a triple-whammy. I'll leave you to join the dots.
My sympathies are with
CFI (and his compatriots) on the receiving end of the Trinity.