Mike Pence's plane skids off runway at LGA
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According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it. It was the long landing that caused the overun and it sounds like the MEL'd speedbrake was extended late and the late reversers may not have helped.
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. Two engine go arounds are not well taught in my airline and there is no shortage of evidence saying that they are a real problem on the B737. There are so many possible go around scenarios and you have think out how you are going to carry out each one without scraping the tail, stalling out, nose diving in, overspeeding the flaps etc.
If go arounds are not well trained, "hoping" that the aircraft will stop will seem like the better option in the heat of the moment....like in this case.
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain. Two engine go arounds are not well taught in my airline and there is no shortage of evidence saying that they are a real problem on the B737. There are so many possible go around scenarios and you have think out how you are going to carry out each one without scraping the tail, stalling out, nose diving in, overspeeding the flaps etc.
If go arounds are not well trained, "hoping" that the aircraft will stop will seem like the better option in the heat of the moment....like in this case.
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The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain.
The real issue is why the Captain (clue is in the name/title) did not call a go around. End of.
What the F/o did is largely irrelevant. That Capt was in charge - rather he was supposed to be. And clearly wan't. The Capt manifestly failed to ensure his crew did a proper job and to manage his flight, yet the poor F/O got fired and the lousy incompetent Capt just got demoted.
That is just so, so wrong.
The real issue is why the long landing occured and was not noticed by the FO and the go around not called by the Captain.
According to the QRH, using F40 for landing only saves a few hundred feet of runway over an F30 landing. If the FO, had no experience of F40 landings, a wet La Guardia, was not the place to try it
That said, I agree with you that the primary problem is the lack of a go-around.
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314' landing distance decrease with F40 vs F30. They went maybe 75-100' off the end?
The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float.
My company uses F30 as standard. That's probably true for most operators. But everyone was exposed to F40 landings in training and IOE/LOE.
The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float.
My company uses F30 as standard. That's probably true for most operators. But everyone was exposed to F40 landings in training and IOE/LOE.
The big difference with F40 is it's very hard to float.
There's more to this story then meets the eye.
Crew composition being one of them.
Company culture and all that.
No doubt this incident cost Eastern its future as an airline.
Simply the wrong people were flying the most important highest profile contract in the existence of this startup airline.
Crew composition being one of them.
Company culture and all that.
No doubt this incident cost Eastern its future as an airline.
Simply the wrong people were flying the most important highest profile contract in the existence of this startup airline.
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Both pilots are currently off line with full pay. He wanted to ensure that their retraining was good. The airline plans on recreating the night of the incident in future training and it should be complete within the next 15 days. He has elected to downgrade the incident captain as a first officer until the NTSB’s final ruling on the incident.
There have been no previous issues with the captain. He recalled that when he was in the simulator he had difficulties in flaring to [sic] high since he was flying bigger airplanes.
...
Flew with incident captain a while ago. He would have been the incident captain’s first officer they did not dual captain together. He would characterize him as a “by the book” individual. The captain would have been one to criticize and he felt comfortable doing so if it was necessary. Very open minded great communication. He enjoyed flying with him. They were never in an emergency or abnormal situation.
He has only flown as a dual captain on maybe 3 times in a year and half, unless it was training. With two captains there was no standard on who was the pilot in command it would be just a discussion to decide at the gate.
...
He had flown with the incident captain at Eastern Air Lines, and has known him since flying the DC-10 with Centurion Air Cargo. He characterized the incident captain as friendly, polite, professional, and fair. He further stated that that incident captain was always providing explanations for what he wanted to do. The most recent flight with the incident captain was about a week prior to the incident. He was to fly with the incident captain on the incident flight; however, they were rescheduled because he had family issues and needed to return home. No issues with the captain, always helping and stated “no issues at all.” The incident captain was always helping with the weight and balance.
He felt the captain was one he could ask questions to and considered him a friend as he has known him for about 10 years. He stated that the incident captain was a “pleasure to fly with.” He was “very friendly” and they joked about politics. He has not flown with the incident captain often at Eastern; however, he had flown with him a lot at a previous employer. He flew to Havana and also on the campaign with the captain. He felt comfortable with asking the incident captain questions.
When asked about the captain’s proficiency as a pilot, he felt the captain was a “sharp guy” and always reading and checking. He was very detail oriented when it came to the standard operating procedures.
He felt the captain’s greatest strengths were that he was one of the finest captains he had flown with. The incident captain was one that was preferred to fly with, by first officers, at the previous employer. Her felt that the incident captain flew very well and followed the procedure. When the incident captain needed to take a leg he was very polite and explained why he had made that decision. He had flown 10 hours straight with the captain in the DC-10 and reiterated that he was a pleasure to fly with. In the 737, they did short flights and felt that he could tolerate anyone in that time frame.
...
When asked to describe any weaknesses that the incident captain could improve on, he said that he couldn’t recall any. At Eastern, the captain was flying very well. They’ve flown into windy with nice weather and short runways. The captain always took those legs.
There were requirements for which airports that captain must land at, such as special use airports. He did not feel that the incident captain needed to provide a reason why he wanted to fly a certain flight, as the incident captain was a “gentleman” and respectful and friendly. When he had flown with the incident captain it was windy and when there was a short runway, the captain flew those legs. He could not recall if there was a specific wind limit for first officer.
...
He has observed captains make minor mistakes such as forgetting to set missed approach altitude, adjusting airspeed for windy conditions, flying the appropriate speed. He has not seen the incident captain make any mistakes since he has been flying at Eastern Air Lines.
...
He also stated that he flew with the incident captain June 2, 2016. He was a first officer at the time when he flew with the incident captain; however, they only flew one flight together from Phoenix to Atlanta. He remembered that the captain was the pilot flying and thought that he was a good pilot, open, and very experienced. There were no issues with the flight that he could recall and he felt as though he could have brought up any issues or concerns with the captain when they flew that flight.
...
He clarified that he does not consider incident captain to be a friend and does not have a relationship with him. He described the flight as “all good.” The incident captain had him conduct the takeoff and fly most of the leg, and the incident captain landed the aircraft. He described the incident captain as nice. He further stated that the easy part of the flight was to be the PF and PM had a lot of paperwork which the incident captain completed. They transferred controls before descent. He said that the incident captain wanted to do the landing because Georgetown was a shorter than average runway. He didn’t consider it short as he’s landed on a runway less than 4,000 foot long runway in a Boeing 737-SFP25. The weather for the flight to Georgetown was good. There was no rain or wind and the visibility was “okay.” He said that there was good CRM and that incident captain was “open.” He described the incident captain as professional, and a normal guy. He said he was comfortable speaking openly with him. He enjoyed flying with the incident captain and said he was treated fairly, treated well, and felt comfortable. He said the landing at Georgetown was on the touchdown zone and he didn’t remember anything being different from normal. He said that before OPT, everyone [pilots] complained, but he described the incident captain as “not the kind of person to complain.”
...
Flew with incident captain a while ago. He would have been the incident captain’s first officer they did not dual captain together. He would characterize him as a “by the book” individual. The captain would have been one to criticize and he felt comfortable doing so if it was necessary. Very open minded great communication. He enjoyed flying with him. They were never in an emergency or abnormal situation.
He has only flown as a dual captain on maybe 3 times in a year and half, unless it was training. With two captains there was no standard on who was the pilot in command it would be just a discussion to decide at the gate.
...
He had flown with the incident captain at Eastern Air Lines, and has known him since flying the DC-10 with Centurion Air Cargo. He characterized the incident captain as friendly, polite, professional, and fair. He further stated that that incident captain was always providing explanations for what he wanted to do. The most recent flight with the incident captain was about a week prior to the incident. He was to fly with the incident captain on the incident flight; however, they were rescheduled because he had family issues and needed to return home. No issues with the captain, always helping and stated “no issues at all.” The incident captain was always helping with the weight and balance.
He felt the captain was one he could ask questions to and considered him a friend as he has known him for about 10 years. He stated that the incident captain was a “pleasure to fly with.” He was “very friendly” and they joked about politics. He has not flown with the incident captain often at Eastern; however, he had flown with him a lot at a previous employer. He flew to Havana and also on the campaign with the captain. He felt comfortable with asking the incident captain questions.
When asked about the captain’s proficiency as a pilot, he felt the captain was a “sharp guy” and always reading and checking. He was very detail oriented when it came to the standard operating procedures.
He felt the captain’s greatest strengths were that he was one of the finest captains he had flown with. The incident captain was one that was preferred to fly with, by first officers, at the previous employer. Her felt that the incident captain flew very well and followed the procedure. When the incident captain needed to take a leg he was very polite and explained why he had made that decision. He had flown 10 hours straight with the captain in the DC-10 and reiterated that he was a pleasure to fly with. In the 737, they did short flights and felt that he could tolerate anyone in that time frame.
...
When asked to describe any weaknesses that the incident captain could improve on, he said that he couldn’t recall any. At Eastern, the captain was flying very well. They’ve flown into windy with nice weather and short runways. The captain always took those legs.
There were requirements for which airports that captain must land at, such as special use airports. He did not feel that the incident captain needed to provide a reason why he wanted to fly a certain flight, as the incident captain was a “gentleman” and respectful and friendly. When he had flown with the incident captain it was windy and when there was a short runway, the captain flew those legs. He could not recall if there was a specific wind limit for first officer.
...
He has observed captains make minor mistakes such as forgetting to set missed approach altitude, adjusting airspeed for windy conditions, flying the appropriate speed. He has not seen the incident captain make any mistakes since he has been flying at Eastern Air Lines.
...
He also stated that he flew with the incident captain June 2, 2016. He was a first officer at the time when he flew with the incident captain; however, they only flew one flight together from Phoenix to Atlanta. He remembered that the captain was the pilot flying and thought that he was a good pilot, open, and very experienced. There were no issues with the flight that he could recall and he felt as though he could have brought up any issues or concerns with the captain when they flew that flight.
...
He clarified that he does not consider incident captain to be a friend and does not have a relationship with him. He described the flight as “all good.” The incident captain had him conduct the takeoff and fly most of the leg, and the incident captain landed the aircraft. He described the incident captain as nice. He further stated that the easy part of the flight was to be the PF and PM had a lot of paperwork which the incident captain completed. They transferred controls before descent. He said that the incident captain wanted to do the landing because Georgetown was a shorter than average runway. He didn’t consider it short as he’s landed on a runway less than 4,000 foot long runway in a Boeing 737-SFP25. The weather for the flight to Georgetown was good. There was no rain or wind and the visibility was “okay.” He said that there was good CRM and that incident captain was “open.” He described the incident captain as professional, and a normal guy. He said he was comfortable speaking openly with him. He enjoyed flying with the incident captain and said he was treated fairly, treated well, and felt comfortable. He said the landing at Georgetown was on the touchdown zone and he didn’t remember anything being different from normal. He said that before OPT, everyone [pilots] complained, but he described the incident captain as “not the kind of person to complain.”
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From the Chief Pilot's interview last year:
Do you have more recent information?
The captain seems to get pretty good reviews in the personnel interviews:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604028.pdf
Do you have more recent information?
The captain seems to get pretty good reviews in the personnel interviews:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604028.pdf
And no doubt he will rue the lack of a go-around for the rest of his days. But boy the armchair critics can be unforgiving. I guess you have to take that when you're in the hot seat. I think it's easier for people to try and make you out as an incompetent fool after an incident rather than acknowledge that the same can happen to them. One mistake, uncorrected.
For me it's not about forgiving or blaming, it's about dragging lessons from it.
The lesson for me ( apart from the go-around call that never happened) is that the Captain should not be persuaded from what he or she thinks is most prudent without serious consideration. (equally important is that they do consider different assessments from the f/o ).
It's like the Captain of a ship deciding not to enter the harbour until full tide and the first mate saying "nah I'll take it in now, you had miles of clearance at that last harbour we entered". And the Captain replying " alright".
The lesson for me ( apart from the go-around call that never happened) is that the Captain should not be persuaded from what he or she thinks is most prudent without serious consideration. (equally important is that they do consider different assessments from the f/o ).
It's like the Captain of a ship deciding not to enter the harbour until full tide and the first mate saying "nah I'll take it in now, you had miles of clearance at that last harbour we entered". And the Captain replying " alright".
After shutting down the engines and starting the auxiliary power unit, the pilots opened the cockpit door to provide an assessment of the situation to a Secret Service agent.
“Nice. Nice job,” the agent said, after being briefed.
“Huh,” the captain replied.
“Nice job,” the agent said. “You stopped it, at least.”
“Nice. Nice job,” the agent said, after being briefed.
“Huh,” the captain replied.
“Nice job,” the agent said. “You stopped it, at least.”
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Is American "Airline" training really so shonky that an FO can have never done a flaps 40 landing, and his Captains is scared to ask/tell him to? What goes on in US type rating courses? Coffee and poker? How can anyone convert to a type and not practice all the landing configs? It doesn't seem possible.
WTF?
Is there some mystery to a F40 landing? Because if so I missed it. For several years.
What other config would you even consider to use on a wet runway with a tailwind component? Is there one? - apart from asking for a runway change?
Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.
WTF?
Is there some mystery to a F40 landing? Because if so I missed it. For several years.
What other config would you even consider to use on a wet runway with a tailwind component? Is there one? - apart from asking for a runway change?
Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.
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737NG has some different handling characteristics with F40. Creates the increased possibility of lateral PIO's. It's something to be aware of. And it's hard to land smoothly with F40. So some pilots are leery to use it. Short, wet, tailwind? F40 it is. Plant it and park it.
There's something up with the human being. Give that captain a description of his scenario before it happened, and he'd tell you that he'd go around. 20,000 hours, and of course he knows that a long landing in those conditions mandates a go around. And sure enough, just after his scenario he verbally wonders why he didn't go around.
I have had it. Different scenario and I got away with it. It was an instant loss of nearly all visibility in the flare, due to a freak shower. Should have gone around, but the startle factor causes 2-3 seconds of non-thinking, or an attempt to continue with the thinking you have been doing, even though you know you need to change thinking, but the thinking-inertia needs to be overcome. I was left (after a very untidy landing) wondering why I didn't go around.
We need training and exposure to this phenomenon. Of course flying gods and Pprune retirees need not apply.
Hundredpercent, I agree with you that more training and knowledge is required about startle factor. I think you're being a bit harsh on those who identify errors the Captain made though. If someone believes that the Captain made an error of judgement/leadership/ communication ( whatever) and they thInk there is a lesson in it for themselves and others, suddenly they're macho and an armchair expert/ flying god?
We have to be able to say what we think if we want to use a site like this for learning and it is inevitable that others will disagree.
We have to be able to say what we think if we want to use a site like this for learning and it is inevitable that others will disagree.
framer,
Pilots want a no-blame culture or a "just culture" when it comes to dealing with mistakes. A culture that looks at the source of the mistake, learns from it, and then passes on the newfound wisdom to other pilots in order to improve safety.
Yet pilots come on here, point the blame finger, and deride. It's those that I have issue with.
I like to look at incidents like this as deeply as possible, to try and work out what caused (in this case) an experienced captain to not go around when clearly it was required - and he knew it. I would suggest others do too, it may help one day!
Pilots want a no-blame culture or a "just culture" when it comes to dealing with mistakes. A culture that looks at the source of the mistake, learns from it, and then passes on the newfound wisdom to other pilots in order to improve safety.
Yet pilots come on here, point the blame finger, and deride. It's those that I have issue with.
I like to look at incidents like this as deeply as possible, to try and work out what caused (in this case) an experienced captain to not go around when clearly it was required - and he knew it. I would suggest others do too, it may help one day!
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Exactly. As a 737 commander myself you bet I have learnt from this incident. The modern "just culture" has been hard-won yet those on here who noflynomore or those who never did, want to crucify the crew for their mistakes.
Wow.
Originally Posted by noflynomore
Truly shocking. This is genuine Indonesian aviation standards - right there in the USA.
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As usual the prune professional slaggers crawl out from under their stones to deride anyone with an opinion that isn't exactly in line with theirs or that they think they can belittle for not being exactly like them - ie retired - generally considered in our society a very boorish and unacceptable, bigoted thing to do while ignoring the fact that the retired are quite likely to be more experienced than they are, but of course they cannot know but shoot from the gob anyway.
50%Nothankyou, it may have escaped your notice that there is a chain of command on an aeroplane and that the Captain is at the top of it. I gather you take the modern view that no one is ever at fault for anything but believe me you are just plain WRONG. The final responsibiity rests with the Captain. I this case he didn't just make one cardinal mistake, he made a whole string of them, none of them excusible and as NHP without the possibility of being maxed out by flying. These errors are so fundamental that there can be no excuse.
No one has said we shouldn't learn from this incident or examine it deeply, least of all me, yet this accusation seems to have been pointed in my direction in the usual prune baseless slagging-off style by people who invent things others have never written.
Equally I have never suggested crucifying anyone in this case - an utterly baseless accusation as ever - I merely stated the obvious that no one else could shoulder the blame. Because they can't.
"Just culture" involves not crucifying people for human errors, not gross professional misconduct which imo is the only definition possible for landing on a wet runway downwind with a spare stage of flap unused, and then failing to go around after the f/o floats half the length of the runway. "the monment had passed" had it? Bloody long moment, that one, he had what must have felt like aeons to think about it. No-one at fault my @rse!
Even so I haven't suggested any form of punishment - merely responsibility. A fact that some holier-than-thou false accusers who can't be bothered to actually read other peoples' posts before slagging them off - like JC07 might like to take on board. Talk about pot/kettle! You are a paragon, sir!
I may be considered old-fashioned by taking the view that Professionalism involves Responsibility - and that includes shouldering the responsibility, even when your colleague screws up, because YOU ARE IN COMMAND. I am certainly not a crucifier and believe 100% in a just culture but I also cough to my errors and am happy to take what's coming if I deserve it. I do NOT agree with the namby-pamby notion that finding fault is undesireable and people shouldn't suffer sanctions if they get things culpably wrong.
Also, perhaps actually reading what is written and not inventing stories/opinions/scenarios between other peoples' lines might result in a more "just culture" here... think about it.
50%Nothankyou, it may have escaped your notice that there is a chain of command on an aeroplane and that the Captain is at the top of it. I gather you take the modern view that no one is ever at fault for anything but believe me you are just plain WRONG. The final responsibiity rests with the Captain. I this case he didn't just make one cardinal mistake, he made a whole string of them, none of them excusible and as NHP without the possibility of being maxed out by flying. These errors are so fundamental that there can be no excuse.
No one has said we shouldn't learn from this incident or examine it deeply, least of all me, yet this accusation seems to have been pointed in my direction in the usual prune baseless slagging-off style by people who invent things others have never written.
Equally I have never suggested crucifying anyone in this case - an utterly baseless accusation as ever - I merely stated the obvious that no one else could shoulder the blame. Because they can't.
"Just culture" involves not crucifying people for human errors, not gross professional misconduct which imo is the only definition possible for landing on a wet runway downwind with a spare stage of flap unused, and then failing to go around after the f/o floats half the length of the runway. "the monment had passed" had it? Bloody long moment, that one, he had what must have felt like aeons to think about it. No-one at fault my @rse!
Even so I haven't suggested any form of punishment - merely responsibility. A fact that some holier-than-thou false accusers who can't be bothered to actually read other peoples' posts before slagging them off - like JC07 might like to take on board. Talk about pot/kettle! You are a paragon, sir!
I may be considered old-fashioned by taking the view that Professionalism involves Responsibility - and that includes shouldering the responsibility, even when your colleague screws up, because YOU ARE IN COMMAND. I am certainly not a crucifier and believe 100% in a just culture but I also cough to my errors and am happy to take what's coming if I deserve it. I do NOT agree with the namby-pamby notion that finding fault is undesireable and people shouldn't suffer sanctions if they get things culpably wrong.
Also, perhaps actually reading what is written and not inventing stories/opinions/scenarios between other peoples' lines might result in a more "just culture" here... think about it.
Last edited by noflynomore; 6th Jun 2017 at 10:28.
Just me.
I first flew the 737 in the Middle East a long time ago. We used only flaps 15 or 40 for all landings. Was not a problem.
Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ.
Used 30 and 40 years later in the BBJ.
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Interesting, shows how company culture affects such things. I never did a F15 landing in 12 yrs on the 737-3/400. We (3 UK companies) only ever used F30 and occasionally 40 as we were seldom length limited.
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And, I can see where the FO might not want to do flaps 40 if it wasn't a normal flap setting covered in the company training program. And, I'll agree with those who say that the flap setting was not the probable cause of the mishap.