AA Crash Jamaica
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66,360tons
Correct, relocate to France and you will need to adapt to receiving invoices/utility bills/bank statements and writing out cheques in this format.
e.g one thousand two hundred thirty-four euros and fifty-six cents as one decimal two three four comma five six.
e.g one thousand two hundred thirty-four euros and fifty-six cents as one decimal two three four comma five six.
the captain stated that flaps 30 “was normal for this situation,” and further stated that “for these conditions and for the go-around, flaps 30 was the better choice.”
If only.
strong tailwind, wet runway... and then floating. To err is human. There were 2 pilots, one is going to be cognitively impaired due to the workload demands, where on earth is the other one?
After proving that decisions are not well conducted in time critical events (have a look at the end of any runway for evidence... or at the tire tracks on some taxi ways....) as a profession we can only conclude that whatever we have been doing to date, CRM/ERM/HF, sitting around singing Kumbaya feeling warm fuzzies, does not add up to a reliably safe outcome.
But, I guess absolute safety is not economically acceptable, and the system appears to be happily devolving, not improving, anyway.
There is probably no runway anywhere in the world where a crew has not attempted to park shiny aluminium tubes off the end. The solution to this is don't place markets/houses at the end of runways... more chance of that happening than the decision making of crews suddenly becoming perfect at all times.
Mistrust in Management
The NTSB believes pilots should be knowledgeable about the effects of a tailwind on the landing performance ...
In honesty I find it remarkable that the NTSB find themselves in the position of 'having' to make such a statement.
Even if a considerably experienced (in total hours) Captain had been given no specific training on the effects of a tailwind on landing performance, he must have had exposure to the effects during his career and so would surely have picked up some sort of understanding.
As for the very deep touch down - well we can all experience a 'float' from time to time (in my case it has almost always been a result of a poor handling technique in the flare) - but the option to go-around must be exercised if landing performance may be in doubt.
What were this crew thinking?
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Was there no option to land into wind ?
Would it have been the prudent course of action for the skipper to land into the wind? We were not in the cockpit. Thus not aware of what his thought process was at the time.
Perhaps other pilots may have elected to use, flaps 40 resulting in a 7 to 8 knot lower approach speed resulting in much less float. Another choice would be to maneuver for a landing on RWY 30 with a flaps 30 landing.
Either way, I’m sure the captain is reliving this landing many times on a daily basis. The saving's grace is that nobody died in this accident as a result of this captain’s choice to land with a tailwind, poor airman skills in not being able to land in the touchdown zone, and not executing a go-around after the touchdown zone disappeared behind him.
The NTSB states the obvious (#566), but remains biased towards a pattern of ‘blame and train’.
Blame the Feds, the Operator, the senior management, the crew. Yes all held extensive accountability, but much more might be learnt by trying to explain and understand the reasons why the people and organisations behaved as they did; why was their understanding apparently so poor, why were procedures written as they were, why weren’t they followed, why did the crew choose this particular alternative and continue with it; why didn’t the crew Go Around.
Why didn’t anyone, – why doesn’t anyone know?
The style of the NTSB report promotes a ‘legalistic’ approach to safety (not litigious), whereby operators / managers / pilots seek ways of continuing the operation – ‘how can we do this’, the ‘how to’ or ‘can do’ attitude.
The industry’s safety interests require “should we be doing this”, the ‘why’ attitude; evidence, reasons.
The NTSB apparently does little to help with these safety questions.
Blame the Feds, the Operator, the senior management, the crew. Yes all held extensive accountability, but much more might be learnt by trying to explain and understand the reasons why the people and organisations behaved as they did; why was their understanding apparently so poor, why were procedures written as they were, why weren’t they followed, why did the crew choose this particular alternative and continue with it; why didn’t the crew Go Around.
Why didn’t anyone, – why doesn’t anyone know?
The style of the NTSB report promotes a ‘legalistic’ approach to safety (not litigious), whereby operators / managers / pilots seek ways of continuing the operation – ‘how can we do this’, the ‘how to’ or ‘can do’ attitude.
The industry’s safety interests require “should we be doing this”, the ‘why’ attitude; evidence, reasons.
The NTSB apparently does little to help with these safety questions.
I find it hard to believe that someone can get to this stage in their career and feel that a 14 knot tailwind on a wet (and not overly long) runway at night is an acceptable risk.
Yes there are restrictions on them circling, but there are other airports too. Did they not consider diverting?
Sure the regulator, the airline and the crew all had a hand in this, but the PIC is the final filter. An avoidable accident.
Yes there are restrictions on them circling, but there are other airports too. Did they not consider diverting?
Sure the regulator, the airline and the crew all had a hand in this, but the PIC is the final filter. An avoidable accident.
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US carriers are permitted to conduct an instrument approach to runway conduct a visual approach to the opposite runway, provided that VFR or CAT "D" conditions prevail, whichever is greater.
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Minima are specified under each airlines' respective Operations Specifications Part "C" Paragraph E... reference below.
E. Provisions for Part 121 Certificate Holders to Perform Circle-to-Land Maneuvers. Part 121 certificate holders may conduct circle-to-land maneuvers under two separate provisions within OpSpec C075.
1) Part 121 Operations with Flight Training and Flight Checking. Part 121 certificate holders whose pilots have been trained and checked for the circling maneuver in accordance with part 121 appendices E and F, or in accordance with an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), may conduct a circle-to-land maneuver:
· At the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used; or
· At the minimums specified in the chart contained within the OpSpec paragraph, whichever is higher.
a) Appendix E does not require a part 121 certificate holder to train a second in command (SIC) in the circling maneuver if the certificate holder prohibits the SIC from performing/conducting (acting as PF) a circling maneuver. However, an SIC must be trained and can be checked in those functions specific to the circle-to-land maneuver that the SIC is required to perform while acting as pilot-not-flying (PNF).
b) Any pilot who possesses a pilot certificate restricting circling approaches to visual meteorological conditions (VMC) is not eligible to conduct circle-to-land maneuvers, except as provided in subparagraph E.
2) Part 121 Operations Without Flight Training and Flight Checking. Certificate holders conducting circle-to-land maneuvers without training and checking must use a minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1,000 feet height above airport (HAA) or the MDA of the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used, whichever is higher. Certificate holders that conduct a circle-to-land maneuver under this provision remain under an IFR clearance and must comply with those procedures otherwise required for circle-to-land maneuvers. Certificate holders must ensure that pilots are familiar with those procedures. Part 121 pilots who have not been trained and checked for the circling maneuver in accordance with part 121 appendices E and F, or in accordance with an AQP, may conduct a circle-to-land maneuver when:
· The reported ceiling is at least 1,000 feet and the visibility is at least 3 statute miles (see part 121 appendices E and F); or
· The reported weather is at least equal to the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used, whichever is higher.
E. Provisions for Part 121 Certificate Holders to Perform Circle-to-Land Maneuvers. Part 121 certificate holders may conduct circle-to-land maneuvers under two separate provisions within OpSpec C075.
1) Part 121 Operations with Flight Training and Flight Checking. Part 121 certificate holders whose pilots have been trained and checked for the circling maneuver in accordance with part 121 appendices E and F, or in accordance with an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), may conduct a circle-to-land maneuver:
· At the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used; or
· At the minimums specified in the chart contained within the OpSpec paragraph, whichever is higher.
a) Appendix E does not require a part 121 certificate holder to train a second in command (SIC) in the circling maneuver if the certificate holder prohibits the SIC from performing/conducting (acting as PF) a circling maneuver. However, an SIC must be trained and can be checked in those functions specific to the circle-to-land maneuver that the SIC is required to perform while acting as pilot-not-flying (PNF).
b) Any pilot who possesses a pilot certificate restricting circling approaches to visual meteorological conditions (VMC) is not eligible to conduct circle-to-land maneuvers, except as provided in subparagraph E.
2) Part 121 Operations Without Flight Training and Flight Checking. Certificate holders conducting circle-to-land maneuvers without training and checking must use a minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1,000 feet height above airport (HAA) or the MDA of the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used, whichever is higher. Certificate holders that conduct a circle-to-land maneuver under this provision remain under an IFR clearance and must comply with those procedures otherwise required for circle-to-land maneuvers. Certificate holders must ensure that pilots are familiar with those procedures. Part 121 pilots who have not been trained and checked for the circling maneuver in accordance with part 121 appendices E and F, or in accordance with an AQP, may conduct a circle-to-land maneuver when:
· The reported ceiling is at least 1,000 feet and the visibility is at least 3 statute miles (see part 121 appendices E and F); or
· The reported weather is at least equal to the published circling landing minimums for the instrument approach to be used, whichever is higher.
Last edited by captjns; 10th Dec 2011 at 07:52.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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We can dress this up with FAR/Company regs/psycho-babble/pressures/weather etc but as Downin3 says in #570 - simples. Pilots are there in the cockpit to handle these. Endex. The traveling public should be aware that one or more pilots in AA appear not to have the necessary piloting skills to be allowed to operate unsupervised in the cockpit. As to whose 'fault' that is, refer to sentence 1?
Simple guidance for AA Captains:
Tailwinds: Cruise - Good / Landing - Bad
Headwinds: Cruise - Bad / Landing - Good.
Simple guidance for AA Captains:
Tailwinds: Cruise - Good / Landing - Bad
Headwinds: Cruise - Bad / Landing - Good.
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first max auto.. then if needed pls max manual... dont forget other must do things..
obviously nobody stops you from taking over onto using manual max from max auto.. buddy... thrust reversers/ flaps 40, and all others are sure considerations... what i mean is start with max auto and after that you please take over ...max manual.. same is written in the slippery runway landing second paragraph...
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I find it hard to believe that someone can get to this stage in their career and feel that a 14 knot tailwind on a wet (and not overly long) runway at night is an acceptable risk.
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Originally Posted by Dream
I don't really feel the conditions pose a risk
Last year was despatching to one of our shorter runway and one of the cabin said to me "It's a bit of a short runway at XXXX, isn't it?"
"So long as we obey the rules and fly the a/c correctly it's long enough" I replied.
"So long as we obey the rules and fly the a/c correctly it's long enough" I replied.
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Yankee Whiskey:
As I recall there was an RNAV IAP to the opposite end of the runway. Just speculation on my part but I see "get on the ground itis" because they had a sustained nasty ride through TRW getting there.
Was there no option to land into wind ?
One thing I've noticed, is that many airline pilots from all countries and both major and minor airlines don't unerstand landing distance performance and requirements.
As for this particular overrun.....there is no doubt their decision making was shot, but why was it shot? Did they not appreciate the current conditions (ie lost S.A. ) or did they have such poor knowledge that they thought flap 30 and a deep touchdown might work?
As for this particular overrun.....there is no doubt their decision making was shot, but why was it shot? Did they not appreciate the current conditions (ie lost S.A. ) or did they have such poor knowledge that they thought flap 30 and a deep touchdown might work?