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With the beginning of the active phase of hostilities against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, reports about funerals of Russian military men became a mainstay of the Russian regional and federal media. In the early days, there was complete silence in the Russian media space, and this is easily explained. In order to be buried, the first Russians killed in action had to be brought to Russia, properly documented and then delivered to the burial place – this normally takes several days. It is also known that the Russian Federation either does not want, or does not have time to take all its bodies. Logistical problems for transporting of filled body bags are the same in the Russian army as with the botched logistics of the advancing invasion forces. Therefore, in the Russian press, news reports about the dead Russians have been appearing with a lag of a week or even 2-3 weeks. Therefore the mass media are becoming aware of the losses of the first days of the full-scale war only now. In this publication, InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community demonstrates an example of OSINT investigation aiming to verify the casualty data of the Russian Armed Forces. We turn to the Russian “medal count” for helpful information about the body count. Read the details in our investigation.

Russian losses in the first week

In the very first days, Ukraine immediately reported thousands of Russians killed in action. The Russians kept silent about the losses until March 2 – on that day, the Russian Ministry of Defense for the first time, and so far the last time, voiced an official report on the losses: 498 killed, 1597 wounded. Here we need to make a remark. Konashenkov is a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Defense – he talks about the losses of the Russian Army and units reporting to the Ministry of Defense. But the Russian Guard of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is also involved in the war against Ukraine. There are also Alpha and Vympel special operations forces as well as Russian border guards that belong to the FSB of the Russian Federation. The losses for these agencies have not yet been told at all.

So let’s go back to March 2nd. Back then Ukraine announced Russian losses at 5840 killed military men. Effectively, these were the losses of the Russians in the first week of the war.

In recent weeks, we have begun to analyze reports in the Russian regional press and social media. We’ve looked through hundreds of news stories about funerals, hundreds of hospital videos, and thousands of social media posts. What did we see?

Vanya, would you have a medal or an order?

We could trace clear decoration patterns for the Russian military men involved in the war with Ukraine. All those killed receive the Order of Courage posthumously. Sometimes gravely wounded senior officers and individual military officers with spectacular wins, also receive this order – but these are isolated cases. Basically, the Order of Courage is now issued posthumously.

Individual senior officers are awarded the star of the Hero of Russia for severe wounds or posthumously. So Denis Shishov, the commander of the 11th Air Assault Brigade, wounded during the assault on Kakhovka, became a “hero”. His “feat” took place on February 25, and the news about the award appeared only two weeks later. Let’s quote:

ndeed, only a person gravely wounded to the head would defend the Donbas near Kakhovka.

The commander of the 331st Kostroma Regiment of the Airborne Forces, Colonel Sergei Sukharev, who was killed in Ukraine, received the Star of the Hero posthumously.

But junior officers and soldiers receive simpler awards. Wounded soldiers receive a Medal for Courage (a copy of the Soviet Medal for Courage) – this can be seen on almost all videos from hospitals.

Sometimes the wounded receive an Order of Courage, but for the most part, Russian soldiers earn only a basic medal for the wounds sustained.

Some awards are really ridiculous. For example, the governor of the Moscow Oblast presented to the wounded soldiers of the Russian Guard a regional badge with the pompous name “For Valor and Courage”.
This is not a state or departmental award, just a colored badge with a ribbon from the hands of local authorities.

Order of Courage (posthumously)

But how do we estimate the number of issued decorations? Some Russian soldiers and journalists post photos of decoration certificates showing the serial numbers of the awards and the day the award order was signed.

This is what a typical obituary of a Russian military man looks like after a tour of duty to Ukraine:

It is immediately striking that a large number of awards relate to the presidential decree signed on March 3 – this is about a week into the full-scale war against Ukraine. That is, those who died in the first days got on this decorations list. It was on this day that the Russians reported their losses for the first, and so far for the last time.

The lowest serial number of the posthumous Order of Courage according to the decree of March 3, 2022 which we could find is 78487.

The highest serial number is 83281.

The difference between them makes 4794 orders. This is a very rough assessment, because every day we find new numbers, and these figures will most probably be adjusted upwards, increasing the count of the decree of March 3rd. Most of the awards for this day are posthumous, because only the Medal for Courage was issued for non-lethal wounds.

That is, the number of issued posthumous awards approximately matches the data published by Ukraine on the losses of Russians in the first days of the war.

What is the numbering system of Russian awards?

After the outbreak of the war in the Donbas in 2014, the numbering of the Orders of Courage was in the range of 70xxx – 77xxx. InformNapalm volunteers have repeatedly written about the awarding of this Order for participation in the Donbas hostilities. The highest serial number we have detected before was 77741.

We proceed from the knowledge that the numbering of the Orders of Courage from the beginning of the full-scale war starts from numbers greater than 78xxx. But as our OSINT studies show, the numbering in the first days of the war has already exceeded 83,000.

The Order of Courage is also given to civilians, for example, for individual feats in extinguishing fires, or to important artists or scientists, but these cases are very rare. For the most part, this is a typical military award, and the intensity of decorations clearly correlates with the outbreak of hostilities – in Chechnya, Syria, Crimea-Donbas 2014 and others.

There are cases when an award with a lower serial number is issued by a new decree – perhaps to decorate somebody who was first missing in action, and then officially recognized as killed. Sometimes it could be a higher number on an old decree – these are also isolated cases, where some department might have reserved number slots for their awards. But mostly, we see serial numbers gradually increasing.

During the First Chechen War and until the end of the 90s the numbering was from 0 to 30000. During the Second Chechen War and before the seizure of Crimea and the war in the Donbas the numbers ranged from 30,000 to 60,000. The Ukrainian campaign for the Russian army started with numbers as of 7xxxx.

And Putin’s mass posthumous decoration of March 3 stands out prominently.

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Speech of the Head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

https://eng.mil.ru/images/upload/201...0_9%281%29.jpg

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief since February 24 this year. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are conducting a special military operation.

Its main goal is to provide assistance to the people of the Lugansk and Donetsk people's republics, who have been subjected to genocide by the Kiev regime for 8 years.

It was impossible to achieve this goal by political means. Kiev has publicly refused to implement the Minsk agreements. The Ukrainian leadership twice in 2014 and 2015 tried to solve the so-called Donbass problem by military means, was defeated, but did not change its plans on resolving conflict by force in the East of the country. According to reliable data, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were completing the preparation of a military operation to take control of the territory of the people's republics.

In these conditions, it was possible to help the Donetsk and Lugansk republics only by providing them with military assistance. Which Russia has done.

There were two possible courses of action.

The first is to limit the territory to only the DPR and the LPR within the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which is enshrined in the constitutions of the republics. But then we would be faced with constant feeding by the Ukrainian authorities of the grouping involved in the so-called joint force operation.

Therefore, the second option was chosen, which provides for actions throughout the territory of Ukraine with the implementation of measures for its demilitarization and denazification.

The course of the operation confirmed the validity of this decision.

It is conducted by the General Staff in strict accordance with the approved plan.

The tasks are carried out taking into account minimizing losses among personnel and minimizing damage to civilians.

With the beginning of a special military operation, air supremacy was won during the first two days.

Offensive actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are carried out in various directions.

As a result, Russian troops blocked Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Sumy and Nikolaev. Kherson and most of the Zaporozhye region are under full control.

The public and individual experts are wondering what we are doing in the area of blocked Ukrainian cities.

These actions are carried out with the aim of causing such damage to military infrastructure, equipment, personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the results of which allow not only to shackle their forces and do not give them the opportunity to strengthen their grouping in the Donbass, but also will not allow them to do so until the Russian army completely liberates the territories of the DPR and LPR.

Initially, we did not plan to storm them in order to prevent destruction and minimize losses among personnel and civilians.

And although we do not rule out such a possibility, however, as individual groups complete their tasks, and they are being solved successfully, our forces and means will concentrate on the main thing – the complete liberation of Donbass.

Significant territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk people's republics have also been liberated. The people's militia has taken control of 276 settlements that were previously under the control of the Ukrainian army and the national battalions.

Demilitarization of Ukraine is achieved both by high-precision strikes on military infrastructure facilities, locations of formations and military units, airfields, control points, arsenals and warehouses of weapons and military equipment, and by the actions of troops to defeat opposing enemy grouppings.

Currently, the Ukrainian air forces and the air defence system have been almost completely destroyed. The naval forces of the country ceased to exist.

16 main military airfields were defeated, from which combat sorties of the AFU aviation were carried out. 39 storage bases and arsenals were destroyed, which contained up to 70% of all stocks of military equipment, materiel and fuel, as well as more than 1 million 54 thousand tons of ammunition.

All 24 formations of the Land Forces that existed before the start of the operation suffered significant losses. Ukraine has no organized reserves left.

Losses are replenished at the expense of mobilized persons and personnel of the territorial defence forces who do not have the necessary training, which increases the risk of large losses.

At the time of the start of the special military operation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, together with the National Guard, numbered 260 thousand 200 servicemen. During the month of hostilities, their losses amounted to about 30 thousand people, including more than 14 thousand - irretrievable and about 16 thousand - sanitary.

Of the 2,416 tanks and other armored fighting vehicles that were in combat on February 24, 1,587 units were destroyed; 636 units out of 1,509 field artillery guns and mortars; 163 out of 535 MLRS; 112 out of 152 aircraft, 75 out of 149 helicopters; 36 Bayraktar TB2 UAVs - 35;

180 out of 148 S-300 and Buk M1 air defence systems; 300 out of 117 radars for various purposes.

The AFU continue to use high-powered weapons indiscriminately against towns in Donbass. An example of this is the strikes by the Tochka-U missile system on the civilian population of Donetsk and Makeyevka.

In this regard, they are the primary targets.

As of today, 7 Tochka-U launchers have been destroyed, and 85% of missiles are in arsenals and in the air. This significantly limited Ukraine's capabilities for their combat use.

Since the beginning of hostilities, the Western countries have supplied the Kiev regime with 109 field artillery guns, 3,800 anti-tank weapons, including Javelin, Milan, Konkurs, NLAW ATGM, M-72, Panzerfaust-3, 897 Stinger and Igla MANPADS.

We consider it a vast mistake for Western countries to supply weapons to Kiev. This delays the conflict, increases the number of victims and will not be able to influence the outcome of the operation.

The real purpose of such supplies is not to support Ukraine, but to drag it into a long-term military conflict "to the last Ukrainian."

We are closely monitoring the statements of the military and political leadership of individual countries about their intention to supply aircraft and air defence systems to Ukraine. In case of implementation– we will not leave it without attention.

We also hear assurances from NATO leaders about non-interference in the conflict. At the same time, some member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to close the airspace over Ukraine. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will immediately respond accordingly to such attempts.

In order to prevent the restoration of weapons and military equipment of the AFU that have received combat damage, the Russian Armed Forces are disabling repair enterprises, arsenals, storage bases, logistics warehouses with high-precision weapons.

At the moment, 30 key enterprises of the military-industrial complex have been hit by cruise missiles X-101, Kalibr, Iskander, and the Kinzhal aviation complex, which carried out repairs of 68% of weapons and equipment disabled during combat operations.

Russian modern weaponry has proven to be highly accurate, reliable and capable of operational use.

I would like to emphasize that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation do not strike at civilian infrastructure facilities, including the destruction of bridges across rivers.

127 bridges were destroyed in the area of military operations. All of them were blown up by Ukrainian nationalists in order to deter the advance of our troops.

Another example of recklessness is the mining of approaches to the ports of Odessa, Ochakov, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny, where over 400 anchor mines of obsolete types are installed.

At least 10 mines have broken anchor and are drifting in the western part of the Black Sea, which poses a real threat to warships and civilian vessels.

The rampant crime, looting and marauding and civilian deaths have been caused by the Ukrainian regime's massive uncontrolled distribution of tens of thousands of small arms to the civilian population, including to criminals released from prisons. The situation will only get worse in the future.

The course of hostilities, the testimonies of civilians who left the blockaded settlements and captured Ukrainian servicemen show that today the AFU's ability to resist is based on fear of reprisals by neo-Nazis. Their representatives are embedded in all military units.

The mainstay of the Kiev regime are nationalist formations such as Azov, Aidar, Right Sector and others recognized in Russia as terrorist organizations. In Mariupol alone, they include more than 7 thousand militants who are fighting under the guise of civilians, using them as a "human shield".

The militants of the Azov battalion drive women and children out of the basements, threatening them with weapons, and send them towards the advancing units of the DPR in order to hinder the advance of the people's militia. This has become a common practice for them.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, on the contrary, seek to avoid unnecessary losses. Before the start of the offensive, the AFU units are invited to leave the combat area and move along with equipment and weapons to the point of permanent deployment. Not to resist when the offensive begins and those who lay down their arms are guaranteed safety.

Civilians caught in a war zone are always advised to stay in their homes.

Humanitarian corridors are being organized in all cities to get the population out of the area of hostilities, and their security is also maintained.

Humanitarian corridors are being created in all towns to allow people to leave the area where the fighting is taking place, and their security is being maintained.

In addition, at the initiative of the Ukrainian leadership, the country has become a home to 6,595 foreign mercenaries and terrorists from 62 states.

They are not subject to the rules of war and will be ruthlessly destroyed.

Today, the number of foreign mercenaries is declining. This was facilitated by high-precision strikes on their bases and training camps. On March 13, more than 200 militants were killed and more than 400 wounded in Starichi and at the Yavorovskii training ground alone.

I note that not a single foreign mercenary has arrived in Ukraine in the last seven days. On the contrary, there has been an outflow. Within a week, 285 fighters escaped into Poland, Hungary and Romania, I hope without Stingers and Javelins.

Previous experience has shown that man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and ATGMs are spreading out fairly quickly, along with the mercenaries who return home.

In general, the main objectives of the first phase of the operation have been achieved. The combat capabilities of Ukraine's Armed Forces have been significantly reduced, which allows us, once again, to concentrate our main efforts on achieving the main goal - the liberation of Donbass.

In eight years, in the area of the so-called "joint forces operation", a defence belt has been prepared that is deeply echeloned and well-fortified in engineering terms, consisting of a system of monolithic, long-term concrete structures.

In this regard, in order to minimise casualties among the troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lugansk and Donetsk people's republics, the conduct of offensive operations is preceded by a heavy fire attack on the enemy's strongholds and their reserves.

At the beginning of the special military operation, the LPR and DPR people's militias were confronted by a group of 59,300 people comprising the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the National Guard and nationalist formations.

As a result, Ukraine's security forces in the OOS zone lost about 16,000 people, or 26% of their total strength as of 24 February this year.

More than 7,000 of them were irrecoverable losses.

Replacing losses is prevented by isolating the Ukrainian grouping of troops in Donbass, taking control of railway stations and key road routes with firepower.

The supply of missiles and ammunition, fuel and food to Ukrainian forces has been almost completely halted.

The field depots of missile and artillery weapons and ammunition, as well as fuel located directly in the area of the Joint Forces Operation are being hit. To date, 32 facilities have been destroyed, or 61% of the total.

All weapons and military equipment, including foreign-made, seized by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the special military operation are handed over to the People's Republics. Already 113 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles, 138 Javelin and 67 NLAW grenade launchers and other trophy weapons have been handed over.

Units of the People's Militia of the Lugansk People's Republic have liberated 93% of the republic's territory.

Fighting is currently taking place on the outskirts of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.

The People's Militia of the Donetsk People's Rupublic controls 54% of the territory. The liberation of Mariupol continues.

Units of the Russian Armed Forces together with the People's Militia of the Donetsk People's Republic are conducting an offensive to liberate settlements to the west of Donetsk.

Unfortunately, there are casualties among our comrades-in-arms during the special military operation. As of today, 1,351 servicemen have been killed and 3,825 wounded.

All family support solutions will be taken over by the state, raising children up to higher education, full repayment of loans, housing solutions.

We receive a large number of appeals from Russian citizens wishing to take part in the special military operation to liberate Ukraine from Nazism.

In addition, more than 23,000 foreigners from 37 countries have expressed their willingness to fight on the side of the people's republics. We offered the leadership of the LPR and DPR to accept this assistance, but they said they would defend their land themselves.

They have enough power and resources.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will continue to conduct a planned special military operation until the tasks set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief have been completed.

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By Chen Aizhu, Julie Zhu and Muyu Xu

March 25 (Reuters) - China's state-run Sinopec Group has suspended talks for a major petrochemical investment and a gas marketing venture in Russia, sources told Reuters, heeding a government call for caution as sanctions mount over the invasion of Ukraine.

The move by Asia's biggest oil refiner to hit the brakes on a potentially half-billion-dollar investment in a gas chemical plant and a venture to market Russian gas in China highlights the risks, even to Russia's most important diplomatic partner, of unexpectedly heavy Western-led sanctions.

Beijing has repeatedly voiced opposition to the sanctions, insisting it will maintain normal economic and trade exchanges with Russia, and has refused to condemn Moscow's actions in Ukraine or call them an invasion.

But behind the scenes, the government is wary of Chinese companies running afoul of sanctions - it is pressing companies to tread carefully with investments in Russia, its second-largest oil supplier and third-largest gas provider.
Since Russia invaded a month ago, China's three state energy giants - Sinopec 0386.HK, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC)0857.HK and China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) 0883.HK - have been assessing the impact of the sanctions on their multi-billion dollar investments in Russia, sources with direct knowledge of the matter said.

"Companies will rigidly follow Beijing's foreign policy in this crisis," said an executive at a state oil company. "There's no room whatsoever for companies to take any initiatives in terms of new investment."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs this month summoned officials from the three energy companies to review their business ties with Russian partners and local operations, two sources with knowledge of the meeting said. One said the ministry urged them not to make any rash moves buying Russian assets.

The companies have set up task forces on Russia-related matters and are working on contingency plans for business disruptions and in case of secondary sanctions, sources said.

The sources asked not to be named, given the sensitivity of the matter. Sinopec and the other companies declined to comment.

The ministry said there is no need for China to report to other parties about "whether there are internal meetings or not".
"China is a big, independent country. We have the right to carry out normal economic and trade cooperation in various fields with other countries across the world," it said in a faxed statement.

U.S. President Joe Biden said on Thursday that China knows its economic future is tied to the West, after warning Chinese leader Xi Jinping that Beijing could regret siding with Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Global oil majors Shell SHEL.L and BP BP.L, and Norway's Equinor pledged to exit their Russian operations shortly after Russia's Feb. 24 invasion. Moscow says its "special operation" aims not to occupy territory but to destroy Ukraine's military capabilities and capture what it calls dangerous nationalists.

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A Russian Colonel has been run over and killed by his own soldiers because of the huge death toll being suffered by their own brigade in Ukraine, Western officials said on Friday.
The officials identified the dead commander as Colonel Medvechek of the 37 Motor Rifle Brigade, adding that the incident illustrated the “morale challenges Russian forces are facing.”
Nato officials reportedly estimate that as many as 15,000 Russian troops may have been killed since Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine a month ago. Nato is also reported to estimate that in total 40,000 Russian troops have been killed, injured, captured or gone missing.
The Western officials said they believed Col Medvechek was “killed by his own troops deliberately”…as a “consequence of the scale of losses that had been taken by his brigade”. They added: “Indeed we believe he was run over by his own troops.
“When we think about the operations it’s important we don’t just count weapons systems and tanks but we think about the moral and conceptual elements of fighting power.”
On Friday further details emerged of a seventh Russian General believed to be killed in action.
Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, 48, was killed in a strike by the Ukrainian armed forces, they say. He was Commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District.
The Russian side has not so far confirmed the death but Western officials said on Friday they believed Lt Gen Rezantsev had been killed.
With Russia’s forces now throwing their “maximum” effort into the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the Western officials estimated around 20 of the 120-150 Russian battalion groups which were available at the start of the assault, were no longer “combat effective”.
“That means they are being pulled back for repair or reconstitution,” the officials explained.
“Some groups have gone back to Russia…some have just lost enormous numbers of people. After a month to have one sixth, maybe one fifth of force to be no longer combat effective…that’s a pretty remarkable set of statistics.”

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No idea if this is fake or not. According to this leaked (faked?) Pape, Russian defence minister Shoigu is absent. DefMin is under control of Army General Bulgakov. Officers are instructed to fake their interaction with Shoigu. Well: either dead, or heavily wounded (or detained).

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0:28
Russian defence minister 'suffers heart attack'
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/worl...-60856533Anton

Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine's interior minister, has claimed that Russia's defence minister suffered a heart attack.

Sergei Shoigu had not been seen publicly since 11 March, until he appeared briefly in a video released by Putin on Thursday 24 March.

"Shoigu's heart attack happened after a tough accusation by Putin for a complete failure of the invasion of Ukraine," Gerashchenko wrote on Facebook, adding that he is currently "undergoing rehabilitation" in hospital.

There has been no confirmation from Russia of Shoigu's alleged health problems.

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I am reposting this interesting article that appeared earlier today in Moscow Times.

Moscow Times

Not only Sergei Shoigu fell out of the public field, but almost all the main security officials. We came to this conclusion after studying the reports in the media and official sources about the activities of Viktor Zolotov, Igor Kostyukov, Valery Gerasimov, and Alexander Bortnikov. They all disappeared at about the same time.

The head of the National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, disappeared on March 13, right after he went to the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and accepted the icon from the hands of the Patriarch himself. Then Zolotov complained to the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church that in the war with Ukraine "not everything is going as fast as we would like." Prior to that, on March 11, Zolotov presented awards to the Russian Guardsmen who distinguished themselves in hostilities. There were no more videos of him.

The last photo with Zolotov hangs on the website of the Russian Guard in a publication dated March 22. It says that he held a working meeting in Moscow with the leadership of the department. At the same time, initially, the material appeared for some reason on the website of the Samara department of the Russian Guard. There were no videos or any comments from this event.

At the same time, after March 13, the name of Zolotov was mentioned in the news of the state media only in connection with the sanctions of Japan and the United States. On March 17, information appeared that Zolotov allegedly fired his deputy Roman Gavrilov. According to some reports, Gavrilov was his close friend and was "person number 2" in the Russian Guard. media claimed that Gavrilov was detained on suspicion of embezzling funds from the National Guard, which were intended for fighters fighting in Ukraine.

The name of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Valery Gerasimovalso ceased to appear in the media. On March 12, he had a conversation with a colleague from Turkey, and on March 4 he discussed the situation in Ukraine with the Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces, Thierry Burcar. There are no more messages, as well as photos or videos, with Gerasimov.

On March 24, the Pentagon announced that Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu were refusing to speak to them on the phone. The last time they spoke was February 18.

There is no information about the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Igor Kostyukov. Recently, only the former Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arsen Avakov wrote about him. According to his sources, Kostyukov's health has "drastically deteriorated" - the military man is experiencing a "burning sensation in the heart."

Alexander Bortnikov appeared only at meetings of the Security Council led by Putin on March 24 and 11. At the same time, the director of the FSB was dressed in the same clothes (even the color of the tie was the same - red), behind him the same background, and the frame itself was exactly the same angle. On both broadcasts, Bortnikov appears only for a few seconds and does not utter a word. There is no more news about him.

Earlier, the media wrote that the head of the Ministry of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, had ceased to appear in public space since March 11. Sources close to the minister said he was "unwell and has heart problems."

After Shoigu was shown on video on March 24, he allegedly took part in a meeting of the Security Council with Putin. However, we found that the footage with the minister is very similar to the broadcast from a similar meeting on March 11th. The minister's tie has moved in the same direction, the background has not changed either. Mediazona came to the same conclusion.

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26
Fredrick W. Kagan and George Barros
March 26, 1500 ET

Russian forces continued their unsuccessful efforts to move into positions from which to attack or encircle Kyiv, claims by First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Sergei Rudskoi on March 25 notwithstanding. The Russian military continues to concentrate replacements and reinforcements in Belarus and Russia north of Kyiv, to fight for positions on Kyiv’s outskirts, and to attempt to complete the encirclement and reduction of Chernihiv. Russian activities around Kyiv show no change in the Russian high command’s prioritization of the fight around Ukraine’s capital, which continues to occupy the largest single concentration of Russian ground forces in Ukraine. The Russians have not claimed to redeploy forces from Kyiv or any other part of Ukraine to concentrate on fighting in Donbas, and we have observed numerous indicators that they have not done so. The increasingly static nature of the fighting around Kyiv reflects the incapacity of Russian forces rather than any shift in Russian objectives or efforts at this time.

Russian forces will likely bisect the city of Mariupol in the coming days as they claim and will likely gain control of the city in the relatively near future. Fighting in Mariupol continues to be fierce, however, and Russian forces continue to suffer significant losses. The amount of combat power the Russians will be able to harvest from Mariupol once they gain control of the city will determine whether the city’s fall will allow the Russians to launch renewed large-scale offensive operations in Ukraine’s east. It remains unclear how badly damaged Russian units fighting for Mariupol are—or how much more damage they will incur in completing the capture of the city—but high-profile casualties in elite and conventional Russian combat units such as the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, both of which have lost commanders in the past few weeks, suggest that losses in such units are high.[1]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct limited counter-attacks across the theater, most recently near Kharkiv. Ukrainian counter-attacks have been prudent and effective, allowing Ukrainian forces to regain small areas of tactically or operationally significant terrain without over-extending themselves.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure positions from which to attack and seize Kyiv despite the supposed reframing of the Russian military’s priorities by First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Sergei Rudskoi on March 25.
• The Russians will likely make important progress in seizing the city of Mariupol in the coming days and will probably take the city in the near future. The scale of Russian losses in the fight for Mariupol will determine whether the city’s fall will permit Russia to renew large-scale combat operations in eastern Ukraine. It is too soon to tell, but current indicators suggest that Russian losses have been and will continue to be high.
• The Ukrainian General Staff continues to report on challenges Russia faces in finding both troops and equipment to continue the war. The General Staff reports generally match observed patterns and indicators within the Ukrainian battlespace and are likely largely accurate, although we have little independent verification of their details.
• The captured city of Kherson appears to be resisting Russian control in ways that are driving the Russian military and national guard to concentrate forces on securing it. The requirement to secure captured cities can impose a significant cost on over-stretched Russian forces and hinder their ability to conduct offensive operations.

Click here to expand map below.
https://understandingwar.org/sites/d...h26%2C2022.png
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that the Russian military is continuing efforts to replace personnel and equipment losses but struggling to do so. The General Staff claimed on March 25 that Russia has established a base in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast to repair and rehabilitate equipment pulled from strategic reserves.[2] The General Staff asserted that much of Russia’s reserve equipment is unusable or in very poor states of repair, with essential gear—including engines—stripped out of many vehicles. The General Staff added on March 26 that the Russians are attempting to refurbish old T-72 tanks as part of this effort.[3] The General Staff also claimed that the Russian military is lowering its standards for conscripts and recruits and has been forced to use a higher proportion of conscripts in combat as it has suffered losses among its professional soldiers.[4] We have no independent confirmation of these reports, but they are consistent with observed patterns of Russian operations and losses in Ukraine and with ISW’s earlier assessment of the state of the Russian personnel reserve system.[5]

Morale problems within the Russian military are becoming more serious and apparent. Reports that the soldiers of a Russian unit killed their brigade commander by running him over with a tank and, more recently, that the commander of the 13th Guards Tank Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army) committed suicide likely indicate a general breakdown of morale even among first tier Russian combat units.[6]

The Russians continue to try to concentrate forces for renewed fighting around Kyiv, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that additional Russian forces from the Eastern Military District were being sent into Ukraine at an unspecified location.[7] Eastern Military District forces have been engaged exclusively in the Kyiv and Chernihiv region.

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

• Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
• Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
• Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
• Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.

Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.

Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro

Russian forces did not attempt any major offensive operations west of the Dnipro in the past 24 hours but are continuing to fight for positions in Irpin and around Hostomel.[8] Russian forces deny Ukrainian reports that they have been surrounded at Hostomel Airfield.[9] We assess that Russian forces are not yet fully encircled, but Ukrainian forces have created a Russian salient that is exposed from several directions and apparently under continued pressure. Russian forces continue to dig in around northwestern Kyiv and to shell Ukrainian-held positions without conducting significant offensive operations.[10]
Click here to expand map below.
https://understandingwar.org/sites/d...%2C%202022.png

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:

Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the southern direction in the past 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on March 26 that the Russians have deployed all Rosgvardia units based in Crimea and/or located in Kherson, Donetsk, and Zaporizhiya Oblasts to suppress Ukrainian unrest in Kherson, Henichesk, Berdyansk, and some districts of Mariupol.[21] The General Staff further reported that the Russians are attempting to establish strict administrative and police regimes in these areas on March 26.[22] These reports appear to confirm statements by an unnamed US Department of Defense official that Kherson is no longer fully under Russian control.[23] There is no front line anywhere near Kherson City, so the assessment that the Russians no longer control it fully almost certainly rests on the existence of local Ukrainian partisan activity.

Immediate items to watch
Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks and have entered the city center;

Russian forces around Kyiv will likely continue efforts to hold against Ukrainian counter-attacks while also attempting to restart offensive operations on a limited scale;

Russian and proxy troops will continue efforts to seize the full territory of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, but will not likely make rapid progress in doing so.

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