A&B
 

My point being a 16 year old Cadet was able to attain this certificate before he could drive a motor car. This was the USP for the organisation and a source of pride on the Squadrons. Was sadly replaced with oodles of dual and One solo.

A Cadet could then apply for an advanced course (more solo's and check out to single seater), and the keen ones would get into a school as a SC.

Brilliant system that made the ATC different to all other organisations,and it was the SOLO aspect that gave the Cadets the inspiration and confidence.

Worse is to come sadly. I understand the experts who got us into this situation now what to change the commission structure and smash volunteer morale even further. Give it a couple of years and ATC squadrons will be closing through a lack of staff. It's almost as if they want to have a smaller organisation, maybe this is budget cutting through the back door. Either way as someone who is now a senior manager in industry, responsible for employee engagement for a large number of people, I have a new case study of how not to engage a workforce.....

Quote:

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Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | In the latest AEROSPACE magazine - June 2016

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Why does the RAeS get involved? If it didn't support the RAF would the current CAS do what a predecessor did and threaten to withdraw membership?

The BGA had to come into line with EASA and the age for solo was lowered to 14 some time ago. Even at 16 it was still before the legal driving age.

Read AVM Turners article. It speactaculary fails to provide any information on how and why the cluster f@@@ that was the maintenance occured nor whether the MoD has clawed any money back from the contractor responsible or whether anyone has been censured over this.
Letter inbound to MP.

Smaller Organisation
 

S-Salad What happened to the Prime ministers statement about increasing Cadet Units in Schools. Was this just an idea or have the schools failed to engage with it.

This recent interview will cheer you up (not):

Interview with Air Vice Marshal Turner, HQ RAF - Military Training International

It looks like they are planning to spend £1/2bn to merge all initial training at Cranwell at some point. Somehow, someone thinks spending £1/2bn will save £1bn over 10 years - I would like to see the maths for that utter folly. I wonder if this will be another bright idea like the one to move Cosford to go St Athan, hold on lets go to Lyneham, in fact let's leave Cosford where it is because we can't afford it! With MFTS and legacy flying training at Cranwell, and RAFCAM expecting to move there as well, plus an expanded UAS/AEF, and then the usual Cranwell stuff one wonders where it will all fit. There is a shortage of Married Quarters in Lincolnshire and so where is everyone going to live? Is this the end of Henlow, Honington and Halton? They're building a massive new med centre at Honington so it must be time to close it!

I wonder how many gliders we could buy with £1/2bn?

The B Word :ugh:

Pobjoy - My understanding is that whilst they wanted to expand cadet forces in schools, they didn't want to pay for it in full and expected the schools to stump up most the cash, schools had other ideas. I did have one local (state) school ask me for advice given my background but funding was the killer....

Official Cadet figures here: https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...stics_2016.pdf

Released this week...:sad:

100 new CCF units in state schools already up and running. Under resourced but happening thanks to LIBOR money.

Now they want 150 more by 2020. Not going to be easy as all the low hanging fruit has been picked...

But at the same time, the numbers in existing cadet units are falling.

Recent interview with AVM
 

Lots of scrambled thinking to go with the scrambled egg.
If I was running the Air Force I would wonder why all this wonderful system stuffed full of high ranking staff could not keep a fleet of Gliders operational !
It beggars belief. Mind you website operational capability spot on and twatter/facebook 'cascading' at an all time high. The government had budgeted £50 million for Cadet expansion yet numbers fall, and there is a Staff/Cadet ratio of approx. 3.5, so huge amounts of money going somewhere but not getting any results, also not doing any 'actual' gliding but the 'enabling' of facilities for the PTT at the surviving VGS is alive and well.
Any reasoned look at the situation would find it hard to believe someone was actually in charge of this current state of play; not to mention being paid for it.

Oh, there's someone in charge all right, POBJOY, but their agenda is different to ours. This charade was brought about by those who were in charge whereby
Their agenda now is to protect those who created that wonderful system and those who have ever since covered that up. There is something rotten in this State and it needs cleaning out ASAP.

We now have a situation when previously respected and honourable institutions such as the RAeS, even the RAF itself, have been infected by this corruption and act as apologists for the MOD. Time then for a latter day Trenchard to step forward and purge the system, reinstate UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation, and then reform the MOD itself.

Tall order, but if not then we may see the demise of the world's first independent Air Force before it even reaches its centenary.

Chugalug2
 

The original reason for setting up the RAF was strategic use of air power, this was first identified in the report by LT Gen Jan Smuts in August 1917, Smuts commented

"the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of miltary and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate".

Following the demise of the Vulcan some say that the RAF can no longer forefill the role it was set up for and should be dissolved back into the other services.

I do not hold this veiw but as you raised the prospect of the end of the RAF I was think it was time to play devils advocate.

A and C, thank you for your post. You are quite right that some people do indeed question the need for a separate UK Air Force and would like to see it returned to the separate air arms of the Army and Navy from whence it came. That rather misses the point that I was trying to make though, and obviously failed to do so. My fault, for which I apologise.

By using the word demise I was trying to imply a withering away of a once powerful force to a state of impotence, due to the ever spreading contagion of unairworthiness amongst its fleets. That is the real implication of the grounding of the ACO fleet, a fate shared with the RAF's maritime fleet. It is the tip of an airworthiness iceberg that infects every RAF fleet, operational or otherwise.

All that is needed to start the long hard road of regaining control of airworthiness is for the RAF to acknowledge that it was its own VSOs that caused this situation and for its subsequent cover-up. Then and only then will the vital need for separate and independent Regulator and Investigator, from the MOD and each other, be made clear.

That isn't going to be achieved by committee, it can only be done by one person, of sufficient stature and power, to force through such an acknowledgement. Once that happens then the real work can begin, and the sooner the better.

Time is of the essence, for the withering away continues until such time that it can be checked.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!

Chugalug2
 

We are in violent agreement about independent regulation and I have to work under the oversight of EASA/UK CAA who are not slow to let you know if you are falling short of the mark.

Although the new initiative now extends to the "Devolved Administrations" - i.e. Wales, Scotland and Norn Iron - the original CEP (Cadet Expansion Programme) was for England only as Education - under whose remit it falls - was a devolved responsibility.

A & C

I beg to differ on EASA/CAA airworthiness in respect of pilot licencing, supervision, recency and competence. In fact, I would be so bold to say that in some areas of their responsibility it appears to be non-existent compared the supervision of commercial air transport.

As an EASA licenced pilot there is little supervision of what I do and in the very unlikely event of being caught by the CAA doing something wrong then it can take years for them to do anything about it. I also hear rumours that there are rogue maintainers within the GA community that only get caught out when there is an accident - I think the accidents in Caernarfon and Cranfield in recent years are indicative of that?

So maybe all is not as rosey in EASA/CAA land in the non-commercial sector?

Chug

You often espouse that the MAA is not fit for purpose regarding its independence. What is your suggestion, then? But before you answer I would offer that even if the CAA oversaw MoD aviation then the fact that these are 2 Governent bodies means that they cannot be truly independent? Furthermore, if an independent body were set up outwith the Government then who pays for that? One could argue that it is almost impossible to achieve true independence without taking people out of the loop - everyone has their own centre of gravity to lean one way or another!

--------------------------------------

Back to the thread. I believe that taking gliding out of MAA-land and into EASA/CAA/BGA-land would be a good thing. Having a tiny fleet of 75-odd MAA regulated gliders makes no sense at all - in expense, manpower and effort. If we wanted some more independent oversight (but even then not 100% independent) then flying gliders under EASA/CAA/BGA rules and regs would save a whole load of heartache and the ability of enjoying synergy with the civil regustered fleet. You can still put a roundel on a civvy reg aircraft and even apply for an exemption from the CAA to carry military registrations - trying to run them on an airworthiness system from the MAA is just plain dumb...:ugh:

The vast majority of gliding carried out by the military in the last 26 months (yes, that's how long it has been!) have been on JSAT courses or via the 3 Single Service Gliding Assocs - funny old thing they fly EASA/CAA/BGA gliders that cost about 3/4s of the cost to run one than those on the military register. Taking that example, if we can only afford to run 75 Vikings then we could have 300 Grob 103s running for the same cost. Utter madness...:ugh:

IMHO of course! :ok:

LJ

A and C, thank you for your "violent agreement"! I understand that the MAA is counting as independent airworthiness auditing the issue of ARC's by EASA. I am very suspicious of such moves by the MOD. I don't doubt for a minute the strict compliance that EASA demands of commercial aviation that you refer to, but does the same go for the military airworthiness of member states? The words "bite", "hand", and "feed" come to mind!

Unless and until Regulator, Investigator, and Operator (aka the MOD) are separate and independent of each other, UK Military Airworthiness will continue to remain blighted.

Chug, Others,

Perhaps I might be allowed to offer a couple of observations here.

I think A and C brings up a good point - just how WOULD any organisation run (presumably by the government) that was 'responsible for the regulation, surveillance, inspection and assurance of the defence air operating and technical domains' (this text taken from the MAA website) be truly 'independent'?

I've suggested before that the RN, ARMY and RAF should all have organisations in place to 'enhance the delivery of operational capability through the continual improvement in military air safety, appropriate culture, ....and practice'. The MoD should properly be the guardian of higher 'joint' regulation affecting air safety. My suggestion for more 'independence' would be met, in my view, a (very active) supervising board made up from recognised experts and professional organisations. But hey, that's just my view.

The reasons I make these points is that the Air Cadet gliding scandal (and scandal it most certainly is) raises some issues that should, in my personal view, be addressed in public. These are simple training aircraft being used by school children and flown by volunteers. Here's my stab at a starting list I'd like to see answers to:

Was a full airworthiness and safety audit of the fleet conducted on their initial introduction to the Military Register and who signed it off? (As Tucumseh would remind us, this has ALWAYS been a requirement). Did the Vigilant and the Viking have proper safety cases and risk registers? Did they have approved and controlled configurations? Did they have proper accredited DA support?

What had 22 Group RAF been doing with the Air Cadet Fleet since 2010 when they took full charge? Who has been responsible for supervising the maintenance of the fleet? How about the PT in DE&S? Plenty of very senior people around there who should be answering some questions.

What exactly was it that was serious enough to warrant, in 2014, the whole fleet of ATC gliders and aircraft to be grounded over an Easter week, which is one of the Air Cadets busiest? Can't have been 'technical issues' across two fleets, could it? Are we looking at a systemic issue?

But to my mind, one of the biggest questions to be answered is this - where was the Military Aviation Authority? Hadn't they carried out audits of the Air Cadet Fleet? (They were, after all, RAF aircraft). Wasn't the PT checked out? Hadn't they checked out 22 Group?

My final point - these issues deserve much better answers than the spin and froth that has recently been offered up in an RAeS publication.

Anyone on PPrune got any details on these issues?

Best Regards as ever to those trying to get Cadets into the air

Engines

LJ:-
Sorry Leon, we clashed (posting that is ;-). Of course, no system is or can be perfect. No doubt an independent MAA, or just as importantly MilAAIB, will be open to much justified criticism. My hope though is that it could at least be free of the malevolent influence of the MOD (and the RAF Star Chamber!) if placed outside that body.

AFAIK, the CAA is a Self Funding Public Corporation. Of course, it is still prone to government pressures, but at least it is not dependent on it for its very existence. In any case, the parlous state of UK Military Airworthiness was not brought about directly by UK governments per se, but rather by the incompetent and malevolent action of RAF VSOs desperately trying to claw monies out of ring fenced Air Safety budgets that their own gross negligence dictated. The possibility that such illegal action and orders could be resorted to had never been anticipated, but they were, and in covering that up to this very day UK Military Air Safety continues to be subverted.

My solution? Well, I could suggest that by sending an SAE and Postal Order for 10/- to I, Horace Batchelor, at Dept 1, Keynsham (spelt K-E-Y-N-S-H-A-M), Bristol, you too can receive my famous Infra Draw Method of Independent Air Regulation and Investigation, but I might fall foul of some EU regulation or other!

Suffice to say that this is truly a matter of National Security, way above my OAP rate, but can and must be attended to. The real difficulty isn't the solution but the opposition from the MOD. That must be met head on and overcome. When we have an independent MAA and MilAAIB (wedded to the CAA and AAIB? Mixed civilian and Service staffed? Why not?), then I would suggest a complete reform of the MOD might be a good idea, but let's do one thing at a time!

As to funding, this would come from the long suffering British Taxpayer, via HM Treasury. Yes, I can see the problems too, but as I said earlier, the real cause of this was RAF VSOs within the MOD, not HM Government. The problem with my solution will be the personnel rather than the money. Would a dedicated branch (Air Safety?) of professional military regulators and investigators help get the Star Chamber off their backs? You are more in the know regarding the modern RAF than I. How bad is it?

Just noticed the bit above about the change from A&B Certs to "one solo". IMHO, one solo proves little (but is great achievement), it is post solo consolidation that counts. For example at the Club I flew with in France there was requirement for 12 post solo consolidation flights - I was lucky as I got the Pegase in comparison to the young French boys and girls who had to do it in the Marianne - a heavy glass 2 seater. When I finished a course in UK 3 years ago, BGA even found my old A&B record and issued a duplicate certificate (photo was a tadge different though). If the ACO cannot (eventually) get the boys and girls to A&B could there not be a deal with service gliding clubs to take them on and finish the job, so to speak.

Leon
 

I tend to agree about the private pilot licensing however I was referring to EASA145 maintenance standards and the quality assurance standards that are part of EASA145 regulation as the ATC glider issue is one of engineering quality assurance.

Engines, you ask some critically important questions of the MAA, DE&S, 22Gp, and last and least, of me. For myself, I have tried to answer similar questions from Leon. I truly believe that the MOD's ability to ensure airworthiness for the military fleets via its subsidiary the MAA to be unviable.

Tucumseh has described better than I ever could the profound effects of the attack on Air Safety by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s and of the subsequent cover up by the MOD. It is the latter that has caused the really long lasting damage. The one hope was the Nimrod Review. If Haddon-Cave had reported the facts of that attack, then reform could have been commenced to ensure that no such attack could happen again by putting Regulation and Investigation outwith the MOD. Instead he described the period of that attack as a Golden Period of Military Airworthiness. Now why would he do that? Why?

So instead of reform the deck-chairs were rearranged and the "Independent" MAA had as its subsidiary the "Independent" MilAAIB! Even the MOD has belatedly seen the nonsense of that, so more deck-chair layouts have given us the Defence Safety Authority, of which the MAA and the Defence Accident Investigation Branch are subsidiaries. The MilAAIB is no more, but the DG DSA now oversees both Regulation and Investigation as part of the MOD!

The cover up continues, the lack of independence continues, the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness continues. I hope that you get your answers from others that you question but with respect the answers are known already. ACO aircraft have been grounded because they lack airworthiness. Other RAF fleets have not been grounded. Are they airworthy? How can they be when the system is so badly broken?

We can carry on counting the number of fairies on a pin head or we can face up to reality, slaughter a few sacred cows, and reform UK Military Airworthiness. We are talking about lives being at risk, we are talking about valuable resources being at risk, we are talking about this nation's security being at risk. Or are we instead talking about certain VSOs' reputations being at risk?

What's wrong with, for example, the C-17? Voyager? Herc?

ToD:-
I've no idea, which of course is irrelevant. You need to ask your question of the MAA, the same Authority that presided over the Safety Case of the MB Mk 10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham. Turned out there wasn't one, but they didn't know. What makes you think they know the answer to your question?

I'm sorry, I realise my post sounds truculent. It isn't meant to be. It merely illustrates the systemic dysfunction of UK Military Airworthiness. This explains it better than I can, though it gets longer as more is added :-

https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/

As usual, Engines and I are in agreement. An excellent post and, as he says, the same old issues arise in this case as did on Nimrod, Chinook, Hercules and the rest. THIS, I believe, is what any campaign should concentrate on. (I'm pretty certain we don't actually have a campaign here). After all, it is what won these cases, and rather easily if I may say so. It is great that the issues are aired here, but a higher profile must be attained. The media and MPs need to be aware that we've been here before, MoD has been castigated by a series of independent Reviews and Inquiries, but it is STILL happening.

Precisely, and MoD's machinations are clearly aimed at deflecting attention from these departments. It is now 6 years, but I recall being alarmed at who the MAA appointed to do one particular aircraft audit, which was the subject of a legal Review at the time. That aircraft had not enjoyed a Local Technical Committee (whose job, ultimately, is to deliver a valid safety case) for over EIGHT years. The auditor said so what, I always ignored that mandated requirement as well, and nothing more was said. A little digging by the MAA would have revealed the number of deaths arising from this, but they don't seem interested in such things. Or at least, the senior MAA staff don't allow the concerns of knowledgeable MAA staff to be printed. I mention the LTC because it is the process that it controls that has broken down in this ATC case.

And that is linked to Leon's question of Chug about what to do. Understanding the simple chain Build Standard > Safety Case > RTS reveals where the boundaries of responsibility must be established. No MAA document goes remotely near this, hence the bugger's muddle we see. The mandated Standard that does spell it out was cancelled without replacement in 2008. As I tend to say, a solution emerges..... If the MAA want a copy, they only have to ask, but alternatively they could nip down to Neighbourhood 1 at ABW and just ask for current contract documents which continue to call it up. Unsurprisingly, they are the projects that run well.

If I may just add something on the issue of cost. Doing the job correctly in the first place is invariably cheaper and better in the long run.

The example I always use involved multiple fatalities in 2003. The mandated regulations were ignored and an unsafe design was installed. Boscombe refused to issue MAR recommendations but the 2 Star ruled that (any) aircraft need not be functionally safe. The correct design in one aircraft had been costed at a mere £50k. Correcting the unsafe design cost £4.4M and lost the programme 5 months (which was recovered as the TI didn't have any faults during trials). But the other aircraft was not corrected, and two died. Not counting the tragic loss of aircrew, this single event cost MoD around £60M (not sure of cost of the aircraft, and accept that cost is sunk anyway). The same applied to Nimrod - just add another few zeroes. And Chinook Mk3, around £300M. Please don't mention cost and alleged unaffordability. There's a reason why we don't have the money and it's nothing to do with budget cuts. It is all about not implementing the same regulations and systematically and quite consciously wasting money.

Chug,

Thanks for coming back, I really appreciate it. Discussion is always good.

I fully agree that the move of merging the old RNAIU (renamed and expanded to become the MAAIB) with the MAA was a nonsense on stilts from the very start. Moving the Defence Accident Investigation Board (DAIB) away from the MAA has to be welcomed.

The DSA is (in my view) a renaming of something that that actually existed for many years, most recently as the Defence Safety Board. It provides (again my view) a necessary 'safety focus' at the relevant level to allow the MoD to properly discharge its safety responsibilities, both to its own personnel and the wider public. The DSB was supported by a number of organisations that had built up excellent safety records, such as the Ordnance Board (the old 'OB') that looked after weapons, CINO (Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance), and the RN's Nuclear Safety Committee. I'm struggling to find a better place for it within MoD, unless it went to VCDS or someone of that ilk.

The key point was that these organisations did their jobs properly. They ensured that people understood the regulations and implemented them via clear lines of responsibility. The problem that Haddon-Cave (in my view correctly) established was that successive reorganisations in military aviation administration, many in the name of 'jointery', had diluted and confused the lines of responsibility. The problem he didn't identify so clearly was that the essential safety relevant regulations had also been mangled (and in some cases deleted altogether) as part of the reorganisations. (JSP553 was a particularly bad publication that should have been strangled at birth).

I do think (and I know you'll disagree, and I understand why) that the movement of the MAA to the DSA, and the relocation of the DAIB are at least in the right direction. Having the MAA as a three star fiefdom outside the MoD's safety management organisation was another 'nonsense on stilts'.

I do agree that there has been a scandal with regards to military aircraft airworthiness. I also agree that the RAF's senior officer cadre has a hell of a lot to answer for. However, where I must (respectfully) part company with you is the 'way forward'. I've not set my ideas out clearly enough, and my apologies for that, so here's my 'nice to see it happen' list.

First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.

Second, restore some sense to the system and devolve responsibility for the detailed management of airworthiness engineering back down to the people who should be doing it - the Chief Engineers. MAA should set out high level policy and regulations, the Chief Engineers should issue the relevant orders and instructions to implement them. They are the people who need to re-establish LTCs, MCCs, and CCBs that actually do what they are supposed to do. The MAA's current effort to run the whole world of aviation engineering from the centre is not going to work in war, and that (last time I looked) is what Joe Public pays the Services to do.

Thirdly, start training a cadre of airworthiness engineers to implement proper airworthiness standards and practices. Give them clear lines of responsibility to their Chief Engineers, and the power to say 'NO'. Especially to say no to aircrew, whatever their rank.

While that lot is going on, have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.

That's just my first stab, I'm sure others have better and more relevant ideas. I'm not sure that any public enquiry will happen soon, but perhaps the Air Cadet glider fiasco could be used to get MoD to answer what I think is the $64,000 question:

'Has the RAF been flying school children in non-airworthy aircraft?'. Yes or no answer please, preferably from AOC 22Gp.

Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing at the right time

Engines

Engines

Spot on about the Ordnance Board. Throughout my career it was patently obvious to me where competence was taught and demanded in MoD, and the OB was one. It was a disgraceful decision to disband it, on a par with AMSO's 1987 policy to waste money and his successor's policy to run down airworthiness management.

Turning to these senior oversight committees, the Defence Airworthiness Group was established in March 1993; I'd like to think as a direct reaction to AMSO's policies kicking in with a vengeance that year. The committee was a good idea but the members were somewhat lacking. They oversaw the disbandment of LTCs in June that year; which is the evidence that prevented any legal action following the Nimrod Review. (The IPT should have inherited a safety case, but it was no longer policy to have one). Their first real decision was to rob aircrew of a major defence in depth! If I say that one of them was ACAS, who a few months later made a false declaration in the Chinook Mk2 RTS (see Philip Report), then you get the idea. On the other hand, another member was Commandant A&AEE. I wonder what the topic of conversation was at the first meeting in 1994? You ****, you're asking for trouble ignoring the mandate that Mk2 isn't airworthy. And then the next one - Told you. 29 dead. Those events set the tone and MoD has never recovered. The membership was 12, two of whom were your FONA and Controller Navy. History tells us the vote would have been about 7-5 in favour of airworthiness, but the person most involved in practical implementation would have been against. The following year the RAF Chief Engineer took over that particular post, so nothing changed. Lesson - it's all about people.

tuc:-
Spot on, tuc! That is the real conundrum. You can have all the committees and appointments imaginable but if the man at the top says jump, what do you do? That is why Regulators and Investigators have to be entirely separate from the Operator and from each other, lest that one illegal command comes down from above to suborn the regs and/or fix the investigation. Both have happened in the past under the present arrangement of all three in the same bed. The results are still with us and, arguably, now worse than ever.

Engines,

The MAA in other words has failed utterly to do so in the last 6 years. Why? Because they are stymied by the very report that is their raison d'etre, Haddon-Cave's. There is nothing wrong with the present system because he commends it! Until that lie is faced up to, nothing will change.

Which is the very reason that no-one wants to touch this with a barge pole; the RAF Provost Marshal, the civilian police, HoC select committees, HoL committees, the UK Government, MPs, Coroners Courts, FAIs, even the media. That just about ticks off the whole of the UK Establishment I think, but if it doesn't I suspect that those not mentioned would concur with the rest.

As tuc infers, any system is only as strong as its weakest link. That turned out to be people being forced to choose between their careers and their duty. Most chose the former, and so people died. We will go on being in disagreement on this key issue I'm afraid. Separation and Independence is what keeps civilian aviation safe. It could do the same for military aviation and thus maintain our Air Power for use in war (its ultimate purpose as you so rightly point out).

Tuch and Chug,
 

I very much enjoy reading your well articulated posts and agree wholeheartedly with your stance and opinions of the lack of independence of the MAA, MAAIB, and any other acronym they have rebranded.

Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal? My blood boils when I realize what has gone on/is going on, and I am hoping that knowledgeable professionals such as yourselves are taking these issues to task formally. Having lost several close friends on Nimrod XV230 and being proud to have gone solo on a T21 glider as a 17 year old Air Cadet, I am keen to see this shambles proved as such publically and a fit for purpose replacement introduced.

Avtur, thank you for your kind words and support for those like tucumseh and myself who want to return airworthiness to the UK Military Airfleet. I must correct you on one point though, tucumseh is very much the professional of which you speak, but I am but a mere spear-carrier, entering from stage right; an ex-driver airframe.

Like most of my genre I had little or no idea of what airworthiness was, other than it was obviously a jolly good thing to have. My involvement in the campaign therefore began with the Mull of Kintyre thread (29 Killed) and the obviously unjust assault by RAF VSOs on the reputations of the deceased pilots.

That campaign eventually succeeded, not only in restoring the pilots' reputations but in revealing that the aircraft was flying under an illegal RTS and grossly unairworthy. Similarly the Iraq (Parliamentary Questions) Hercules (10 killed) thread proved the aircraft to be knowingly unfit for purpose and resulted in the retrofit of Explosion Suppressive Foam (ESF) into the rest of the fleet being used on active duty. Other threads have revealed the illegal replacement of anti-collision lights with High Intensity Strobe Lights (HISLs) on the Royal Navy's Sea King ASaC's (7 Killed) when two of them collided in poor visability, the known IFF lack of failure warning when a Tornado (2 Killed) was shot down in a blue on blue tragedy, and the complete lack of a safety case for the MB Mk10 seat fitted to the Hawk (1 Killed). Then we came to the Afghanistan Nimrod (14 Killed) that your friends died in. Again, knowingly flagrant breaches of airworthiness regulations in the fuel system were revealed.

So, 63 avoidable deaths in 6 airworthiness related fatal accidents with 7 aircraft lost covered in this forum alone, and then followed by the grounding of the entire RAF Maritime capability. All avoidable predictable tragedies. The solution to all of this waste was supposed to be the result of the Nimrod Review, but Haddon-Cave reneged on his duty, fudged the report and protected the VSOs who had perpetrated the original attack on Air Safety, which still renders UK Military Airworthiness dysfunctional to this very day because the cover up continues.

All of this is in the way of pre-amble to answer your question:-

The answer is yes, but it needs people like yourself who are professionally outraged that what was once a source of justified pride, UK Military Air Safety, could be reduced to such a parlous state. In retrospect the individual campaigns were the easy bit; ESF, Fox's Mull Statement, even getting the MAA and MilAAIB, were all tangible outcomes. The big one of course is to get Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation working to restore UK Military Airworthiness. The MAA as presently constituted can't do that, the DSA can't, the MilAAIB is already history. The only solution that can be depended upon is independent and separate Regulation and Investigation, from the MOD and from each other.

I don't take offence about your comments about our efforts on this forum, but I would encourage all like yourself to join in. The internet is the game changer. The people who instigated this scandal in the 80s/90s never imagined that their illegal actions could become the subject of comment on a world wide basis. They bullied those who enforced the regs into suborning them instead. Those who wouldn't were moved and replaced by those who would, mainly because they were untrained and inexperienced. Now those who learn of the persecution of their forebears can fight against that injustice, the fatal damage done to their profession, and for those whose very lives depend upon it. Which rather brings us back to the Mull pilots again...

Chug; thank you for the informative reply. Although I understand the value and merits of a web campaign, which has clearly had the success you describe, I was wondering whether there were any other lines of attack ongoing, say for example broad sheet newspaper articles, petitions, or getting MPs on side to fix the MAA construct? Perhaps the public who do not frequent aviation forums et al may be disturbed to keep reading in "hard" media or perhaps on programmes such as panorama (if that still exists) how unfit for purpose the military airworthiness system is today, and why. When you present facts like you did, it is hard not to be appalled and alarmed. Thanks for all you are doing.

Thank you avtur.

Today is the 22nd anniversary of the Mull of Kintyre crash. Yesterday, the Coroner agreed to reopen the Birmingham pub bombings inquest as hitherto concealed evidence had been revealed. If the legal system agreed to do that for Military inquests/FAIs, it would be snowed under; but if someone grasps the nettle may I suggest starting with MoK and Sea King ASaC, where MoD serially lied in court and contaminated the entire process. There is another similarity - in all three cases the innocent were blamed. In many ways, ASaC is the worst of them all as MoD maintain their stance, in the face of written, photographic and recorded evidence proving innocence. The truth is easy. When you are up against this level of Department of State sponsored deceit, justice is more difficult.

Avtur, you are absolutely right that once the extent and depth of the malevolent attack on Air Safety, and perhaps even more importantly the continuing cover up of that by the MOD and the RAF Star Chamber, is understood then there is indeed shock and outrage as a result. I remember my own reluctant realisation that part of the leadership of my own Service had acted illegally and wilfully in destroying an entire system merely for their own short term purposes. You will see from the list of institutions in my #2590 above, some of the representations and evidence that have been presented to date. When a QC is given clear evidence of subvertion of the regulations and turns it on its head by calling that a Golden Period you get a real idea of the mountain that has to be climbed to get the message accepted and acted upon. Similarly the media, both broadcasters and newspapers, are prepared to highlight tragedies such as Mull, but balk at spending half the programme or article in explaining what airworthiness is, let alone describing the system that is supposed to provide and maintain it, and then further explaining the systemic damage that prevents that being done. So it isn't easy, but TV productions, radio interviews, newspaper articles, have all been produced with campaign input. MPs have been lobbied, ministers quizzed and informed differently to what has been "staffed" to them, evidence presented to military and civil police authorities. As has been made clear by the tenacious efforts of those campaigning re the Hillsborough and Birmingham scandals; justice delayed is truly denied, but better late than never! Just so with this scandal, the importance is to prevent recurrence, in our case of Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents. That has to start with the acceptance of what has happened, the reform of the system so that it cannot happen again, and rebuilding it so that it can once again provide for Air Safety.

The one great thing that militates against getting all that out into the public arena is us, the aviation professionals. We all discourse with our own jargon, with acronyms that are constantly shifting so that Bletchley Park would have trouble keeping abreast of them, and starting out with a level of knowledge completely denied to the layman. That has to be overcome if we are to build up an awareness of the problem and what we think needs doing about it.

Some here will almost certainly dismiss my proposals re independence and separation for example. Unless there is an agreed agenda then there is no campaign, just noise. That is why I believe that PPRuNe is so useful. Many who read these threads never post, but may well pass on what they learn to others, spreading the word. Those who do post can fashion their style so that when they post to their MP for example, it is in a concise, informative, and authoritative style. Some MPs have already got the message and questioned ministers accordingly. There is no Golden Bullet, especially when the opposition lies, misrepresents, and generally obfuscates. Persistence is the key, and the more that join in the sooner we will prevail.

Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say. We are always open to suggestions and guidance. This is a many headed Hydra that we have to slay. A few heads have already been felled so come on in and join the fray!

Gentlemen ...

Some might recall that I wrote to my local MP requesting that he present a very specific question to PUSoS for Defence, Mr Julian Brazier TD, MP.

I now have a reply ...

Just to recap on my specific question (Bold) and context (Bold) for that question ... here is my original Post (2272/Page 114).

PUBLISHED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Here is the reply from the PUSoS for Defence. I have only redacted reference to my name and address.

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http://i1004.photobucket.com/albums/...psccarepcb.jpg

Without prejudice ...

I intend to reply to the PUSoS, via my MP, this Month. To be clear, whilst I lament the drastic reduction in the scale of Air Cadet Gliding (when fully recovered), it is clear that cost economics (rightly or wrongly) are now the primary Drivers. By that I mean the 'cost' of maintaining continuous airworthiness of a reduced fleet (to MAA Spec) and what appears to be a desire to increase the life of the aircraft assets.

I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies' ... What prompted this action ... Was it a 'Compliance/Enforcement' intervention by the MAA ... Or did 22Group put their hand-up. In any case, what went on (or didn't) prior to 2014 ... Was it the loss of experienced staff through headcount/cost reduction, plain incompetence or other contributory factors.

Whilst I won't presume to 'advise' the PUSoS ... But it seems a bit odd to me for the 'contributory parties' to 'discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities' ... that, IMHO, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public (as we are talking about Public money).

Please feel free to add on this Thread or PM me ... But I'm going to stick to the scope of my original question to the PUSoS in my reply, as I feel decisions are now 'fixed' in terms how the Air Cadet Gliding will work in the future :(

Coff.

Well done Coff.

Neither. The failure is systemic and it was noted in numerous internal MoD audits e.g. 1988, 91, 96, 97, 98...... In 1991 AMSO issued an edict that CC would NOT be maintained. In March 1999 Sir Robert Walmsley, the Chief of Defence Procurement, admitted the systemic nature to the Public Accounts Committee. Neither knew the significance of his statement, so nothing was done, except CDP reiterated to his staff that it would NOT be carried out. That year, I know all my CC funding for 2 complete aircraft fleets was withdrawn. Every last penny. If an equipment or aircraft is not under Configuration Control, one cannot have a valid Build Standard or Safety Case. It is much more than historical maintenance records. It is fundamental airworthiness certification documentation.

When MoD claim they can't find such records, it is odds-on they haven't bothered to ask the person who is paid to ensure they are retained. Phone the holder, pitch up, look up archive register, pull files, photocopy...... The MAA don't employ anyone junior enough who would know where to start.

Thanks Tuc ...

Let's see what others have to contribute ... But you make an observation that I'd like to follow up by PM (not immediately) if I may :ok:

Coff - well done - and I am with you on the financial point - looks a lot like "let's see what we can get away with"

Chug; Not at all. I am very grateful for your, and everyone else's detailed and very explicit answers to my original question, and I also applaud Coffman, for his well targeted questioning to his MP. These were clearly the questions that were not asked/avoided at that farcical parliamentary "debate".

Since my initial question yesterday, I am quite reassured that there are many activities being undertaken to address these issues. I cannot say enough how grateful I am for all these efforts. The safety of our military aviators must not be put at risk because of systemic failures and cover-ups that are wholly preventable and immoral. Good luck.