I thought Airbus had a 'primary control' switch to determine whose control was #master#.
Rather than 'manfully' grapple with the controls and the camera, would it not have been 'easier' to press the over-ride button and fly from the other seat?
yes - sat in comfortable armchair using hindsight but is that not training and time spent in the cruise considering 'what-if' scenarios are for - rather than getting 'bored'?

Guys, can I recommend the actual words of the Service Inquiry report, which will resolve most of the queries in the past few posts?
You probably need to start reading at Paragraph 1.4.51, in the section titled 'The response of the aircraft'
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...t_2_Ex_Pub.pdf

airsound

Beat me to it! Pages 37-39 give the details. Probably the most significant protection that assisted was the pitch limiting function, that stopped the nose going past -17 degrees. This was then augmented by the overspeed protection which initiated the recovery. Without the former protection, the aircraft would have ended up vertical (with no protections I assume it would simply respond conventionally - and that's what full forward stick normally does!)

Not the first time a protection has assisted: https://assets.publishing.service.go...EZJK_09-10.pdf

EESDL, you're right; each sidestick has a takeover button which disengages the opposing side stick. Even if it had been impossible to free the ill-advisedly placed camera, the aircraft could have been flown normally from the other seat with no wrestling involved.

As for the recovery, once the obstruction was freed, the aircraft would have recovered itself to 1g flight. Put simply it would continue in stable flight where it was pointed. If a spin is being generated along the lines of "hero flight-crew saved aircraft" it is, to put it mildly, very wide of the mark.

A handy shelf, motorised seat & armrest, right before the control input.

Sloping? Painted red with 'Put no objects here?

VERY basic stuff in design, many hours flown without incident until it goes wrong.

Just saying how the very simple things matter. I imagine the general public scratching their heads at such a simple mistake.

Perhaps I can add to the discussion over control of loose objects in cockpits.

A few years ago, I was involved in a meeting to review location and design of some new switches on the centre console of a well known RAF heavy lift helicopter. At one stage, I was asked what I was doing about the risk of certain switches being accidentally knocked on or off. I replied that we would use DefStan 00-970 guidance and regulations, using gated switches plus clear indications in the primary field of view of the status of the switches. I was then told that we would have to add a set of large guards around a certain switch 'as the pilots always put their flip cards and other folders on the centre console in flight, as there wasn't anywhere else to put them'.

My first reaction was stunned incredulity. The idea that you'd have a folder sculling about loose in the cockpit, potentially knocking switches (and preventing the aircrew from getting at the controls) was, to me, amazing. I was even more amazed when this 'requirement' was endorsed by QQ, and led to a late design change to put a great bit set of side bars around the switch. However, I wasn't in the least surprised when the same people then tagged the side bars as a potential hazard as they 'might prevent access to the switch'. Sometimes, you just can't win.

There was (and still might be) a very strong culture that loose objects were 'acceptable' in this particular cockpit. A bit like the Voyager. If that's the case, then you could paint the whole s*****g cockpit red, covered in 'DON'T DO STUPID STUFF' signs, and you'd STILL get the problem. I agree with the Airbus response to this one. Putting a camera loose on a coaming anywhere near a control stick is just asking for trouble. And dull. Sorry, it just is. Same goes for putting folders on switches.

Best Regards as ever to all aircrew doing the long miles,

Engines

Not so sure about the AB 'excellent design' preventing this incident.


You'd need a damn big camera to jam the yoke forward on a Boeing..

Or an NVG case.....
https://www.airforcetimes.com/story/...case/83182244/

(I know LM not Boeing, but same idea)

I know this incident was caused by a personal article but as the 212's post Service articles are also the cause of accidents. Kit is procured but often no stowage provision or guidance is given.

The Nimrods were provided with BAE Steady Scope viewers but as far as I know there was no provision for secure storage. I suspect that much such kit is provided with little thought to due process.

This guy is a pilot . . . pilots DEAL in 3 dimensions, everyday. Spatial awareness . . . !!!

The uninformed me (I only jump seated on civil A330 once) says it's plain and simply gross negligence. I admit I don't have all the facts, but there are some seriously shonky dealings going on here.

Shot One
Thanks - sounds like crew panicked and didn't really know their aircraft - lack of credibly training or an 'attitude' problem within?
Fu$k knows what I would have done in that situation but I have been in various predicaments and glad to report still sitting here in comfy chair and spouting rubbish :D

EESDL, so are they.

I know where you're coming from EESDL, but you sound very judgemental and Pontius makes a correct response.

Even though he is going through court martial, the Captain helped bring the plane into service and the Co is a capable pilot.

It's easy to judge from a comfy chair.

3 bladed beast

I don't think the Captain's knowledge and experience has ever been questioned. What I believe is being questioned is his INTEGRITY or lack thereof which as a direct consequence led to an RAF fleet grounding, the waste of countless manhours internally within MoD and externally at Airbus, and the undisputed disruption to Op HERRICK.

This of course is a personal opinion only and am always open to other points of view.

From what I remember PN, you are quite correct. I think we just put them on the floor or on the pilots side shelves. In this incident, it was a personal item, not cleared for carriage/use on the flight deck, that was the culprit.

So, might I ask why the CM!

Avtur, as I said, it was a service supply item but was stowage ever considered? I know one piece of kit in a Vulcan was withdrawn because Boscombe Down refused clearance. However, like the Steady Scope, I don't think any thought was given to the CVBS case.

Also compare and contrast a civil airline procedure for stowing flight rations and the ration boxes, cooking utensils, sauces etc in an MPA crew kit.

PN, I get that, understand, and not arguing, but the offending camera was a personal item, so technically should not have been on the flight deck in the first place.

Beagle,

You're talking grade A BS I'm afraid. The captain's integrity is very much in question and having spoken to a few Voyager peeps, the CM seems very, very justifiable.

He made a mistake, let's give him that but, endangered several hundred people's lives and then allegedly attempted to cover it up causing no end of headaches to the AT world and the Herrick logistics line. That aside, I'm sure he'll be fine...

Airframe Fatigue
 

Out of interest, is there any open source info regarding how much stress the airframe was during the event? I've often wondered if it's service life might be somewhat shorter than the rest of the fleet.