Yep please tell! and S/L Burke, please enlighten us with informed information.

Bloggs check those bloody fastners. I have Sir! Well Bloggs bloody well check them again! I am Sir.
Ah just another normal sortie in the day of flying with S/L Burke.
Def one of the best. If you can crash every type in the helo world and walk away, then you must walk on water! and know your stuff too!

Vertico, thank you for your kind words. Unlike you I am merely a long retired RAF pilot (fixed wing only) so I defer to those with far more professional knowledge and experience, such as yourself, be they aircrew or groundcrew. What I do not defer to are those who imply that rank alone ensures such knowledge or wisdom, especially when they choose not to share it with others, especially when they ignore the questions of others. From what I have learned on these pages it would seem that the RAF is riven with a pandemic of incompetence and gross negligence at the highest levels as compared to the skill and dedication of those lower down the food chain. That is for the RAF to tackle as no doubt it will, but what goes around comes around and the moral from this thread and others like it is that Airworthiness Regulation must be removed from such hands and placed in the more certain ones of a Military Airworthiness Authority.
8-15fO. Good questions, and good luck with seeking answers. You'll need it!,
Dalek, Winch-control, ah yes Sqn Ldr Burke. I was most impressed with the evidence that the BoI sought from such an important witness. "But Holmes, Sqn Ldr Burke was not called to give evidence to the BoI". "Precisely, Watson, precisely".

Air Cowboy,
Sorry to burst your bubble, but the 'destruction' of our submission, as you so maturely put it, wasn't really that, was it? All you have done is regurgitate the tired old discredited mantra that has been coming out of the MoD for years.

Your Mod response claims (again) that the ROs based their decision on the evidence that the pilots were in breach of flying rules at the waypoint change. Remind me please. Where, exactly was the waypoint change made?

Where there is a difference of opinion, you simply state that you disagree. No recourse for the family, no offer of discussing the matter. The Mod's word is final.

With regards the 'new evidence' label, you claim that there is no evidence (in our report) that was either "not available at the time of the BOI (although they may have deemed it not to be relevant to their investigations), or has been put forward (and dismissed) in the intervening years." So, for example, the BoI had access to the second Boeing simulation requested after the HoL Select Committee did it? There's plenty of information that was not considered by the BoI and it is incredible that you claim otherwise.

I could go on, but the MoD response is available for all to see and it is clear that you have not made your case.

I also look forward to reading your briefing notes to the Minister as they are subject of an outstanding FOIA request.

Mr Purdey,
Rather than make a childish comment, I challenge you to step up and answer the points I put to you in post 4242. Somehow I think you will simply refuse or make a personal comment. Why not try something dofferent like actually answering a question? Both you and AC are from Bath. Do you know each other? :hmm:

On the point of the control pallet, the only fact that needs to be considered is that the AAIB could not say whether or not it had become detached before, during or after the crash. Furthermore, it was at a time when the bonding was giving cause for concern and required a visual check on a regular basis.

The campaign continues...

My best, as always,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Chinook
 

8-15fO. Yes, if it will bring an answer to my question at 4307.
Brian. I replied to your 4242 at 4266.
Kind regards. JP

Brian, Team, please carry on fighting the good fight - you will win in the end.

The reason I am sure of this, and the reason for my first post on this thread, is the nauseating contribution by AC on 2nd May. I don't know where in the MoD office organization he fits, but I was disgusted by the notion that someone would be proud of wring a 'clear and cogent destruction' of a submission to a Minister.

He's a public servant. He's paid for by us. He serves us. He is supposed to be impartial, honest and fair. What he should have done was to write an impartial appraisal for consideration by the Minister, not some mincing hatchet job to please his Masters. It's a glimpse of a moral cesspit. AC should hang his head in shame, but I'd guess he has a problem understanding the word 'shame'.

Brian, please keep going.

Best Regards

Engines

Mr Purdey, thank you for your answer.

Now Atlantic Cowboy, it seems that people on both sides of the argument would like an answer to this question:

With respect to the investigation into the Chinook crash of 2 June 1994, was an airworthiness audit trail document drawn up?

Atlantic Cowboy:Ah, but how wrong can you be? If the next prime minister's words can be relied upon. Unless of course your cess-pit world has already in place a way to stop him.


And JP:Although I seldom agree with anything you put forward, I respect your right to an opinion. That juvenile rant is not worthy of you, and if it's your best shot in answer to Chug's post, then you are truly rattled.

Mr Purdey,
Indeed you did, Mr Purdey. You replied, but you didn't answer. I see the play on words extends further from the halls of the MoD. Would you please answer, as oppposed to reply. Thank you.

Thank you for your support Engines, and welcome to the thread. I wouldn't wory too much about AC. They are clearly out to impress someone with their rigid adherence to the pary line. I am really looking forward to reading the briefing notes they provided though!

8-15,
Hope, as always, you are well. From what I have seen, I don't think there is a complete audit trail and that is why no-one will answer the question. It could be, of course, that this document is one of the many that can no longer be found by the MoD (despite there being an 800+ page spreadsheet listing all the related documentation). :hmm:

My best to all, as always,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

It's like trying to reason with Orwell's sheep. :rolleyes:
I hope that the Mull Group is not sticking so rigidly to the theme of airworthiness just because it has invested so much time to it. There is no harm debating alternatives - unless you either just don't want to be embarrassed by the false hope you have given for so long or it is such a useful red herring, an inexhaustible source of material for innocuous debate - in which case who is it who is really pushing the party line? AC or the Group?
As I said earlier, AC is telling it as it is - if you really are genuine about clearing the pilots' names, why not look into any plausible alternatives? Why the blinkers?
Snap out of the groupthink and put your minds to the analysis - there is enough to go on - there are simply too many anomalies to hide from experienced eyes that this was an extraordinary flight if only you would all look.

Brian,

Thank you for your kind reply. Please let me know what else I can do to support you.

Good luck with the FOI request - that's a briefing note I'd like to see. The line peddled by AC does concern me, as it possibly erects another layer you will have to break through to get this injustice put right.

Very best wishes,

Engines

Tandemrotor

I am still waiting for an answer to the questions asked in my post 4332 - or are they unanswerable in respect of your scenario?

What is clear is that there has been no repetition of this tragedy despite there being no major modification to the Fleet as a direct result of Technical Failures which caused the crash. The reason for this is that there was not then (and there is not now) any evidence of such a Technical Failure.

Surely just because no evience exists does not mean it wasn't there/didn't happen?

Perhaps you would wish to comment on the disregard of STCASI's and GASO's?

Well that is / was SF! This was an SF crew, doing what was mandated to them, ie undertaking the task.

'Finally; perhaps you would agree that, if you are using a chart and log prepared by somebody else, it would be a good idea to check the "waypoints" to ensure that they are actually where you think they should be?'

And SF crews do this ad nauseum... I doubt Ric, Jon and Graeme (and probably Kev too) would not have double checked the planned route to the nth degree.
If there was a difference between the waypoint on the Mull, with reference to the light house and the landing site, then the crew would have been aware of it.

Winch-control

Could you tell me which version of events you believe to be correct:

1. The version given on oath to the BOI investigating the crash that "Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a "day on/dayoff" rota.

or

2. The version given on this thread that it was the other crew that were going to fly the sortie but the deteriorating weather prompted a change of crew at the last moment.

In reply to this question cazatou, I believe both are correct.

The crews in theatre did prefer to work day on, day off.

And indeed, the more experienced crew elected to fly the sortie.

Winch-control

So you confirm that the crew with the inexperienced Captain was the Primary Crew for the VIP task; whilst the experienced crew flew the routine in-Theatre resupply sorties? That does seem a rather odd way of utilising ones assets to their full potential.

It also means that crew of ZD576 had already been on the go for some 10 hours when they departed Aldergrove utilising someone else's Flight Plan with poor weather forecast on route. Moreover, it is unlikely that Flt Lt's Cook and Tapper had sufficient time to check the prepared flight charts thoroughly prior to departure; if they had they would have discovered that the turning point at the Mull was not. the lighthouse.

You say that this was SF "doing the job". It was exactly the opposite -"doing the job" would have entailed proper crew allocation in respect of the tasks to hand - not what suited crew members on that day. It would have matched crews to the tasks; not to their personal preferences.

The way this detatchment was run - it was an accident waiting to happen. The best that could be hoped for was that it would happen without fatalities; sadly that was not to be.

You are supposed to be an intelligent person, that last comment will upset a lot of people including me. That detachment was not an accident waiting to happen, every job was a VIP job to us. Every single soldier, be he general or private was a VIP. Of the two jobs you mention, a resupply to troops living in bunkers on the front line (and it was the front line) was equally as important as the fatal trip. You were not there, doing the job we did every day, you do not know what you are talking about. 1. Don't quote the flight safety line either, we did the job as safe as we could in the circumstances. When you regularly operate close to the limits, these things can happen. 2. Don't tell us we became blase (sp?), we were constantly reminded that safety came first.
The Chinook flight was well run by professional aviators. Why this happened, who knows, maybe they were negligent, maybe they were not. Maybe Walters crackpot theory is correct, maybe not. I don't know the facts, neither does anyone else left alive.
If you had stated that 'in my opinion' before your statement instead of 'fact', you may have more sympathy.

jayteeto,

Many Aircrew operate close to the limits day in/day out - but manage to stay within the rules. They obey the Flying Order Book/ GASO's/ STCASI's and JSP 318 and utilise their resources to achieve the Task safely and efficiently. The planned programme for that day's flying which allocated an RN Pilot straight from the OCU (with an RAF Navigator as the other Flight Deck Crew member) to do the VIP Task whilst the 2 experienced Chinook Pilots carried out routine tasking beggars belief.

As you were there, perhaps you can explain how it was that the BOI came to the conclusion (based on the evidence it heard) that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a day on/ day off basis" - thus ignoring the allocation of Lt K and Flt Lt T to the VIP Task? I assume that the BOI were made aware of that allocation -of course they were; weren't they?

What input did the Group FSO have before the accident? How often had he visited the detachment to try to understand the task and operational environment?

Possibly the FSO you hint at was busy sorting out the catering debacle at his own unit :ugh:

The problem with having no operational experience, no Support helicopter experience and no SF experience is that some folk will simply never understand :rolleyes:

If a RN pilot goes Chinook, he already is experienced in his own service. If he is an aircraft captain, he will be qualified to do the job. I flew government ministers as a young pilot.

Shy Torque,

"What input did GFSO have before the accident?"

I was not there at that time but it would have been minimal because of the workload of the other 13(?) BOI's in progress at that time + some Unit Inquiries.

SFFP

GFSO was a Tornado Pilot - what have they to do with Catering?

Jayteeto


As a Flight Instructor/ Training Captain/ IRE on 32 Sqn for many years I can assure you that your statement is wishful thinking and not borne out by my experience.

Caz,

Can you please stop throwing your teddies out of the pram? Amusing though it is, it doesn't do you any favours. That said, you are as entitled to your say along with the rest of us, its just that I don't think you are seeing a bigger picture here.

Look, everyone has a different view about what was, or wasn't, important in the events leading up to the crash of ZD 576, whether they be about breakfast times, flight planning, poor weather, a crew-change, turning point choices, icing limitations, safety altitudes, a lack of HC1s because the HC2 is rushed into service with clear design and airworthiness issues, possible distractions in-flight, or unplanned LZs etc etc. However, I am sure that many, if not all, of the points we raise here had an influence on the pilots' operations that day. Sadly, the slices of cheese were too few and with too many holes. But as JT2 said, echoing the thoughts of many, many others (including the original BOI)

NO-ONE KNOWS FOR SURE.........FACT!

The ROs, by overturning this assessment, showed immoral, weak and subjective leadership because such a ruling was unsubstantiated by the facts, then or as now.

My lasting regret is that had the BOI uncovered the true state of affairs at Boscombe and MoD(PE) and why it was going downhill rapidly, then other more recent accidents involving design/airworthiness issues would almost certainly have been prevented.

flipster:
That just about sums up this can of worms for me as well flip, and the common denominator here is Gross Negligence in my view, not of the two deceased pilots but of the MOD. A botched RTS followed by a botched BOI. Both of these functions need to be in much much safer hands, independent of the politicians and Air Marshals that presided over this and other such tragedies.

flipster,

No teddies, just a certain irritation in respect of an ALM contributor who feels that he is the sole repository of experience in operating with Special Forces such as the "Hooligans from Hereford". Some of us were doing that 40 years ago in a slightly different "sandpit" from the one in use today. IIRC, Sir John Day was operating around that time with the Gurkhas (and some Hooligans) in the jungles of the Far East.

You may have noticed that no-one has attempted to answer the question as to how the BOI was able to state that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook flew the fatal sortie because "Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a day on/ day off rota" when all the "evidence" posted on this thread suggests that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took over the task from Lt K and Flt Lt T because the weather forecast was such that it was unsuitable for someone with the limited experience on type of Lt K operating as the sole Pilot.

I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.

Actually cazatou it's "Gurkhas" not "Gurkha's". I would have thought that as you started the Gurkha thread you would have known that. But then again you are an expert on everything it would appear.

cazatou
 

Quote:

I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.

With the greatest respect, sir, both can indeed be correct.

Evidence to BOI: Normal practice was for crews to do day on/day off

This thread: Because of deteriorating weather (could have been for a host of other reasons, too) less experienced single RN pilot was replaced by crew of two highly experienced RAF pilots.

Where is the inconsistency in that? Suggest you promptly withdraw your holier-than-thou allegation of perjury - and soon, before you find yourself being sued for libel by whoever it was gave that testimony to the BOI.

Finally, please don't lose sight of the sole purpose of this thread - to right a gross injustice.

Caz,

I have never been SF but I do listen to, respect and invariably believe facts from those who have been :ok:

Now imagine how you could have saved yourself from looking oh so silly a little while back if only you had believed a couple of folk who gave you chapter and verse on in flight catering :p

chumzpilla

You are quite correct, an inexcusable typo and I apologise.

What do you fly?

SFFP

So you have never been on SF.

That explains a lot!!!

Well, as I understood it - and with the exercises we did in the Middle East and Europe - my War role in the 60's was to operate with the "Hooligans from Shhh-you know where".

I even met some of them (unexpectedly) when they were "deployed" some years later. I got a nice "thank you" from the CSM after their deployment was over. I obeyed rule 1 - you never acknowledge them!!

But then you knew that, didn't you?

This thread does seem to wander about a bit but can I ask what the problem would be in using an "inexperienced" RN pilot on a low level flight over the sea? Surely he would have some relevant experience.

DL

Instead of constructive comment, sarcastic remarks and obfuscation are the norm here.
I thought some of Cazatou's points were relevant - let me try and rephrase them:
What the hell was the captain doing while his crew were having their meal (that was usually taken together?)?:
If the expected, routine rostering had not been the case, what was the reason actually given for the crew change? (I would assume that someone on the ground knew/made the decision.) and was this reason made clear at the BOI?
As for my theory being wacky, does anyone have anything better that fits all that is known?

Caz,

No I didn't know that, but there was little doubt in my mind that you were going to tell me something along those lines :rolleyes:

SFFP

My 31 years, 1 month and 20 days Service is a matter of record.

Yours is, of course (and rightly) , subject to security restrictions. Feel free to investigate my record and I will sign any disclosure form that you will require.

Pity we don't have AQM's like Don Hayward any more.
:cool::rolleyes::ok:

ALERT, ALERT Thread drift ALERT

(including the catering which, I'm sorry to say Caz, is a large red-herring ---ahem!)

Walter - your theory IS whacky but you are perfectly entitled to it. However, I do not believe that any crew would have attempted an unplanned/unauthorised LZ in poor weather - especially as their time was tight. But like everything we discuss, it cannot be proven one way or t'other......FACT! Which is why the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met.

flipster,

Surely they did not stoop so low as to serve Herring (whatever its colour) to VIP Pax?

Gravadlax and Langoustine perhaps - but HERRING!!!

:eek::mad:

Flipster
We do not know that any such activity was unplanned – indeed, it would have had to have been in my scenario – what we do know is that the usual planning and outbrief that would have been expected for a simple ferry flight was not the case here, was it? Perhaps there was an opportunity for the captain to have been attending such a planning meeting before the flight – why don't we try and detail the known movements and activities of the crew for the day leading up to the departure? Who else was in the Ops area that day whose presence may have been somehow unusual?
The weather was ideal for a demo of the system (I proposed) to have been demonstrated.
Timewise, it would have been an insignificant addition to the overall journey and it had a real benefit – a touch and go, however brief, outside the operational area got them off the limitation on duty hours – they would not have exceeded the duty hours by the time they had got to the Mull (even as far as Campbeltown) and the subsequent journey would have been outside the op area – the CO of Aldergrove made this point very clearly at the FAI – the duty hours limitation did not apply to flights outside the operational area.
That they were doing something extraordinary can indeed be proved – the proof is in the procedures and actions they took – it just takes people with relevant experience and authority to recognise them and advise the interested parties accordingly – I am talking about, for starters: the callsign and radio call that suggested an exercise; the line up to a known LZ with altimeters set for a landing there; their slowing down.
Regarding the mantra of “... the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met.” - if the establishment set them up as patsys you are not going to change their mind as long as it suits their objectives – of course there is never going to be proof of their negligence if they were not negligent – you have to try and establish how this a/c was crashed.
A crash of this a/c type in such circumstances is a rare event indeed – and it just happened to occur when the whole anti-terrorist team for NI was packed on board who represented an obstacle to the peace process – how bloody convenient.

Olive Oil


I'm no pilot, but does this answer your question?

I agree it is important to stick to known facts and be consistent.

I therefore twitch violently when the BoI report notes that ZD576 was a Mk1 converted to Mk2, having flown “only” 57 hours since delivery, but did not mention the long list of technical problems in that period which, conservatively speaking, gave the aircraft an MTBF of not-a-lot. And that’s just on safety critical items.

And then, in complete contrast, Minister (AF) claimed in 2005 (to an MP, in writing) that Mk2 Chinooks were new, as of November 1993, so could not have suffered from any legacy problems such as Mk1 defects or documentation not being corrected or maintained. His letter specifically refers to ZD576, stating problems with any other RAF Chinook are irrelevant, which rather negates the concept of fault reporting and trend failures – a bit of a giveaway that his staffs were completely out of touch with the obligations placed upon them by JSP553, Ch. 5.

As someone said earlier, both statements can’t be right, but I guess it’s important to twist the facts to fit the political imperative.

Olive Oil:
Ah, if only that stricture had been observed by the Messrs. Wratten and Day! A great deal of angst since could then have been avoided.