The level of frustration at lack of focus and progress here reminds me of Buster Keaton's film, The Awakening.:ugh:
Anyway, once again to try and draw the focus onto what is known:
Grunt – if you look at the tracks, they were only closing with the shoreline at about 20 deg – only a slight turn left would have taken them up the coast – and presumably, being over the level sea, a lot less stressful control inputs were going on compared to when they were low flying over the 10 miles or so of Antrim hills that they had crossed earlier in the flight – such a coincidence that they should fail just there, surely? It is also highly improbable that the engines would have been found closely matched and with no record of emergency power demands if they had been struggling with a control problem.
Regarding undemanded power surges – I have made the point before that had this occurred the obvious immediate response would surely have been to pull up so keeping the RPM within limits – this would have been to their advantage, a miracle if it had happened. Anyway, there are 3 things which I can think of which argue against any undemanded run-up: no history in the DECU of such; distance/time calculations by Boeing indicate that they had started to slow down (in airspeed) over the course of the leg from waypoint change to impact; the engines were found to have been at matched power (within limits normally requiring power trim by either the pilots or the FADEC and normally when in a steady state – I suggest such as level cruise, cruise climb, approach, etc).
Regarding distractions - as Cazatou so rightly said, their number one priority was to fly the aircraft – and of course, a top priority in flying an aircraft is to avoid an unintended/ unexpected contact with terrain. It would be a reasonable excuse to have over stressed an engine after ignoring a warning light because the pilots were distracted by the imminent approach of high ground – but the other way around?!!! They had ¾ of the compass to turn towards while they sorted out anything within the a/c.
Not forgetting that unless they had a reason for going there, they were already imprudently close in, in the prevailing conditions, by the time they changed waypoint if they had just meant to be chugging past to somewhere else.
So why don't you all address the issues that may explain what they may have been doing, these being:
has anyone come across the use of a domestic squawk code (as 7760 was) for exercises?(as EUROControl told me did happen on occassion back then due to the shortage of codes for special exercises);
is the type of callsign used (F4J40) appropriate for a SAR ex? (as I have been told from several sources);
has anyone on this forum landed at the LZ I have described (the one by waypoint A) and if so would you like to describe what altimeter settings you would use and what approach heading you would take? - oh, and how far away would you start to let your speed wash off?;
what is the usual way of making a call to the regional ATC on VHF when you are approaching an area for a local low level exercise under VFR and do you need a response or is it just a formality? - is this the way you give an early warning to exercise participants on the ground to stand by on the local UHF?
Anyone know a good tailor?:E

Walter, you make many good points, but by the same token you wish to junk the good points others have made because they do not accord with your scenario. What you call a lack of focus I would call keeping an open mind. A really serious compromise to the airworthiness of the aircraft as has been described by Winch Control regarding the delaminating of the control palette the day before may or may not have been a factor on the final flight of ZD576 and needs to be considered. Indeed it could possibly even accord with your scenario of an intended landing at the Mull LZ causing a loss of control during that approach, could it not? It seems to me as one who suspects that the airworthiness of the aircraft could be the smoking gun that one is spoilt for choice with so many likely candidates, be they DECU code and/or connectors, detached springs or delaminated control palettes, hydraulic fluid contaminated with metal particles, etc etc. In that respect you are right to complain of lack of focus. Ignoring all those possibilities does not entail a renewed focus but myopia.

Winch-control has given a compelling account of the state of the flight control pallet, and more importantly it's attachments, on the day the aircraft arrived in theatre.

I too have had the opportunity of viewing this very same item, though very sadly post accident. I did so in the company of the senior investigator of air accidents, conducting the investigation into the events of 2nd June 1994.

I well remember his comment to me at the time. He said:

"Look at this. I wouldn't even consider this a safe means of attachment if this was on my bicycle, and this is the flight control system of a helicopter!"

I am intrigued to know whether chinook240 can tell us how this item has changed since the accident?

I believe any deference extended to chinook240, should also have been extended to the crew of ZD576 since they made the ultimate sacrifice. Sadly they have not even been shown the respect, in their absence, of being given the benefit of a VERY considerable doubt!

Let right be done.

Given that the basic argument of this campaign is the unjustified verdict of gross negligence levelled at the two pilots, I find Winch Controls comments in post 4311 disappointing.

You ask the question did anyone check the suitability and cure time of the adhesive used to reaffix the pallet insert? YES the technician who did the job, the NCO who oversigned the work and the SNCO who carried out the independent check. You also state that you are not aware of any ground run being carried out, there would be no need to that's why, a simple APU run would be sufficient to verify the serviceability of the pallet and although I wasn't there, I see no reason why the groundcrew should consult you before such actions were carried out.

You also state as a matter of "fact" that the pallet had become detached from the floor that would be impossible as it is mounted vertically and doesn't contact any part of the floor. That is a fact.

Regards NC

Brian, keep up the good work I hope you suceed. Any help I can give you regarding technical information please ask.

A bit of detail - does anyone of you recall, when flying anything near the Mull light house, seeing a white post on the seaward edge of that landing area I have described?
I wondered when it was last seen standing upright.
When I came across it, it was lying down in the ferns near its post hole - it may have been decided it was no longer required at some stage but it was probably too heavy to be worth taking away - a foot in diameter and about 8 feet long - half painted bright white. It was in the middle of the edge of the cliff and would have been a handy aiming point on ground that was otherwise devoid of recognisable features - like DPM would look to a fly. Its position was only a matter of tens of yards from the position of waypoint A.

Notchy

'Given that the basic argument of this campaign is the unjustified verdict of gross negligence levelled at the two pilots, I find Winch Controls comments in post 4311 disappointing'

Can you please explain or pm me?

"You also state as a matter of "fact" that the pallet had become detached from the floor that would be impossible as it is mounted vertically and doesn't contact any part of the floor. That is a fact."

Nope the control pallet I am referring to is horizontal at stn 100 to 140 behind the LHS pilots seat.
Post glue fix a ground run may have occurred, however I was not party to it. No Air test did occurr. I would have been aware of it.

Notchy you are clearly on a different wave length.. but I like your thoughts..

Regards
Winch

Notchy, Was that a bite?

WC

Not a bite, just trying to point out to you that the comments you made about adhesive and cure times and testing could be seen by others to impune the reputation of the groundcrew who carried out the work. or perhaps that was your intention. I would like to think not.

Regarding the control pallette I assume you mean flying controls If that is the case the only honeycombed ones around that area are the ones I described previously. I certainly would not like to fly in an aircraft that had a control pallet mounted to the floor at Stn 140 as you state, you might trip over it every time you moved around the aircraft as it would be in the cabin aft of the avionics cupboard as you described it.

Perhaps you could post a photograph of the offending item I would be most interested to know what it is you're on about.

Kind regards

NC

PS enjoyed your last post it made me laugh.

Notchy, not a knock at he ground cew....Tho they may need one.....I don't think my comments on glue curing etc will have any impact on this case....Now the prawn Volovents.....ahem
And yep the control pallette is / was mounted to the floor, do we really need to go into CH47 stations again? ahem stn 100 to 140 is not in the cabin....

It is a long time since I worked on Chinooks, but I'm pretty sure 140 is in the cabin, and this diagram available on this page seems to agree:

The CH-47D Chinook Structural Drawings.

8.15

Officially the cabin section of the aircraft is spliced to the cockpit section at Sta 160 however between Sta 120 and 160 there is nothing on the floor except floor boards and tie down points, so to all intents and purposes it is cabin area.

Winchy I don't know what it is you think you saw but I can tell you with absolute certainty it was not part of the flying control system.

I've just noticed on your profile that you are from Perth, if that is Perth in Scotland I think you need to lay off the whiskey trail tours, if it is Perth in Australia I think you need to stay out of the sun.:ok:......Only joking

NC

Bearing in mind how much discussion there has been on the flight control pallete, surely someone here can confidently and authoritatively let us all know exactly where the control pallette was and how it was mounted.
Interestingly, I have had no less than two sources say that, when fitted in several HC2 Chinooks by early 1995, the airborne side of the PRC112 system (the CPLS/ ARS6/ whatever) was fitted on the floor behind the left hand pilot's seat.
So can we clear this up? - it may be important!

The internet is truely a wonderful thing.

Walter in answer to your question about where the control pallet is and how it is mounted can be found here: TM-55-1520-240-23-9 CH-47D Heilcopter Manual scroll down to the instructions to 'Remove Control Pallet Sta 95' and 'Remove Control Pallet Sta 120'.

As you will see the pallets are fixed to the bulkheads (as Notchy advised) not to the floor, inside the control closet behind the LH seat, the pallets are secured to the bulkheads by 8 bolts. The manuals also describe exactly what flight control components are on the pallets. No radio/comms equipment at all was fitted to them.

Please bear in mind my first hand knowledge is distinctly dated, but (for what it's worth) my time and Talisker addled memories do concur with the information detailed in the documents above.

8-15 Thanks heaps - I am getting a bit slow as I have had the link to that manual for years but somehow didn't find this relevant bit when I was looking for it the other night.
The control pallette does seem to fit its common description of "broom cupboard" better by being vertical!
So let's spell it out - the infamous "broom cupboard" was not mounted horizontally on the floor.
The electronic kit which interests me would have been mounted on a pallette on the floor behind the LH pilot's seat - so if any others of you saw something there on ZD576, please come forward too - if I can get a significant number (say, 3 or more) to give a stat dec then we can progress.
Remembering that the sets delivered for early '95 were palletised for easy in-service-mod fit (30mins each way) for easy transfer between Chinooks, a set could have been put on board ZD576 with very little obvious activity.
If the kit was fitted, it would have probably been on loan at that time and so may not appear in the usual paperwork - so eye witness statements are crucial.

Notchy,
I may have the stn position incorrect. A function of time. However, the control pallette is indeed secured to a honey comb pallette, which is secured to the floor. (and still is). The pallette on the a'c in question was delaminated, raised at the rear by approx 1 1/2 inches. It is situated in the broom closet (as is/was known) behind the left hand pilots seat at station? Less than 120 by previous posts. It is not secured vertically. The control runs themself are. And if you think the base of the control runs do not affect the a/c, then what does?

Nochy, I don't drink whiskey, anyone that knows me knows that! a glass or 5 of Chardonnay maybe. And indeed the sun is great in WA!

WC

I have enjoyed playing E mail tennis with you but we are not really advancing the cause, so it is probably time to agree to disagree on this point. But I will end by saying that in 25 years of working on the Chinook Mk1 and 2 including 5 years of instucting at the maintenance school I never once saw, adjusted, measured, pinned or taught anything remotely like you described. enjoy the sun out in Aus.

Kind Regards.

PS I'm now off down the opticians to get my eyes tested.

NC

Chaps

This is all very interesting.

However, I would be very interested to hear what has changed regarding the method of attachment of critical parts of the flight control system to the honeycomb pallet?

Absolutely clearly this item was an utter disgrace at the time of the accident. I cannot believe it has not been modified?

Anybody know, or does it require a FOI request?

Many thanks.

Tandem

There was a modification carried out to the fasteners that are bonded to the pallets I can't remember the details of the fix but the design is basically the same it has just made more robust to cope with the loads imposed on it. After the modification was carried out, the need to check the pallet components for security by moving the controls channels to full range of movement after each flight was discontinued.

NC

Tandemrotor

As Winch-Control and Notchy Collective are completely at odds as to what was attached to what, when and where; and in addition, where these components were situated; I find it very difficult to accept your statement:

"Absolutely clearly this was an utter disgrace at the time of the accident"

I do believe, however, that the Detatchment Commander and his Replacement were beholden by their appointments to ensure that their aircraft were fit to fly. In this particular case they had been flying this aircraft for some 6 hrs that day and had not reported any significant defects - indeed, for the defect that they did report, they failed to raise the required paperwork; thus putting the groundcrew in the invidious position of having to attempt to isolate and cure a fault without completing any paperwork to show what had been done.

NC

Thank you.

So thanks to this modification, an aircraft which was previously unairworthy has now been improved, and is much safer.

For the avoidance of doubt cazatou (K52) there are some on here who feel that reliable flying controls are considered a pre-requisite for 'airworthiness'. Presumably you aren't one of us??

As I have always said. The fact that the aircraft has flown blah thousand hours, and currently does sterling service for the RAF, doesn't change the fact that it was a heap of garbage in June of 1994.

Let right be done!

Tandemrotor

As NC cannot remember the details of the Mod; how can you state that it made the aircraft safer to fly?

In fact, how can you be sure that there was such a Mod; it is, after all, nearly 15 years since this tragedy and memory is a fragile thing.

What is clear is that there has been no repetition of this tragedy despite there being no major modification to the Fleet as a direct result of Technical Failures which caused the crash. The reason for this is that there was not then (and there is not now) any evidence of such a Technical Failure.

Perhaps you would wish to comment on the disregard of STCASI's and GASO's?

Finally; perhaps you would agree that, if you are using a chart and log prepared by somebody else, it would be a good idea to check the "waypoints" to ensure that they are actually where you think they should be?

As I recall (from memory rather than looking up just now), Boeing did recommend checks in the control closet for bonding etc in the immediate aftermath and as a result of this crash BUT dropped the requirement only a few months later - presumably because it was not worthwhile as problems were not being found.
Regarding TR's comments:
<<... "Look at this. I wouldn't even consider this a safe means of attachment if this was on my bicycle, and this is the flight control system of a helicopter!"
I am intrigued to know whether chinook240 can tell us how this item has changed since the accident?... >>
Well such means of attachment are common in a/c where weight is at a premium – and it has been good in an awful lot of 47Ds, before and since ZD576, has it not?
You are grabbing at straws with this control issue – you are postulating that a reliable a/c type had a very rare jam just when it was near a critical point on its route and just when it was carrying passengers of special value – and this despite there being no evidence of a jam.
Yet at this critical point there is evidence of an intention to land in a controlled fashion at a known LZ for Chinooks.
Anything but the unpalletable obvious?

Caz
There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft, not by Sqn techies.

Tandem
A heap of garbage seems a little excessive, perhaps it might be fairer to describe it as a work in progress.

Walter,
I don't think anyone in the pro camp seriously believes that the pallet de-bond, Fadec issues are going to one day provide the "smoking gun" that blows this case wide open, however, I believe that they help bolster the case that the finding of gross negligence beyond any reasonable doubt is totally unsustainable.

NC

Work in Progress


It’s important to understand to what degree the Mk1 > Mk2 conversion was a work in progress. i.e. how mature was it and was it of acceptable quality.

MoD regulations acknowledge that every aircraft and equipment design is a work in progress, as there is a mandated requirement to Maintain the Build Standard, which must be reflected in the Safety Case.

It is a question of when a design is deemed safe enough to fly and, much later, enter Service operationally. This is a safety issue, although we all recognise that the political imperative often kicks in. In making this decision, the good book says “Professional engineering judgement is by far the most important part of Safety Management”. (The same paragraph states ““It has never happened before” is not valid evidence on its own, that a particular event will not happen”).

By 1994 MoD were 3 years into a policy of diluting this body of engineering experience (which came to a head in 1996 when CDP announced 600 job reductions at AbbeyWood as he didn’t see the need for engineering project managers). The practical effect was that, increasingly, MoD lost its capacity to apply professional engineering judgement, and the “advice” from e.g. Boscombe Down actually became the most significant authoritative input.

I’ve mentioned a few fundamental components of airworthiness there (judgement, experience, competence, resources, Build Standard, ensuring quality and maturity etc), and you may be able to cope if one of these defences in depth (to prevent accidents) is missing or compromised.

But, not only were ALL of them compromised, there were deliberate decisions made to save money by ditching some altogether. Thus, the Safety Management System had been compromised by the Political Imperative, breaching the basic rule. I think TR’s term “garbage” is a good description of the System which was meant to provide a safe aircraft.

The upshot is, I believe, the Mk2 entered Service prematurely. The design was immature, certainly in the area of FADEC software. There were various faults and (design) defects which, in isolation, may have been barely acceptable, but the cumulative effect should have been ringing bells. Not only that, the evidence shows a distinct lack of urgency to correct them.

In crude terms, it was a “simple” conversion programme but some new features in the Mk2 were crucial to flight safety and, in those circumstances, it is unwise to simply say “The Mk1 was ok, so that’s our safety baseline - just read across”. (And the tendency to over-rely on “read across” deserves a chapter of its own, being at the root of many an accident). In fact, only an idiot would not insist that the build standard was stabilised at induction to the conversion programme, giving you a KNOWN baseline, rather than an assumed one. Yes, it costs money, but given the mandated requirement to maintain that build standard was ditched 3 years previously, at the time it was a well known risk which project offices considered a routine task.

That a mandated, but missing, airworthiness component was considered routine is indeed an indictment of the System.

Thank you tucumseh, for a readable authoritative and succinct resume of the road to purgatory. How on earth could air ranking professionals, be they pilots or engineers, participate in such a doomed enterprise? "I was merely obeying orders" doesn't even begin to explain this lemming like abandonment of fundamental Flight Safety principles. No matter what changes are made in house to rehabilitate UK Military Airworthiness Provision, the fact remains that if it could happen once then it can happen again and again. Airworthiness is not safe solely in the hands of the MOD, or any other user for that matter. It must be enforced by a separate and independent authority, an MAA.

Dear All,

So a week on and no comprehensive rebutal of the scenario I postulated.

Remember, I do not say that this definitely happened, but to find gross negligence you must be able to say that this definitely did not happen.

Walter raised some fair points which I will address:

I envisaged a progressive failure with the slight left turn merely being the last straw that caused loss of control.

Quote:

---

It is also highly improbable that the engines would have been found closely matched and with no record of emergency power demands if they had been struggling with a control problem.

---

I have been in a pitching APC, where even with small pitches of 0.5-1 metre it was impossible to use the controls, so I do not find it that difficult to believe in a violently pitching aircraft, as postulated, it is impossible to manipulate controls effectively.

Quote:

---

Regarding undemanded power surges – I have made the point before that had this occurred the obvious immediate response would surely have been to pull up so keeping the RPM within limits – this would have been to their advantage, a miracle if it had happened. Anyway, there are 3 things which I can think of which argue against any undemanded run-up: no history in the DECU of such; distance/time calculations by Boeing indicate that they had started to slow down (in airspeed) over the course of the leg from waypoint change to impact; the engines were found to have been at matched power (within limits normally requiring power trim by either the pilots or the FADEC and normally when in a steady state – I suggest such as level cruise, cruise climb, approach, etc).

---

In the scenario I postulated I did not mention any engine run ups. The consequence of the postulated decu failure was misleading information.

Could you explain this more.

EG

NC

'There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft'

If you are talking of the control pallet afore of stn ? 120 on the LHS then it is the same pallett.

'I have enjoyed playing E mail tennis with you but we are not really advancing the cause, so it is probably time to agree to disagree on this point. But I will end by saying that in 25 years of working on the Chinook Mk1 and 2 including 5 years of instucting at the maintenance school I never once saw, adjusted, measured, pinned or taught anything remotely like you described'

This is not a contest!

I believe we are talking about the same thing, I also flew on the Mk1 and Mk2; just stn numbers that differ? and those only because I have been in other a/c types since? So I fully accept they are incorrect.

Were you present in Aldergrove the day prior to the a/c departing on its last flight? and did you view the delaminated control pallette?

Maybe the big picture is just too hard to swallow at one go – perhaps you all could apply your knowledge to one significant aspect at a time.
Let's start with engine power:
(from memory)
Luckily (from an analysis perspective that is) the last manouevre was of insufficient duration for the thrust lever demand to have been reacted to by the engine management system and so we know the state of the engines just before impact.
AAIB etc had it that the engines were at matched power settiings and at an “intermediate level”;
Boeing's “Analysis of available data” had it that they had started to slow down on the final leg.
Why don't you all address these two related points?
Do some homework/ask around to clarify what “intermediate” meant – was it about right for coasting in on an approach? – just enough thrust to balance the weight while the speed washed off.
Because if it was and you agree with Boeing's analysis that it was slowing down, then it would seem that the intention was not to maintain the high cruise speed, continuing the route – nor to climb over the Mull. Just from this, the analysis problem is reduced significantly.

Tandemrotor,

Perhaps you would be so kind as to reply to the 2 Questions I asked you in Post 4332? They are, I would suggest, fundamental - given the difference between the scenarios posted on this thread as opposed to the evidence given on oath to the BOI.

Why assume evidence given under oath to a BOI is true? I know for a fact, of one MACR that lied under oath to a BOI, and is stil employed by HRH.

And withholding relevant evidence, for what ever reason (but usually to protected senior ranks/grades) is an equally malevolent and disgraceful offence against people one has a duty of care over. The aim of the BoI/SI is, in part, to prevent re-occurrence. How can they make an informed recommendation or decision lacking vital evidence?

I do appreciate many disagree with this, not least Ainsworth, who has been happy to place this in writing.

I have a very clear recollection of briefing Ainsworth on the supposed "new evidence" put forward by the Mull group. After a short discussion his view was that there was nothing new and nothing would change his mind or the Government on the findings of the BOI.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported. So did S of S. So did CAS and ACAS.
So will every future S of S and PM.

After nearly 15 years and no change from a Government of either colour there is no prospect of any change of findings.

Atlantic Cowboy is telling it as it is.
I suggest that the unjust verdict was politically expedient at the time and, given the ongoing sensitivities in the region, may remain so beyond our lifetime.
Thus the onus falls on interested parties, who wish to clear the names of the pilots, to prove that something other than negligence on behalf of the pilots caused the crash.
While the Mull Group is correct in that there was not sufficient evidence for the verdict of gross negligence, and that it was therefore unjust, I would suggest that their strategy of not digging into the flight planning and conduct lest anything detrimental to their cause emerge has had the effect of blinkering debate, intentional or not.
I believe that there could be sufficient evidence of an extra activity in the vicinity of the Mull – I have done my best to point out the parameters that indicate this – it requires people who were in the right positions at the time to recognise and correlate these parameters such that an authoritative statement can be made which could open up further formal investigations.
Any such extra task being exposed that has hitherto not been disclosed by the authorities would immediately void that unjust verdict – it could also ultimately lead to real justice.

As you well know, this completely misses the point that no new evidence is required. It is for MoD to demonstrate Gross Negligence beyond any doubt whatsoever, and they can’t.

Your loyalty to the party line is very clear. I’m sure, like others, you thought it a thrill to brief Ainsworth (however intellectually unchallenging). But ask around your longer serving colleagues and they’ll tell you that it is you who’ll be hung out to dry when the truth emerges, as it surely will. Your only protection is to attain 2 Star level before that day; the lowest protected species. Step back and ask yourself why you are protecting people you almost certainly don’t know, and who wouldn’t give you a second glance. If you are a Civil Servant, are you sure you are adhering to the Civil Service Code? Your lack of objectivity and impartiality is startling.

The danger this places aviators in is equally clear; but then politicians don’t worry about that. The failure to adhere to very simple regulations meant an aircraft flew that day which was manifestly and demonstrably not fit for purpose. If the MoD’s policy of running down the airworthiness system had been exposed in the immediate aftermath, I wonder how many lives would have been saved subsequently. I wonder if you truly agree with the Chinook 2 Star of the day and CDP (as was) that, for example, airworthiness is optional, and can be traded out in order to meet time and cost. Or that withholding vital evidence is fine. That completely abrogating your duty of care is just dandy. Perhaps you should reflect on those past Ministers, including a Prime Minister who, when told the truth, immediately and publicly stated they would have overturned the verdict had they been so briefed. It is a shame they didn’t follow this through and seek action against those who lied to them, but that seems to be accepted in Government.

I well recall a vacancy arising in the MoD’s “Mull Team”, those charged with answering PQs and the like. An engineering post. The outgoing man had 30-odd years under his belt and was considered inexperienced, as per the personnel rules in the preceding years. A very fine engineer indeed. The Vacancy Notice didn’t ask for any normal qualifications, experience or proven competence. Only that applicants could write a good letter. That is, be told the party line and put it on paper. No thought required. Certainly no technical knowledge. A step change in recruitment policy, unique to that one post. In effect, a political post. I wonder why? Could it be that the Team knew that what they were told to write was spin and nonsense, that true context was missing and vital evidence was being withheld? Were they uncomfortable at how vulnerable their position was? I believe so.

I do hope Ainsworth made good coffee. One should always know ones limitations.

Nice post Tuc.

Wonder how Atlantic Cowboy's ego is feeling this morning.

What a nob.

Hope they have a CS clear out when Labour lose the election, getting way too political for my liking. Administrators........can't even spell.

Atlantic Cowboy:
"Good day at work today, dear?" "Not bad, not bad at all although I say it myself, indeed quite satisfying. Something nice for dinner?" What a nasty small minded vindictive little world you inhabit, AC, along with all the other apparatchiks like you, bent on nothing more inspiring than seeking to please your minister. This thread is predicated on the honour of two deceased junior officers and the dishonourable way that senior officers destroyed their reputations for their own purposes. Why do I just know that already has your lips curling in wry contempt? Your post illustrates with far more clarity and precision the gulf that separates HM Forces and the MOD than I ever could. The first stands for what is excellent and noble in the ways that they serve this country with dedication and fortitude. The second is rotten to the core, betraying those that it owes a duty of care to by deliberately subverting the very regulations that it is mandated to enforce to ensure, inter-alia, aircraft that are airworthy and fit for purpose. That you are so proud of your piddling little contribution speaks volumes. I'm sure that you sleep soundly every night. It wouldn't occur to you not to.

Chinook
 

Chugalug2. Now please pick up your toys, and put them back in the pram. JP

John Purdey and Atlantic Cowboy just a repeat of my question of 11 Mar 09 (post 4071):
Now I think this question does need to be answered and Atlantic Cowboy seems to be the ideal person to answer it. Why is this important?

1. The content of such a document will answer many of the questions placed on this thread concerning STIs, FADEC, Contol Pallets etc etc.
2. If such a document does not exist it would indicate that the investigation was less than thorough.

So in summary:

• My question to John Purdey - Would the publication of (if it exists) an airworthiness audit trail be useful?
• My question to Atlantic Cowboy - Mindful of points 1 & 2 above, was/has an airworthiness audit trail document been drawn up?

Chugalug 2
 

Thank you for your clear and effective contributions to this thread. As a (long-retired!) RAF test pilot, I entirely endorse your measured views. Please do not be put off by snide comments from the likes of JP, who seem to be pursuing their own separate agendas, which have nothing to do with the shining, noble purpose of this thread.

Seeing the success she has had with the equally honourable cause of Gurkha resettlement, should we be recruiting Joanna Lumley to the support of our cause?!

Atlantic Cowboy,
I have never claimed to be a Chinook expert. I have, however listened to Sqn Ldr Burke. At the time of the accident, I believe he was one of the most qualified Chinook experts in the Royal Air Force. He reasons that there are more likely alternatives to aircrew error. Pray tell us why your opinions are superior to his?