This was not a VIP task. The most senior rank was planned to be a 2 Star general, whose status would not qualify as a VIP, but he could not make the flight on the day.

Furthermore, no one at Aldergrove knew who the pax were as the pax manifest was retained elsewhere to protect the identities of some of them.

Compared to day-to-day ops in the Province, this was a benign pax run, and the only challenge was the weather.

Couldn't imagine the Queen being allowed, by senior officers, in any aircraft where the DECU fault codes had to be checked (by the Loadmaster, looking behind a little panel in the cabin wall) every 15 minutes, in case everything was about to go pear shaped.

Pity senior officers didn't think that other very special and irreplaceable persons weren't as important.

Cazatou's points are relevant.
This sortie was late in the day: it would be nice to know that the crew was refreshed and ready for it;
it would be nice to know that the most able crew was doing it in view of the importance of the passengers (yes they were VIPs to the people of NI and the service personnel involved in the conflict – they were indeed irreplaceable and their loss ended any practical alternative to capitulation to the peace process negotiated between MI6 and the IRA);
it should not have been thought to have been less vulnerable to the usual operational threats because it was going out of “theatre” - it had, after all, to cross 10+ miles of Antrim countryside before getting its feet wet and the Mull should have been such an obvious spot to bushwack a mil helo crossing from NI (as I have suggested recently) that extra awareness should have been in order – and one would have hoped that the crew was in 100% condition to react to the unexpected;
add to this the slip in a post some years back from one of you who appeared to be knowledgeable of operations at the time that it had been the intention several weeks earlier to use an HC2 Chinook for this flight;
seems to an outsider that there had been some higher influence that disrupted the usual detachment decision making processes, preparations, and routines.
Or was planning and preparation at the detachment level as chaotic and unsatifactory as you all seem to accept as the norm? - or at least as you portray it to the public? Do you think that a request for a flight for such VIPs would have just plopped on someone's desk at detachment level with no further dialogue with a higher level of command?
Is it not time for you who know to come forward with all you know about the planning for this flight and who specifically put it together and ultimately gave the go-ahead given the worries of the aircrew re the HC2 Chinook, the weather, the unknowns re the flightplan, etc, etc, etc...? A more deserving fall-guy than the captain perhaps ...

Bertie, I totally agree with your sentiments.

I've said it before more than once (first in 1995), but these passengers (or any others) should have been re-scheduled to fly either with 32 Sqn, one of the C-130 squadrons or by civvie air transport. Or postponed until another SH was available.

Not in an experimental aircraft that was deemed unsafe to fly by the very department tasked with bringing it into service.

The Chinook Mk2, (as a type), should NOT have been flying at all. If those running the show at Command and MOD level had any morals or common sense, instead of an insistance and a spiteful indignance to put this type prematurely into service, they would have agreed and grounded it until the airworthiness concerns had been met.

I wonder what input the RAF's Flight Safety organisation had at this time.

The DECU Display is not active in flight unless the ECLs are moved past a 5 degree gate; therefore, the crewman cannot check it every 15 minutes.

Ah the memory fades. What the hell were the Loadmasters checking?

Soon I'll forget that every time the cab had a DECU fault indication the fault was 'cleared' at base by simply swopping the DECU to the other engine. No spares you see. And no maintainance manual for the DECU's.

Bet the F700's have disappeared now!

I recall from the Flying Supervisors' Course, that 'benign transits' feature quite disproportionally often amongst accident statistics.....

Not that anyone actually knows what happened in this accident, of course.

DECU Connector
 

I feel the DECU connector saga gets to the heart of the airworthiness issue, exposing the obvious political imperative that the “new” Mk2 must be seen to be flying which, I believe, led to shortcuts and poor engineering practice. If I may, the following is from the House of Lords Committee minutes; House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report. See Section 5 – Evidence.

109. Squadron Leader Burke spoke to having experienced two engine run ups on the ground at the Boeing factory in Philadelphia while flying with an American Army test pilot (Q 655) and similar run ups when testing the overspeed limiter on the ground at Odiham (Q 680). He also spoke to problems with the multi-point connectors which went from the engines into the DECU. These were of bad design and liable to be displaced by vibration which then produced a power interruption. Although there was a back-up system this did not always work and on two or three occasions pilots had lost control of the engine condition lever. As a result squadrons introduced a procedure whereby crewmen every quarter of an hour checked that the connections had not been displaced in flight (QQ 677-9).
110. At the time of the accident DECUs still presented recurring problems. They were removed from the aircraft when something had gone wrong and returned to the makers who on many occasions could find no fault (QQ 698-9).

And from the Board of Inquiry:

“There were two entries in the Supplementary Flight Servicing Register that had potential relevance to the accident: Serial 2, SI/CHK/57 on the security of the DECU connectors…….”



I do not have a copy of the SI (Servicing Instruction) but it would seem to relate to a pre-flight check to be carried out on the ground. The “supplementary” in-flight 15 minute check was, it appears, introduced by the “Squadrons”. If I’m wrong about this, sorry, but I’ve asked the question many times without reply. It changes little of what I am about to say.

SIs are issued by MoD(PE) (as was). The Def Stan is very clear on this. The User or Design Authority can be tasked to develop / trial the SI, but it is seen to be issued by PE (that is, the Technical Agency – the named person in the mandated contract whose sole purpose is to maintain the build standard). Therefore, straight away one knows who approved it, as he/she is NAMED in the contract. I won’t comment on the fact the SI was controlled by the very people who have, for 15 years, been allowed to sit in judgement of themselves and prepare Ministerial replies. The independent scrutiny argument.

The reason why PE controls the SI is because it represents a change to the build standard, and should be a fully documented. If it is not, the airworthiness audit trail is broken.

Nowhere does the Def Stan address the concept of in-flight SIs.

It is my opinion that such a design problem should not have been managed by an SI. There are some parts of an aircraft design that you just don’t mess with, and fuel computers are one. For example, you can accept an EMC problem almost anywhere, but if a fuel system is affected, the aircraft doesn’t fly. Simple. Users and maintainers tend not to see such problems in-service – precisely because they MUST be designed out. I accept I have limited knowledge of this particular problem, but even the basic information screams “Class A modification” (“essential for safety, to be embodied irrespective of delay, scrap or downtime involved”). A Class A does not necessarily mean grounding, but in this case I’d have said yes, especially given Boscombe’s concern with the associated software.

I’d go further. If the problem was known about before CA Release was granted, a Class AA modification should have been issued (“essential for initial approval, for Service Use or a new type of equipment” e.g. FADEC/DECU). “To be embodied prior to delivery, irrespective of cost, scrap or delay involved”. All quotes are from the Def Stan.


But, checking in-flight is a new level of lunacy altogether. Why was this extraordinary action necessary? There must be a recorded reason, but it seems no deeper investigation took place post-crash. Some of the more obvious questions are - Did the Users report concerns about the DECU or the SI? Was a request for a proper engineering solution refused, or was it “in hand”? Who authorised this in-flight servicing? What tests/tools/test equipment were to be used to verify the check/repair (as servicing is not complete until verified)? What was the test - a simple wiggle? (See previous posts about degradation). An electrical continuity check? An insulation check? Was electrical bonding compromised by constant wiggling? (Poor bonding is the first thing to check if one suspects nav problems). What was the maintainer (Loadmaster/Maintainer??) meant to do if the connector came loose in his hand? Get on the intercom to the pilot and say “I think I may know why we’re in the clag”?

Frankly, this stinks. Yet, the systemic failings I describe were becoming common practice at the time, due mainly to the RAF (in particular) not requiring the build standard to be maintained. A waste of money you see.

The Safety Case (or Safety argument, whatever) MUST reflect the current in use build standard (which is why one maintains it). Therefore, what safety and risk related documentation exists to support the SI? Read the Nimrod thread and see the discussion of impact and probability. Someone in the Sqn apparently disagreed with the probability of occurrence and, probably, the impact. For example, a pre-flight check may be a temporary risk mitigation, but it is not the engineering solution. An SI is not a permanent device; it is temporary pending superseding modification.

What mod superseded the SI to replace/improve the design? Crucially, what on earth do Fields 6 and 7 of the 714 say? This is a serious question, because the 714 (the modification proposal) demands a multitude of answers, and would reveal prior knowledge and understanding of the problems, which could not be hidden given the extant SI/CHK/57.

And what was the impact if the connector came loose or detached? Catastrophic? Critical? When combined with an increasing probability of occurrence (witnessed by the 15min check), the risk is definitely Class A - in other words, unacceptable and to be tolerated only under exceptional circumstances. May I suggest a VVIP transit to FG is not exceptional circumstances?

There - down to precisely the same argument as Nimrod. Sorry, I've been there before with this on Mull, but few reply. Is it apathy?

Nail..... Head......SMACK!


Doubtless, there will be lots of scurrying along the corridors of power and files being 'lost'?

Strikes me you've pointed to a known known, in the midst of all the known unknowns and unknown knowns that obfuscate this thread, tuc. As always all roads lead to the MOD. As always we discover gross negligence there. Why should we wonder that they are so determined to pin it on anyone other than themselves?

Here’s another relevant question. Given SI/CHK/57 by definition accepts the possibility that the connector can become detached or loose, is the system design (not just the male and female connectors) designed for “hot-swapping”? That is, does it facilitate safe removal/insertion when powered up through, for example, offset contacts which ensure certain pins mate before others? I’ve chaired meetings which went on for hours debating this very point. It’s really quite important as getting it wrong tends to trip CBs and make lights flash. The Chief Test Pilot, Chief Designer and his Chief Safety Officer always attended!! One of those occasions when you need lots of Chiefs.

And, while slightly facetious, can the test pilot who flew the trials aircraft when the SI was validated and verified, please step forward?

Its not facetious, I believe he has already stepped forward...S/L Burke. He has given his opinion at the highest possible level to him. And he was also the one to require the grounding post accident, tho that didn;t happen

MoD (including Ministers) have always denied that the safety management system was not implemented properly on Chinook.

As any engineer, and everything ever written on the subject, will tell you, configuration management is a crucial component of airworthiness and safety management.

From Public Accounts Committee report, July 1999........


33. Looking at the Sea King helicopters, paragraph 3.6, those were Sea King Mark 2 which were introduced quite quickly in 1982, and it seems your management information systems have not been able to establish their design status or keep up with the modifications to Chinook helicopters. Is that right? That is what that paragraph seems to say. I am not an expert on defence equipment so I hope I have understood it correctly.


(Sir Robert Walmsley) I think you have understood it absolutely correctly. That is true.


So, even after everything that had happened 5 years previously.......................

Tuc, it seems that you only have to lift any MOD airworthiness rock to find something very unpleasant slithering desperately to avoid being seen. From a position of proposing that there may be specific problems with specific aircraft types, the MOD's record shows that the whole system of UK Military Airworthiness under the MOD is broken. No fleet is unaffected, as the rot is endemic throughout. Blame and consequences are secondary to urgent remedial action. Notice I do not say "swift", for the system may be broken simply by a two star ordering his subordinates to flagrantly ignore their mandated duty to enforce the airworthiness regulations; that's the swift part, as breaking the system merely requires "good men" to do nothing. Restoring airworthiness to the military airfleets will take much longer, decades perhaps, and some fleets will never attain the status of airworthiness before they are scrapped. All the more reason to initiate reform ASAP, and that reform begins only when the MOD is no longer responsible for UK Military Airworthiness Regulation enforcement.

Not had a chance to read as yet, but an article in today's Daily Telegraph on the crash.

Unable to post a link to the DT article. Gist of it is "Those in charge of helicopter safety warned that the upgraded HC2 model was not fit for service and that flying operations should cease immediately". This statement was made on the day that the crash occurred.

The well known aviation and legal expert John Hutton (Who he?) states that "No new arguments have been advanced to warrant the overturning of the findings" Another name to add to the list of incompetent top men who are shamed by their approach to this matter.

Dr Michael Powers QC, speaking for those fighting the finding, said "This Chinook was so unreliable that the very people charged with its safety had reached the conclusion that they would not let their test pilots fly it"

The DT seems to have sorted itself out and the link is a bit easier to find now:

DT article - 'Chinook that crashed into Mull of Kintyre should have been grounded'

Chinook that crashed into Mull of Kintyre 'should have been grounded'

A Chinook helicopter crashed killing 29 servicemen on the very day that RAF safety experts requested it should be grounded because of serious mechanical flaws, new evidence has shown.



By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent
Last Updated: 3:00PM BST 06 Apr 2009

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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph...2_1379176c.jpg The wreckage of the Chinook Helicopter which crashed on the Mull of Kintyre Photo: PA

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph...1_1379175c.jpg A Royal Airforce Chinook HC2


The loss of the aircraft, which was carrying 25 of the top MI5, Army and RUC Special Branch officers combating terrorism in Northern Ireland, has been blamed on the "gross negligence" of the pilots.
But a document obtained by The Daily Telegraph indicates that those in charge of RAF helicopter safety gave warning that the upgraded HC2 model of the Chinook was not fit for service and that flying operations should "cease immediately".

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The Chinook crashed into the Mull of Kintyre on June 2 1994 after it hit a hillside in thick fog while flown by Flt Lts Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook.
In the hitherto unseen document, coincidentally written on the same day as the crash, the commanding officer of the Rotary Wing Test Squadron (RWTS) recommended in the "strongest possible terms" that the Air Force should "cease Chinook HC2 operations" until mechanical problems over digital flight systems had been addressed.
Campaigners, who have fought for years to clear the names of the pilots following a questionable RAF board of inquiry, have now demanded that John Hutton, the Defence Secretary, should annul the inquiry findings of two senior officers.
While the report said it appreciated that delays in an overhaul would have an impact upon operations the RWTS would be "failing in its primary role of providing the front line with equipment which can not only efficiently carry out the task but to do this safely".
However, suggested improvements had been "ignored" and until there was "clear, unequivocal and realistic explanation of the faults" further Chinook HC2 flying "shall not be authorized".
The document, uncovered by the Mull of Kintyre Group, was made public at a time when the RAF has grounded its Nimrod reconnaissance fleet because of safety fears following a crash over Afghanistan that killed 14 servicemen.
Despite the new evidence the Mr Hutton has refused to either open a new inquiry or even annul the "gross negligence" findings because there are "no arguments advanced to warrant overturning" the original findings he wrote in the letter to the group.
Dr Michael Powers, QC, spokesman for the Mull of Kintyre group, said the Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) position was "unsustainable" because there was "stacks of evidence" which showed mechanical failure could not be ruled out.
"This Chinook was so unreliable that the very people charged with its safety had reached the conclusion that it was so unsafe that they would not let their test pilots fly it. That is a critical piece of evidence."
He said the families and the group would be "perfectly happy" with an annulment of the "gross negligence" findings in a move that would avoid the cost of another inquiry.
The former RAF pilot Omar Malik, representing the group, said it was astonishing that "even this damning document" was not considered as new evidence.
"The MoD is well aware that the families of the pilots have been well nigh destroyed by their fight for justice for their sons."
Mr Malik, author of The Grown-Ups' Book of Risk, added that there were "serious questions" over Air Force boards of inquiry where senior officers could "influence findings".
He said the original verdict was the "equivalent to manslaughter" and if the pilots were living "they would have the right of representation" that would have "rapidly demolished as risible" the reviewing officers' verdict.
In the original investigation evidence was remarkably scarce because 80 per cent of the aircraft was destroyed. There was no flight data recorder and no cockpit voice recorder.
The cause of the accident can never be ascertained but at least six technical failures have been identified. In the weeks before the accident the Chinook suffered three mechanical failures.

If I may, I’d like to add to my previous two posts regarding Configuration Control. But first, to recap, if an aircraft or equipment is not under CC, then the Safety Case or Safety argument cannot be validated or verified, a pre-requisite for an aircraft to be deemed “airworthy” or fit for purpose. But, as we have seen, it can be offered to the Release to Service Authority knowing that it is unsafe, and subsequently Released to Service. Furthermore, the contract can be paid off in full, in the knowledge that the contractual requirement to make the aircraft safe has not been met. Similarly, this contractual requirement may be waived, with full payment made. This has been ruled on many times, and is still the case; although MoD is somewhat reluctant to advise Boards of Inquiry or Coroners’ Inquests of this little gem. I wonder why.

As I noted, in July 1999 CDP acknowledged CC of the Chinook Mk2 was somewhat lacking (in 1999).

In the few years leading up to the accident, the MoD slashed funding to maintain the Build Standard (what the PAC refer to as “design status”, a crucial component of which is CC), so the Mk1 suffered along with most aircraft and their equipment. You don’t have to take my word for this; it’s noted in a number of subsequent HCDC, PAC and NAO reports.

However, in November 2005, in a written reply, the then Min(AF) Adam Ingram stated that the Mk1 WAS under CC as of November 1993; and the Mk2 CC was maintained from that date until the accident. This resurrection, worthy of Lazarus, would have been a major programme, involving most of the Directorates in the little family tree I posted a few weeks ago. Anyone involved would surely remember it.

As someone whose job it was to try to maintain build standards (without funding) at this time, I can assure you that, far from being resurrected, the RAF (especially, as they controlled funds) were actively running down this process. In fact, the 2 Star responsible threatened anyone who voiced an opinion that, inter alia, we should try to make kit safe, with disciplinary action. (A threat which still hangs over staffs today, again confirmed in writing by Ingram, Ainsworth et al).

So, in addition to the usual lies, we have a situation whereby the MoD (a) knowingly compromised safety in the years before the accident (b) in the days immediately preceding the accident refused to take Boscombe advice that the aircraft should be made airworthy, and (c) in the following years, to at least July 1999, apparently did nothing to correct matters.

Perhaps the most damning confirmation is this. The procedures for maintaining CC are laid down in Def Stan 05-57. But there is another Def Stan laying down the wider procedures for maintaining the Build Standard, of which CC is but one part. Try asking D/Stan for this Def Stan, and all the specifications it calls up. They topple.

UK Military Airworthiness
 

tucumseh, your perceptive post illustrating the Gross Negligence of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (AKA the MOD) is timely. Reading the Telegraph piece one might well think that the story is of two Chinook HC2 pilots sacrificed to protect those who presided over the operation of this flawed type, leading to the loss of not only an RAF crew but also the cream of British Intelligence on the slopes of the Mull of Kintyre. Of course that is part of the story, but only part of a much bigger and even more damning one. This is a story of the intentional dismemberment of the airworthiness protection of the UK Military Airfleet. It has cost many tens of lives already and sadly will probably cost many more before it can be put right. To my mind it is a story of dereliction of duty far graver than that perpetrated by the banks. They lost merely treasure and jobs, the MOD's Gross Negligence lost lives. It must be replaced forthwith in this vital responsibility, having reneged on it totally.

Olive,

Just a couple of thoughts with regards your post,

"With two competent pilots in the cockpit of an aircraft that has not climbed to safety altitude and has not turned away from rising terrain in deteriorating weather, the conclusion here appears sound."

Sounds like you have the same reservations that I have on this subject.

"If it had been a single seat fast jet without passengers and crew, then "cause unknown" might be appropriate, but not here"

Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.

Sffp

I agree 90%. I would agree totally if the paragraph read:

Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.

Firstly, my apologies to you all for the prolonged absence. It was brought about by a complete computer meltdown which is now sorted. I am grateful for those who have kept the momentum of the thread going over the past few weeks.

As you already know from the Telegraph article, the Campaign has not been idle. There is still yet more to come.

Reading back over the thread since my last post, I have been intrigued by the different locations where it is claimed the negligence took place. From the planning of the sortie, to breakfast, to prior to the waypoint change (wherever that was actually made), to just after the waypoint change, to well… it doesn’t really matter where – they were just negligent.

Quite a discussion about breakfast, but, in actual fact, all the Board could say was that they were unable to ascertain whether breakfast had been taken by Jonathan Tapper. At no point was it stated that he had not eaten. Another assumption put to bed, I hope.

Olive Oil, welcome to the thread. You stated that had it been a fast jet without passengers and crew then “cause unknown” might be appropriate. Are you suggesting that the Chinook verdict is based purely upon the fact that it was carrying passengers? I think you could actually be onto something there. After all, when reviewing two Boards of Inquiry some fifteen days apart and, despite overwhelming evidence to the cause of the accident of the fast jet (due to ADR and CVR being fitted) the Reviewing Officers made comments such as, “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [removed] should be absolved from blame.”, “It is therefore because there is no scope for conjecture… that I find any consideration of human failings to be academic and fruitless. Despite the wealth of detailed evidence, we are confounded and under these particular circumstances I consider it is futile to indulge in hypothesis.” and “Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.”

However, in a Chinook (not fitted with ADR and CVR), the Reviewing Officers, just fifteen days earlier, had commented, “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.” and “In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”

Speculation and judgement have no place in a finding which requires absolutely no doubt whatsoever, and the differences in the application of standards in these two accidents confuse me. I asked the MoD for clarification of these issues several years ago but Mr Ingram MP stated he was not prepared to answer my comparative analysis on a point-by-point basis. He did, however, make comment that it might be considered that the Chinook crew owed a “duty of care” to the passengers, and that the need to exercise that care could lead, perhaps, to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred.

The Campaign has, and will, continue to press the MoD and the Secretary of State for Defence to face up to the shortcomings of their case against Jon Tapper and Rick Cook and to do the honourable thing and remove the unfounded allegation of negligence that has been laid against these men for the past fourteen years and ten months.

It's good to be back!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Chinook
 

OLive oil. Pls see your PMS. JP

Chug wrote: <<This is a story of the intentional dismemberment of the airworthiness protection of the UK Military Airfleet. >>
Perhaps this is a pragmatic approach when a complex aircraft is purchased from overseas. Although I do not believe airworthiness was a relevant issue in this crash I thought I would bring you all to reality regarding your endless discussions about it – having worked in a defence industry, I can tell you that the CC/QA (call it what you will) function is hard enough when the kit is manufactured “in house” with the design engineers readily available to the QA guys and that on systems nowhere near as complex as a twin rotor helo – the numbers of QA staff seemed to outweigh the engineers and we had to give them much of our time such an onerous task it is – if you do not build the thing yourself you have very little chance to maintain rigorous, meaningful CC – and apart from keeping you all running around in ever decreasing circles, the airworthiness issue is not going to achieve anything.
In this particular incident the FADEC has drawn much attention – that the engines were found at matched power and that data stored in one of the engine management computers did not record any excessive transients should put this one to bed.
Regarding any other possible control problems, as others have said, they were already very close in when they changed waypoints and made the fatal turn to the right – it was not a control problem that got them into danger and indeed when in the last seconds an evasive manouevre was started the a/c seemed to have responded as expected.
So you are not going to get anywhere with blaming the aircraft – especially with the strong political need at the time to assure the public that sabotage was not an issue as the pilots were at fault beyond any doubt whatsoever – that's why the verdict was so unjustly harsh as, in strict legal terms, it implied just that – had there been any realistic chance of blaming the aircraft to a similar degree of certainty, perhaps the powers that be could have taken that option back then – the case the Mull group has put forward is nothing like enough to get them to change horses now.
Perhaps if you all could have applied your collective wisdom to a constructive analysis we may have progressed somewhat. All that is known about this crash is consistent with them approaching a known landing area but overshooting – if you had followed this argument that I have put on this thread many times with the chartwork, reading and checking Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data”, and visiting the site in various weather conditions perhaps you too could see the obvious. If they had been given an extra task that has not so far been declared then the whole case must be reopened – put your minds to it – what is there to lose?

Walter

Thank you.

My aim in noting MoD's acknowledged failure to implement their own airworthiness regs is not to claim this was the sole cause of the accident, but to highlight the fact that there were many underlying contributory factors which, in a legal sense, would introduce reasonable doubt. That is, falling well short of the requirement of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". Such contributory factors are the ever increasing "holes" in the model so excellently described by flipster a while ago, and they are seldom if ever explored in detail by BOIs or Coroners. And certainly not by MoD. The devil is in this detail


As the Board of Inquiry said;


To me, that introduces doubt. Perhaps someone could advise how the Reviewing Officers dealt with this when overturning the "verdict", as they must surely have refuted this statement.

JP,

Nice to see you back on the boards again sir, just wondered if you had had chance to look at post #4140 from the 23 March where I asked you

"Is there anyone alive today who actually knows exactly what happened on that fateful day?"

Quite a straight forward question really, just wondered if you felt up to giving us your opinion on it?

Let me remind you that sabotage or other hostile action was confidently dismissed by the authorities rather quickly after the crash;
then we had the damning of the pilots with a judgment that implied to the world that there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was a case of pilot error;
remember that throughouty the early inquiries there were suggestions that the crew were incompatible, that they were in a hurry, that they were listening to a pop station, etc, etc.
From what you all know and have campaigned to correct, these pilots were not incompetent or cavalier and there has not been anything to show that they had been to support the above official view; what this official view did do was to deflect public concerns regarding other causes of the crash and perhaps defuse possible public unrest over the loss of the security team – with hindsight, is there any other plausible reason for that unjust decision to have been made and so strongly maintained?.
The Mull group's strategy to rectify the (unjust) blame on the pilots seems to be restricted to casting doubt over the airworthiness of the aircraft: despite its track record of being a reliable, invaluable workhorse and suggesting that partway through a simple flight some transient control issue (for which there is no evidence whatsoever) just happened to occur when they were near an obvious spot for a bushwacking of some sort and to which they seemingly intentionally closely approached; further, no effort has been made to seriously address why they had instruments set for a landing at a known landing site for such aircraft nor why they were using an exercise callsign for the flight, why the radio call to Scotmil was unanswered (perhaps a prearranged call for someone else to receive?), etc, etc.
The a/c had approached closer than was wise or necessary in the prevailing conditions for a ferry flight just passing by the Mull; they had ditched the waypoint that should have been of use to them (perhaps this was just a way of telling the world that they were using something else just in case?), turned right (into the higher ground) and started to slow down (significant reduction in airspeed as per Boeing's analysis); their path from the point of waypoint change to the crash site was the optimum approach heading for a known site (for which waypoint A would have been an obvious inner marker) and which was found set on the HP's course selector of his HSI; and the HP's baro alt was set for QFE at for it's elevation (a RADALT alarm was set at minimum as per an immediate landing in marginal conditions).
All that is known about this crash is explained by them deliberately approaching a known landing site with the intention to either land or pass closely (for whatever reason) but someone or something that was giving them range and bearing who/which should have been on the landing site but was actually ½ a mile or so up the hill such that they had turned right a bit early and misjudged their closing range in conditions which prevented reasonable visual judgment that could have contradicted their (mis)guidance.
Given who was on board, the possibility of any such exercise being wilfully misused should have been considered – they were opposed to the peace process.that has been foisted upon the whole island of Ireland and they represented a significant obstacle to its implementation. I do not hold any hope for the pilots' names to be cleared in the immediate future while there is considerable, growing anger about the peace process's effects on the communities concerned – people would like to know how the possibility of sabotage was so summarily dismissed when all these years later the cause of this crash is still wide open.

Chinook
 

Seldom. This to-ing and fro-ing has gone on long enough, so to save other readers from extreme boredom, please check your PMs. With all good wishes, JP

JP,

No need for a pm Sir, the question is simplicity itself and should only take you a brief moment to answer, and I doubt very much that your response would bore those who have an interest in this thread.

Chinook
 

Seldom. I have given you my amswer in a PM, and if you cannot be bothered to read it, then so be it. JP

JP,

No pm recieved this end Sir and I would never dare be so rude as to ignore a missive from you.

But as I said no pm is required as a simple answer in this open forum would suffice

Chinook
 

Seldom. Sorry about that; something wrong with my PC or yours. Since my PM was lost, what I said in it was that of course no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight, just to give one example, what conversations took place between the two pilots?. But the one thing we do know (without any doubt whatever) is that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC. This was the negligence.

A question for you, though it deals with the probable reason the crew 'got it wrong' (see Gpt Crawford's letter) and certainly does not explain the earlier breach of rules: have you studied Annexes J and K to the MOD Response to the Mull Group submission, showing the intended track and the actual track, and the consequent difference in the height of the hill ahead? What do you make of that?

With all good wishes as always, JP

JP

In asserting: Can you tell us on what evidence, vis a vis, weather, you are relying upon to satisfy the standard of proof of: For myself, I have seen no evidence whatever of weather at that point, other than circumstantial. Only one witness had a useful perspective of that point in space. That being Holbrook, who has stated that the weather was relatively clear below the cloud which presumably is what enveloped all other witnesses?

After 4 weeks of courtroom evidence, Sheriff Sir Steven Young agreed with the position I have just stated. He did not agree with yours!

Holbrook's evidence? To the BoI or FAI?

Whichever you prefer. I said it was 'circumstantial'. and most definitely not with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.

For background, from HoL Inquiry 2002:

JP,

Sorry but I am even more confused now, on one hand you tell us that

"of course no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight, just to give one example"

but then go on to say

"the one thing we do know (without any doubt whatever) is that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC"

If no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight how can anyone arrive at "at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules"


Especially as no one alive actually knows what could be seen from the Chinook flight deck windows.

chinook240

I have no idea how your response progresses the issue. I can only imagine you are attempting to cast doubt on the reliability of the yachtsman's evidence regarding the weather. Perhaps we can leave that debate for the moment, and return to the crucial question in the light of the most recent postings?

I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.

Could JP or C240 help us?

JP/MoD

The claim that "negligence had already taken place at the waypoint" is completely discredited by the fact the protection afforded by the legal obligation of Duty of Care had already been denied the crew and pax - by the same people. That, I submit, was an act of gross negligence. That these people are allowed to judge their own case defies natural justice.

Not a lot of comment on that. Too many Stars involved. Better blame the deceased.


Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but it remains just that. Only, I do not really see an opinion borne of independent thought; only a blind adherence to the discredited party line and verbatim quotes of same.