unbelievable

"The “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” test was intended to be capable of practical application, and in the view of the Department required a distinction to be drawn between honest or genuine doubt and implausible conjecture. Thus it was not
permissible to avoid a finding of negligence by recourse to an hypothesis for which there is no evidence and which is revealed as wholly implausible when tested against the known facts."

or in other words the determination of negligence through the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever should not be avoided merely because there may be some doubt

and another thing...
whose version of the facts? Day was specifically criticised by their lordships for being unable to distinguish between fact and unsubstantiated opinion

"5. A sufficiently detailed picture of the circumstances of any particular accident, pointing conclusively towards aircrew responsibility was clearly necessary before a finding of negligence could properly be made. This was so in respect of the Chinook
accident. Even though an investigation into any serious accident will inevitably be unable to answer every technical question with absolute certainty, this does not mean that the established facts when taken together cannot compel a particular conclusion."

so the true test for negligence is revealed - although there is doubt as to whether there were any technical malfunctions, gross negligence is to determined if it can be inferred, imputed and assumed from hypothesis based on opinion. this, the MoD believes, satisfies the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

this took 6 months?!:rolleyes:

if this is the best the MoD and their woefully substandard legal team can come up with, god help us.

i find it incredibly arrogant that the MoD favours the ruling of 2 legal laymen over 4 distinguished law lords.

brian, chocks et al, assuming this decision is open to judicial review or further action, might it be worth considering establishing a trust on behalf of the families (with their permission of course) in order to finance such a move? I for one would gladly contribute.

If i hadnt pvr'd i'd resign my commission in disgust.:mad:

I think that this poor response is an insult to the HoL Select committee whose enquiry was painstaking, skillful and well considered. I am absolutely disgusted.

Lord Chalfont said on BBC news tonight that there would be a debate in the Lords and that he would be asking the MoD:

Who was responsible for this Chinook being used in the light of the doubts about its safety, and,

Who authorised the transport of so many important passengers in one helicopter.

It sounds like the campaign is going onto the offensive. I look forward to hearing how we may help i.e more letters, money etc. I wondered if now might be a good time to write to selected members of the Lords to support them. It would seem that the future morale of our armed forces is now in their hands

One of my sons is currently applying to the Navy as a pilot. I now have serious reservations about this but he will make his own decision. At the moment he is extremely angry so, if that comes out in his interviews, he may well fail anyway.

I watched the "statement" from MR hoon today. I have to say..he's a good "minister"....a little too good.

Unbelievable arrogance!

"No investigation into a serious accident can ever answer every question with cast-iron certainty".

"In a case where there were deceased aircrew, the relevant departmental guidance required the reviewing officers to be in no doubt whatsoever that their negligence was a cause (although not necessarily the sole cause) of the accident."

It would appear that there is a fundamental conflict in the statements above.
There was no cast iron certainty of what caused the accident, and that was needed before the crew could be accused, and found guilty in absentia, of gross negligence.

The BoI failed to find the crew guilty due to insufficient evidence, technical investigation was unable to rule out mechanical failure, the House of Lords found that the Air Marshals were wrong in law, and now we are asked to accept that 2 Brass Bound Blimps, and Buff Hoon know best!

If this travesty is permitted to stand it will mark a low point in British Military Justice, and it will forever brand the two Air Marshals as cowards for taking the easy road, and far from occupying the moral high ground they claimed, have shown themselves as being completely lacking in any sense of responsibility for the well being of the servicemen and women under their command.

And for the Secretary of State for Defence; he deserves to be treated with the same contempt which he has displayed towards the august members of the House of Lords Committee whose legal acumen is beyond reproach.

This surely is a blunder of such magnitude that it now represents more than the initial campaign to clear the reputations of the crew, and is now a struggle of where does the power of justice reside?:mad: :mad: :mad:

In all of the discussion that I have seen on this tragic accident and the seemingly indefensible accusation of gross negligence against the pilots, there are a few aspects that warrant deeper analysis. I have not seen these discussed before and have not previously aired my thoughts in public. The details below are written from memory of documentation that I read at the time and from discussion with knowledgeable friends. I hope that someone reading this is able to follow them up.

a. Why put a large number of highly important intelligence personnel together on a military, tactical helicopter and transport them at low level? Why not use commercial transport with the commensurate lower probability of a catastrophic accident? It IS possible to travel incognito and securely on a scheduled airline when involved in highly classified projects. Surely, the political embarrassment of making such an horrific and uneducated decision regarding the transport of such important people has been the driver behind making the pilots scapegoats!

b. The Mark 2 Chinook was, at the time of the accident, prohibited from flying in icing conditions. This was quite normal for a helicopter that was just being introduced to service and had only a limited clearance. However, as I recall, the cloudbase around the accident site was approximately 1000 ft and the freezing level was only just above this. Therefore, the crew did not have an option to climb above safety altitude and obey the Release to Service icing limitations existing on their aircraft.

c. The crew were going to be very close to exceeding their duty time by the time they returned to base at the end of the planned sorties. This would have made them reluctant to deviate from the planned track and thus extend the flight time.

d. A crew under pressure is more likely to make mistakes than one that is not (providing the task is not so mundane as to put them in a state of underarousal). The above points, b and c especially, would have put the crew under considerable pressure, as would their known fears concerning the relatively common FADEC runaways.

e. A Mark 1 Chinook was available for the mission. This had a clearance for flight in icing conditions and did not suffer from engine control problems. Therefore, the use of a Mark 1 would have reduced the pressure on the crew significantly.


The fact that the charge of gross negligence against the pilots was first made by a senior officer who was well up the command chain and not the actual Board of Inquiry has been reported in the public domain before. The fact that to justify a verdict of gross negligence requires there must be NO doubt at all has also been reported. Perhaps my memory has been influenced by the sadness and anger within me at the political injustice that has been perpetrated against two highly professional pilots who were trying to carry out what I consider to be a poorly planned mission in adverse conditions. But I hope that that my views may lead to the long overdue justice that the pilots deserve and that their families are owed.

Quite right!

There was very little support from anyone in the House yesterday for Hoon's statement. His statement continued to show that there was insuffcient evidence to make the verdict of gross negligence sustainable; he still cannot show that there was 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'......

The Shadow Defence Spokesman neatly summarised the flaws in Hoon's argument; however, Hoon did seem to concede that a Judicial Review was one possibility for the way ahead. But should such a review proceed and were it to find against Hoon's statement, would the government still cling to its position? Or would it have to fall in line?

Lomcevak:

The points you raise are very good, particluarly those regarding FADEC and flight in icing. However, what more did you expect from Hoon and the whole Blair crowd? There really is little evidence of backbone from any of them and while the C in C who found the pilots negligent is still alive, I dont believe the government will change its mind.

I suspect, although I dont know, that the guys flying made a mistake. Who hasn't, especially under pressure. But the point is, I cannot put my hand on my heart and state that as a fact. Therefore, it is unjust to find them negligent and in this respect the C in C involved was wholly wrong to over-ride the B of I with his finding.

Can anyone tell me what the difference is between a "Judicial Review" and the HoL Select Committee enquiry which has already reported it's findings?

Maxburner

Look at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/procrule...s/prot_jrv.htm for details of judical review and guidance for applicants

Astounding!

I haven't trawled through all of the document yet, and my recording of the late running debate turned up a lot about foot and mouth, but not much of the Hoon laugh in.

If it is true that the MOD said:

"No investigation into a serious accident can ever answer every question with cast-iron certainty".

Then they are once again admitting that they have failed to prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that this tragedy was caused by pilot negligence.

That extremely high burden of proof was required expressly to protect dead pilots from whitewashes like this one. That it is damned hard to attain was deliberate. You have to be damned certain before you stain the characters of dead aircrew.

The HoL select committee grasped this fundamental and found the Air Marshalls lacking. Dark forces are at work, and they must be attacked 'gloves off'.

I say again:

Negligence is something which must be proved beyond any doubt whatsoever, not just used as a convenient cause when no other can be found.

Ark. So @!&*ing angry my keyboard is suffering
:mad: :mad:

slj,

Thanks for the link on judicial enquiries.

From this I see that a:

"Judicial review allows people with a sufficient interest in a decision or action by a public body to ask a judge to review the lawfulness of:

an enactment; or

a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function"

So a judge will review the evidence and make a judgement.

The HoL Select Committee, comprising a majority of judges, reviewed the evidence and made a judgement which the MoD reject.

Yes I can now see the clear difference between the two procedures:confused:

Judicial Review
 

Obviously the opinion of a reputable QC would be helpful, but I suspct Hoon offers Judicial Review (JR) as a way forward as he knows it is a complete non-starter from our side.

Any Judge would be bound by the Wednesbury 'Unreasonableness' principle in JR proceedings, which basically means the judge could only overturn an administrative decision by the Govt (such as the Reviewing Officers' Bof I finding) if we could show that no reasonable person could have made that decision. In practice this is a very difficult thing to do, and in laymans terms, we would have to prove positively that only a complete imbecile smacked out of his face on narcotics could have made the decision complained of.

However wrong Day and Wratten have been, it is almost impossible to show that their finding is 'unreasonable' to the extent required by Wednesbury and the JR procedure.

I suspect the only way out now is if both Houses recognise this for what it is - a test of the accountability of the executive to Parliament. AFAIK, Parliament in our democracy is supposed to be sovereign, and if both Houses were to reject the MoD's response, we could take it that reputations were restored.

misterp
you have a good handle on the wednesbury unreasonableness aspect of JR but it is not the be-all-and-end-all of JR. The purpose of JR is not to only examine the decision itself but how the decision was reached. minor point but exceptionally important.

one of the principles most sacred amongst lawyers and the judiciary is that justice must not only be done but must also be perceived to have been done. perception is almost more important than actual justice.

secondly, this finding of gross negligence is equivalent to manslaughter and the satisfaction of the burden of proof has received much commentary. This raises the question of whether the pilots received a fair trial - a human right guaranteed by Art 6 (1) of the human rights act. As there will be human rights issues the principle of wednesbury unreasonableness is restricted so that it is almost irrelevant, it also has the effect of shifting the onus from the complainant to prove the decision was unreasonable to the defendant to prove that it was not.

thirdly, in my opinion it could be demonstrated that the MoD fettered their discretion (individually capable of JR) when dealing with this case. The MoD has refused to accept the findings of a fatal accident inquiry, public accounts committee inquiry and the house of lords select committee. I dont think it would be too difficult to argue that the MoD's collective mind remained closed and refused to examine the case on its legal merits.

few points just off the top of my head from a tin-pot ex lawyer. just imagine what a suitably eminent QC would make of it. i suggest Mrs Cherie Bliar QC, quite good apparently - husband a bit of a gutless no-mark...;)

things arent so black just yet.

i say again - i for one would gladly contribute to a trust for the families to continue this fight.

Uncle Peter

Cherie Booth (Mrs Blair) or one of her colleagues at Matrix Chambers http://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/frames/frame.html would be a good choice as the practice specialises in human rights, judicial review and that sort of stuff.

shameful outcome.

we are not finished yet though........

:mad:

Hi everyone.
Well, I hate to be the one to say "I told you so".

Interesting how it wasn't Minister Hoon who had the bottle to initially break the news formally. That honour fell to a good old Junior Minister. The cynic in me notes that the Junior Minister was also a Lord. ??Subliminal message.

We all know this is a disgusting decision, left (despite several assurances from Mr Hoon) until the very last minute before recess so that he would not have to face the full heat of the response.

I'm currently studying the Government response so will refrain from an in-depth reply at the moment. I promise I won't take six months to reply though!

Interesting slant on the negligence angle though - "Negligence can operate either alone or in conjunction with other factors to cause an accident".

What about - "Government Departments can operate either alone or in conjunction with Senior Officers and weak Ministers to avoid responsibility for an accident"
Just my slant on things ;)

I would encourage everyone to write again to your MPs to express your disgust at the latest statement. Whilst I appreciate that they are soon off on their hols, your letter will be waiting for them upon their return and they will be reminded of this injustice. Ask that they write to Minister Hoon to clarify why this decision has been made. Also get them to ask for the full details of the Boeing simulation as Minister Hoon said that he would make everything available. Hoon will find a rather large post bag waiting for him, which he will promptly pass on to the MoD.

The campaign continues, and everyone has a lot of writing to do!

Rest assured I, and my friends in the Campaign Group are in no hurry to go anywhere. There is a strategy meeting planned and I will keep you all informed of the developments. Rest assured, the gloves have been removed.

Please try, wherever possible, to keep this injustice in the public eye.

To those still serving and flying I would say this: Be sure that the aircraft you are going to fly is fully serviceable. No matter how small the snag, consider using another aircraft. Should that tiny little snag cause loss or damage to the aircraft (or heaven forbid anything worse), how can you be sure that you will not be held to account? Protect yourself. It is clear that there are only a few who are indispensable.

I was also pleased to note that the BBC website covering this story places the campaign web site higher than that of the House of Commons and the Ministry of Defence. Coincidence? Nah!

Jon, Rick and their families need us all now more than ever.

Keep up the good work everyone!
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

I have to register my sorrow yet again over this latest cowardly statement. yes WHERE was the minister at the time of this cop out - probably discussing which particular Marine officer's reputation they will sacrifice for a now habitual cover up for use of faulty MOD equipment - ie: the SA 80 rifle - anyone notice a similarity here? No not a poorly selected rifle - just a whole army of poorly trained marines - no not a faulty piece of chinook hardware assessed by inadequate nameless ones just 2 fine well trained pilots to the sacrifice!!!!
I rest my case - but please tell me what we can do next to help the families who deserve some peace .:mad:

My anger spilled over into a letter to my MP tonight and I had to re-write it. Much better tempered now but I have put it plainly that this injustice must NOT be allowed to continue, and am seeking his help in any way he sees fit. He is a good man so maybe................who knows.

It is truly disgusting that Hoon has behaved so badly. And what happened to the simulator evidence he sought - to help him reach a decision? Is there no depth to which the MoD and Hoon will sink?

To inject a little levity it may be that the MCC could recruit some "Wizards of Spin", not from the traditional County teams, but from MoD where they all seem to be plying their mystical art:p

On a more serious note it would appear that the UK's misguided Secretary of State for Defence is closely related in abilities to New Zealand's pathetic excuse for a Minister of Defence, aptly titled the Misnomer of Defence :D

The Early Day Motion continues to pick up names - another four since the announcement, making 160.
Thanks to:

John Burnett
Peter Ainsworth
Edward Garnier
Cheryl Gillan

Out of the current 1997 open EDM's, ours is number 54. We only need another four names to make the Top 50! This is outstanding - keep up the good work.

If you want to check whether your MP has signed, check here

If your MP hasn't signed yet, you can easily email them via the Parliament website using this link

If you don't know who your MP is, they are listed by constituency here

Thanks to everyone who has helped with this - as of this week the battle is now firmly established in parliament, and the EDM is one of our best weapons.

Also, don't forget the petiton on the campaign website is still open - I've got another forty or so names to add this week (are you listening Mr Hoon?), bringing it almost to 500 names! Access it via the website, or just email your name to [email protected]

Buffhoon was patently reading the script in the House, and it is unlikely that this was *his* wording - his team have long had the 'never give in' strategy mapped out. This is simply one case that having acknowledged by inference that they can only lose, they are simply holding out until their hand is forced.

The statement was in most respects no surprise. We still need to ponder two aspects.

Who has the political clout to superimpose a change of decision upon the MoD. While the HoL are patently on the march on this matter, can they really, in their diminished form, be expected to take HMG on in this issue, given that they have an awful lot more to lose in terms of overall influence if HMG plays hard ball on the HoL reforms? I suspect it would not take a great number of meetings to warn off the HoL although Chalfont of course answers to no one and is highly versed in matters pertaining to Defence.

Secondly, if MoD are holding out, why? Who has most to lose, and what is the background agenda that is being held together with elastoplast which might fall apart through this can of political worms being opened up? Is it Chinook related - Boeing, US relations, etc? Are the yanks involved, and if so by what means? Is it Peace Process related?? Or is it simple old fashioned Staff Officer intransigence?

I still ponder who might have nailed Wratten and Day; I remain of the opinion that they were nobbled. This whole matter smells, and the longer it goes on, the more mysterious the smell becomes.

Whatever, the bell may have gone, but there are plenty of rounds left to fight. Keep it up, guys.

I have heard that Day will be the next CAS. If this is so could parallels be drawn to the lack of will to remove Saddam at the end of the Gulf War ie who would replace him? A bit simplistic I know, but the whole affair reads like some cheap fiction.

BBC Parliament is rescreening previous coverage now. Had Sqn Ldr Burke earlier, now we have a plausible chap in the uniform of the RAF.

I have been watching it too. If a certain potential future CAS was in govt at this mo, he would face a vote of no confidence.....all hypothetical of course.

My blood is beginning to boil on this one. Nevertheless I am sure that I am nowhere near as disgusted, angry, ashamed and hurt as some folks are about this travesty.

I have added my name to the petition and just sent a communication to my MP demanding to know why his name is not on the EDM 829. I doubt whether he will have the guts to reply - he has ignored me before - but if he does, I'll gladly let you know what his latest excuse is.

It would appear from an article in The Telegraph today that Buff Hoon must be causing more than his fair share of Defence Debacles.

The article refers to the failure of the current service rifle, and the efforts of MOD to prevent its replacement by 'fudging' a new test and report.

Something must be seriously wrong within the MOD establishment when it is considered that all 3 Armed Services now have a major problem on their plate, and the Secretary of State appears to be the nut behind the wheel in all cases.

Army trials of new SA-80 rifle 'were fudged'
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2002)
Trials of the modified SA-80 rifle in Kuwait to test it in the heat and sand of the desert were a sham, say defence sources.

Hessian matting was laid on the ranges to protect the SA-80 A2s and they were taken to the trials in bags.

A team from the Army's Small Arms School carried out "operational" trials in Kuwait, Norway and Belize, to test the weapon's reaction to arctic, jungle and desert conditions, said a senior source yesterday.

The rifle was modified by Heckler & Koch at a cost of £92 million after more than a decade of reports on its failings, most notably in the Gulf War. But it reacted badly to the fine sand and heat in Afghanistan. Royal Marines using it in combat reported stoppages and magazine failures.

A more realistic test by a company of marines for an investigation team sent to Afghanistan led to problems with 30 per cent of the rifles.

The Liberal Democrats will call today for the weapon to be replaced, but senior Army officers and MoD officials are continuing to say the problems were caused by marines not cleaning the rifle properly. Some officers have suggested that the marines deliberately caused the difficulties because they believed they should be treated as special forces and given the G36 rifle used by the SAS.

Paul Keetch, Liberal Democrat spokesman, dismissed this in a letter to Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary. "It is no good blaming soldiers for inadequate maintenance of the SA-80 when field tests have been fudged.

"For British soldiers to be deployed with a weapon that has operated below par for over a decade is scandalous. The £92 million upgrade appears to have done little to improve confidence. The SA-80 is fatally flawed. It must be replaced."

The suggestions that the Royal Marines were to blame was also dismissed by a former Parachute Regiment officer who said the weapon was "an unmitigated disaster". The former officer, who was serving when the weapon was introduced, said: "The first time I had concerns was when the magazine fell out on to my boots on exercise."

The problem, which remains, was typical of the weapon, which worked well in ideal conditions on the range, but did not pass the army's main requirement of any piece of equipment that it should be "squaddy-proof".

He said: "The weapon is not robust enough. The right signals are not getting through to the decision makers."

The MoD said the initial findings of the investigation team had been given to ministers but assessments were continuing.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...26/ixhome.html

So how accurate is SuperTANS in any case? Do we know what present position was actually displayed to the crew at the time of the accident? In Hoon’s ‘last 20 seconds’?

According to the RAF’s own AP 3456, the TANS computer uses inputs of TAS, heading (from the compass system), drift, along and across heading velocity and vertical velocity (from the Doppler) and manually entered start and waypoint positions, wind velocity, magnetic variation and time to calculate and display present position, continuously predicted steering information from present position direct to a previously inserted waypoint, sensor input values and computed navigation variables, e.g. heading, track and wind velocity. The computer will normally operate using Doppler inputs, however should these fail, navigation calculations will continue using air data information together with the last stored, or manually inserted, value of wind velocity.

More importantly, “The TANS computer has a 6 nm/hr error growth rate when fed by Doppler inputs, and 20 nm/hr in the Air Data System (ADS) mode”

Is it possible then, that in the 18 minutes journey time of this fateful flight (0.3 hours) the TANS would perhaps have indicated to the crew that they were between 1.8 and 6 (0.3 x 6nm to 0.3 x 20nm) miles from where they actually were? Ironically a flight on 13 July 1995 (as recorded in Hansard 19 Mar 2002, column 241) by a similar Chinook Mk 2 tasked with overflying the memorial to Jonathan Tapper displayed an error of.......2 nautical miles. Precisely the accuracy stated in the RAF’s own Manual of Flying. So when encountering what they thought was a patch of mist or low cloud at least some 1.8 to 6 miles off-shore, the crew perhaps elected to press through it rather than climb up into the known icing conditions for which the aircraft wasn’t cleared - thinking that they were at least 45 seconds away from the Mull? Tight indeed - but after a few seconds might they then have realised that they weren’t where their navigation system told them that they were and attempted - albeit too late - to abort from low level? An error of judgement, perhaps, but certainly not ‘gross negligence’? We will never know - because their Chinook didn’t have a CVR or FDR. Even when used for the Public Transport of government employees.....

Is this plausible - or can it be ruled out with ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’?

Beags

There is no proof that JT or the rest of the crew could not see the coast at this so important (apparently) 20 sec to run. I seem to remember both Day and Wratton looking down and shuffling their feet when the HoL select committee started to quiz them on this very point.
Although there are witnesses on the Mull to say they could not see out to sea, there were only four witnesses to say what was visible from the height and distance of the aircraft at twenty seconds to run. IF the crew were visual with the coastline* what stands of the Day/Wratton argument? Nothing, absolutely nothing.


*This is not impossible by any means. If one considers the cloud to be associated with the geography of the Mull of Kintyre then you will realise that it would be possible to sit anywhere between the lighthouse and the summit in cloud yet be clear of cloud and in sight of the coast at 10 to 10 000 feet amsl and 0.1 to 10 miles out from the coast.

Well said OIS.

I have been champing at the bit waiting for someone more qualified than me to point out this obvious ommission from Hoon's statement.

There is strong evidence from the yachtsman that the pilots could see the bottom of the Mull and would probably have assumed that the top was strongly attached to it.

We are only certain that the actual top of the Mull was in cloud. We do not know how far that cloud extended seawards from the Mull. Hoon's statement (Wratten's & Day's) is therefore a dishonest presentation of the facts we do know, and is a typical "spun" version we are accustomed to hearing from this goverment.

Reheat on, A few years ago I watched a program suggesting that Churchill "engineered" a plane crash which killed a senior Polish leader in exile. He is supposed to have done it at the request of comrade Stalin. In 1994 more than a score of top anti IRA men die in similar circumstances and within a year the IRA are in ceasefire. Of course Governments nowadays are above such appalling behavior. They are thoroughly honest, truthful, and loyal to all their citizens

Beags

The Supertans is GPS driven with doppler and ADS backup. You refer to the previous model.

HPT

Thanks for your info, HPT.

Has it been postively determined that the GPS element was serviceable and providing stable inputs? Does the GPS element of SuperTANS include a military Y-code receiver - and were the appropriate cryptovariables loaded? Or does it rely purely on C/A codes? Was the last known position displayed to the crew obtained from the remains of the SuperTANS recovered from the site?

GPS Aspects
 

I used the same TANS at the time of the accident, and it did on occasion go walkabout, in my experience up to 6NM.

Dont throw the bad numbers in, bad info out argument my way because I checked and double checked and it seemed to happen in the same part of the country on differant days. Leicestershire of all places not too far from the Daventry Antenae.

Another aspect is that the Chinook was probably set up for the Irish National Grid whilst crossing to the the land of British National Grid, and an input error could have arisen, unless as is probably (usually) the case, the crew were using Lat & Long.

For local knowledge, I believe that one of the crewmembers was brought up on the Mull, as I met and spoke to his brother @ Macrihanish once (after the accident). I wonder what wiggly amps were at Macrihanish that nobody will own up to.

It is because of my lack of faith in the Nav kit at that time that I signed the petition, running the gauntlet of the Senior Officers wrath. With photocopied FRCs the MOD must be pooing themselves about an eventual fair outcome, and the litigation that is bound to follow.

We must all remember that to compare the GPS of 2002 to that available in 1994 is a big error of judgement.

Quite so mate.

Was the SuperTANS GPS a Y-code device at the time? Or did it rely on the same C/A GPS satellites as any civil non-IFR approved GPS did at the time? Remember that SA hadn't been disabled back then......

Personally I reckon that it's highly likely that the crew believed they were further away from the landmass than in fact they were due to cumulative navigation system errors.

Helicopters are flown looking out of the window. When a support helicopter goes IMC it is a major event, which is not undertaken lightly. You go IMC early ie when there is nothing much to see out of the window, or turn around. It is as simple as that. Both of these were options for the (four man) crew of ZD576. Day and Wratton sell this as if they were travelling at light speed. It was a Chinook helicopter, not TSR2.

I’m afraid that I see all this speculation about accuracy of the 252 (‘supertans’) as so much froth. The manufacturer stated that any info obtained from the wreckage would be unreliable yet the MOD or, closer to home, the RAF managed to find an ‘expert’ who could state not only what the crew were being shown but, of far greater importance WHAT THE FINAL FLIGHT PATH was of ZD576. Remember this is using information the manufacturer of the kit says is unreliable.

The whole situation is arse. The MOD, Day and Wratton know this to be so and yet they are so far up their own ego’s that they probably do think that they are taking the difficult, but necessary, line to further the cause of the RAF.

Knobs!
:mad:

Whilst Oh I See is correct in his initial comment regarding heli and VMC flight, once an IMC abort is completed, and especially in that part of the world, reliance is placed upon the GPS to provide a SAFE HEADING. Which clearly did not happen.

You can rarely get a radar service from Scottish Mil between NI and Scotland below 2000`, and Macrihanish was closed. Which takes us back to the only onside navaid available and its accuracy or not therein.

Beags

The supertans fitted at the time of the accident worked off the C/A codes only. I too have had spurious GPS readings whilst operating in NI of 300NM!!

Oh I See

I don't agree that going IMC in SH is a major event. Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean.


Try giving yourself an engine run-up with a couple of miles to run to coast in next time you are in the Chinook Sim. Put the weight at about 17-18 tonnes and a low-cloudbase with you VMC below.

Unsurprisingly you will find that you enter cloud as you pull pitch to contain the NR; the nose drops and the speed increases and before you know it, the slow rate of climb achieved, combined with high closure rate equal disaster. Now bring the disorientating effect of very high vibration levels due to increased NR into the equation!

HPT

Yozzer

The thrust of your argument appears to be that an IMC abort had been flown with sole reliance to the 252. This is not only unrealistic it also adds weight to the single point scoring arguments of the MOD.

HPT

Apologies, probably my poor use of englese! I was trying to explain that an IMC abort is not carried out every day and that when approaching weather likely to require such action it is discussed within the crew beforehand. Remember this was a straight and level transit over water, not whistling around the bend of a valley.
Your final two paragraphs sum up what, IMHO, probably occurred to ZD576.

Never forget this:

New MK2 aircraft well behind schedule in coming into service. Old MK1 Chinook airframes being withdrawn from service and being rebuilt as new aircraft. General shortage of Chinook helicopters resulting.

Test flying and documentation of new type incomplete. Generic random, unexplained engine control excursions to high power, causing overspeeding of rotor system and resulting in destruction on the ground of another airframe of new type. Engine computer software problems. Old / obsolescent software language, now difficult to find and rectify problems. MOD suing aircraft manufacturer. MOD's own test pilots refuse to fly aircraft any more, even for a ten minute flight to return test airframe to main Chinook base for maintenance.

Airframe shortage looking critical. General loss of face and frustration perceived by RAF hierarchy. Aircraft type cannot be released for service in normal way but MOD give limited release to ease aircraft shortage.

25 highly valued personnel from same anti-terrorist department required to go to meeting on mainland. No available aircraft except one of previously mentioned new type. Airframe has, in addition to generic problems, previous recent report of navigation system errors, no fault found. Marginal weather forecast, especially in view of aircraft's limited release to fly. Further frustration to hierarchy, too much loss of face already. Crew protest, don't want to take the new aircraft, not happy to fly it but carry out flight as required.

Tragic accident occurs to aircraft en route, all occupants deceased. No conclusive evidence of cause found by RAF inquiry team but evidence of possible crew intercom failure in wreckage. RAF hierarchy over-rule findings of President of Board of Inquiry team and criticise him as too inexperienced and lacking strength of character to form correct opinion, despite ordering previous appointment as President. Ignore evidence of witness to weather conditions at time of accident.

Deceased crew given blame, all other problems swept under carpet. MOD off hook, involved senior officer promoted. Won't change stance until forced. No further loss of face tolerated.


:rolleyes: That's it so far. The question now remains: Does a system exist to oblige MOD to change stance? :(

My thanks to David Cameron MP for having sent me a copy of Hansard for 22 Jul 02 and for his courteous letter in which he has also promised to pose certain questions to Buff.

Bernard Jenkins' response is succinct and accurate. He demolishes Hoon's ridiculous position; e.g.

"May I refer briefly to the SoS' own statement today? At one point he said:

"This evidence at the crash site also indicates that the aircraft was almost certainly responding properly to its controls, at least in the final seconds before impact"

I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that "almost certainly" is not "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". He then went on to say:

"These, then are the facts".

I put it to him that these are not the facts.

Nothing in BuffHoon's utterance in the House changes the level of doubt surrounding this accident.