B Eagle

That is indeed good news - and if that happens we can all breath a huge sigh of relief. Beware the vested interests though......

David

BEagle

So you are saying, are you not, that Experienced and Well Qualified Officers who are placed into a Staff Appointment should only ever be able to comment, or make recommendations, in respect of those aircraft types that they have flown in Service.

How does the RAF introduce a new Type of Aircraft into Service with those constraints? Would all Air Officers in future have to be graduates of ETPS?

Your Caps Lock seems to be sticking a bit...

People so allegedly 'experienced and well-qualified', when in 'staff appointments', should acknowledge lack of relevant experience when commenting on something about which they have scant knowledge. "Sorry, I don't know - I'll find out" might be a start. Or would that lose them too many staff smartie points?

If you want to continue clouding the issue with irrelevant pontifications, be my guest. But the simple fact is that neither you, Day nor Wratten has the slightest clue about what actually happened to the level of proof their shameful verdict required by their own rules.

bastOn, I'm a bit confused about your take on this accident. You say that little is really relevant apart from the last few moments preceding the crash. I'd take issue with that and hope that is not the present stance of RAF Accident Investigation. At the same time you plead for kindness to the pilots' memories based on the benefit of the doubt. That was their right, there is no call for kindness, nor none expected. Any doubt means not Grossly Negligent, endex. You also warn in an earlier post against vested interests. Indeed. Such a sign, in glowing neon, should be hung above the main entrance to Main Building.
1. The MOD was responsible for the Interim Release to Service of an unairworthy aircraft type.
2. Despite pleas from the Flight Detachment Commander to the contrary, he was fatally ordered to use this unairworthy aircraft to fly passengers who were essential to our National Security.
3. Evidence and Witnesses to 1. above were withheld from the BoI.
4. Nonetheless it was not the BoI but the ROs that brought in the infamous finding of Gross Negligence against the pilots.
5. The most important item in this list, and which has emerged in this thread, is 1.

Chinook
 

Tucumseh. Your repeated assertion about the alleged unairworthiness of this Chinook, invites a repeat of earlier questions, ie, if it was not airworthy then just what changes were made to correct that failing? And if no corrections were made, then why are these machines still authorised to operate? Regards JP

Chugalug

I am also amazed at the view taken by some.

If this flight had not ended in tragedy no-one would be any the wiser or care about it. The fact that it ended in tragedy means that it became everyone’s business.

An analogy. 44 ton truck at 56mph driving down the M20 in a glorious summers dawn. Mist patches about, damp road, whisps of drifting fog. East European driver over his hours, had complained to his boss about the brakes fading, told to get on with it or lose his job, wife had left him, on the phone to his girlfriend who tells him she is pregnant by another man as he enters a fog bank. Slams on the brakes and stops 4” short of Fiat Panda with ICAN standard family, 2+2 and small dog. No story – lots of rules broken but no judgement or prosecution. If he had stopped four feet further on causing horrific crash, jumps out and survives, all the vehicles catch fire destroying most of the evidence he would have had the book thrown at him, been locked up and the keys thrown away. If the Chinook had landed with a bit of heather round the wheels it would have been the same scenario, breakfast, un-airworthiness and all that, but without the tragic ending and no judgement would have been made upon the crew.

That’s why the last part of the flight is so crucial.

Well it would seem that your philosophy and that of the MOD has much in common then bastOn, break all the rules but no accident equals no problem, break all the rules and big accident equals big problems. Solution? Find a scapegoat, or in this case two. The prime cause of your Eastern European's (near) accident was an irresponsible employer which makes it indeed a fitting simile for this accident. The employer here was Grossly Negligent in releasing an unairworthy aircraft into service, in contrast though the alleged Gross Negligence of the pilots has yet to be proved, even during those last few vital seconds.

Chugalug

So true - 4ft can make the difference between going home for supper or vilification. It's not fair but it happens.

David

It may be true in the Brave New World over which the MOD now presides, but it is the complete antithesis of the one that I left in 1973! The whole philosophy then was accident prevention. Each and every incident was reported and depending on its severity became either the subject of immediate remedial action or at the very least another part of a data base that highlighted weak points for similar action. Above all though Airworthiness was achieved and maintained by continuous audit. as illustrated by tucumseh. Now it would seem most of that Flight safety system has been swept away by the bean counters and we're back to the attitude that "S**t happens, so?". Well so 29 people die unnecessarily, that's so.

Chugalug 2

Perhaps we could have your perspective on the Aircraft Captain asking the Groundcrew to "have a look" at the avionics without indicating any unservicability in the Form 700 or raising any Incident Report?

Of course, because no paperwork was raised by the Captain - there was no record of any "remedial" action taken; and no confirmation by a SNCO that all necessary safety checks had been carried out and the aircraft was servicable.

We don't know if what was looked at was what the Captain meant:- so we don't even know if the fault the Captain meant was not the "fault fixed" but the fault that caused the crash!!

Perhaps you would care to comment?

JP

I agree it would be very interesting to know exactly what changes have been made to the Chinoook since the frankly awful limited RTS - for certain, the FADEC is a lot better. However, as many as 5 years after the crash, the MoD admitted they did not know the answer to this because their audit trail was still in a mess. I sincerely doubt that much has changed in respect to the MoD's knowledge. Tuc might put us right?

caz

As others have pointed out, there is no need to be rude nor wave your willy at me, so please desist.:=:=
However, I'm very sorry if you got the wrong end of the stick - I never said you were not 'well travelled' - just a little predictable.:bored:

BEagle
<<Nevertheless, I consider that comments about the preparation for flight are irrelevant from anyone except RW aircrew intimately familiar with the conduct of such flights.>>
All well and good except that such eminently suitable people have not made public a considered analysis of all the available data - identifying correlation with their procedures - nor supplied the details of their procedures for others to do it.

flipster,

I am a trifle confused by your post 4530. I have been back several pages and my last post addressed to you was 4451.

Could you please elaborate?

:ugh:

BEagle

You did not answer the question.

JP


You indeed asked this question before, and I replied. I assume therefore you did not take my advice, or MoD did not offer an answer – both equally likely.

Maintaining the Build Standard consists of 17 core components, as stated by the only Def Stan dedicated to the subject. (And the Build Standard is but one small component, albeit a crucially important one, of airworthiness). Designing and proving modifications to correct faults or defects is one part of one component. The suggestion that a modification would make the aircraft airworthy would mean the other components are implemented properly. They are not.

Again, you will have to ask MoD what changed, but first I recommend you bone up on what constitutes airworthiness. It helps if the question makes sense, as they take great delight in being pedantic when replying. As I said at #4511;


For what its worth, I think that, having introduced a policy in 1991 deliberately compromising airworthiness, MoD decided to take a calculated risk and continue to carry on lacking the “defences in depth” the regulations mandate. In modern parlance, many slices of cheese disappeared and the holes in the rest got bigger. The probability of occurrence increased.

If MoD had been honest and said “We are taking this calculated risk, as we can’t afford the current cost” then everyone concerned could make an informed decision as to their role.

But they weren’t honest. Every time the policy was challenged you got a different reply, until (in our case) the 2 Star cracked and threatened dismissal if we insisted on implementing the regulations. (December 1992). The single most appalling excuse for telling me to ignore an aircraft being unsafe, was when I was told “He’s the 2 Star’s mate and earmarked for promotion, so don’t rock the boat”. I ignored this and notified two 2 Stars, recommending specific corrective action. Unfortunately, while the subsequent BoI repeated my recommendation word for word, they had come to it independently, as they hadn’t been told it had been made previously. Nor was the Coroner. So the lessons couldn’t be learned as crucial evidence was withheld. Same as Chinook really. Same 2 Star post.

Caz:
Questions, questions, questions, as ever caz. For me, for flip, and a nudge for Beags to answer his. Busy, busy, busy, but little enough from yourself in return of course. I have no idea what is alleged to have happened pre departure, caz. Perhaps you have and can spell out what is known regarding servicing. If you know that the captain wanted someone to "have a look at" the avionics, then perhaps you know what if anything was then done and by whom. I have no reason to believe that the aircraft state was anything other "serviceable" for that flight. My contention, together with others, is serviceable it may well have been but airworthy it most certainly was not, in company with its sister Mk2's under the bizarre restricted RTS. It was Grossly Negligent of the Airworthiness Authority to have released it into service thus. The alleged Gross Negligence of the pilots has yet to be proved.

bastOn

The Investigating Board felt unable to come to a unanimous finding in respect of negligence and the Station Commander at Aldergrove was only required to comment on those aspects that came under his jurisdiction.

Ir was the Station Commander at Odiham who found negligence in respect of the Aircraft Captain; a finding that was extended to the Co-Pilot by the AOC 1 Group. CinC STC concurred and the BOI was then reviewed by CAS.

I have no doubt that all subsequent Chiefs of the Air Staff have also reviewed the findings in this ongoing saga and the findings still stand. The most senior Military Personage in the UK's Armed Forces MRAF Lord Craig, also made his viewpoint quite clear in the HOL debate.

Any political decision to overturn the findings would mean HMG rejecting the considered professional opinions of seven Air Chief Marshals and one Marshal of the Royal Air Force.

Chugalug2

May I suggest that you read the BOI which details what happened between sorties and the reasonings of the Board and the Reviewing Officers.

Chinook
 

Tuc. I was hoping for a factual answer to my question, rather than a philosophical one. Perhaps someone else could tell us just what was changed, and if nothing was changed then why were all the CHinooks not grounded? Regards. JP

Caz,
I listened to MRAF Lord Craig give his evidence to the HOL. I also listened to Sqn Ldr Burke. Remind me again.
1. Who was the Chinook expert?
2. Whose evidence did the HOL chose to accept?

JP



Like I said, ask MoD. It is their responsibility. While you’re at it, ask why they never accepted Boscombe’s advice that the aircraft was not airworthy, and where the reasoning for that decision is recorded.

You may find the two are related. To ground the fleet after the crash would have immediately highlighted the refusal to do so beforehand. The resultant catalogue of lies and deceit, in an attempt to hide the facts, is well recorded. That the lies come from the very people who were allowed to judge their own case, speaks volumes.

We wouldn’t be discussing this if someone had had the gumption to make the very decision you’re talking about.

caz:
What would be really helpful, caz, is if you could summarise the above for all of us. That way we will know what you know, ie classic CRM. This isn't a game of "I know something that you don't", or shouldn't be. Neither is it incumbent on those who seek to overturn the ROs' finding to prove anything. That was for the ROs to do, or at least ensure, given the finding that they came to. You know as we all do that they did no such thing. An explanation for their bizarre behaviour has now emerged on this thread, that the aircraft was unairworthy and known to be so. Hence their finding, hence the obdurate refusal of the MOD to overturn it, hence the long list of worthies that you enumerate to bastOn that tacitly endorsed it. Shame on them and on the RAF while this scandal persists. The MOD of course has no shame.

Chinook
 

Tuc. I must be confused, but are you saying that someone should, after this disaster, have grounded the Chinook fleet? And does that mean that they should not therefore still be flying, or have i missed something?

JP

I can only offer an opinion, albeit as someone who has held airworthiness delegation (but not senior enough to sign a CAR/MAR or RTS).

• The decision to ignore Boscombe’s advice before the accident was, I believe, flawed. I have seen numerous instances where this advice is heeded only when it suits, but rejected when it does not align with the political imperative or the perceived need to meet time and cost, while ignoring performance (which includes safety). Notably, when discussing advice they accepted (on Chinook), MoD refer to them as “AAEE”, but when discussing rejected advice, they say “Boscombe Down” – as if they were two separate entities. Deceit like this is what undermines their position in many eyes. It shows they are trying to hide something.

• Similarly, I cannot believe grounding was not considered after the accident, but was complicated by the refusal to listen to Boscombe beforehand and the political imperative. Reading what little evidence there is of this period, all the indications are of tension between the MoD(PE), AAEE and RAF. In fact, there was even tension between two parts of the RAF – the Suppliers (who controlled support funding) who are on record as thinking airworthiness a waste of money (and acting accordingly); and the Users who tended to like a safe, reliable, supportable aircraft. The actions of the former are important in this debate, as the Mk2 arose from converting a Mk1 (notwithstanding Ingram’s claim the Mk2 was a new aircraft), the airworthiness of which was, as we know, compromised by AMSO’s continued cutting of relevant funding lines and complete ignorance of the subject. Ingram’s claim that the Mk1 was of no relevance to the Mk2 is drivel. After 3 years of neglect (91-94), the build standard was not maintained, so any safety argument was flawed. I would only (barely) accept Ingram’s argument if the Mk1 > Mk2 contract included full resurrection of the Build Standard, and establishment of a stable baseline prior to induction. These are fundamental issues and project management basics, but are still routinely ignored.

• Even given the above, no, I cannot say they should still be grounded. I simply do not have the detailed information to offer such an opinion. However, looking at the equipment list, I can say for definite that some corrective action took place in the following years, but that was by other projects whose work (the routine stuff above) happened to correct Chinook problems, as the kit was also fitted to other aircraft. I also note the RAF suppliers’ attempt to hide this inconvenient fact at the time (1997), as it exposed their actions and attitudes from the early 90s. The person who took issue with Wyton over this is now sadly deceased, but the record survives. The example I’m thinking of may seem relatively minor, but it is symptomatic of the neglect I mentioned.

I hope this helps.

tucumseh,

Off piste I know, but may I ask if MOD Hels 1 and OC SH STANEVAL were part of the decision 'process' to ignore Boscombe's advice at the time?

AA

AA

Good question. I simply don't know, but perhaps others can advise. The advice from Boscombe was, correctly, directed at the MoD(PE) project office (as their "customer"). The PO's records (later transferred to the Chinnok IPT) would say who they discussed it with (and perhaps what direction they were given!).

Caz,

re yr last ....No! No! and thrice No! - think for yourself, for once, please!!

I will now add you to my ignore list, so expect no answer to any further dialogue (hardly the correct terminology) - but I do hope you get better soon.


Bye,
flipster

Flipster

You have lost it..............

What a great contribution that last post was. ......................not

Of course - no need for any more guess work as to their intentions!
If Flt Lt Tapper did go to a met brief there would have been someone else there.
Presumably, even out of curiosity alone, the person presenting the met stuff would have inquired as to their intentions, if it was not volunteered - why wouldn't it have been so?
So where in any of the inquiries is the bit where the met person (or anyone else who was present) was asked about what was said? - Surely such a person would have been called to give evidence?:ok:

baston,

Now don't you start! It was a long day yesterday, with probably too much lubrication - sorry you are right, that last post didn't add much, please forgive me.

The unfortunate truth is that it is caz who has lost it - 'it' being the ability to see other possible scenarios that are different to his own twisted reasoning. Of course, he is entitled to his opinions and I have sought to be reasonable with him but he blinkeredly follows the trite mumblings of his previous bosses without an ounce of balanced logic and all we have done is to encourage him to remove his blinkers. He has not and, therefore, I have come to believe that he is just a 'wind-up merchant' with nothing remotely sensible to add to this thread (which is why I will be trying to ignore his ramblings). If he is a wind-up merchant, then with me, he succeeded; my aplogies to all for falling for his inanities. Sadly, he just answers genuine questions with other 'off-track' questions, most of which we have already discussed and rejected on the balance of things.

The truth is that caz irrititates most people who genuinely believe that the ROs were hugely vindictive and demonstrably unjust in overturning the BOIs reasonings and bringing the findings of gross negligence against Tapper and Cook - for the simple fact that the last minutes of decision-making (or not) on board ZD576 are a complete unknown and will always remain so - which does not meet the burden of proof of 'with no doubt whatsoever'.

Now, I will say nowt more about caz - we have agreed to disagree!
So, please, can we all get back to thread with a modicum of open-mindedness?

Chinook
 

Tuc. Your 4543 very interesting, and as you have said there is confusion about airworthy/serviceable. Definitions may have changed since my time, perhaps you could enlighten us? Regards. JP

I've mentioned it before but I'll do it again. If we assume that there is a reasonable probability/possibility that this was a CFIT, what is it that makes the burden of proof far more convincing in this accident than a significant number of other CFITs? In other words, how can the MOD justify differing 'verdicts' from the same level of evidence? From the 1990 Shackleton BOI:

So, I was wondering whether it is worth pursuing a line with MOD regarding their widely varying application of standards when reviewing accidents in the 1990s?

cows

Quite right and I agree with you.

Another CFIT accident where the BOI were stymied for definitive causes was the crash of Hercules XV193 in May 1993, near Pitlochry in Scotland, where the BOI found that the ac probably stalled 'at an altitude from which recovery was not possible'. Again, no findings of gross negligence (rightly so) because there were a number of unknowns and so the burden of proof to the level of 'with no doubt whatsoever' could not be met.

One possible explanaition for this is the alledged influence of Wratten's contraversial letter to his subordinate air staff (after the Mull crash but before the BOI had finished). Was he hung by his own petard? Was Wratten going to go against his own express wishes? Was Day going to go against his superior's own explicit edicts? I doubt it!

Maybe not such as silly question and one that has probably been answered, but...

What is the probability of a "gross negligence" finding had there not been the passengers there were in the rear?

The answer to that will go a long way to determining whether overturning the verdict is even possible.

AA
<<What is the probability of a "gross negligence" finding had there not been the passengers there were in the rear? >>
I have suggested an answer to this many times before but I think you are meaning that the crew were being dealt with harshly just because of the significance of the passengers and the magnitude of the loss – my view is that there was more to it than that: if you look at the time scale of investigations and the lack of certainty (even after all these years) of the cause, you would probably be gob smacked as to how soon after the crash that sabotage was dismissed out of hand.
I have always held the view that the dismissal of sabotage so early was politically motivated to prevent public unease and perhaps unrest – to justify such a dismissal they had to have a solid reason, beyond any doubt whatsover, and when they blamed it on pilot error of course the inference was “beyond any doubt whatsover” which meant … you know the rest.
This crash removed a major obstacle to the peace process, the consequences of which are still ongoing and the need to keep public thinking away from any dirty trick is still ongoing – so you are not going to get a change in the verdict unless you work out amongst yourselves what actually happened and ram it down the throat of the politicians.:}

VFR?
 

A request for some information please. I have asked this question more than once before but received no definitive answer. If the precise answer been published somewhere in the mass of info or sources available, please forgive me.

Can anyone tell me what the precise VFR weather minima would have been at the time of the accident for an SF crew operating a Mk II Chinook overland, overwater, in/to/from NI. Please, no "I think it was....", "what we used to use in BAOR..." or "same as anywhere else!" The book figures please.

Secondly, this was a flight carrying pax who were VIP's and/or civilians (please correct me if you know for a fact that they were not or were not considered to be) between two civilian airfields. I am still wrestling with the idea that the weather minima for such a flight would have been the same as, say, for a troop/SF insertion in South Armagh/other operational area, ie, the absolute minimum conditions usable. Can anyone state categorically that there would have been no difference in the weather minima applicable.

I was about to start with 'I think it was.....' - then thought twice!

I have not seen 'the book' figures but my CFS notes (taken from the UK Military Low Flying System (UKMLFS) Handbook) from that time are quite specific - for helicopters it was:

"1nm in-flight horizontal viz, clear of cloud, insight of the surface".

Bearing in mind this was a military flight within the UKMLFS (properly booked IIRC) and so would have been conducted to those VFR rules once they crossed the sea into the LFS - (LFA 14?).

Although near the Mull lighthouse, on land, these VFR criteria were very probably not met (but we can't definitely prove that). Unfortunately, this crew could have been operating to much less restrictive wx criteria on the NI mainland - eg 'do what is necessary to get through to the troops on the ground and don't crash' (this was a truly operational theatre, far, far removed from the peacetime environment in Scotland) - I haven't heard if there were any such limits but if there were, I expect that they may be 'classifed'. To suddenly change to more restrictive limits (in flight, if the truth is known) may have led to confusion at a most inopportune time.

However, just about 2 nm out at sea, VFR was more-than-likely possible as the yachtsman's worst assessment was about 1 nm viz, in haze and the ac was clearly visible at 3-400 ft - probably higher (and possibly with some hazy sun/breaks in cloud) - which explains the crew's waypoint change 1-2 nm short of the lighthouse indicating they were going to maintain VFR below along the coast (of course, we can't prove this either).

Then, for some reason, they didn't stay VFR below, didn't turn and didn't climb.

If only they'd had a CVR/ADR we'd know a bit more - but then, I hear that it was AVM Day that had decided not fit this piece of eqpt to mk2?



Bottom line - no-one knows for sure.....FACT.

Boslandew
<<Secondly, this was a flight carrying pax who were VIP's and/or civilians (please correct me if you know for a fact that they were not or were not considered to be) between two civilian airfields>>
There was a lady passenger who was a civilian – this had a significant impact in the events that followed that, while not exactly the matter you were raising, you may find interesting:
The MOD did not want the Procurator Fiscal to hold a Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI);
they had argued that as it was a military flight they would handle all that sort of thing – and this would have been correct had the crash occurred within England;
however, as it occurred in Scotland, the Procurator Fiscal held that he had the right to hold an FAI;
it was, I am told, a bitter argument – the MOD seeming desperate to prevent such;
the deciding factor was that one passenger was a civilian and the MOD attempt to block an FAI failed – it was held in 1996 at the Sherrif's Court in Paisley.

WEATHER AND VMC AGAIN!
If only those interested in this case were familiar with those typical conditions on headlands such as the Mull as viewed from the sea! - perhaps then they would understand.
As they crossed the sea, the only “high” ground they had to worry about was the isolated low hill that was the Mull – it should have been a cake walk passing it by safely compared with the 10 miles of LL across the Antrim hills that they had just accomplished.
If there was any worthwhile debate on the VFR applying, it should include the crossing of the Antrim hills – it would perhaps make a few things clear: for one, the general cloud base was reasonably high in the region of this flight. The lower cloud base of concern was the table top of the orographic cloud generated by the Mull at about 800 ft and which extended out to sea enough for them to have flown underneath it when close to the shore – still OK though but it prevented getting a perspective of the larger topographic features.
I'll say it again, they were not in bad vis until the last few seconds – the land that they could see was shrouded in ground hugging mist which followed the slope up from about 200ft – they were not in breach of VFR approaching the land as they could see it – the problem was the judgment of distance from it.
This is a hazard that I am sure many of you who have done LL flying would be aware of.
If they had no business approaching it so closely, they could have avoided it visually or by DR or by leaving waypoint A selected in the SuperTANS and maintaining a safe distance from it (the margin for error in the SuperTANS would have required turning away before the position of waypoint change in this case).
So I say they were approaching it intentionally close and the other settings I have mentioned before support this pointing to a landing at the LZ I have indicated before – really, nothing else makes sense.

Oive Oil
Thanks for a clear and correct post - I think I brought this up several years ago that, below 140 kts IAS a helicopter was not constrained to a rigid minima for horizontal vision (because they can always slow down a bit more!) - but the usual suspects like to go around in ever decreasing circles on innocuous aspects.
Boeing's analysis has it that they were down to 120-125 kts TAS on that final leg between the position of waypoint change and impact (the increased tailwind as they approached and crossed the shoreline masked this as the ground speed remained the same). They had indeed started to slow down (supported by the power data retrieved from one of the engine computers).
So they were not in breach of VFR as they approached the Mull.

Now for a general prod:
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
There are several different perspectives being talked about at the moment which include the following 5:
legal niceties re the verdict;
airworthiness of the a/c;
airmanship wrt rules and prevalent conditions;
an undisclosed extra task involving a landing;
procedures and preparations.
The first 3 have been subject to exhaustive debate;
the 4th is apparently taboo;
the 5th seems to be ridiculed out of hand.
I would have thought all 5 worthwhile of exploring and filling out as much as possible.
I won't discuss 4 here as that is my usual theme – it is the last one that I cannot understand not being taken up by all of you experienced in operations.
Cazatou has had a good deal of experience and has shown attention to detail that is to be expected from men of his position and has been trying to establish, as I see it, the programme of the day – surely a possible contributory factor is the preparation in all respects of the crew and adherance or otherwise to procedures that have been established for good reason. While you all snipe at particular points he has raised, you (as a group) have not contributed significantly to the understanding of the crew's movements and preparations that day – surely this should have been a fundamental component of an analysis of this crash – just as much as Boeing's Analysis of Available Data was for distance/time calcs – their every move that day should have been tabulated years ago.