Chinook
 

This discussion is ecoming very esoteric, Meanwhile can someone say, as I asked on 6th March, whether or not the Chinook is now airworthy. If it is not, then why is it still flying; if it is, then what exactly was done post-Mulll disaster, to make it airworthy? May we please have a clear answer? JP

Now that is quite ironic, JP asking for an answer to a question.... :rolleyes:

John

The discussion you describe as “esoteric” (i.e. getting too close for comfort) is primarily concerned with the airworthiness of the fleet at the time. Your question seeks to shift emphasis to the present day. A typical MoD ploy if I may say.

Why not study and draw up a list of what constitutes airworthiness, and then ask if, for example, the various Directorates involved were given the resources to meet their legal obligations.

You’ll quickly realise (but perhaps not acknowledge) that those charged with implementing the regulations are completely hamstrung if under resourced and there is no political will or leadership. In a process which relies so heavily on a “top down” approach, it will become apparent that the pilots (and pax) are merely at the bottom of this food chain in the sense they are totally reliant upon everyone before them doing their job – not just the maintainers they see while doing pre-flight checks. Then ask if the factual evidence gives even the remotest indication that all these mandatory tasks were carried out correctly and in a timely fashion before the crash.

A simple statement of verifiable fact – they were not. Now - who is to blame for that? Answer that one and you get close to the reason why the establishment were so keen to hoist the blame on pilots who couldn't defend themselves.

Chinook
 

tucumseh

"the pilots are merely at the bottom of this food chain"

An unfortunate choice of words given the blatent disregard of ASI's, GASO's and Command Catering Instructions regarding pre and in flight catering for that days tasking.

When they took off on that fatal sortie none of the crew had partaken of a meal (as opposed to the odd chocolate biscuit) for at least 10 hours and in the case of the Captain some 22 hours.

Caz,

"An unfortunate choice of words given the blatent disregard of ASI's, GASO's and Command Catering Instructions regarding pre and in flight catering for that days tasking.

When they took off on that fatal sortie none of the crew had partaken of a meal (as opposed to the odd chocolate biscuit) for at least 10 hours and in the case of the Captain some 22 hours."

I have challenged you before and I challenge you again to prove that :=

Caz

Regardless of whether what you say is right or wrong (and I am in no position to say), apologies if any aircrew were offended.

However, I think most aircrew here can differentiate between those interested in their safety, and those dedicated to steering any discussion away from the inconvenient fact that MoD don't give a damn, and have lied and deceived at every turn.



John

In reply to your question, you know I've already said I can't answer your question for certain, but can offer an educated opinion based on available evidence. For the purposes of this thread, the aircraft was clearly not airworthy at the time of the accident. However, I do know what questions to ask, which is always a good start. Again, it is crystal clear who doesn't like them being asked.

I think if you wrote to SofS and asked "Is xxx currently airworthy?", the answer would be the usual "The MoD has a robust regulatory framework". In other words, we have some mandated regulations and a legal duty of care, but we don't bother applying them in full, a God help any of our staff who insist on doing so.

Chinook
 

Tucumseh. You are one of the knowledgeable folk who have talked at length here about airworthiness, and my question simply is 'what (if anything) has changed since this disaster'?. Please speak up. Regards JP

SFFP

I was merely quoting the BOI regarding catering. They concluded that the crew would have eaten only a few biscuits during the first sortie. There was no record of Flt Lt Tapper having breakfast and no crew meals were ordered for either sortie.

Thus, when they departed on that final sortie, the Co pilot and ALM's had not had a meal for some 10 hours and the Captain for some 22 hours.

You may recall that changes were made to ensure that Aircrew had breakfast before flight.

Caz for an ex FSO you have, if you don't mind me saying so, a worrying tendency to take supposition as reliable proof. SFFP has challenged your:
and your reply is:
I presume the
is your ever helpful personal inference that absence of evidence means evidence of absence. Really won't do, just as your mantra of flying at high speed.....won't either. The only high speed evidence is that at impact AFAIK, or do you as ever have 'proof' (other than your ingenious supposition that Crew Duty Time worries meant that it had to be thus...)?

This connector problem. Can we see a picture of it please? Most connectors that have a tendancy to come apart can usually be held together with the use of good old pussers masking tape. Not very scientific I grant you - but it works. I know.................

Whether or not the crew had been in a position to eat or not before the flight and if it had any relevance to the cause of the accident - if the system was at fault by not allowing the crew to eat, why, Cazatou, do you try to turn this around to make it a crew "negligence" issue?

It was quite common for SH crews to have to scrounge a meal as and where they ended up. Sometimes we went without. If we were on the early wave, or on a callout, breakfast was nowhere in the equation. If we got a lunch break programmed in, we were lucky. We flew all day (in my case, more often, all night) and it was by no means uncommon to get just one meal, supplemented by snacks, if we were lucky, in a day. It was by no means unusual to be at a place over mealtimes where no catering was available.

You have a viewpoint swayed by your cosy VIP fixed wing background. Catering, hotel, waiter, G&T, snap fingers etc. You plainly have very little idea of how SH were obliged to operate in NI. Although I flew SH for most of my 18 years, I never was in a position to eat in flight - 100 feet AGL is no place to be flying around with a white cardboard box on one's lap.

You still appear to be on a mission (as you previously were as K52) to string up the crew for any alleged breach of the rules that you can muster. Again, for SH crews, NI was an operational theatre. It possibly wasn't for yourself as a VIP pilot flying the ILS when not well above the small arms and SAM threat from airport to airport (although you were still eligible for your medal). We were flying to fight a very real terrorist threat on a daily basis whilst having to comply with what were effectively two sets of rules.

I find it intriguing that, on one hand people highlight the absence of a bowl of cornflakes as if this was a direct causal factor, but on the other seem to ignore more irritating elements as questionable airworthiness and unsound judgements.

PS. Having worked with SH for a while when in the RAF I can't remember one occasion where an operational crew actually managed 'three square' in a single day. Something to do with the tasking regime and operational tempo demanded by the hierarchy?

bast0n

Generally speaking, masking tape is inadvisable in an aircraft. Contaminants such as hydraulic oil tend to degrade the adhesive whereupon the tape itself becomes FOD. The adhesive also degrades electrical contacts. The regs require an engineering solution, for example a mechanical locking device – wire locking is a crude but effective example. This is routine day to day stuff for a design office and why I can’t understand why there was any need for MoD(PE) to issue an SI. I, too, wish I knew more about the detail other than what we read in the official record (which, as we all know, is not actually required to be truthful or complete).


John

When you asked the same question last year I advised you what questions to ask SofS. Assuming you (a) haven’t asked or (b) think my questions inappropriate, please tell me why and we can work together to satisfy your curiosity. PM me by all means. But, like I said, last time I formally asked MoD the reply was “We do not have records”, which itself is an admission that the airworthiness audit trail is irretrievably broken.

Caz knows what he has posted is utter tosh because I have told him so before but to help him remember I will ask him to consider the following

During the period 1990 to 97 I was a Puma crewman, part of the SH force. From 92 to 94 I was based at RAF Aldergrove on 230 Sqn and during that tour I spent a period of time directly responsible for inflight rations. The term inflight when applied to Aldergrove and the SH force in general was a bit of a misnomer as we rarely actually flew anywhere with rations on board. It was my task to collate flying hours from the monthly auth sheets on a chock to chock basis, file the appropriate paperwork with the catering office and then submit a food order to the NAAFI, based on our monetary entitlement once the catering office had worked it out.

I would make regular trips to the NAAFI store where I would collect a huge variety of items to include bread and associated spreads, tins of corned beef and the like, cereals, biscuits, crackers, crips, chocolate, soup, individual meals, pies etc etc, suffice to say there was bucket loads of scoff.

The food was stored in the crewroom and was readily available 24/7 due to the nature of Op's. It was common place for pilots and crewman to arrive early for work and have rations in the crewroom, it was common practice in between sorties for pilots and crewman to eat rations in the crewroom and it was common practice for a few drunken individuals to leave the Swift or Lair after last orders and eat rations in the crewroom prior to going to bed.

In summary there was a shed load of food and it was available 24/7 and whilst there may be a suggestion that breakfast in the mess was missed is there a shred of conclusive evidence to say that the 4 crew members did not eat, at some stage during the day, in the crewroom?

I look forward to your response.

tucumseh,

You never cease to amaze me with your knowledge. Light duty electrical contacts are extremely sensitive to organic material, either too much or, strangely in some cases, too little. The "little" is usually codeposited in the plating process.

But now we are getting esoteric.

I like your offer to John to work together. But first, he would have to agree that the Chinook was not airworthy in 1994, based on the S/L Burke testimony. How about it John?

John Purdey
Whilst you're about it (see above entry) and are so keen to repeat your question, you still haven't answered mine:
I will comment on the question you ask, though I don't know the answer:
I think you're trying to suggest that nothing has changed on the Chinook Mk2 since the accident involving ZD576 and that, as no more have crashed in mysterious circumstances, there must have been nothing wrong with ZD576. Sorry old fruit, but that logic doesn't work. To use an analagy, a Ford Cortina could crash because the man at the factory forgot to attach the brake master cylinder correctly. The fact that no similar accidents have occurred doesn't rule out the possibility that the relevant part design/attachment instructions are faulty and that the same could happen again.

SeldomFit
I agree that there were ample opportunities to eat, not forgetting any food that the crew may have bought separately, and the absence of a record showing the crew to have had breakfast in the Mess is not proof that they had not eaten. Plenty of folks regularly get through the day on a sandwich, a chocolate bar and coffee.

Chinook
 

Meadowbank. We seemto be back to the suggestion that the aircraft was out of control, or at least suffered serious undemanded control imputs. This is of course sheer speculation, completely lacking any proof technical or otherwise. What is more, I find it difficult to reconcile that theory with the fact that the a/c entered a climb which, had the machine been on intended track, would have enabled it to clear the hill ahead by around 300ft. But it was not on track, and the hill ahead was around 300 ft higher than the crew expected. Nor does the control theory tie up with the very heavy rudder control imput in the last few seconds of flight.The aircraft must have been under control. But we have been here before, have we not. Regards. JP

For once two sentences in one of JPs posts make sense:

Meadowbank,

I admire yours and other efforts in trying to challenge JP in this manner but I am afraid it will be a very cold day in hell before you get him to give you a direct answer. You have asked him a very specific question with regards to a previous Chinook UFCM

"It happened, (is therefore de facto credible, so why do you dismiss it even as a 'possibility'? Please discuss."

In his reply he conveniently ignores your question and in almost politician style spins out a reply that itself is riddled with speculation.

A long while while back, post #2776 in Oct 07, he was asked to tell us what the flight deck crew could see out of the cockpit windows prior to the aircraft impacting the mull and his reply is thus, and I have highlighted the most telling parts

Brian. No, we do not know and we shall never know what the crew could see from the cockpit, but there are only two possibilities; one, they could see ahead to the coast and the cloud-covered hills, in which case it would have been prudent airmanship to turn away; or, two, they could not see clearly ahead, in which case it would have been prudent airmanship to have turned away.

Please say which version of their forward vision you prefer. Regards. JP


Probably the most vital piece of information with regards to this disaster is not available, and never will be yet JP is happy with the verdict given.


Now consider his assertion that there are only two possibilities, his choice of words then again how on earth can you arrive at the verdict in this case based on possibilities?


The only thing we all know for certain and that is that no one currently alive on this planet knows what actually happened that day and I challenge JP et al to prove that fact to be incorrect.
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Chinook
 

Seldom. In the lines you correctly quote. I offered the only two hypothese about the view from the cockpit; ie, the crew could see the hill ahead or they could not. I cannot understand why you have such difficulty with the two possibilities. They were hypothese only, and not an indication of doubt about the cause of the crash, as you choose to suppose. And in either case, as I said, the crew should have turned away. Now please tell us which hypothesis you support . Regards. JP

JP,

There you go again with the old assumption thing.

Why are they the only two possibilities?

You have freely admitted you have no idea what was visible from the flight deck windows so surely there must be other possibilities?

But of the two possibilities you propose which one do you think is correct and how certain are you the other possibility can be discounted?

Chinook
 

Seldom. Now were are getting somewhere; they could see the granite ahead, or they could not. Please tell us what the other possibilities were, or are we on different planets?. Regards. JP

Well as you freely accept the notion that there are other possibilities what about a combination of VMC and what Meadowbank suggests with regards the previous Chinook UFCM..............or have you conclusive and irrefutable proof that that cannot be the case?

Chinook
 

Seldom. We were having a reasonably intelligent exchange about what the crew could or could not see ahead;but since you now choose to introduce other factors - such as I suppose - technical faults, let us agree to disagree and stop wasting space here. Regards. JP

And as soon as the questions get difficult................

Lets try an easy one then, you have offered us two possibilities as to what the crew could see out of the flight deck windows, considering of course this is sheer speculation, completely lacking any proof technical or otherwise .

Which is right and which is wrong and why?

The weather in the immediate vicinity of the Mull and the lighthouse just minutes before the crash can be clearly seen on the video taken by the holidaymakers. The evidence of the lighthouse keeper clearly confirms that conditions deteriorated in the time from the video to the crash occurring with visibility at the lighthouse estimated at 15 to 20 metres.
The only option in prudent airmanship would have been to turn away when visibility was less than 1km. They did not and then some 600m from land made the waypoint change.
They failed to do something which, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would not do or would do differently. They were negligent before the waypoint change.

Perhaps it would pay to reflect on the previously unpublished comments of the Stn Cdr at Odiham in his covering note to Day on his comments on the BOI:
"I have coo0nsulted the Officer Copmmanding No 7 Squadron and senior members of both No 7 Squadron's Special Forces Flight and No 27(R) Squadron. You may wish to know that there is a unanimous and strongly held view that the Board's most probable cause is incredible. Moreover, there is general agreement, that the crew, in some unknown way, 'got it wrong'".

Crawford was careful not to go the whole distance in his formal comments but clearly he and colleagues were of the view that this was human failings.

Or climb to above the SALT. They were foolish and displayed bad airmanship. But they were not negligent...

AC/JP

Very nice post but please excuse the pedant in me as I attempt to poke a hole or to in the flawed logic in it. However it does not really address the extremely easy question I posed, excuse the repetition

"Lets try an easy one then, you have offered us two possibilities as to what the crew could see out of the flight deck windows, considering of course this is sheer speculation, completely lacking any proof technical or otherwise .

Which is right and which is wrong and why?"

Whilst you consider that could you also consider the couple of problems I have with your last post

The only option in prudent airmanship would have been to turn away when visibility was less than 1km......If no one knows what was seen from the flt deck windows at what point did the vis drop below 1Km?

From OC RAF Odihams unpublished comments you state
Moreover, there is general agreement, that the crew, in some unknown way, 'got it wrong'". How does " in some unknown way" satisfy the verdict in this case?

You also assert that "Crawford was careful not to go the whole distance in his formal comments but clearly he and colleagues were of the view that this was human failings."

which if you spin it about a bit could also read as

"Despite his and his colleagues view that this accident may well have been caused by human failings Crawford quite rightly kept his council as the investigation would only deal with factual evidence, not supposition"

Another simple question for you to ponder

If no one alive actually knows exactly what happened that day how does that satisfy the verdict conditons in this case?

spheroid

If you read the Comments of the Stn Cdr Odiham in the BOI you will note that he found that Flt Lt Tapper as Captain had a "Duty of Care " in respect of his Passengers and that Flt Lt Tapper had failed in that Duty. My copy of Chambers Dictionary defines "Negligence" as "omission of duty, especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."

SFFP

Troops were first deployed in support of the Civil Power in NI on 14 August 1969 - I know that because I was the person who received the message that the request had been made and passed it to Mr Callaghan; the then Home Secretary. My first task to Aldergrove was 30 Sep - 2 Oct 1969 to take the then CAS to see his Son, an Officer in the Life Guards, who had been severely wounded by a negligent discharge fom the rifle of one of his Troopers. My 329th (and final) task to Aldergrove was on 23 Feb 1995 - not once did we fail to get in flight meals and other rations delivered to the aircraft when requested.

In flight meals are supplied to augment or replace meals supplied on the ground. Not one piece of testimony to the BOI involved the crew eating meals prior to the departure (or requesting in flight meals) and they had another 4 or 5 hrs duty ahead of them - or more (depending on refuelling time at Kinloss, which in my experience could take 2 hrs or more).

PS If Flt Lt T had taken Breakfast then both Pilots could have gone to the Met Office together for Met Briefing.

PPS The Stn Cdr Odiham found negligence, AOC 1Gp found negligence, AOC in C found negligence, CAS reviewed the whole before publication and did not find any reason to disagree with the findings.

Caz,

I gave you a very simplistic explanation with regards to the SH version of in flight catering and asked you a very simple question

" In summary there was a shed load of food and it was available 24/7 and whilst there may be a suggestion that breakfast in the mess was missed is there a shred of conclusive evidence to say that the 4 crew members did not eat, at some stage during the day, in the crewroom?"

Do you think you have answered it?

JP

I like your reasoned posts and fail to see why Seldom seldom sees the point you are making. I always, what ever kit I had on board did a DR calculation and pressed the stopwatch on the dashboard. When my DR time was up, and it had a safety margin put in by me, I reacted. Coming into Norweigan fiords from the sea at night and in poor vis needed this bit of very basic airmanship that I was taught as a safety net very early on in my career. I do hope that modern day pilots are not so engrossed in amazing kit that they forget the basics. It can kill you. DB

SFFP

Sorry, but it is up to you to prove that they did.

Flt Lt Tapper did not have breakfast in the Mess and went to the Met Office alone. If he and Flt Lt Cook had breakfasted together then they could both have gone to Met Brief - in accordance with standard procedure.

If I had been programmed to carry out a Standardisation, Categorisation or Instrument Rating Test with a crew where only one of the Pilots went to Met prior to a 6+ hour sortie for which no in-flight meals were ordered then there would have been only one outcome and that would have been followed (I would expect) by a one sided interview for that flightdeck crew with someone with 3 or 4 rings on their sleeve.

Incidentally, has anyone asked Lt K exactly what the turning point was - the Lighthouse or the Helicopter Landing Site?

cazatou, forgive me, I'm a bit puzzled. I bow to your status as a VIP trapper, but are you suggesting that the lack of evidence of dietary intake on Flt Lt Tapper's part that day is evidence of gross negligence?

airsound

airsound

It was a requirement for aircrew to partake of breakfast before flying - though I can't, 15 years later, be specific as to whether that requirement was in STCASI's or 1 Gp ASO's.

I do recall that some 2 -3 weeks after the crash that breakfast arrangements at Northolt for those crews departing on tasks between 08 -0930 hrs were completely revised and a cooked breakfast was provided by in-flight catering after the crew had completed pre-flight planning.

That would have been just after the BOI had presented their initial findings to the AOC.

I would consider that ignoring Orders or Instructions that you sign as having read and understood each month would be deemed to be negligence - as does my copy of Chambers Dictionary.

Breakfast
 

cazatou

Many years ago, there was a Flight Safety poster bearing the words "Very few people are eaten by alligators: most are nibbled to death by ducks". In other words, very few aircraft accidents have one single, catastrophic failure as the direct cause. Most are the end result of an accumulation of minor (sometimes trivial) events which ultimately end in a fatal accident. Makes no difference whether that result is a heap of smoking wreckage on a cloud-covered Mull, or the remains of a Nimrod strewn across the Afghan bundu.

Whether we are discussing waypoint changes, possible intended landings outside the tasked flight or the crew's eating patterns, these all fall into the "nibbled to death by ducks" category. Why? Because there is simply no evidence that any of these is or was responsible for the catastrophe.

Ergo, we simply cannot allow the intolerable verdict of gross negligence to stand. Solid evidence, not speculation, is required to support that finding. As the evidence does not appear to exist, the finding must be overturned.

That is the sole purpose of this thread, so will you and the others please stop floating red herrings across the stream.

Chinook
 

bastOn. Thankyou. As I seem to recall having said before, as far as those who continue to insist that the crew did nothing wrong, their arguments produce more smoke than Krakatoa, offer more mirrors than the Great Hall of Versialles, and fish up more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler. Do come off it, some of you. The crew breached the basic rules of airmanship when faced by IMC weather over high ground. With all good wishes as always. JP

Caz,

The great thing about real time experience is it gives one the ability to give a slightly more accurate and more representative spin on things. I acknowledge your 329 missions into Belfast Aldergrove but ask you to consider the following.

From Jan 92 to the end of 94 I was on 230 Sqn at Aldergrove. I worked a 21 day on and 7 day off shift pattern, factor in leave and I reckon I was available for flying duties for about 7 months or so each year so imagine how many approaches and departures to Aldergrove, Bessbrook, Dunganon etc etc do you reckon I would have been on board for in that time?

The above is not any sort of willy waving exercise it simply to show that I like so many others flew quite a bit in that theatre of Op's and I cannot recall one occasion in all that time where I got airborne with in flight rations on board, the odd choc bar or bag of crisps but in flight rations no, as at that time SH didn't work that way.

We also didn't need to take in flight as everywhere we went there was normally food of some sorts available and as previously described the was enough food to stock a small supermarket in the 230 Sqn crewroom.

For the last 11 years I have been a Herc ALM and know full well that not providing in flight for MCT is a hanging crime let alone not providing food for the 5000 on a route but SH was different so please, just this one time, be told.

JP/AC

If you get a moment could you cast your eyes over post #4055 and #4058 and let me have your thoughts.

Chinook
 

Seldom. I have tracked back, and you offer absolutely nothing new to the discussion. JP.