Cazatou,
1. I am not a conspiracy theorist. I accept that the crash may have been caused by:
a. Negligence.
b. Error of judgment.
c. Technical failure.
d. A combination of all three or something completely different.
What I know is that from the time of the last radio call until the point of impact all reconstruction of events are works of pure fiction. No reconstruction using Supertans can be relied on because unlike an ADR the equipment was never authorised to do the job.

2. If you read my earlier posts, I have always accepted that Sir John Day
(unlike Wratten and probably Craig) has some right to talk as an helicopter expert. However, if by using his past operational experience to equate his (then current) level of expertise on Chinook operations to that of Sqn Ldr Burke you are as stated by a previous entry, "having a larf."

3. I have never stated that Sir John has done anything improper, but face the facts.The decision to reverse the negligence verdict on the pilots would reflect badly on the RAF chain of command, including Wratten and Day. Allowing them to dictate the outcome of the BOI is no different than allowing an accused to sit on the jury.

4. Before you protest, I accept that not all accused are guilty. But airwothiness questions are valid and need answering in front of a truly independent and impartial judge.

I too try to share dalek's open-minded approach. I see no compelling evidence as to absolutely prove why the aircraft hit the hill. Indeed, I would go as far to say that there is a reasonable probability that the crew got it wrong. However, I do not understand how this probability can be extended to an "no doubt whatsoever".

Indeed, indeed Dalek and Cows,

You are correct but I fear that you will get no acknowlement of that and the possibility that Day and Wratten got it wrong - from either of them (or even Caz). Somehow, admitting to error is not in their make-up - it is as if they feel they would be lesser men for doing so.
Strangely, it would be the opposite; I would have much increased respect for them if they did 'see the light' and accept there is a trace of doubt.

"There is no greater joy in heaven than when a sinner repenteth" and all that.

I find that somewhat ironic since one of the things that my instructors kept hammering into us early on was that flying was about honesty and being able to accept/own up to your mistakes and learn from them before they become dangerous. The mindset they were trying to foster was that mistakes are not something to be ashamed of but to be learned from. Shame these men didn't seem to learn that.

dalek et al

You do seem rather uninformed in respect of the Staff structure in a Group Headquarters. At HQ 1 Gp there was a Group Captain SH, a Wg Cdr SH and a Sqn Ldr for each major Type of Helicopter in Squadron Service in the Group. Having been staffed by the SH specialists the BOI passed through SASO to the AOC. A similar structure was in use at HQSTC which reviewed the findings prior to release, finishing up with the comments of the AOCinC. In this particular case, CAS and his Air Staff also reviewed the BOI prior to release.

No changes were made to the findings.

PS Just to remind you:

BOI para 16e

"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

BOI para 32c

"in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."

dalek is spot on.

All descriptions of the minutes leading up to the first impact of ZD576 with the Mull of Kintyre are based on models of what may have happened. Not records of what did!

The BOI's version of events is a hypothesis, not a fact.

The president of the BOI accepted this. He said so at the Fatal Accident Inquiry, and that is precisely why he was unable to make a finding of negligence.

Of course others seemed more keen to overlook the limitations of the 'modelling'.

Cazatou,
Are you honestly saying that everything said by Sqn Ldr Burke is total b@@@@@ks. Remember, one of your infallible staff officers at HQSTC must at least of condoned his presence at the initial crash investigation.
If there is a scintilla of truth in any of his "theories", then doubt is cast on the verdict. If you are questioning his integrity, shame on you.
I find it incredible that a man of his experience, was not called before the BOI.
And yes I do have a theory on this one, conspiracy or otherwise.
A barrister once told me that the cardinal rule of cross examination was never to ask a question,to which you did not know, or would not like the answer.
Your Staff Officers, no doubt under pressure from on high, were well aware of Sqn Ldr Burke's opinion and chose to obey the cardinal rule.
Since you have not answered one of my questions I will do so for you.
Whenever Burke has given evidence, the body listening has found in his favour and removed the slur on the pilots. Both Wratten and Days evidence to the HOL, was found unconvincing. The defence rests.

Caz,

Why don't you answer the questions I asked you yesterday?

1. How does the ability to land a piston helicopter in a jungle clearing qualify you to make judgements on connector performance?

2. Would you fly in an aeroplane which required a vital connector check every 15 minutes?

The first question may seem like a frivolous attempt to score points. But there is a serious issue here which everyone who flies should be aware of.

There is a human tendency for humans to think that things they do not understand are not important. The more qualified people become, the stronger is this tendency when they consider technologies outside their knowledge. After all, we all use connectors, especially in this IT age, and I suspect that most of us have fiddled with them to get them to work. So what's the problem? Well, not much if all you're going to lose is the odd document or your sound. Fiddling with a live connector in an aircraft control system, which is not designed to make and break under load could mean that you lose your life.

Now, please answer the questions for once.

Is this the same structure that reviewed the Tornado accident several months later where the Reviewing Officers (AOC) commented, “The possibility of either a control restriction or medical incapacitation could not be ruled out.” and “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [the pilot] should be absolved from blame.”

The AoCinC stated, “… I find the hypothetical reconstruction offered by the Board of limited usefulness.” and I consider it futile to indulge in hypothesis.”

The Tornado had ADR and CVR, yet control restrictions and medical incapacitations cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, it is deemed futile to indulge in hypothesis. Yet, in the Chinook – with no ADR or CVR, control restrictions and incapacitation can be absolutely ruled out. Plus, there is a "Degree of speculation" as to what happened to the Chinook. What the “Regardless of the circumstances” comment in respect of the Tornado means exactly, I would dearly like to know.

Some structure, Caz. Hardly a standardised approach to reporting now, is it? Especially when both BoIs were concluded within a fortnight of each other.

Perhaps, as mentioned previously, the loss of passengers left the MoD with little choice but to find the pilots guilty. In a letter to me, Adam Ingram stated, “It may, for instance, be considered that the flight crew of the Chinook owed a ‘duty of care’ to the passengers for whom they were responsible. The crew of the Tornado, with a joint responsibility for the operation of the aircraft, shared a duty of care to each other. Clearly, the burden in the former case, and the need to exercise that care, is greater, leading, perhaps to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred.”

The MoD were embarrassed. At the time of the accident, there were only ten Chinook airframes available for worldwide operations (and the MoD are unable to say how many of those ten were serviceable). Quite simply, due to the mid-life update schedule, the MoD had no option but to introduce into service an aircraft that was not fit for purpose – hence the ridiculous Interim Release to Service. The problems were known, yet the Chinook HC2 was still pushed to the front line.

The accident happened, the MoD were caught out in a very big way. Can’t admit problems with the fleet, because questions would be asked as to why the N.I. team were allowed to fly in a shed. Probably not an easy option, but certainly the line of least resistance – blame those unable to defend themselves. Hope the whole thing goes away. That was their second mistake.

Time and again, the Campaign has stated that Jon and Rick may well have got it wrong, but the rules in place at the time mean that there has to be absolutely no doubt whatsoever before such an allegation can be allowed to stain the reputation of a deceased pilot. The MoD’s case fails on so many levels. The Reviewing Officers could have said a long time ago, that they based their opinions on information known at the time of their decision. Since that time, so much more has been learnt about the state of the Chinook fleet. They could have walked away from this whole situation and still retained their credibility, by stating as such, yet they do not. One has to wonder why?

It is also very interesting that the MoD have still to provide me with the Chinook accident briefing notes, and correspondence to, and from, Mr Hutton since taking post. Come along now chaps, remember that the FoIA states that I should have received a reply within 20 working days.

Fifteen years ago tomorrow since this terrible accident. I am just as passionate today, as I was all those years ago, in restoring the reputations of two fine men, I had the privilege of calling friends.

My best, as always.
Brian

“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook

Brian, as one who came to this thread only in the last couple of years may I simply say that your tenacity and drive to reverse this stain on the reputations of Jon and Rick, who I never had the privilege of knowing, means that you are a friend indeed to their memory. This thread may well drift into jargon and technicalities, inevitably, but it is fundamentally about those age old issues of what is right and what is wrong. What Messrs Wratten and Day did was wrong, no matter how illustrious their status and ranks. What those who have done in perpetuating that wrong over 15 years is doubly wrong for they have the advantages of reflection and hindsight. This is a blemish on the good name of the Royal Air Force and will remain so until it is disowned and reversed. The MOD of course has no good name.
Let Right Be Done.

Quite right!

15 years ago to this day, Boscombe Down were getting ready to ground the aircraft. However, people like Day and Wratten had other ideas, possibly for some good operational reasons - like having to resupply troops under fire in NI? But then they allowed a passenger transit flight to go ahead in an aircaraft they knew to be unairworthy and over which the crew had expressed disquiet. That was an abuse of rank on behalf of the AOC and above. Unfortunately, the same people were the senior Reviewing Officers and they hid behind the 'smoke and mirrors' of their own words on the BOI report, rather than take responsibility for the inaction.
I think the world can see them now as cowards - shame on them!

Dalek wrote: <<What I know is that from the time of the last radio call until the point of impact all reconstruction of events are works of pure fiction. No reconstruction using Supertans can be relied on because unlike an ADR the equipment was never authorised to do the job. >> (My emphasis.)
What a ridiculous attitude – if something can add to the available data then it should be used – especially when it fits reasonably enough with the dist/time calcs and was reasonably consistent with the impact point.
A “work of fiction” in this regard would be the track put forward at one of the inquiries that I posted along with my version of the track some time ago – you know, where they moved the position of waypoint change so as to infer that they went straight in.
Using the higher figures of the range of wind speed according to met, you have the simple state of them flying at 135 kts TAS for the most of the flight until the position where they changed the waypoint, having held 027 mag up to that point;
they then turned 8deg to 035 (the track to the impact area) and slowed down (in TAS), which was found set as the selected course on the HP's Horizontal Situation Indicator (his main steering aid, if you like) and which just happened to be the best line for landing at that LZ I keep on about, where Chinooks had landed before, where Flt Lt Tapper had landed before, and for which the HP's baro at was set for QFE at that elevation, and a RADALT alarm was set for imminent landing;
not to mention the call sign being appropriate for an exercise;
they appear to have been surprised by their proximity to the rising ground in the last few seconds.
It seems perfectly reasonable from all of the above that they were prepared for a landing there but thought they were further out – why? That is the big question.
.
Now about the team on board as opposed to the crew who were looking after them: as individuals, for their particular jobs they were of the highest calibre and further sacrificed a normal lifestyle and security in service of their people – individuals that, because of their dedication to one type of society, would probably not have ascended to such positions of responsibility and effective authority in today's multicultural/ globalist/ internationalist/ secular humanist mess; further, the chances of them being allowed to group together let alone being put together in modern times would be highly unlikely in light of the type of ministers and policy makers who hold the reins of power in what is supposed to be Britain (eg under Thatcher, 2/3 cabinet ministers were not even notionally Christian). So it was an irreplaceable loss to a significant chunk of the UK who did not want to dissolve their community values nor surrender their traditional self reliance.
The team as a whole were planning to hit the IRA harder and did not want to make concessions at that point in time which was in direct conflict with the intent of the leaders in London who wanted to wash their hands of NI by restructuring it along the lines of the rest of the UK.
Bliar complimented Bertie (on his recent retirement) with having accomplished this in the South – genuine Irish nationalists have lost just as much as a result of the consequences this peace process as the people of Ulster in terms of the destruction of their culture – ironically, despite centuries of bloody hostility they have a lot more in common with each other than the recent immigrants and of course the old fear of the Protestants in the north, that they would become outnumbered by the Catholics in time, no longer applies as the birthrate in Ireland is now the lowest in the world – perhaps the remnants of nationalists of both sides should contemplate their own cooperation to save the Island as a whole.
Had the team got to Ft George and enabled the strategies they had been planning it would have stalled the peace process and delayed this “modernisation” for years.
After the lies regarding Iraq, is it beyond contemplation that a convenient accident could have been arranged for NI?
Do we not owe it to them to leave no stone unturned in exposing any possibility of foul play? - however unlikely? Hiding what many of you may think could have just been an embarrassing stuff up in a simple exercise would block this.

SuperTANS
 

Walter

Regarding the post-crash SuperTANS “testing”, the important point is that MoD continue to claim this as evidence that the entire nav system was both serviceable and accurate. This is patently ridiculous, but symptomatic of a Department which widely regarded (and still does) system integration and demonstration of INSTALLED performance a waste of money.

In short, the Racal testing was not carried out in a representative environment, especially with regard to EMC/EMI. It is (barely) useful background information, but simply cannot be used to verify or even hypothesise what happened during the flight. Contrary to what the Chinook 2 Star and CDP thought (and placed in writing) it is rather important to progressively test systems (LRUs on bench > sub-system in rigs > system installed in aircraft etc). It is NOT acceptable to say “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”, yet this is very clearly the philosophy used during Mk1 > Mk2 conversion.


Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. Yes, the system was reasonably accurate, as it got them to the vicinity of the Mull. But in the back of their minds (I imagine) was the fact that their documentation told them that the GPS didn’t have Initial Operating Capability declared yet in the US and could not be relied upon. That error codes in the TANS were now to be regarded as “meaningless”. Little gems like that, with no indication of when INSTALLED performance will actually be measured, so that meaningful limitations can be advised.

It's fifteen years ago today that the crash happened. Perhaps, just for today, those of you who are blaming the pilots might take some time to think of them and their families.

It's great to think that after all this time there is so much to say about the crash and I applaud all those who have taken so much time to keep it in the spotlight and work to clear the pilots names. :D

Not just the pilots, Pen (as you know). Everyone is just as important. Hope you are well.

In memoriam
ACC J C B Fitzsimons

Maj C Dockerty

Maj G P Sparks

Maj R Allen

Maj R Pugh

Flt Lt J P Tapper

Flt Lt R D Cook

MALM G W Forbes

Sgt K A Hardie

Mr J Deverell

Mr M Maltby

Mr J Haynes

Mr M Dalton

Ms A James

Mr S Rickard

DC Supt M M Neilly

D Supt W R Gwilliam

DC Supt D P Conroy

D Insp S Davidson

D Supt R Foster

D Supt I Phoenix

D Insp K Magee

D Supt P G Davidson

DC Insp D Bunting

Col C J Biles

Lt Col G V A Williams

Lt Col J W Tobias

Lt Col R L Gregory-Smith

Maj A R Hornby

RIP

Olive Oil,
please check your PMs.

Brian

No cheap trick intended, after all there would be no thread at all if there were not opposing points of view.

Tec
<<Of far greater import is the human factors effect on the pilots. They had no confidence whatsoever in the SuperTANS. >>
I have been making this point for years – Flt Lt Tapper (acknowledged as very knowledgeable on nav systems) had warned colleagues of its potential inaccuracies – he would certainly not have relied upon it for keeping clear of a fuzzy obstacle like the Mull was that day as close in as the position of waypoint change – further, if he had another reference in which he had more confidence but which contradicted the SuperTANS by anything up to a mile, he would probably have dismissed the conflict as just the error in the SuperTANS, especially after a sea crossing which would have been expected to have made the Doppler side of the system erratic to an extent. He would most certainly not have relied upon it for the closing range in, say, a fast approach to that LZ and so it would not be surprising if he had dumped waypoint A when he considered it of no further use.
That said, who is talking about “testing” of the SuperTANS post crash? I am not drawing upon any conclusions by the MOD about its serviceability and accuracy for the whole flight – just the values stored in it, and their correspondance to the position of the crash site and velocity data (as did Mr Mitchel of Boeing in his “Analysis of Available Data”) - these suggest that the system was reasonably accurate at the time of impact and working back to the time of the waypoint change (not that long) dist/time calcs agree with the position the SuperTANS thought it was at at that time (from the range and bearing to the waypoint stored then). The crew may well have had no confidence in it but the SuperTANS retrospectively had been reasonably accurate in the critical area – which helps analysis greatly as we have a “stake in the ground” that is the position where the waypoint was changed from “A” in the SuperTANS.
A general observation I would like to make regarding not only debate on this forum but from what has transpired at the inquiries is that there appears to be a desire by many to avoid accepting the determination of any parameters that help analysis – a single fundamental example which I will use to illustrate this is the speed of the a/c:
SPEED
There has been so much emphasis on the speed being too high over the duration of the flight and particularly in the vicinity of the Mull – the impression one would get is that they were pushing the a/c beyond the recommended cruise speed (uncomfortable and not so good for the a/c) because they were in a hurry, and possibly disregarding VFR by exceeding 140 kts air speed in unsuitable conditions. Cowboys? But what are the assumptions about their speed based upon?
Let's look at Boeing's Analysis:
Their man refers to forecast wind speeds of 12-18kts at the surface and 25kt at an altitude of 2000ft and argues that “... the aircraft was likely flying at a low altitude of between 400-500ft. Consequently, the surface winds are considered to be more applicable to a calculation of average airspeed.” and so uses 15 kts as the average wind speed to get a mean airspeed of 148.8kt for the bulk of the flight up to the position of waypoint change.
Clearly, as he says, “... somewhat higher than the generally accepted operating parameters for the aircraft, where a cruise airspeed of approximately 135kts is normally used as being optimum for both aircraft range and pilot comfort.” And also, of course, above 140kts which puts more constraints on the VFR applicable to them.
But was he right to use a surface wind speed of only 15kts? If you apply some met science and use the two forecast speeds (at the surface and at 2000ft), calculations using the wind profile power law for the a/c at 500 ft give a wind speed of about 22 kts.
So reducing by 7 kts their average, we get more like 142 kts as a mean.
Further, if we consider that the forecast at the Mull was 20 kt gusting to 30 kt but the calculated wind speed from the aircraft steering calculations was 30 kts then perhaps we can understand that the actual winds that day could have been a few knots more than forecast, at least at the high end of the forecast range – after all, forecasts are not all that precise.
Perhaps you are now beginning to see a different perspective here: the MOD (and Boeing's analyst) used forecast wind speeds which implied a higher speed than was sensible – I am saying that, calculated properly for 500 ft altitude, their air speed was significantly less such that, had the wind been only a few knots more than forecast, they would have been cruising along at about the recommended 135kts air speed.
Does it not make sense that, with passengers on board and it being a nice new a/c that one would have thought they did not want to shake to bits, that they would not have exceeded the normal cruising speed? And would they not have had consideration of the 140kts barrier with respect to helo VFR?
If you really want to give these pilots the benefit of the doubt then this is one specific point that you should start with – they may not have been “speeding” at all.

Cazatou

You have quoted the following from the BoI:

This may sound pedantic but it's important to note that no distances are used within the quote. With relation to helicopter flying (ie relatively slow and able to hover taxi if necessary) "in the vicinity of" could be, say, 100 yds.

Given the evidence of Mr Holbrook (the only witness to have given evidence as to the weather a mile or two offshore), it seems entirely feasible to me that ZD576 was likely to have been legally being flown under VFR, at least until it failed to carry out the left turn to Corran that Supertans indicates was selected. True, when the aircraft failed to turn (for whatever reason) it entered IMC and subsequently struck a cloud-shrouded hill, but that does not, in itself, indicate negligence of the crew "beyond any doubt whatsoever", "beyond reasonable doubt", or even "on the balance of probablity". I agree that they may have been negligent but no-one can ever know. Someone was, however, negligent to ignore the warnings from Boscombe Down and press the HC2 into service on, I understand, a Service Deviation. I have my own suspicion but is anyone in Ppruneland in a position to name the signatory of that Service Deviation?

Meadowbank,
I wouldn't waste anymore time on this particular subject if I were you.
The vast majority of the rest of the world accept:
1. Fog at the lighthouse has little relevance to the actual conditions at the turning point over sea.
2. A forecast of conditions made some 6 to 8 hours before the aircraft arrived at the Mull cannot confirm whether the actual conditions were VFR or IFR.
3. The evidence of Mr Holbrook, (flawed or not), suggests VFR.

Cazatou has already stated he will not accept these facts / hypothesis / opinions, call them what you like.

dalek

Since 1941 there have been 20 recorded military air accidents in the vicinity of the Mull; the first being an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley of 502 Sqn in 1941. These have resulted in more than 120 fatalities.

A very experienced Maritime Captain and Instructor, Sqn Ldr D Kinch, who lost a Brother in Law in the Neptune crash on the Mull on 10th October 1956, wrote the following letter to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-

" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."

The Chinook pilots had an advantage over the other unfortunates who crashed on the Mull; they could have slowed to walking pace until clear of the fog.

They did not do that.

walt has a valid point and, what's more, he could well be right - it is liklely that the ac was not 'at high speed' but was at the planned cruise speed of 135KIAS (I believe that the definintion for helos in the UKMLFSHB was IAS.)

Secondly, Chug is correct also - the weather on land AT the Mull was pants but offshore, it was most probably VFR.

Thirdly, the concept of a climb to the SAlt for just 'around the Mull' (Approx 2400') and then levelling off before either carrying on and diverting is flawed logic - if the intent was to avoid the icing level at above approx 2500ft. The crew wouldn't have known how high the cloud-tops were and couldn't assume they'd get VMC on top; they would have had to assume continuous IMC (been there done that!)

This is because the crew would have had to climb much higher than 2400' - to either approx 6000' if carrying on Corran (Min Safe quadrantal FL of 70 in ISA conditions) or approx 4000' (min safe quadrantal of 5000' (TL was 5000' - so maybe even higher) if diverting to GLA/PIK. Either way, staying at 2500'ish was not a sensible option unless they took a long sea route- even then they would have been right on the edge of the predicted icing level - not good airmanship. Furthermore, the strength of the crew's continuation bias would have been high considering the importance of their passengers.

Ultimately, an IMC climb was an option that was greatly compromised by the limitations of the RTS and the crew knew this - they had been forced into a corner by the organisational decisions and failings.

Cazatou,

I continue to wonder at your absolute belief in the bits you want to believe in, whilst rubbishing those you don't, and the apparent infallibility of senior officers in your eyes.

You quote from the BOI:As meadowbank points out the word 'vicinity' is vague. Holbrooke could see both the helicopter and the lighthouse, so they were in VMC and most likely in sight of the lighthouse.

Probably correct, but as flipster points out, something the crew would not have considered, when a left turn along the coast would have been a far better option. Why they didn't turn, we simply don't know.

I can't remember the settings, but if flying VFR in VMC quite irrelevant.

Totally at variance with Holbrooke's evidence. It is also very unlikely that they would have changed waypoints until seeing the first.

A crew flying a serviceable aircraft might enjoy such a luxury. We have no idea why Cooke and Tapper did not.

And You do not know why they did not with no doubt whatsoever. Do You?

Caz,

A serious question Sir, can you give us an idea as to how many of the subsequent BOI's of those 20 recorded accidents arrived at the same conclusion as Messer's Wratten and Day?

Cazatou.
1. Did Not. Gross Negligence.
2. Could Not. Technical Malfunction.
3. Should have but didn,t. Due to??????
Turbulence, bird or aircraft avoidance, icing, visual illusion, wasps in cockpit, emergency, (either real or percieved), sudden illness etc etc, in other words distracted by something serious or minor.
Negligence with mitigating circumstances or error of judgement. It would depend on knowing all the circumstances, which we don't.

I always though the MOD cased failed the required level of proof before I had heard the name Sqn Ldr Burke.
It has been pointed out by a previous entry that the majority of his evidence was based on fact and not expert opinion.
Do you:
1. Contend all his evidence, both fact and opinion, was wrong?
2. Accept that his evidence to the Scottish Inquiry and the HOL were major factors in their rejection of the MOD position?

All these questions for cazatou.

I wonder if it would help if we built up a list of questions which he has ignored. Each person who has a question ignored could then add to the list to update it.

dalek, pulse et al

As few answer the questions that I have posed there is little incentive to answer the fallacious barbs and innuendo that flow from your posts.

You answer a very basic question that has been studiously ignored from the very start of the original thread until now.

If, as described on this thread, Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took over the task that evening from Lt K RN and Flt Lt T because of the actual and forecast weather around the Mull; how was it that the BOI felt able to state quite categorically (based on the evidence it had received on oath from Detatchment Personnel) that Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a day on/day off basis?

I was not present that evening; but many on this thread have claimed that they were. So, which "evidence" is correct?

Cazatou,
I wasn't present that evening so I don't know.
It is many years since I have read the BOI. I cannot remember any serious concerns on crew composition, so why does it matter who the two pilots were?
Answer my final two questions please.

Caz,

Not expecting a response to post #4633 because of the nature of the question but if you do get a moment to put together a response I would appreciate it.

Caz,

I know that questions to you are getting quite frenetic but I really would be grateful if you could justify your accusation of "fallacious barb"?

Were you referring to everyone or just dalek and myself? Please use an example if you care to.

Caz
 

much as it hurts me to say, "you do have a point" when you say that they should have slowed down etc etc and amongst all the comments I have to agree that we don't know; but say the crew were misled by the visual cues into thinking that they had greater visibility than they actually had, previous incidents and accidents testify to the deceptive nature of the local weather. How is that different to someone who flies into a mountain in broad daylight and good vis when that can be put down to "unexplained" "error of judgement" etc etc. ?

rgds
DL

dalek

In answer to your query:


CREW DUTY LIMITATIONS :ugh:

From the BoI:

Crew Duty Time Considerations
The Chinook task for 2 Jun 94 was planned by HQNI to require 9 hours and 30 minutes total flying time, comprising 6 hours and 30 minutes for the in-Province task, and 3 hours for the sortie to Inverness and back. Flt Lt TAPPER considered that the in-Province tasking would take less time than HQNI had allocated and, to maintain crew rostering, decided that his crew would complete the entire day's programme.

Prior to his first take-off on 2 Jun, Flt Lt TAPPER obtained the 230 Sqn Duty Flt Cdr's permission to extend his normal NI limit of 7 hours flying per crew duty period to 8 hours. A further extension to 10 hours, the normal SH Force maximum, would have been unusual for NI operations, and would have required the personal authority of SRAFONI.

When the Board reviewed the in-theatre task details, it found that the time which could be saved was in the order of 60 minutes. However, this would still have been insufficient to allow all of the days tasking to have been completed within 8 hours. In the event, the morning's tasking took 5 hours 40 minutes. On the flight authorisation sheet, Flt Lt TAPPER anticipated that the approximate duration of the flight to Inverness and return to Aldergrove would be 4 hours. He did not obtain SRAFONI's authority to exceed his 8 hour limit. This would have meant that on arrival at Inverness, Flt Lt TAPPER would correctly have either required SRAFONI's authority to return to RAF Aldergrove, or HQNI clearance to remain outside NI overnight.

The evidence relevant to Flt Lt TAPPER's intentions on arrival at Inverness is contradictory.

Flt Lt TAPPER had briefed the 230 Sqn Duty Flight Commander during the morning of 2 Jun that if he reached his crew duty limits he intended staying at Inverness. However, no accommodation bookings were made, and all the flight planning preparations, including weather information, low flying bookings and the authorisation sheets indicated a return flight to Aldergrove. Furthermore, Flt Lt TAPPER did not take the F700 with him and, although the crewmen had taken overnight kit, they were expecting to return to Aldergrove that evening.

After considering the balance of information, the Board considered it most likely that at the time of the accident, Flt Lt TAPPER was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening. The Board concluded that at the time of the accident crew duty time limitations had not been exceeded and that fatigue was unlikely to have played a part in the accident. The Board also concluded that, if Flt Lt TAPPER was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening, he may have felt pressure to complete the sortie as quickly as possible, and that this may have been a contributory factor in the accident.

So, in a nutshell - Flt Lt Tapper was aware of crew duty limitations. There is factual evidence stating that if the limitations were exceeded, then the crew would overnight in Inverness. The Board considered it "most likely" a return to Aldergrove was planned, which is not absolutely no doubt whatsoever. The Board also stated that at the time of the accident, crew duty limitations had not been exceeded.

So, there is proof that Flt Lt Tapper was aware of the duty limitations and that remedial action would be taken if those limitations were exceeded. To suggest that they were going to run over, or that they were tired is pure speculation designed to support an assumed, unsupported theory.

Next!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

pulse 1

Perhaps you misunderstood my post 4592; operating at not above 100ft whilst carrying VIP Pax was due to known potential threats.

There was no requirement for that Chinook flight to be carried out on that route at low level. The BoI determined that the Chinook could have overflown the Mull at Minimum Safe Flight Level within the Icing Limitations in force at that time. I know the qualifications and experience of those who made that determination: I have no knowledge of your qualifications or experience.

You have not addressed the matter of Crew Composition for the known tasks of the Detatchment that day. Which is correct: the version given to the BOI or the version aired on PPrune? The 2 versions are not compatible; please share with us your views.

You are basing your viewpoint on the various statements made on this thread by unknown persons, who may or may not have any knowledge of aviation. Or were you actually there that day? Nothing you have said leads one to that conclusion - but if you were, then you can answer the queries above!!

One would have thought that the planning for this flight would have been established clearly - obviously every aspect would have been worthy of checking. Surely someone left on the ground would have been party to the decision making process and so questions like those being put by Cazatou should be able to be answered with confidence.
But as with other fundamentals of this flight, there is doubt.
Forget your personal sniping for a moment and try and answer Cazatou's fundamentally important question regarding who was supposed to fly the sortie, and why, etc. - it is stuff we all need to know.
Now to throw something else into this planning business – many years ago on this thread someone claimed that it was planned to use a Chinook several weeks earlier – I wonder if that person would kindly come forward with what he knows?


Cazatou
As I have pointed out before, according to what I heard at the FAI the crew would have been within their duty hours that day on the outward part – as the duty hours limitation was just for flights in the operational area, they would have got around their limitation by doing a touch and go anywhere on the Mull, the subsequent “take off” and leg to Inverness being outside the op area they would have saved that amount of time from their limitation leaving enough for the return flight later.
By the way, you say there was no requirement to do this flight low level but, with a general cloud base of about 1500ft and pleasant scenery at LL, wouldn't it have been the obvious way? Didn't some RAF witness say at one of the inquiries that this was a training flight as were most of such flights?


Arkroyal
<<Quote:
Para 45b
"The Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
I can't remember the settings, but if flying VFR in VMC quite irrelevant. >>
The point was that neither warning setting was of any use to them if, as they did, they for whatever reason crossed the shoreline as the upper setting was too high and the lower setting (69ft?) would not have given them sufficient warning. The above statement (para 45b) was relevant in the case that the crew had been distracted by something in the cockpit as the alarm may have helped – not that I subscibe to the distraction theory at all but it is why you have RADALT alarms and so they should have been set appropriately. As I have pointed out many times, the minimal setting was appropriate for an imminent landing in marginal conditions, the uselessly high other setting would have been just to prevent confusion by getting it out of the way effectively – and don't forget that the HP's baro alt subscale setting was right for a QFE at the elevation of the LZ that they crashed so close to.

Caz,
Whilst we are on about contradictory statements, could you please tell me which is correct:

BoI Para 39. Spatial Disorientation
The Board considered that the weather conditions prevailing over the Mull of Kintyre and its offshore approaches at the time of the accident were conducive to spatial disorientation. The cloud base was ill-defined and broken, and the visibility beneath was very poor.

In the opinion of the Board, the lack of surface texture over the sea and the absence of an external horizon would make accurate visual flying difficult, and may have produced a ‘goldfish bowl’ effect. The pilots would therefore have had to combine external and instrument references to maintain their spatial awareness, with an increasing reliance on the instruments as the conditions deteriorated. Furthermore, any ‘goldfish bowl’ effect would have made it difficult for the pilots to accurately assess their in-flight visibility.
Nevertheless, both pilots were experienced in instrument flying, were rated and were current. There is no evidence to doubt the correct functioning of the AFCSs or any of the flight instruments. The crash parameters provided no indication to support or refute the possibility of spatial disorientation.
Nevertheless, it is possible that one or both of the pilots was suffering from spatial disorientation to an extent sufficient to reduce his capacity to deal with other demands of airmanship at a critical moment.

The Board concluded, therefore, that spatial disorientation may have been a contributory factor in the accident.

Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee:
ACM Sir John Day. 27 Sep 01. Para 284.

“I tried very hard indeed to find various explanations. For example, I remember saying to Wing Commander, as he was then, Pulford, Group Captain Pulford now, and his team when they briefed me, "Surely the crew could have started to climb, lost control of the aircraft in cloud as a result of spatial disorientation or just bad instrument flying, and then crashed from that?" But the answer was, "No."

So, to coin a phrase, the 2 versions are not compatible; please share with us your views.

My best,
Brian

“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook

As with other aspects of this case, especially those concerning airworthiness and fitness for purpose, MoD don’t want to dig too deeply.

What you are talking about is the settings on the RadAlt Indicators; and indeed it would seem from the evidence that the settings may be have been different from what one would expect. I leave that argument to those who know.

But elsewhere the evidence shows that the “black box”, which I doubt few here would recognise if they saw it, and certainly not the guts of it, was carrying certain “defects” (MoD’s word). Most notably the AGC (Automatic Gain Control) was wrongly set, resulting in incorrect information to the indicators from the range computer.

This has been dismissed by MoD as of no consequence.

Why? It may have been of no consequence to ZD576 (again, other people can comment) but the fact that such a crucial setting in the Tx/Rx was wrongly set in the first place demands investigation, rather than simply dismissing it. I think it is of consequence, if it fosters a lack of confidence in the kit – as with SuperTANS.

Again, the complete failure of MoD to dig deeper to get to the root of problems, thus helping prevent reoccurrence.

Dig deeper (i.e. conduct a proper investigation in accordance with the regs) and perhaps you’d find previous examples of spurious indications, or just plain wrong indications. Perhaps you’d find a lack of configuration control which allowed incorrect range computers to be fitted to this RadAlt, and its sister AN/APN 171. Perhaps you’d find that the 3rd Line maintainers were only given the 2nd Line Test equipment to conduct Depth C/D repairs. Perhaps you’d find a history of not bothering to conduct power interrupt testing because (a) the APs had no procedure and (b) no test equipment was provided anyway.

Oops, power interrupt. Back to the DECU problems.



Absolutely correct. Airworthiness regs are not optional, despite what the Chinook 2* and CDP said.

Cazatou,
Time and time again in my Air Force career I have started a multi stage task knowing it could not be completed within a normal crew duty day. So have you, and most others on this thread no doubt.
The only point of importance here, is that at the time of impact and at his planned landing time at Inverness, he would have been within his crew duty limits.
Once at Inverness, whether he planned to break crew duty, ask for an extension or a night stop, are matters of pure conjecture. Therefore they have no relevance to the crash

Cazatou,
Same question. I will keep it to one this time:
1. Do you still contend that all of the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke to the HOL, both factual and "expert opinion" was wrong.

Brian

It looks to me as though Sir John was recalling a verbal debrief by the BOI and the President. He then decided, as the point had been raised, to insert that statement into the findings to make matters clear.