Sea Jet
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
TLAM has it's place, but it's a very expensive way of delivering a 1000lb bomb. You might be able to render a ship non-effective with 2, but to deny an airfield would require more than the entire RN stock.
It's a niche capability and a nice shiny trophy toy for the navy, but don't get carried away about it.
It's a niche capability and a nice shiny trophy toy for the navy, but don't get carried away about it.
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We dont have to take out every harden aircraft shelter and every hangar to deny use of the airfield. Lets say its an 8000ft runway - TLAMs spaced at 2000ft, 4000ft and 6000ft ought to put the place out of use for a while. I believe the weapon has the accuracy.
Suspicion breeds confidence
yes, but only for 30 mins or so
Bomb craters are pretty easy to patch up. Sounds and expensive use of limited resources.
The Shar is well up to that particular job with dumb bombs.
The Shar is well up to that particular job with dumb bombs.
It's a Knockout
Think about the logistical problems associated with knocking out an airfield with TWO runways (and don't forget the taxiways - or the autobahn out the front of base). Then they also have to hit the middle of the 150ft wide runway - not just alongside it....
Maybe they could drop mines all over the airfield, then that way it'll slow down repairs. Oh that's been done? Not PC? Damn these Western rules of nice play that only our side abides by.
Maybe they could drop mines all over the airfield, then that way it'll slow down repairs. Oh that's been done? Not PC? Damn these Western rules of nice play that only our side abides by.
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Timzta,
The L16 connectivity in SSII was irrelevant. We could and did track you purely from watching where the aircraft faded. Maintaining that tag on a CVS was relatively easy despite the other maritime traffic in the area. Certainly it would have been sufficient to get an air strike in on you, and we were not operating with our usual other targeting assets during SSII. Don't get me wrong Tim, I'm not saying that finding a CV BG is a piece of cake when starting from a cold start. I just wished to place a counter argument to the 'we were invisible during SSII' posts.
As you say however, the E-3 is a HVAA and are well aware of our position on the enemy's 'Top Target for Today' lists. Accordingly we place much emphasis on HVAAD tactics. We are confident of this, and our procedures have been proven in both exercise and war.
Clearly on the ground however, that's a different matter. TLAM is an outstanding capability which I've personally seen used during Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, you're certainly not going to deny an airfield with 2 TLAM, and, as someone else has stated, they are very costly way of delivering a warhead. Any further comment regarding the capabilities, detectability and targetting practicalities of TLAM and CALCM is clearly innappropriate on this forum. Personally, I think that expanding the RN TLAM capability is highly desirable and you guys are quite correct to covet it's installation on the T45. Financially however, I understand that this is untenable and I envisage TLAM remaining unique to the silent service as far as the RN goes.
Additionally, TLAM are only useful for strikes. They are of no value when providing air presence for ground forces where TST must be applied within minutes, or in PSO or Northern/Southern Watch type ops. This is where we must now look to UCAVs in the future.
You are correct that the GR7 did not have a recce capability during Pallister; I did not suggest otherwise. My reference was to the type's current capabilities.
I totally agree however that the current unsatisfactory position of not just the UK's fixed wing carrier capability, but that of the entire RN can be traced back to the late 60's. As ever, inter service rivalry played a major part in this. If it had not been for the RAF/RN each ultimately undermining the other, we would have had a supersonic VSTOL capability (the P1154) in service on land and sea by 1970. However, I would suggest that the demise of CV01 was a direct result of the procurement of Polaris. The massive cost of this system (and subsequently Trident) ultimately crippled the RN. Perhaps in retrospect we would have been better off accepting that we could not afford to procure such systems, and have maintained our nuclear deterrent via other means. Clearly, the reaction and deterrence would not have been so great, and we have to consider the Cold War perspective of the time. But how much more money would have been available for the wider defence budget today, had we for instance purchased 2 sqns of B-1B with nuclear tipped CM, or a dozen SSN's with similar armament rather than Trident?
My concern is that history is about to repeat itself. I would dearly love to see the RN return to the conventional carrier business with 2 x CVF. The utility of such capabilities cannot be denied (although as I've said many times before, even the USN CVN's require considerable land based fixed wing support). However, I wonder what other capabilities will need to be sacrificed to fund such acquisition. Personally, I think that we'll be lucky to see a single CVF design procured. I think that you'll get your new carriers. But they may well be more similar to the current CVS rather than a Charles de Gaulle in terms of displacement.
Regards,
M2
The L16 connectivity in SSII was irrelevant. We could and did track you purely from watching where the aircraft faded. Maintaining that tag on a CVS was relatively easy despite the other maritime traffic in the area. Certainly it would have been sufficient to get an air strike in on you, and we were not operating with our usual other targeting assets during SSII. Don't get me wrong Tim, I'm not saying that finding a CV BG is a piece of cake when starting from a cold start. I just wished to place a counter argument to the 'we were invisible during SSII' posts.
As you say however, the E-3 is a HVAA and are well aware of our position on the enemy's 'Top Target for Today' lists. Accordingly we place much emphasis on HVAAD tactics. We are confident of this, and our procedures have been proven in both exercise and war.
Clearly on the ground however, that's a different matter. TLAM is an outstanding capability which I've personally seen used during Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, you're certainly not going to deny an airfield with 2 TLAM, and, as someone else has stated, they are very costly way of delivering a warhead. Any further comment regarding the capabilities, detectability and targetting practicalities of TLAM and CALCM is clearly innappropriate on this forum. Personally, I think that expanding the RN TLAM capability is highly desirable and you guys are quite correct to covet it's installation on the T45. Financially however, I understand that this is untenable and I envisage TLAM remaining unique to the silent service as far as the RN goes.
Additionally, TLAM are only useful for strikes. They are of no value when providing air presence for ground forces where TST must be applied within minutes, or in PSO or Northern/Southern Watch type ops. This is where we must now look to UCAVs in the future.
You are correct that the GR7 did not have a recce capability during Pallister; I did not suggest otherwise. My reference was to the type's current capabilities.
I totally agree however that the current unsatisfactory position of not just the UK's fixed wing carrier capability, but that of the entire RN can be traced back to the late 60's. As ever, inter service rivalry played a major part in this. If it had not been for the RAF/RN each ultimately undermining the other, we would have had a supersonic VSTOL capability (the P1154) in service on land and sea by 1970. However, I would suggest that the demise of CV01 was a direct result of the procurement of Polaris. The massive cost of this system (and subsequently Trident) ultimately crippled the RN. Perhaps in retrospect we would have been better off accepting that we could not afford to procure such systems, and have maintained our nuclear deterrent via other means. Clearly, the reaction and deterrence would not have been so great, and we have to consider the Cold War perspective of the time. But how much more money would have been available for the wider defence budget today, had we for instance purchased 2 sqns of B-1B with nuclear tipped CM, or a dozen SSN's with similar armament rather than Trident?
My concern is that history is about to repeat itself. I would dearly love to see the RN return to the conventional carrier business with 2 x CVF. The utility of such capabilities cannot be denied (although as I've said many times before, even the USN CVN's require considerable land based fixed wing support). However, I wonder what other capabilities will need to be sacrificed to fund such acquisition. Personally, I think that we'll be lucky to see a single CVF design procured. I think that you'll get your new carriers. But they may well be more similar to the current CVS rather than a Charles de Gaulle in terms of displacement.
Regards,
M2
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I'm dismayed by Magic Mushroom's post. It is clearly outrageous and totally unacceptable. I suggest that he doesn't post again on this forum. He insists on posting reasoned, sensible and articulate points of view, but how does that make the rest of us look? Not the PPRuNe I've come to know.
Besides, he's not a pilot so how can he possibly have anything useful to offer?
Besides, he's not a pilot so how can he possibly have anything useful to offer?
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Another excellent post by Magic Mushroom - totally agree with Navaleye!
As you say, Polaris/Trident, have probably cost the RN dear in terms of losing out in other areas. If the RAF had won the case for it providing the Strat Nuc Deterrent it is unlikely they would have the wide range of aircraft types in service today. Given likely attrition rates or airborne nuclear weapon carriers in a strike, vunerability of their bases, and time to get to target, it was probably unfeasable for the UK to go down this route, and a small, however expensive, fleet of SSBNs was the correct choice IMHO.
Whilst I am aware of the limitations of TLAM in trying to knock out an airfield, closing it down completely is ideally what we want, but looking objectively, just to reduce the enemies sortie rate by say 30-40% would be a significant gain. The timing of the attack would be critical too - if we have to do an amphib assualt I would use the TLAM the night before. Perhaps we would not look to hit the runway, maybe just the fuel farm or the ammunition dump, that would certainly slow down the sortie rate.
Whilst the SHAR did a good job in 1982, we must remember that many critics, with good justification, said it never achieved air superiority. The enemy was still able to fly over the Falklands and attack largely at will. But the SHAR, combined with RN missile sytems, and once the landings began, Rapier, did just enough.
As you say, Polaris/Trident, have probably cost the RN dear in terms of losing out in other areas. If the RAF had won the case for it providing the Strat Nuc Deterrent it is unlikely they would have the wide range of aircraft types in service today. Given likely attrition rates or airborne nuclear weapon carriers in a strike, vunerability of their bases, and time to get to target, it was probably unfeasable for the UK to go down this route, and a small, however expensive, fleet of SSBNs was the correct choice IMHO.
Whilst I am aware of the limitations of TLAM in trying to knock out an airfield, closing it down completely is ideally what we want, but looking objectively, just to reduce the enemies sortie rate by say 30-40% would be a significant gain. The timing of the attack would be critical too - if we have to do an amphib assualt I would use the TLAM the night before. Perhaps we would not look to hit the runway, maybe just the fuel farm or the ammunition dump, that would certainly slow down the sortie rate.
Whilst the SHAR did a good job in 1982, we must remember that many critics, with good justification, said it never achieved air superiority. The enemy was still able to fly over the Falklands and attack largely at will. But the SHAR, combined with RN missile sytems, and once the landings began, Rapier, did just enough.
In terms of number of views, this thread has already overtaken the two long Sea Harrier threads from 2002. Another good thing has been the fact that the majority of the posts come from people who have first hand experience of what they are talking about. Please permit me to make a few additional comments......
Some might say that the scarcity of Sea Harrier pilots is/was a problem at least partly of the Government's making. As has been stated, the idea of moving from Yeovilton to Cottesmore and Wittering was not popular. Whether the change of location or the change of service environment (as Growbag described) was the greater issue I don't know. However, it was widely discussed in the regional media and on local TV (BBC Southwest and Westcountry). It also caused the following stories in the Telegraph....
Sea Jet pilots threaten to PVR
Lack of pilots
A friend of mine who is a journalist (well sort of, he has written articles in aviation magazines etc) claims that even before the decision was taken to lose the Sea Harrier the MOD were starting to reconsider this move, due to retention issues. Remember too that there are lots of personnel other than pilots who are also affected. And in 2001 the then CINCFLEET warned that the RN would have trouble finding pilots for the JSF - and that was before.....
Since the scrapping of the Sea Harrier was announced things have gone from bad to worse with respect to pilot recruitment and retention. From 2006 until the JSF comes along (delays?) the RN fixed wing pilots will have the problem of maintaining air to air skills (unless they start again from scratch when the JSF comes along) AND keeping their V/STOL skills (assuming the UK still purchases the V/STOL version of the JSF/F35).
Pilots will not be the only ones who stand to lose their expertise, knowledge and skills. Fighter Controllers will be obviously affected (with retention issues involved). The AEW Observers from the Sea King Mk 7 will be similarly affected, with a capable system but no fighters to co-ordinate and direct - remember the upgrade that was scrapped was to include JTIDS integration. The skills of Anti Air Warfare Officers, particulary those based in a CVS, will also suffer. So will the expertise of future task group commanders (and their staffs). At the moment the air defence (including using Sea Harriers) of a force of ships is regularly (ie almost every week) practised under the Flag Officer Sea Training organisation. But not after 2006.....
How long will it take to get back up to speed?
Imagine, if you will, a situation in say 2014, where we find ourselves at war unilaterally, having to defend to fleet from enemy air power but the majority of former Sea Harrier pilots have either left the Service or lost the air/air skills, the newer pilots have not had time to get up to speed in air defence, many of the Fighter Controllers have left AND the task group commander does not have experience or knowledge of using and deploying fighter aircraft as a weapon system, nor do his staff.
In my own opinion, the loss of expertise that will accompany the premature retirement of the Sea Harrier will cause severe problems for the CVF (and JSF) project. I think that these issues are often overlooked when discussing this issue, but they show what a ill thought out and short sighted decision this was.
Some might say that the scarcity of Sea Harrier pilots is/was a problem at least partly of the Government's making. As has been stated, the idea of moving from Yeovilton to Cottesmore and Wittering was not popular. Whether the change of location or the change of service environment (as Growbag described) was the greater issue I don't know. However, it was widely discussed in the regional media and on local TV (BBC Southwest and Westcountry). It also caused the following stories in the Telegraph....
Sea Jet pilots threaten to PVR
Lack of pilots
A friend of mine who is a journalist (well sort of, he has written articles in aviation magazines etc) claims that even before the decision was taken to lose the Sea Harrier the MOD were starting to reconsider this move, due to retention issues. Remember too that there are lots of personnel other than pilots who are also affected. And in 2001 the then CINCFLEET warned that the RN would have trouble finding pilots for the JSF - and that was before.....
Since the scrapping of the Sea Harrier was announced things have gone from bad to worse with respect to pilot recruitment and retention. From 2006 until the JSF comes along (delays?) the RN fixed wing pilots will have the problem of maintaining air to air skills (unless they start again from scratch when the JSF comes along) AND keeping their V/STOL skills (assuming the UK still purchases the V/STOL version of the JSF/F35).
Pilots will not be the only ones who stand to lose their expertise, knowledge and skills. Fighter Controllers will be obviously affected (with retention issues involved). The AEW Observers from the Sea King Mk 7 will be similarly affected, with a capable system but no fighters to co-ordinate and direct - remember the upgrade that was scrapped was to include JTIDS integration. The skills of Anti Air Warfare Officers, particulary those based in a CVS, will also suffer. So will the expertise of future task group commanders (and their staffs). At the moment the air defence (including using Sea Harriers) of a force of ships is regularly (ie almost every week) practised under the Flag Officer Sea Training organisation. But not after 2006.....
How long will it take to get back up to speed?
Imagine, if you will, a situation in say 2014, where we find ourselves at war unilaterally, having to defend to fleet from enemy air power but the majority of former Sea Harrier pilots have either left the Service or lost the air/air skills, the newer pilots have not had time to get up to speed in air defence, many of the Fighter Controllers have left AND the task group commander does not have experience or knowledge of using and deploying fighter aircraft as a weapon system, nor do his staff.
In my own opinion, the loss of expertise that will accompany the premature retirement of the Sea Harrier will cause severe problems for the CVF (and JSF) project. I think that these issues are often overlooked when discussing this issue, but they show what a ill thought out and short sighted decision this was.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 19th Sep 2003 at 06:19.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Time in the service
What is the average service time for an FAA pilot? Bear in mind the F35 won't be here for 10 years and fully operational some years after that, I suspect most of today's pilots won't be around to fly it.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Contingency reserve
What would the potential for holding some FA2s in storage until the F35 comes along. Plenty of room at St. Athan. Some of teh airframes are only 4 yrs old!
Navaleye
4 years old? Are you sure, new SHAR's delivered in 1999? I don't think so.
Why on earth keep them in storage, what for?
WEBF,
Get a girlfriend or something for God's sake!
We are canning the SHAR, the US are canning the F-14, the S-3 is on the way out, the USNR is being reduced to a logistic support force with all it's P-3 and F-18 units axed.
Why?
Because the world has moved on from the 80's. The threat has changed and so has the force mix needed to deal with it.
Most RN fixed wing guys in the pipeline will go onto GR9/9A Sqn's, the plan has always been to have 2 RAF heavy and 2 FAA heavy outfits at Cottesmore, though how the hell the dark blue are going to man their share when they can barely keep two Flight sized outfits up to establishment is beyond me.
4 years old? Are you sure, new SHAR's delivered in 1999? I don't think so.
Why on earth keep them in storage, what for?
WEBF,
Get a girlfriend or something for God's sake!
We are canning the SHAR, the US are canning the F-14, the S-3 is on the way out, the USNR is being reduced to a logistic support force with all it's P-3 and F-18 units axed.
Why?
Because the world has moved on from the 80's. The threat has changed and so has the force mix needed to deal with it.
Most RN fixed wing guys in the pipeline will go onto GR9/9A Sqn's, the plan has always been to have 2 RAF heavy and 2 FAA heavy outfits at Cottesmore, though how the hell the dark blue are going to man their share when they can barely keep two Flight sized outfits up to establishment is beyond me.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Last Sea Harrier delivery
Yes, the last FA2 new build rolled off the line in 1999 to much acclaim. Suddenly its workthless. Mnnn....
Does anyone know if BAE actually fitted a MK107 inh a Shar at any time?
ZH813 FA.2 NB18 Delivered 18 Jan 1999.
4 yrs 8 months ago.
Does anyone know if BAE actually fitted a MK107 inh a Shar at any time?
ZH813 FA.2 NB18 Delivered 18 Jan 1999.
4 yrs 8 months ago.
In an ideal world, with unlimited resources, you'd keep the SHar, just in case.
But you wouldn't get much use out of it. In the post Cold War world, littoral ops against low air threat enemies have been the norm. By their nature such ops allow greater use of land based AD anyway. By their nature we tend to be operating with coalition partners who can provide AD better than we can with a few tired SHars.
Our carriers are too small to carry a viable mix of AD and OS fixed wing aircraft. If you take GR7s along, you can't carry enough SHars to do the AD job properly (to be able to sustain sufficient aircraft on CAP, etc.), and you don't have sufficient GRs either. So the sensible way to employ the carrier is to tailor its air wing to the requirement each time it sets sail, deploying SHars when you want to use the ship as fleet AD (albeit with a limited, basic OS/Recce capability) or deploying GRs when you want to project power or support deployed forces.
In today's world, you'll be deploying GR7s every time.
To pay to keep SHars (which are no longer routinely useful, and are merely a useful option to have 'up the sleeve') you'll have to get rid of something else. Unless the Admirals are happy to bin Trident (say) then you'll have to get rid of something which provides a capability which is actually useful, and which is regularly used.
The world has moved on, and there is no place to retain assets which don't pull their weight, and which are not regularly and routinely essential. Too many of those who argue the case for the SHar do so out of sentiment, out of narrow single-service dark blue prejudice or because they can't or won't recognise that the world has changed.
From a strictly single-service RN point of view, the SHar seems worth keeping because it might one day be useful, and it doesn't matter that (say) the Jaguar would have to be removed to pay for it, even though the Jaguar is regularly useful.
A truly bold policy would be to recognise that Fleet AD as a role can now be ceded to allies or land based assets and to drop it altogether. That's not what's happening, there'll merely be a short capability gap before JSF comes in.
Personally I'd go the whole hog and bin carrier aviation altogether, spending the money on decent SEAD, a proper replacement for the Canberra, two squadrons of surplus B-1s and loads of JAS 39s for the boys to fly!
But you wouldn't get much use out of it. In the post Cold War world, littoral ops against low air threat enemies have been the norm. By their nature such ops allow greater use of land based AD anyway. By their nature we tend to be operating with coalition partners who can provide AD better than we can with a few tired SHars.
Our carriers are too small to carry a viable mix of AD and OS fixed wing aircraft. If you take GR7s along, you can't carry enough SHars to do the AD job properly (to be able to sustain sufficient aircraft on CAP, etc.), and you don't have sufficient GRs either. So the sensible way to employ the carrier is to tailor its air wing to the requirement each time it sets sail, deploying SHars when you want to use the ship as fleet AD (albeit with a limited, basic OS/Recce capability) or deploying GRs when you want to project power or support deployed forces.
In today's world, you'll be deploying GR7s every time.
To pay to keep SHars (which are no longer routinely useful, and are merely a useful option to have 'up the sleeve') you'll have to get rid of something else. Unless the Admirals are happy to bin Trident (say) then you'll have to get rid of something which provides a capability which is actually useful, and which is regularly used.
The world has moved on, and there is no place to retain assets which don't pull their weight, and which are not regularly and routinely essential. Too many of those who argue the case for the SHar do so out of sentiment, out of narrow single-service dark blue prejudice or because they can't or won't recognise that the world has changed.
From a strictly single-service RN point of view, the SHar seems worth keeping because it might one day be useful, and it doesn't matter that (say) the Jaguar would have to be removed to pay for it, even though the Jaguar is regularly useful.
A truly bold policy would be to recognise that Fleet AD as a role can now be ceded to allies or land based assets and to drop it altogether. That's not what's happening, there'll merely be a short capability gap before JSF comes in.
Personally I'd go the whole hog and bin carrier aviation altogether, spending the money on decent SEAD, a proper replacement for the Canberra, two squadrons of surplus B-1s and loads of JAS 39s for the boys to fly!
Suspicion breeds confidence
I don't think its prejudice - survival maybe
Jackonokio,
Your arguments against the Sea Harrier apply equally if not more to the F3 and the Typhoon! If anything its MORE likely that we will meet enemy fighters away from home than in Europe. Now how many "rogue states" are there in continental Europe. Lets see... none. How many outside, lets see... lots!
So why do we need so many of the expensive, redundant, white elephant Typhoons which have no obvious enemy or purpose.
The FA2 on the other hand is an enabling technology to power projection. Without local air superiority expeditionary forces are doomed to failure. The GR7/9 is exposed against any nation that put up a Mig 21 armed with Soviet era missiles or which there any many. How does the RAF propose to defend the fleet in the South China Se, or the Pacific or S. Atlantic?
Your arguments against the Sea Harrier apply equally if not more to the F3 and the Typhoon! If anything its MORE likely that we will meet enemy fighters away from home than in Europe. Now how many "rogue states" are there in continental Europe. Lets see... none. How many outside, lets see... lots!
So why do we need so many of the expensive, redundant, white elephant Typhoons which have no obvious enemy or purpose.
The FA2 on the other hand is an enabling technology to power projection. Without local air superiority expeditionary forces are doomed to failure. The GR7/9 is exposed against any nation that put up a Mig 21 armed with Soviet era missiles or which there any many. How does the RAF propose to defend the fleet in the South China Se, or the Pacific or S. Atlantic?
If you kept even half an eye on what was going on, you'd be aware that the F3 has recently become an extremely versatile and useful asset, and that it has further capabilities (some of which have been demonstrated) which are latent at the moment, but which could easily and cheaply be 'activated'. Or haven't you heard of SEAD?
You'd also be aware that the EF Typhoon is intended as a multi-role aircraft, so is likely to be more useful than the SHars which are effectively single role. Moreover, you'd also be aware that the Typhoon is designed to be capable of rapid deployment and to operate out-of-area with minimal support (like the Jaguar). Such aircraft can inevitably get to trouble spots more quickly than your precious grey funnel lines dinosaurs, and are not vulnerable to anyone with a Gemini and some Semtex, or to an old Russian surplus submarine. Don't say Sierra Leone, because the Jag Squadron on the Azores was held back from hopping on to Dakar to let the carrier appear useful. And before you bleat on about reliance on basing in neighbouring countries, give me an example (since 1990) when an op was politically tenable but when such basing wouldn't have been easily available.
And the SHar is a pointless asset in most scenarios. Put sufficient SHars on a carrier to guarantee its AD and that carrier cannot do anything else. If we have to maintain these seldom used, rarely needed carrier white elephants, let's at least give them an air wing which can do a viable job, and leave AD to land-based assets and/or to our allies. Or are you the kind of Admiral Blimp who can still seriously see us going off doing things autonomously? Even if you are, it's perhaps interesting to point out that even in the South Atlantis we can now provide land based AD cover.
The one threat a GR7/9 could deal with would be a MiG-21 (as long as ASRAAM goes back on the jet), but the realistic threat would be 'Fulcrum'/'Flanker', but I suspect that the USN, the Spanish, the Italians, the French or land based AD would be available to neutralise those.
You'd also be aware that the EF Typhoon is intended as a multi-role aircraft, so is likely to be more useful than the SHars which are effectively single role. Moreover, you'd also be aware that the Typhoon is designed to be capable of rapid deployment and to operate out-of-area with minimal support (like the Jaguar). Such aircraft can inevitably get to trouble spots more quickly than your precious grey funnel lines dinosaurs, and are not vulnerable to anyone with a Gemini and some Semtex, or to an old Russian surplus submarine. Don't say Sierra Leone, because the Jag Squadron on the Azores was held back from hopping on to Dakar to let the carrier appear useful. And before you bleat on about reliance on basing in neighbouring countries, give me an example (since 1990) when an op was politically tenable but when such basing wouldn't have been easily available.
And the SHar is a pointless asset in most scenarios. Put sufficient SHars on a carrier to guarantee its AD and that carrier cannot do anything else. If we have to maintain these seldom used, rarely needed carrier white elephants, let's at least give them an air wing which can do a viable job, and leave AD to land-based assets and/or to our allies. Or are you the kind of Admiral Blimp who can still seriously see us going off doing things autonomously? Even if you are, it's perhaps interesting to point out that even in the South Atlantis we can now provide land based AD cover.
The one threat a GR7/9 could deal with would be a MiG-21 (as long as ASRAAM goes back on the jet), but the realistic threat would be 'Fulcrum'/'Flanker', but I suspect that the USN, the Spanish, the Italians, the French or land based AD would be available to neutralise those.
Surely the weakest link is tanker support. Typhoon is going to happen. Invest in some seriously good long range tankers and the two combined are going to be able to defend likely British interests quite well.
Full on US style CBGs are the answer to all questions - but - we can't afford them. In many ways its a shame that Europe spends about half what the US does on its military only to achieve about 10% of the capability. Not that a combined EU military would ever ever work but a shame nonetheless.
That said, the RAF needs to make itself more relevant to the next 30 years. Tankers, heavy AT, recon and close air support seem critical. Its a shambles that Typhoon *still* isn't a reality given the initial timeframe.
WWW
ps feel free to lambast someone who knows very little about what he posts - it might well be illuminating!
Full on US style CBGs are the answer to all questions - but - we can't afford them. In many ways its a shame that Europe spends about half what the US does on its military only to achieve about 10% of the capability. Not that a combined EU military would ever ever work but a shame nonetheless.
That said, the RAF needs to make itself more relevant to the next 30 years. Tankers, heavy AT, recon and close air support seem critical. Its a shambles that Typhoon *still* isn't a reality given the initial timeframe.
WWW
ps feel free to lambast someone who knows very little about what he posts - it might well be illuminating!
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Jacko (seriously because I don't know), is there really such a thing as two squadrons of surplus B-1s?
If so, has anyone told the Aussies? Seems to me that they'd be better off with some B-1Bs than with no F-111s.
I like the Gripen almost as much as you do, but if Britain were to go down that road, more tankers are going to be imperative. The JAS-39 can't fly very far without needing a drink.
Another genuine question; assuming a future with SHar gone and GR7/9 embarked on HM carriers, would it be technically feasible, and if so, advantageous, to fit said GR7/9s with Blue Vixen?
If so, has anyone told the Aussies? Seems to me that they'd be better off with some B-1Bs than with no F-111s.
I like the Gripen almost as much as you do, but if Britain were to go down that road, more tankers are going to be imperative. The JAS-39 can't fly very far without needing a drink.
Another genuine question; assuming a future with SHar gone and GR7/9 embarked on HM carriers, would it be technically feasible, and if so, advantageous, to fit said GR7/9s with Blue Vixen?
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Jacko
You're a seasoned and respectable contributor to this forum. Much of what you say is creditable, supported by an authoratitive opinion. However in this case, the Shar, I read your last post with much incredulity.
You appear to be suggesting that a deep sea naval task force needs no AD other than that provided by Type42's. If I follow your arguement to its conclusion, then we might as well disband the Royal Navy in its entirety.
The Shar is not an invaluable asset in a pure AD role, it has and does continue to punch more than its own weight against faster adversaries. It has a track record, how many western fighters, in service today can boast that?
Surely in the interim (Shar - JSF), and this is a suggestion based on pragmatism and not sentiment, you could put to sea with two carriers,one for AD and AEW and the other to make the boys from 3&4F ill. So the sensible thing to do would be to retain the aircraft and the Royal Navy's operational effectivity with it.
I am available for consultancy roles for the Admiralty (at great expense) should they require it.
Yours Aye
FEBA
You're a seasoned and respectable contributor to this forum. Much of what you say is creditable, supported by an authoratitive opinion. However in this case, the Shar, I read your last post with much incredulity.
You appear to be suggesting that a deep sea naval task force needs no AD other than that provided by Type42's. If I follow your arguement to its conclusion, then we might as well disband the Royal Navy in its entirety.
The Shar is not an invaluable asset in a pure AD role, it has and does continue to punch more than its own weight against faster adversaries. It has a track record, how many western fighters, in service today can boast that?
Surely in the interim (Shar - JSF), and this is a suggestion based on pragmatism and not sentiment, you could put to sea with two carriers,one for AD and AEW and the other to make the boys from 3&4F ill. So the sensible thing to do would be to retain the aircraft and the Royal Navy's operational effectivity with it.
I am available for consultancy roles for the Admiralty (at great expense) should they require it.
Yours Aye
FEBA
Bluewolf
Parliament report indicates F111 to stay to 2015. Interim fighter undesirable(unavailable).
Spare money to be used to harden army with M1 Abrams tanks to replace Leopard. Good means of fighting alongside the Yanks.
Back to the thread.
Brit's always get caught with their pants down. Quality of their service personnel usually helps save higher embarrassment.
Parliament report indicates F111 to stay to 2015. Interim fighter undesirable(unavailable).
Spare money to be used to harden army with M1 Abrams tanks to replace Leopard. Good means of fighting alongside the Yanks.
Back to the thread.
Brit's always get caught with their pants down. Quality of their service personnel usually helps save higher embarrassment.
Would that be 'more tankers' - or 'the most capable tankers available'? Tankers converted from rather elderly airliners capable of carrying 73 tonnes of fuel, or new aircraft which can carry 111 tonne of fuel?
Correct - we have moved on and capability is indeed the key asset!
Correct - we have moved on and capability is indeed the key asset!
