Timzta,
The L16 connectivity in SSII was irrelevant. We could and did track you purely from watching where the aircraft faded. Maintaining that tag on a CVS was relatively easy despite the other maritime traffic in the area. Certainly it would have been sufficient to get an air strike in on you, and we were not operating with our usual other targeting assets during SSII. Don't get me wrong Tim, I'm not saying that finding a CV BG is a piece of cake when starting from a cold start. I just wished to place a counter argument to the 'we were invisible during SSII' posts.
As you say however, the E-3 is a HVAA and are well aware of our position on the enemy's 'Top Target for Today' lists. Accordingly we place much emphasis on HVAAD tactics. We are confident of this, and our procedures have been proven in both exercise and war.
Clearly on the ground however, that's a different matter. TLAM is an outstanding capability which I've personally seen used during Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, you're certainly not going to deny an airfield with 2 TLAM, and, as someone else has stated, they are very costly way of delivering a warhead. Any further comment regarding the capabilities, detectability and targetting practicalities of TLAM and CALCM is clearly innappropriate on this forum. Personally, I think that expanding the RN TLAM capability is highly desirable and you guys are quite correct to covet it's installation on the T45. Financially however, I understand that this is untenable and I envisage TLAM remaining unique to the silent service as far as the RN goes.
Additionally, TLAM are only useful for strikes. They are of no value when providing air presence for ground forces where TST must be applied within minutes, or in PSO or Northern/Southern Watch type ops. This is where we must now look to UCAVs in the future.
You are correct that the GR7 did not have a recce capability during Pallister; I did not suggest otherwise. My reference was to the type's current capabilities.
I totally agree however that the current unsatisfactory position of not just the UK's fixed wing carrier capability, but that of the entire RN can be traced back to the late 60's. As ever, inter service rivalry played a major part in this. If it had not been for the RAF/RN each ultimately undermining the other, we would have had a supersonic VSTOL capability (the P1154) in service on land and sea by 1970. However, I would suggest that the demise of CV01 was a direct result of the procurement of Polaris. The massive cost of this system (and subsequently Trident) ultimately crippled the RN. Perhaps in retrospect we would have been better off accepting that we could not afford to procure such systems, and have maintained our nuclear deterrent via other means. Clearly, the reaction and deterrence would not have been so great, and we have to consider the Cold War perspective of the time. But how much more money would have been available for the wider defence budget today, had we for instance purchased 2 sqns of B-1B with nuclear tipped CM, or a dozen SSN's with similar armament rather than Trident?
My concern is that history is about to repeat itself. I would dearly love to see the RN return to the conventional carrier business with 2 x CVF. The utility of such capabilities cannot be denied (although as I've said many times before, even the USN CVN's require considerable land based fixed wing support). However, I wonder what other capabilities will need to be sacrificed to fund such acquisition. Personally, I think that we'll be lucky to see a single CVF design procured. I think that you'll get your new carriers. But they may well be more similar to the current CVS rather than a Charles de Gaulle in terms of displacement.
Regards,
M2