Sea Jet
How much more effective would a GR9 be if it had full ASRAAM integration compared with the AIM-9. What about the integration that the Jaguar force has received?
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nozzles
were you being ironic. Sorry, I'd been marinading the grey matter in Teachers last night and didn't detect the subtly. Still the slap wont do you any harm any way.
FEBA
were you being ironic. Sorry, I'd been marinading the grey matter in Teachers last night and didn't detect the subtly. Still the slap wont do you any harm any way.
FEBA
Last edited by FEBA; 26th Sep 2003 at 21:18.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: The edge
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for the birching anyway FEEBs, it was most refreshing. You should all learn from my mistakes:
NEVER DRINK AND TYPE
By the way, was it the bit that goes: "We few, we happy few......blah etc?
NEVER DRINK AND TYPE
By the way, was it the bit that goes: "We few, we happy few......blah etc?
WEBF,
1982 wasn't the result of removing capabilities, it was the result of crass political ineptitude and sending stupid signals to Argentina, who responded to them. Different signals would have prevented the Falklands war far more cheaply than fighting it.
"Now you are claiming that defending the carriers stops the from performing other tasks."
Don't shoot the messenger. West is the man who drew attention to the 'cost' (overstretch wise) of high value assets like carriers, and the greater priority which should be accorded to frigates and destroyers, not me.
You rabbit on and on about how we need organic air defence for all these autonomous expeditionary warfare ops we're going to conduct (and keep saying that this, that or the other is 'fact' when it's usually nothing of the sort). I'll give you a fact. The Government and chiefs of staff have decided that we will no longer undertake major autonomous operations without coalition support. Fact!
"......particularly considering that Jordan was not on the side of the coalition and may have offered their air bases to Saddam." I'll have a tiny, tiny snifter of whatever it is that you've been drinking by the gallon, if it's capable of distorting reality quite so far.
Bluewolf,
1) I'll turn your question around. Who has been deterred by our having SHar?
2) Tough choices inevitably mean that one day you might need a capability you've jettisoned. The secret is to maintain those capabilities you use most often, that you're most likely to need, or that allies are unlikely to be able to provide.
3) You got me. I'd be spending the CVF and JSF money more wisely.
4) No guarantees, so you manage the risk.
5) Put 5 p on income tax and it's problem solved...... but in the real world, we need to concentrate resources where they give us the best return, and CVS and SHar definitely don't qualify. And, in my view, nor will CFV/JSF.
Navaleye,
A full digital ASRAAM integration has been demonstrated on the 'Nightcat' Jag.
The in service Jag GR3A has a fully integrated HMSS, and has compatible wiring for ASRAAM out to the pylons, but clearing the weapon for use on the Jag (and providing the right plug on the LAU) has not been funded. Estimated cost including MAR trials, less than £1m for all 54 jets.
"What if Jags run into an agile air threat...." seems more likely than "what if we need carrier based AD during the six year gap" and costs peanuts.
ASRAAM on GR9 (with AWACS support) would certainly ameliorate the loss of AIM-120 on SHar, but could never fully compensate.
1982 wasn't the result of removing capabilities, it was the result of crass political ineptitude and sending stupid signals to Argentina, who responded to them. Different signals would have prevented the Falklands war far more cheaply than fighting it.
"Now you are claiming that defending the carriers stops the from performing other tasks."
Don't shoot the messenger. West is the man who drew attention to the 'cost' (overstretch wise) of high value assets like carriers, and the greater priority which should be accorded to frigates and destroyers, not me.
You rabbit on and on about how we need organic air defence for all these autonomous expeditionary warfare ops we're going to conduct (and keep saying that this, that or the other is 'fact' when it's usually nothing of the sort). I'll give you a fact. The Government and chiefs of staff have decided that we will no longer undertake major autonomous operations without coalition support. Fact!
"......particularly considering that Jordan was not on the side of the coalition and may have offered their air bases to Saddam." I'll have a tiny, tiny snifter of whatever it is that you've been drinking by the gallon, if it's capable of distorting reality quite so far.
Bluewolf,
1) I'll turn your question around. Who has been deterred by our having SHar?
2) Tough choices inevitably mean that one day you might need a capability you've jettisoned. The secret is to maintain those capabilities you use most often, that you're most likely to need, or that allies are unlikely to be able to provide.
3) You got me. I'd be spending the CVF and JSF money more wisely.
4) No guarantees, so you manage the risk.
5) Put 5 p on income tax and it's problem solved...... but in the real world, we need to concentrate resources where they give us the best return, and CVS and SHar definitely don't qualify. And, in my view, nor will CFV/JSF.
Navaleye,
A full digital ASRAAM integration has been demonstrated on the 'Nightcat' Jag.
The in service Jag GR3A has a fully integrated HMSS, and has compatible wiring for ASRAAM out to the pylons, but clearing the weapon for use on the Jag (and providing the right plug on the LAU) has not been funded. Estimated cost including MAR trials, less than £1m for all 54 jets.
"What if Jags run into an agile air threat...." seems more likely than "what if we need carrier based AD during the six year gap" and costs peanuts.
ASRAAM on GR9 (with AWACS support) would certainly ameliorate the loss of AIM-120 on SHar, but could never fully compensate.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sozzles,
Spot on, St Crispian. Good isn't it.
FEBA
Jacko
I've tried to lace previous responses to your posts with clear hints which you do not heed. So I'll spell it out in clear. GO FOR THE FACTS NOT THE MAN .
Now your nihilism is really getting to the bits of me that they really ought not too. The Government is this government, already discredited over the GW fiacsco.
They will not around beyond the next election. So what happens then !!!!
How many of your precious Jags are you going to fit on a carrier. What will become of our Foreign policy if you get your way.
FEBA
Spot on, St Crispian. Good isn't it.
FEBA
Jacko
I've tried to lace previous responses to your posts with clear hints which you do not heed. So I'll spell it out in clear. GO FOR THE FACTS NOT THE MAN .
Now your nihilism is really getting to the bits of me that they really ought not too. The Government is this government, already discredited over the GW fiacsco.
They will not around beyond the next election. So what happens then !!!!
How many of your precious Jags are you going to fit on a carrier. What will become of our Foreign policy if you get your way.
FEBA
We are no longer a great power. We withdrew from East of Suez. We've handed back the Empire (even Hong Kong). Rightly or wrongly, we've retreated from that role. Rightly or wrongly, the Defence Assumptions assume that we won't do autonomous ops any more. Those were the assumptions on which the SDR was founded, but also formed the bedrock of the previous Conservative Govt's defence reviews.
To go back to the days when we would 'send a gunboat' and conduct autonomous ops would not be supported by the bulk of the electorate - and even those who might support it would not be willing to pay for it. Pro defence people like you and I might think that too little is being spent on defence, but for any politician to say so would be electoral suicide. There will be no return to those days. That's why we have to make tough choices, and why some capabilities which would once have been viewed as essential have to be ceded.
To pay to retain the SHar and CVS until CVF and JSF will be ready would require enormous cuts elsewhere, and it's my judgement (clearly shared by those who've actually made the decision) that that would have resulted in an unacceptable degradation of more useful capabilities, in order to cover a short duration gap in a rarely needed (Cold War legacy) capability which can, in any case, be covered by land based air power or by our allies if required.
Your faith that this bunch of grinning crooks will be voted out at the next election is refreshing, but I don't share your optimism. But even if the charismatic and exciting IDS is elected with a huge majority in a landslide vote, whether or not we have SHar will not make much difference to our foreign policy. Can you see IDS (or any other British leader) going it alone, without NATO or the USA, in an op which required carrier-based AD, but not the SEAD, ISTAR, etc which we also lack?
In the real harsh world of existing and likely defence budgets I wouldn't retain carrier aviation at all, as I've made plain, because it isn't useful enough often enough to justify the cost, and bleeds money from where it is needed. (With bigger budgets I might retain it, however). But that's a minority view,and carrier aviation will remain, and (when JSF enters service) even the carrierborne AD role will be regained.
If we are going to retain carrier capability in the short term, it makes sense for those carriers to be able to fulfil a useful role. They are too small to simulataneously embark viable numbers of SHars and GR7s, which means that a choice must be made. The choice made by the Politicians and the Chiefs of Staff is that they should have a power projection role, and in that role, the GR7 is clearly the best aircraft to embark. They could have decided that the best role for the carriers would be as fleet air defence ships, in which case they would have been best employed embarking only SHars and Sea King AEWs, though there are doubts as to how useful they'd be even in that role, especially in hot temperatures. Moreover, the absence of a serious or credible air threat in all post Cold War ops cannot be ignored. If there is to be a short term capability gap, maybe a brief loss of AD capability is the easiest one to bear - especially since allies can and do cover that gap.
Afterthought: Pinning one's hopes on the next (Tory) Government may be futile for another reason. Historically the Conservatives in Government have presided over the most wide-ranging and damaging defence cuts we've experienced. They talk the talk but have seldom 'walked the walk'.
To go back to the days when we would 'send a gunboat' and conduct autonomous ops would not be supported by the bulk of the electorate - and even those who might support it would not be willing to pay for it. Pro defence people like you and I might think that too little is being spent on defence, but for any politician to say so would be electoral suicide. There will be no return to those days. That's why we have to make tough choices, and why some capabilities which would once have been viewed as essential have to be ceded.
To pay to retain the SHar and CVS until CVF and JSF will be ready would require enormous cuts elsewhere, and it's my judgement (clearly shared by those who've actually made the decision) that that would have resulted in an unacceptable degradation of more useful capabilities, in order to cover a short duration gap in a rarely needed (Cold War legacy) capability which can, in any case, be covered by land based air power or by our allies if required.
Your faith that this bunch of grinning crooks will be voted out at the next election is refreshing, but I don't share your optimism. But even if the charismatic and exciting IDS is elected with a huge majority in a landslide vote, whether or not we have SHar will not make much difference to our foreign policy. Can you see IDS (or any other British leader) going it alone, without NATO or the USA, in an op which required carrier-based AD, but not the SEAD, ISTAR, etc which we also lack?
In the real harsh world of existing and likely defence budgets I wouldn't retain carrier aviation at all, as I've made plain, because it isn't useful enough often enough to justify the cost, and bleeds money from where it is needed. (With bigger budgets I might retain it, however). But that's a minority view,and carrier aviation will remain, and (when JSF enters service) even the carrierborne AD role will be regained.
If we are going to retain carrier capability in the short term, it makes sense for those carriers to be able to fulfil a useful role. They are too small to simulataneously embark viable numbers of SHars and GR7s, which means that a choice must be made. The choice made by the Politicians and the Chiefs of Staff is that they should have a power projection role, and in that role, the GR7 is clearly the best aircraft to embark. They could have decided that the best role for the carriers would be as fleet air defence ships, in which case they would have been best employed embarking only SHars and Sea King AEWs, though there are doubts as to how useful they'd be even in that role, especially in hot temperatures. Moreover, the absence of a serious or credible air threat in all post Cold War ops cannot be ignored. If there is to be a short term capability gap, maybe a brief loss of AD capability is the easiest one to bear - especially since allies can and do cover that gap.
Afterthought: Pinning one's hopes on the next (Tory) Government may be futile for another reason. Historically the Conservatives in Government have presided over the most wide-ranging and damaging defence cuts we've experienced. They talk the talk but have seldom 'walked the walk'.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jacko
Flight International are looking for a defence editor. Please don't apply. I'm off to the Red Lion, if I'm capable of a reply to your last on my return you will get one.
FEBA
Flight International are looking for a defence editor. Please don't apply. I'm off to the Red Lion, if I'm capable of a reply to your last on my return you will get one.
FEBA
1) They can't afford me, sadly.
2) Mrs Jacko would kill me if I made her move anywhere near Sutton.
3) The fact that: "While specialist knowledge or flying experience would be advantageous, they are by no means critical" leads me to think that anyone reading these boards is over-qualified........ Even me.
2) Mrs Jacko would kill me if I made her move anywhere near Sutton.
3) The fact that: "While specialist knowledge or flying experience would be advantageous, they are by no means critical" leads me to think that anyone reading these boards is over-qualified........ Even me.
Jacko
Frigate and Destroyer numbers were cut by the Tories under Options for Change etc, then by the present Government under the SDR. Then they reneged on the SDR commitment to a minimum number of 32 last year, at about the same time as deciding to prematurely retire the Sea Harrier. Undoubtably this was for the same reasons - saving money.
Did you (or anyone else) look at the memorandum from RUSI that I provided a link to in my previous post? It gives a very good explaination of many of the points that I have trying to make.
Since I have now worked out how to post links in a better way that just "copy and paste" here are three more links that may help explain some things and put these issues (and CVF related ones - remember that thread?) in context.....
Roles of the Royal Navy
Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations
Fighting terrorism on the oceans
Frigate and Destroyer numbers were cut by the Tories under Options for Change etc, then by the present Government under the SDR. Then they reneged on the SDR commitment to a minimum number of 32 last year, at about the same time as deciding to prematurely retire the Sea Harrier. Undoubtably this was for the same reasons - saving money.
Did you (or anyone else) look at the memorandum from RUSI that I provided a link to in my previous post? It gives a very good explaination of many of the points that I have trying to make.
Since I have now worked out how to post links in a better way that just "copy and paste" here are three more links that may help explain some things and put these issues (and CVF related ones - remember that thread?) in context.....
Roles of the Royal Navy
Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations
Fighting terrorism on the oceans
Suspicion breeds confidence
Question for John Farley
John,
Assuming the upgrade had happened to the FA2, how would speculate the extra thrust of the MK107 would have altered the flight characteristics of the airplane.
Assuming the upgrade had happened to the FA2, how would speculate the extra thrust of the MK107 would have altered the flight characteristics of the airplane.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Chichester West Sussex UK
Age: 91
Posts: 2,206
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Navaleye
All a bit of a guess really.
Certainly much would depend on whether the intake was changed (as with Harrier II) or not.
If the intake was kept as SHAR then the aeroplane would probably not have felt much different to the pilot, but it would have benefited from more thrust at all conditions. As I am sure you realise when at 40k and 0.8 and excess thrust over drag is small and so could easily double with a touch more donk. Thus the effect on high level manoeuvrability would be considerable. Nice to have more thrust for hot VL too.
How much more thrust would have been available without intake changes I can only guess. Perhaps 40% of the extra potential from the new donk could have been lost if it was sucking a bit hard behind the original intake. Not too sure about the surge margin either. Such matters are very difficult to predict without ever doing the installation and flying it. The Harrier II originally surged in the middle of the envelope on the climb (no alpha to talk of, or sideslip and at normal climb speed) before the redesigned intake and prod engines were tweaked over some 8 months in 1982.
(my most fun year ever – 2 hours gliding in 40 separate episodes…)
If the intake had also been changed then I am sure most of the AV-8B installation thrust would have been achieved, but I don’t see how it would have been at its best without lerx as well.
All a bit of a guess really.
Certainly much would depend on whether the intake was changed (as with Harrier II) or not.
If the intake was kept as SHAR then the aeroplane would probably not have felt much different to the pilot, but it would have benefited from more thrust at all conditions. As I am sure you realise when at 40k and 0.8 and excess thrust over drag is small and so could easily double with a touch more donk. Thus the effect on high level manoeuvrability would be considerable. Nice to have more thrust for hot VL too.
How much more thrust would have been available without intake changes I can only guess. Perhaps 40% of the extra potential from the new donk could have been lost if it was sucking a bit hard behind the original intake. Not too sure about the surge margin either. Such matters are very difficult to predict without ever doing the installation and flying it. The Harrier II originally surged in the middle of the envelope on the climb (no alpha to talk of, or sideslip and at normal climb speed) before the redesigned intake and prod engines were tweaked over some 8 months in 1982.
(my most fun year ever – 2 hours gliding in 40 separate episodes…)
If the intake had also been changed then I am sure most of the AV-8B installation thrust would have been achieved, but I don’t see how it would have been at its best without lerx as well.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Once again it is necessary to re-visit the concerns that are shared by the opposition Defence secretary and the admiralty regarding the inability of the RN to mount deep sea ops after the SHar is removed from service in 2006. The following is a quote from the Daily Telegraph:
Cuts 'rip heart out of defence strategy'
By David Graves
(Filed: 08/05/2002)
THE Royal Navy will be left unprotected and one of its three aircraft carriers will be mothballed as a direct result of a government decision that "rips the heart out" of Britain's defence strategy, the Tories will warn today.
Bernard Jenkin, the shadow defence secretary, will accuse the Treasury of putting "intolerable pressure" on the defence budget, leaving Britain without the capability to mount a war-time expedition to match the Falklands taskforce.
He will use a Commons debate to highlight the scrapping of the Navy's Sea Harrier fighter aircraft, which he will blame on a £1 billion cut in defence spending since Labour came to power in the 1997 election.
The loss of the Sea Harriers from 2006 will mean that for the next decade any Royal Navy expedition will have to enlist the help of an American aircraft carrier to provide the planes needed to protect the fleet, he will claim.
Mr Jenkin will point to the decision to withdraw Invincible, one of the Royal Navy's three aircraft carriers, from service in 2006 as evidence that the decommissioning of the Sea Harriers has a far-ranging impact on the Navy.
Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, announced in February that the Sea Harrier FA2 would be withdrawn from service by 2006, instead of 2012, when the new Joint Strike Aircraft being developed with the United States are due to be introduced. This will leave the fleet without air cover for six years.
"It is simply unbelievable that in the middle of the war against terror the Government continues to cut our frontline forces," Mr Jenkin will tell MPs. "Moreover, this shows how the Government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review is unravelling because of lack of money.
"This decision rips the heart out of the Joint Task Force capability, which was central to the Government's defence policy."
The MoD expects to save what Mr Jenkin described as a "mere" £109 million. But senior Royal Navy officers privately admit that because of the decision the Navy will be unable to send a taskforce to war for at least six years unless it is accompanied by an American aircraft carrier to mount air defence of the fleet.
They conceded that if Argentina reinvaded the Falkland Islands, as it did 20 years ago, between 2006 and 2012, Britain would be unable to recapture them without support from Washington.
The Government's defence policy states that its prime commitment is to provide forces to defend the UK and "overseas territories, our people and interests".
Underfunding of the defence budget - now £23.5 billion - at a time when all three armed services are undermanned, is causing acute concern to senior officers. Lord Guthrie, who stood down as Chief of the Defence Staff, accepted last December that the defence programme "was underfunded".
Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, the First Sea Lord, is retiring three months early amid widespread speculation that he is unhappy about the funding issue after accepting the decision to axe the Sea Harriers.
Warships regularly put out to sea without their full crew complement; another frigate, HMS Sheffield, was effectively decommissioned last month; and the attack submarine fleet will shrink from 12 to 10 over the next couple of years, according to the Conservative Research Department.
Although ministers at the MoD declined to discuss the Sea Harrier issue, Mr Blair insisted during Prime Minister's Questions on April 10 that the decision would not affect Britain's defence capacity.
He maintained that Labour had delivered the first defence budget increase in real terms after many years of cuts under the Conservatives.
Unquote
The arguement is really very simple. There can be no good reason to deprive the RN of its operational capabities and obligations by getting rid of the SHar. Furthermore I have yet to see one creditable reason as to why they should go ie a better replacement for example. Objections to the SHar followed by assertions that the Jaguar is a better aircraft are simply ludicrous and not worthy of any plausible, considered arguement.
Here is some more. If you felt yourselves yawning after the last post Wake Up. This is serious
(I think many of you need reminding)
Quote from the Daily Telegraph:
Sea Harrier's demise puts Britain's fleet in peril for six years
(Filed: 08/05/2002)
BRITAIN loses taskforce capability, writes David Graves
AS with many Government announcements, it was not immediately clear that it contained a significant change in defence policy. On Feb 28, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, made a seemingly innocuous statement about the future of the Joint Force Harrier operated by the Royal Navy and RAF. His bombshell was carefully concealed.
Masked within the statement about upgrading all the Harriers in the force was the announcement that all the Navy's Sea Harrier FA2s would be withdrawn from service by 2006.
Not only had the Secretary of State announced the scrapping of Britain's best all-weather fighter, but he had also disclosed that for at least six years from 2006, until the planned Anglo-American Joint Strike Fighter was introduced, Britain could not unilaterally deploy a naval taskforce because it would have inadequate air defence.
If the Government wanted to go to war, a taskforce would have to be accompanied by an American aircraft carrier to provide fixed-wing air defence. If Washington vetoed the operation, there would be little, if anything, the Navy could do. (So the US get to dictate UK Foreign policy, my words)
The potential ramifications were so serious that several admirals, including Adml Sir Sandy Woodward, who commanded the Falklands taskforce, and Sea Harrier pilots mounted a campaign to change the Government's mind. They reasoned that ministers must have been kept in the dark by MoD officials before agreeing to such a radical "own goal".
At present, a combination of Sea Harriers and RAF GR7 and GR9 Harriers are deployed on the Navy's three aircraft carriers. The Sea Harriers provide air defence to the fleet, while the RAF Harriers are ground attack aircraft. When the Sea Harriers are withdrawn from service, the RAF Harriers will be unable to fill the void caused by the demise of the Sea Harriers.
The Sea Harrier FA2, introduced in 1993, is highly regarded by the United States Air Force as the "small aircraft with the big radar" and regularly beats the RAF's frontline fighter, the Tornado F3, in mock "dog fights".
It has sophisticated air-to-air radar able to track more than 20 targets simultaneously and a proven beyond visual range advanced medium range missile system, able to engage four targets simultaneously more than 30 miles away.
The RAF Harriers do not have the Sea Harriers' radar or missile system and have a very limited air defence capability using Sidewinder missiles, which can be used only at short range and in daylight. It has no ability to defend itself against enemy fighters armed with beyond visual range radar or medium range air-to-air missiles and needs to be escorted by friendly fighters.
At present, the Navy's outer layer of air defence is provided by Sea Harriers. They patrol about 100 nautical miles from the centre of the taskforce. Using their powerful radar, they can detect and intercept enemy aircraft over land and sea more than 70 nautical miles away.
The middle layer of air defence is provided by ageing Type 42 destroyers armed with the outdated Sea Dart missile system, which is no longer deemed capable of reliably engaging and destroying modern air-to-surface missile systems.
The Type 42's diameter of detection is limited to 40 nautical miles. Therefore, six destroyers would be needed fully to cover a 180° threat sector; or 12 if facing an all round threat.
The last layer of detection is provided by Sea King helicopter early warning aircraft, which normally operate not far from the centre of the fleet with a detection capability of about 40 nautical miles. Last ditch defence is provided by point defence missile and gun systems, such as Sea Wolf and Goalkeeper and decoy systems. However, it is more than likely that even if a sea skimming missile is hit, it will still strike the target ship.
Without the Sea Harriers from 2006, a taskforce would have no ability to deter, detect and intercept an enemy aircraft or missile. The Type 42 destroyers, designed in the Sixties, are also due to be withdrawn but, if still in service, Sea Dart would be largely dysfunctional. Their replacement, the Type 45 with its state-of-the-art PAAMS weapons system, has had problems of its own and will not be available in sufficient numbers until after 2010.
The effectiveness of the Type 45's weapons systems have yet to be definitively established during trials. Although the first Type 45 is due to enter service in 2007, there is scepticism that it will not be ready for full active service before the end of 2008. Only three Type 45s, which will still be restricted to a 20 nautical mile radar horizon, are expected to be in service by 2010.
The sombre reality is that, after the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier, the "last ditch" layer of air detection and defence, the early warning helicopter and weapons systems, would be easily saturated and overcome by enemy aircraft delivering air-to-surface missiles, Smart weapons and even iron bombs. That is the legacy the Government has left Britain's Armed Forces, whose achievements are often lauded by Tony Blair.
So to all of you at Blackpool DO NOT ALLOW THE SEA HARRIER TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A REPLACEMENT IS AVAILABLE
FEBA
Cuts 'rip heart out of defence strategy'
By David Graves
(Filed: 08/05/2002)
THE Royal Navy will be left unprotected and one of its three aircraft carriers will be mothballed as a direct result of a government decision that "rips the heart out" of Britain's defence strategy, the Tories will warn today.
Bernard Jenkin, the shadow defence secretary, will accuse the Treasury of putting "intolerable pressure" on the defence budget, leaving Britain without the capability to mount a war-time expedition to match the Falklands taskforce.
He will use a Commons debate to highlight the scrapping of the Navy's Sea Harrier fighter aircraft, which he will blame on a £1 billion cut in defence spending since Labour came to power in the 1997 election.
The loss of the Sea Harriers from 2006 will mean that for the next decade any Royal Navy expedition will have to enlist the help of an American aircraft carrier to provide the planes needed to protect the fleet, he will claim.
Mr Jenkin will point to the decision to withdraw Invincible, one of the Royal Navy's three aircraft carriers, from service in 2006 as evidence that the decommissioning of the Sea Harriers has a far-ranging impact on the Navy.
Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, announced in February that the Sea Harrier FA2 would be withdrawn from service by 2006, instead of 2012, when the new Joint Strike Aircraft being developed with the United States are due to be introduced. This will leave the fleet without air cover for six years.
"It is simply unbelievable that in the middle of the war against terror the Government continues to cut our frontline forces," Mr Jenkin will tell MPs. "Moreover, this shows how the Government's 1998 Strategic Defence Review is unravelling because of lack of money.
"This decision rips the heart out of the Joint Task Force capability, which was central to the Government's defence policy."
The MoD expects to save what Mr Jenkin described as a "mere" £109 million. But senior Royal Navy officers privately admit that because of the decision the Navy will be unable to send a taskforce to war for at least six years unless it is accompanied by an American aircraft carrier to mount air defence of the fleet.
They conceded that if Argentina reinvaded the Falkland Islands, as it did 20 years ago, between 2006 and 2012, Britain would be unable to recapture them without support from Washington.
The Government's defence policy states that its prime commitment is to provide forces to defend the UK and "overseas territories, our people and interests".
Underfunding of the defence budget - now £23.5 billion - at a time when all three armed services are undermanned, is causing acute concern to senior officers. Lord Guthrie, who stood down as Chief of the Defence Staff, accepted last December that the defence programme "was underfunded".
Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, the First Sea Lord, is retiring three months early amid widespread speculation that he is unhappy about the funding issue after accepting the decision to axe the Sea Harriers.
Warships regularly put out to sea without their full crew complement; another frigate, HMS Sheffield, was effectively decommissioned last month; and the attack submarine fleet will shrink from 12 to 10 over the next couple of years, according to the Conservative Research Department.
Although ministers at the MoD declined to discuss the Sea Harrier issue, Mr Blair insisted during Prime Minister's Questions on April 10 that the decision would not affect Britain's defence capacity.
He maintained that Labour had delivered the first defence budget increase in real terms after many years of cuts under the Conservatives.
Unquote
The arguement is really very simple. There can be no good reason to deprive the RN of its operational capabities and obligations by getting rid of the SHar. Furthermore I have yet to see one creditable reason as to why they should go ie a better replacement for example. Objections to the SHar followed by assertions that the Jaguar is a better aircraft are simply ludicrous and not worthy of any plausible, considered arguement.
Here is some more. If you felt yourselves yawning after the last post Wake Up. This is serious
(I think many of you need reminding)
Quote from the Daily Telegraph:
Sea Harrier's demise puts Britain's fleet in peril for six years
(Filed: 08/05/2002)
BRITAIN loses taskforce capability, writes David Graves
AS with many Government announcements, it was not immediately clear that it contained a significant change in defence policy. On Feb 28, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, made a seemingly innocuous statement about the future of the Joint Force Harrier operated by the Royal Navy and RAF. His bombshell was carefully concealed.
Masked within the statement about upgrading all the Harriers in the force was the announcement that all the Navy's Sea Harrier FA2s would be withdrawn from service by 2006.
Not only had the Secretary of State announced the scrapping of Britain's best all-weather fighter, but he had also disclosed that for at least six years from 2006, until the planned Anglo-American Joint Strike Fighter was introduced, Britain could not unilaterally deploy a naval taskforce because it would have inadequate air defence.
If the Government wanted to go to war, a taskforce would have to be accompanied by an American aircraft carrier to provide fixed-wing air defence. If Washington vetoed the operation, there would be little, if anything, the Navy could do. (So the US get to dictate UK Foreign policy, my words)
The potential ramifications were so serious that several admirals, including Adml Sir Sandy Woodward, who commanded the Falklands taskforce, and Sea Harrier pilots mounted a campaign to change the Government's mind. They reasoned that ministers must have been kept in the dark by MoD officials before agreeing to such a radical "own goal".
At present, a combination of Sea Harriers and RAF GR7 and GR9 Harriers are deployed on the Navy's three aircraft carriers. The Sea Harriers provide air defence to the fleet, while the RAF Harriers are ground attack aircraft. When the Sea Harriers are withdrawn from service, the RAF Harriers will be unable to fill the void caused by the demise of the Sea Harriers.
The Sea Harrier FA2, introduced in 1993, is highly regarded by the United States Air Force as the "small aircraft with the big radar" and regularly beats the RAF's frontline fighter, the Tornado F3, in mock "dog fights".
It has sophisticated air-to-air radar able to track more than 20 targets simultaneously and a proven beyond visual range advanced medium range missile system, able to engage four targets simultaneously more than 30 miles away.
The RAF Harriers do not have the Sea Harriers' radar or missile system and have a very limited air defence capability using Sidewinder missiles, which can be used only at short range and in daylight. It has no ability to defend itself against enemy fighters armed with beyond visual range radar or medium range air-to-air missiles and needs to be escorted by friendly fighters.
At present, the Navy's outer layer of air defence is provided by Sea Harriers. They patrol about 100 nautical miles from the centre of the taskforce. Using their powerful radar, they can detect and intercept enemy aircraft over land and sea more than 70 nautical miles away.
The middle layer of air defence is provided by ageing Type 42 destroyers armed with the outdated Sea Dart missile system, which is no longer deemed capable of reliably engaging and destroying modern air-to-surface missile systems.
The Type 42's diameter of detection is limited to 40 nautical miles. Therefore, six destroyers would be needed fully to cover a 180° threat sector; or 12 if facing an all round threat.
The last layer of detection is provided by Sea King helicopter early warning aircraft, which normally operate not far from the centre of the fleet with a detection capability of about 40 nautical miles. Last ditch defence is provided by point defence missile and gun systems, such as Sea Wolf and Goalkeeper and decoy systems. However, it is more than likely that even if a sea skimming missile is hit, it will still strike the target ship.
Without the Sea Harriers from 2006, a taskforce would have no ability to deter, detect and intercept an enemy aircraft or missile. The Type 42 destroyers, designed in the Sixties, are also due to be withdrawn but, if still in service, Sea Dart would be largely dysfunctional. Their replacement, the Type 45 with its state-of-the-art PAAMS weapons system, has had problems of its own and will not be available in sufficient numbers until after 2010.
The effectiveness of the Type 45's weapons systems have yet to be definitively established during trials. Although the first Type 45 is due to enter service in 2007, there is scepticism that it will not be ready for full active service before the end of 2008. Only three Type 45s, which will still be restricted to a 20 nautical mile radar horizon, are expected to be in service by 2010.
The sombre reality is that, after the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier, the "last ditch" layer of air detection and defence, the early warning helicopter and weapons systems, would be easily saturated and overcome by enemy aircraft delivering air-to-surface missiles, Smart weapons and even iron bombs. That is the legacy the Government has left Britain's Armed Forces, whose achievements are often lauded by Tony Blair.
So to all of you at Blackpool DO NOT ALLOW THE SEA HARRIER TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A REPLACEMENT IS AVAILABLE
FEBA
Last edited by FEBA; 8th Oct 2003 at 00:51.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Red Red Back to Bed
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I well remember the second article, in fact we had it up on the wall in the office. It had some lovely graphics depicting the layers of defence. Although not arguing with basic concept behind the article, the piece on the AEW Sea King was wholly innacurate and misleading. Even our old Mk 2 aircraft was far more capable than that described.
The new Mk7 ASac Aircraft is a quantum leap in technology and capability and is state of the art.
A shameless plug for my community I know however more info can be found on the Navy website here
Oggin
The new Mk7 ASac Aircraft is a quantum leap in technology and capability and is state of the art.
A shameless plug for my community I know however more info can be found on the Navy website here
Oggin
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sir Timothy Garden
Sea Harriers Go Early
by Sir Timothy Garden
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon announces the new "Migration strategy for the Joint Force Harrier". This rather technical sounding programme involves the early phasing out of the Royal Navy Sea Harrier Force. There will be concerns in many quarters that the loss of this unique sea-based fighter capability is another indication of problems in funding the UK defence programme. Last month the RAF lost a Tornado F3 air defence fighter squadron, and now the Fleet Air Arm will lose all 24 of its Sea Harrier FA2s which are divided between 3 squadrons. The run down is expected to take place between 2004 and 2006. The MOD are taking a strong line that this is a sensible route to the new aircraft carrier capability which arrives in 2012. The arguments are complex and will need careful handling.
The Joint Harrier Force, conceived during the Strategic Defence Review, is up and running with a mixture of Navy and RAF Harrier aircraft. Unfortunately, the Sea Harrier and the RAF's Harrier GR7 share little in common apart from the name and an ability to hover. The Sea Harrier is an updated version of the original British designed Harrier aircraft. It has a good radar and air defence missile system, but suffers from insufficient power and an elderly airframe. As a result range and endurance are limited for carrier operations, and the problem becomes critical in warm climates. The RAF Harrier GR7 is a second generation and design of aircraft, and is a version of the American AV8B. It is to be upgraded over the next 3 years with a yet more powerful engine, and also the ability to operate the new range of precision weapons. It will then be known as the Harrier GR9.
The new plan sees the Joint Harrier Force changing from a mixture of Sea Harriers and Harrier GR7s to a single fleet of Harrier GR9s. There will be savings in logistics, maintenance and training costs that come from a common fleet. There will also be a considerable saving from the reduction of number of aircraft to be operated. The current Joint Harrier Force has a total of 113 aircraft; after the migration to the GR9 this is expected to reduce to 71 aircraft. Not only will the 3 Sea Harrier squadrons disappear, but the four GR7 squadrons of 12 aircraft each will reduce to 9 GR9 aircraft per squadron. This reduces the pilot requirement at a time when both the Fleet Air Arm and the RAF are suffering from shortages.
But the MOD claims that the savings in money and manpower are not the driving force for this change. Certainly there is no improvement in operational capability in the near term. The prime role of the Sea Harrier was to provide air defence for a Carrier force. Missiles aboard surface ships can provide point defence, but do not allow the area defence necessary to control air space. Without the Sea Harrier, the MOD will have to think very carefully where it places its carriers for operations. In practice they will need to be assured that the US Navy will be able to give continuous air defence cover if they are within range of possible hostile powers. This is not very different from what already happens, but, at a time when Allies are being pressed to do more, it may be seen by the USA as a move in the wrong direction. It would be possible to upgrade the GR9 further so that it had a suitable radar to operate in the fighter role, but this would cost more money than the MOD are prepared to pay when they are expecting the Joint Strike Fighter to provide all their needed capabilities from 2012 onwards.
So why is this drop in operational capability being accepted if budgets are not the key? The rationale is that these moves are necessary in order to make a coherent transition to the new force envisaged for the two new aircraft carriers which are due in 2012 and 2015. A single aircraft type, the Joint Strike Fighter, would have replaced all Naval and RAF Harriers in any case. To have updated the Sea Harrier as well as the GR7 would not have been sensible, particularly as the need is to promote offensive airpower. In addition, the merger of the aircrew and, even more importantly, the engineering support from RAF and RN will take time. By doing it this way, they will be ready as a truly joint force to take on the JSF when it arrives.
On balance, recognition of the limitations of the Sea Harrier is overdue. However, the loss of a key capability in any maritime operation is a concern. The final design of the Joint Strike Fighter has still to be agreed. It would be a brave prophet who forecast a delivery date. Even the upgrades to the GR7 carry technical risk of delay. The acute shortage of Royal Navy Harrier pilots will be less obvious in the merged squadrons of the Joint Harrier Force, and the RAF will be able to absorb its displaced aircrew to fill empty cockpits elsewhere. However, the effect on long term retention and recruitment will take some time to see. It is not clear whether it will be positive or negative for either service. Perhaps the greatest question will be why the new big aircraft carriers are so important in 2012 and 2015 if we feel we can limp along until then with our small capability reduced yet further.
Finally, it is surprising to see this important force change being agreed ahead of the work on the extra chapter to the SDR due in the Summer. There will however we a welcome for the early guidance to the FAA staff at Yeovilton as to the new timetable for their family moves north.
Need any more. I think thats enough for tonight , however the web is full of articles from highly respected people such as Sir Timothy.
FEBA
Sea Harriers Go Early
by Sir Timothy Garden
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon announces the new "Migration strategy for the Joint Force Harrier". This rather technical sounding programme involves the early phasing out of the Royal Navy Sea Harrier Force. There will be concerns in many quarters that the loss of this unique sea-based fighter capability is another indication of problems in funding the UK defence programme. Last month the RAF lost a Tornado F3 air defence fighter squadron, and now the Fleet Air Arm will lose all 24 of its Sea Harrier FA2s which are divided between 3 squadrons. The run down is expected to take place between 2004 and 2006. The MOD are taking a strong line that this is a sensible route to the new aircraft carrier capability which arrives in 2012. The arguments are complex and will need careful handling.
The Joint Harrier Force, conceived during the Strategic Defence Review, is up and running with a mixture of Navy and RAF Harrier aircraft. Unfortunately, the Sea Harrier and the RAF's Harrier GR7 share little in common apart from the name and an ability to hover. The Sea Harrier is an updated version of the original British designed Harrier aircraft. It has a good radar and air defence missile system, but suffers from insufficient power and an elderly airframe. As a result range and endurance are limited for carrier operations, and the problem becomes critical in warm climates. The RAF Harrier GR7 is a second generation and design of aircraft, and is a version of the American AV8B. It is to be upgraded over the next 3 years with a yet more powerful engine, and also the ability to operate the new range of precision weapons. It will then be known as the Harrier GR9.
The new plan sees the Joint Harrier Force changing from a mixture of Sea Harriers and Harrier GR7s to a single fleet of Harrier GR9s. There will be savings in logistics, maintenance and training costs that come from a common fleet. There will also be a considerable saving from the reduction of number of aircraft to be operated. The current Joint Harrier Force has a total of 113 aircraft; after the migration to the GR9 this is expected to reduce to 71 aircraft. Not only will the 3 Sea Harrier squadrons disappear, but the four GR7 squadrons of 12 aircraft each will reduce to 9 GR9 aircraft per squadron. This reduces the pilot requirement at a time when both the Fleet Air Arm and the RAF are suffering from shortages.
But the MOD claims that the savings in money and manpower are not the driving force for this change. Certainly there is no improvement in operational capability in the near term. The prime role of the Sea Harrier was to provide air defence for a Carrier force. Missiles aboard surface ships can provide point defence, but do not allow the area defence necessary to control air space. Without the Sea Harrier, the MOD will have to think very carefully where it places its carriers for operations. In practice they will need to be assured that the US Navy will be able to give continuous air defence cover if they are within range of possible hostile powers. This is not very different from what already happens, but, at a time when Allies are being pressed to do more, it may be seen by the USA as a move in the wrong direction. It would be possible to upgrade the GR9 further so that it had a suitable radar to operate in the fighter role, but this would cost more money than the MOD are prepared to pay when they are expecting the Joint Strike Fighter to provide all their needed capabilities from 2012 onwards.
So why is this drop in operational capability being accepted if budgets are not the key? The rationale is that these moves are necessary in order to make a coherent transition to the new force envisaged for the two new aircraft carriers which are due in 2012 and 2015. A single aircraft type, the Joint Strike Fighter, would have replaced all Naval and RAF Harriers in any case. To have updated the Sea Harrier as well as the GR7 would not have been sensible, particularly as the need is to promote offensive airpower. In addition, the merger of the aircrew and, even more importantly, the engineering support from RAF and RN will take time. By doing it this way, they will be ready as a truly joint force to take on the JSF when it arrives.
On balance, recognition of the limitations of the Sea Harrier is overdue. However, the loss of a key capability in any maritime operation is a concern. The final design of the Joint Strike Fighter has still to be agreed. It would be a brave prophet who forecast a delivery date. Even the upgrades to the GR7 carry technical risk of delay. The acute shortage of Royal Navy Harrier pilots will be less obvious in the merged squadrons of the Joint Harrier Force, and the RAF will be able to absorb its displaced aircrew to fill empty cockpits elsewhere. However, the effect on long term retention and recruitment will take some time to see. It is not clear whether it will be positive or negative for either service. Perhaps the greatest question will be why the new big aircraft carriers are so important in 2012 and 2015 if we feel we can limp along until then with our small capability reduced yet further.
Finally, it is surprising to see this important force change being agreed ahead of the work on the extra chapter to the SDR due in the Summer. There will however we a welcome for the early guidance to the FAA staff at Yeovilton as to the new timetable for their family moves north.
Need any more. I think thats enough for tonight , however the web is full of articles from highly respected people such as Sir Timothy.
FEBA
I seem to remember posting those two stories on another Sea Harrier thread (SHAR Wars) last year, although with much less finesse.
I think this is the diagram you are refering to:
Picture from the Telegraph
This picture is something of a simplification of the situation - but I think you get the point.
Another thing, I seem to remember that in 1998 and 1999 there were a couple of crises in the Gulf (again over the issue of Saddam not allowing UN inspectors to work freely) which resulted in a CVS, complete with Sea Harriers, being sent to the Gulf. So it has been deployed out there.
I think this is the diagram you are refering to:
Picture from the Telegraph
This picture is something of a simplification of the situation - but I think you get the point.
Another thing, I seem to remember that in 1998 and 1999 there were a couple of crises in the Gulf (again over the issue of Saddam not allowing UN inspectors to work freely) which resulted in a CVS, complete with Sea Harriers, being sent to the Gulf. So it has been deployed out there.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The following is an extract from Hansard 17JUL2002. The debate reveals the governments acceptance of horrible gaps in the RN's AD capabilities. Time to have another debate.
Mr. Kevan Jones: May I try to extract a commitment from the hon. Gentleman? The Conservative party's approach to defence expenditure seems to rely on an elastic cheque book. If we were in the nightmare situation that there was a Tory Government, would they take a gamble with money and technology and actually upgrade the Sea Harrier?
Mr. Howarth: There is no technical gamble in operating the Sea Harrier at present. As we speak, the Sea Harrier is on duty with Her Majesty's forces, performing the role for which it was designed—to defend the fleet and act as an interceptor. The aircraft is doing that at the moment, so there is no technical gamble to take.
The Government should acknowledge that the Select Committee, by consensus, was unhappy with their decision to scrap the Sea Harrier. Even Sir Jock conceded:
The hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock) also referred to that point. In effect, Sir Jock was saying—he made no secret of it—"If we had the money, we'd like to keep the Sea Harriers". I have heard that from even higher authorities.
Mr. Hancock: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he still shares my opinion that no sustainable argument was made by anyone who gave evidence to the Committee for the early phasing out of the Sea Harrier? The life of the aircraft could be extended until the gap could be fully covered by the Type 45 and the upgraded equipment on the Type 42.
Mr. Howarth: The hon. Gentleman is right. If the joint strike fighter is to have its air defence capability, it is conceded that that would be valuable for a maritime expeditionary force, but that is what will be removed.
The Government are relying on the Type 45 destroyer with its improved phased-array radar and new principal anti-air missile system to make up some of the air defence capability lost with the demise of the Sea Harrier. However, the first Type 45 is not due in service until at least 2007—as the Minister acknowledged—but we do not know whether that target in-service date will be achieved. Even that is a full 18 months after the last Sea Harrier will have disappeared—assuming that the programme will be on time and that its weapons system meets the specification.
Will the Minister confirm the Defence Procurement Agency's statement that the ship will have a potential ballistic missile defence capability, using the Sampson radar? In a written answer to my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence denied that any Ministry of Defence studies had been made to assess the specific suitability of the Type 45 for a ballistic missile defence role. He also acknowledged:
"It is not . . . something that I would have chosen to do were it not for the fact that we have to make some hard choices in terms of balance of investment
"As the design of the type 45 progresses, opportunities to upgrade the ship's capability are being identified and acted upon".—[Official Report, 16 July 2002; Vol. 389, c. 158W.]
17 Jul 2002 : Column 338
Will the Minister tell us what those opportunities are and whether studies will be carried out to assess the vessel's adaptability to a BMD role? However shy the Government may be on that point, we know that the capability exists, and Labour Members should reflect on the assurances—false or otherwise—that they may have been given.
Mr. Francois: Although the official in-service date for the Type 45 is late 2007, the vessel is a first of class. With such vessels there are often extra trials, so realistically the in-service date will be 2008 or even 2009. Can my hon. Friend therefore confirm that the gap between the Sea Harrier coming out and PAAMS—the principal anti-air missie systems—being available on the Type 45 could be two or even three years?
Mr. Howarth: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Type 45 is due at the end of 2007. Once it has been to sea, it will be withdrawn—as my hon. Friend rightly says—to—the principal anti-air missile systems—undergo further trials. It will thus not be available.
Military chief to retire early as Hoon denies rift
By Andrew Sparrow and Benedict Brogan
(Filed: 06/07/2002)
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce is understood to be preparing to retire as the most senior military officer next year amid rumours that he has a poor relationship with ministers.
The Chief of the Defence Staff will have served just two years in the job if, as expected, he leaves his post early next year at the age of 60.
Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence said yesterday it was usual for a CDS to be appointed for a two-year term, but Sir Michael's two immediate predecessors both served for more than three years. Extending the contract is little more than a formality.
Yesterday, Mr Hoon denied reports that Sir Michael was to step down early because of disagreements. "There is no truth in that story whatsoever," he said.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman was more circumspect, saying that no decision had been taken about his tenure. Reports of a rift between Sir Michael and Mr Hoon were "pretty speculative", the two men enjoying "an effective working relationship".
There have been reports in military circles that Sir Michael's relations with Mr Hoon are strained. The two are understood to have disagreed over funding and aspects of the war against terrorism.
Sir Michael, a distinguished submariner, is said to have been deeply unhappy about Mr Hoon's decision to scrap the Navy's Sea Harriers.
He was subject to criticism at the end of last year for warning against a "Wild West" approach to terrorism, which was interpreted as an attack on the Americans.
FEBA
Mr. Kevan Jones: May I try to extract a commitment from the hon. Gentleman? The Conservative party's approach to defence expenditure seems to rely on an elastic cheque book. If we were in the nightmare situation that there was a Tory Government, would they take a gamble with money and technology and actually upgrade the Sea Harrier?
Mr. Howarth: There is no technical gamble in operating the Sea Harrier at present. As we speak, the Sea Harrier is on duty with Her Majesty's forces, performing the role for which it was designed—to defend the fleet and act as an interceptor. The aircraft is doing that at the moment, so there is no technical gamble to take.
The Government should acknowledge that the Select Committee, by consensus, was unhappy with their decision to scrap the Sea Harrier. Even Sir Jock conceded:
The hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock) also referred to that point. In effect, Sir Jock was saying—he made no secret of it—"If we had the money, we'd like to keep the Sea Harriers". I have heard that from even higher authorities.
Mr. Hancock: Will the hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he still shares my opinion that no sustainable argument was made by anyone who gave evidence to the Committee for the early phasing out of the Sea Harrier? The life of the aircraft could be extended until the gap could be fully covered by the Type 45 and the upgraded equipment on the Type 42.
Mr. Howarth: The hon. Gentleman is right. If the joint strike fighter is to have its air defence capability, it is conceded that that would be valuable for a maritime expeditionary force, but that is what will be removed.
The Government are relying on the Type 45 destroyer with its improved phased-array radar and new principal anti-air missile system to make up some of the air defence capability lost with the demise of the Sea Harrier. However, the first Type 45 is not due in service until at least 2007—as the Minister acknowledged—but we do not know whether that target in-service date will be achieved. Even that is a full 18 months after the last Sea Harrier will have disappeared—assuming that the programme will be on time and that its weapons system meets the specification.
Will the Minister confirm the Defence Procurement Agency's statement that the ship will have a potential ballistic missile defence capability, using the Sampson radar? In a written answer to my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence denied that any Ministry of Defence studies had been made to assess the specific suitability of the Type 45 for a ballistic missile defence role. He also acknowledged:
"It is not . . . something that I would have chosen to do were it not for the fact that we have to make some hard choices in terms of balance of investment
"As the design of the type 45 progresses, opportunities to upgrade the ship's capability are being identified and acted upon".—[Official Report, 16 July 2002; Vol. 389, c. 158W.]
17 Jul 2002 : Column 338
Will the Minister tell us what those opportunities are and whether studies will be carried out to assess the vessel's adaptability to a BMD role? However shy the Government may be on that point, we know that the capability exists, and Labour Members should reflect on the assurances—false or otherwise—that they may have been given.
Mr. Francois: Although the official in-service date for the Type 45 is late 2007, the vessel is a first of class. With such vessels there are often extra trials, so realistically the in-service date will be 2008 or even 2009. Can my hon. Friend therefore confirm that the gap between the Sea Harrier coming out and PAAMS—the principal anti-air missie systems—being available on the Type 45 could be two or even three years?
Mr. Howarth: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Type 45 is due at the end of 2007. Once it has been to sea, it will be withdrawn—as my hon. Friend rightly says—to—the principal anti-air missile systems—undergo further trials. It will thus not be available.
Military chief to retire early as Hoon denies rift
By Andrew Sparrow and Benedict Brogan
(Filed: 06/07/2002)
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce is understood to be preparing to retire as the most senior military officer next year amid rumours that he has a poor relationship with ministers.
The Chief of the Defence Staff will have served just two years in the job if, as expected, he leaves his post early next year at the age of 60.
Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence said yesterday it was usual for a CDS to be appointed for a two-year term, but Sir Michael's two immediate predecessors both served for more than three years. Extending the contract is little more than a formality.
Yesterday, Mr Hoon denied reports that Sir Michael was to step down early because of disagreements. "There is no truth in that story whatsoever," he said.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman was more circumspect, saying that no decision had been taken about his tenure. Reports of a rift between Sir Michael and Mr Hoon were "pretty speculative", the two men enjoying "an effective working relationship".
There have been reports in military circles that Sir Michael's relations with Mr Hoon are strained. The two are understood to have disagreed over funding and aspects of the war against terrorism.
Sir Michael, a distinguished submariner, is said to have been deeply unhappy about Mr Hoon's decision to scrap the Navy's Sea Harriers.
He was subject to criticism at the end of last year for warning against a "Wild West" approach to terrorism, which was interpreted as an attack on the Americans.
FEBA
Suspicion breeds confidence
Another thing
An all GR9 airgroup on CVS will cause another problem, namely bomb room capacity. Its been speculated on another board that the bomb room on a CVS can only hold 30 X 1,000lb bombs. If true, we are looking at less than one strike by a 9 ship GR9 squadron before its stocks are empty. Some power... some projection.
Join Date: May 2003
Location: Tracy Island
Posts: 532
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Time to escalate things, guys.
I want this debated again in the House of Commons and I want the government to back down. Common sense dictates here.
All of you that support this cause would you please write to your MP (mine's getting a letter, Alan Duncan). The ball needs to start rolling; NOW.
FEBA
I want this debated again in the House of Commons and I want the government to back down. Common sense dictates here.
All of you that support this cause would you please write to your MP (mine's getting a letter, Alan Duncan). The ball needs to start rolling; NOW.
FEBA
Navaleye,
If what you say is correct, then the CVS is clearly of no use for power projection. It's not a cost effective way of delivering that small a number of sorties.
It follows that a half and half air wing will be similarly non-effective.
The only remaining role for the CVS is thus Fleet Air Defence, with an all SHar air wing. There aren't enough SHars on a CVS to do that properly even without diluting the numbers by embarking GR9s, and what's the point of sending a carrier if all it can do is defend itself and its escorts?
And our coalition allies can do that anyway.
Scrap the SHar and scrap the CVSs now.
And scrap the 30% overweight JSF and the CVFs now, too and spend the money more wisely.
If what you say is correct, then the CVS is clearly of no use for power projection. It's not a cost effective way of delivering that small a number of sorties.
It follows that a half and half air wing will be similarly non-effective.
The only remaining role for the CVS is thus Fleet Air Defence, with an all SHar air wing. There aren't enough SHars on a CVS to do that properly even without diluting the numbers by embarking GR9s, and what's the point of sending a carrier if all it can do is defend itself and its escorts?
And our coalition allies can do that anyway.
Scrap the SHar and scrap the CVSs now.
And scrap the 30% overweight JSF and the CVFs now, too and spend the money more wisely.