Sea Jet

[rivetjoint]

It depends on how you define "not losing". When was the last time the Navy had a naval battle that it could win, battleships Vs battleships? We regained control of the Falkslands in 1982 but lost a few ships, would you still call that winning?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

In that we (the UK) achieved our objectives - yes!

But if the task force had lost so many ships that it was impossible to carry on with operations, or the Argentines had hit a carrier or other high value unit like a troop ship and politics forced a withdraw, then it would have been a defeat. Likewise if we had been unable to deploy!

In Battleship clashes (including those considered as victories) of the past ships were lost so I don't really see what your point is. And I think that you will find that the Battle of the Atlantic was, in the end, considered a victory for the allies.

[FEBA]

RJ
Of course it was a victory and a bloody good one at that. Perhaps you consider it to have been a pyrrhic victory; well it wasn't.
Had we have had proper carriers, not the pocket size ones, then victory may have cost less. But that's another story, this thread is about the future as we don't seem to have learnt the lessons of the past
FEBA

[Nozzles]

Navaleye,

I can't tell you whether the 9L actually made a difference over the 9G, but the potential was always there. I suspect that the reason the majority of intercepts during the war were of the stern-quarter variety was that the Argentinian pilots' situational awareness with respect to the air picture was poor. I would attribute their poor SA to the following: poor/no GCI coverage due to their long range from friendly surface based radars (and the low altitudes they were flying at) and their own extremely limited air-to-air sensor suites. Thus, when the defending SHARs offset to one side to work round behind them, they didn't react, presumably, because they were unaware of the enemy's presence. Had the Argentinians been aware, they would have almost certainly manoeuvered to negate the turning room the SHARs were trying to generate, forcing a head-on pass. In such a situation one can see the advantage of an all-aspect weapon over a stern-quarter only type.

Perhaps the then advanced technology of the 9L was too far ahead of the enemy's capabilities in that particular situation for it to make a difference-a bit like exploding an EMP charge over an enemy that doesn't have any sensitive electronics.

Then again, perhaps someone who was actually there could enlighten us?

[ORAC]

The Argentinians did have radar cover, provided by the TPS-43 of VCYA2 on Canopus Hill. It not only provided GCI threat warnings to their aircraft, it was also responsible for detecting and calling in fire on the ships landing troops at Fitzroy. It also tracked the Task Force ships and warned Argentine aircraft of Sea Dart launches. That saved the Learjets on 9 May, since they didn't carry radar warning receivers to warn them of either lock or launch.

Black Buck 5 and 6 attempted to take it out with Shrike, but only achieved a near miss inflicting some shrapnel damage on the waveguide.

It was an excellent radar, we used it for many years after the war, once we managed to get hold of some spares.

The Argentines' hadn't paid for it and told Westinghouse to ask the RAF for the money - we shrugged our shoulders and said spoils of war. They were, perhaps understandably, p*ssed off and refused to support it. We had to get all our spares through the back door via the USAF for several years until they accepted no-one was going to pay for it...

[rivetjoint]

Apologies if I made it sound as if I didn't call the Falklands a win, my point was just under what circumstances have the Navy declared a win in the past? How might lack of Shar cover in the future influence this?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

During the gap between Sea Harrier and JSF/F35 the RN will be unable to deploy to places that involve a significant level of air threat, unless it has air defence from allied carrierborne aircraft or from land based fighters.

UK only operations would no longer be possible.

Operations conducted along the US would be possible, but US commanders may (rightly perhaps) resent having to provide a CAP for the UK component. Since many nations have long coastlines (unlike Iraq), different carrier groups may be spread up and down the coast. The British one would provide what was still a small contribution to offensive airpower, yet put an extra demand on air defence resources. This would reduce the amount of influence the UK has on US planning. Additionally should a surprise attack happen then there is the issue of the time needed for extra aircraft to arrive on station. Even with supersonic aircraft, would this be as fast as with our own Sea Harriers aboard our own carrier?

Interestingly USN and USAF senior officers expressed concern over the loss of the Sea Harrier.

Operations alongside other carrier allies would involve many of the same problems. Because of the smaller numbers of aircraft carried by their carriers, the problems would be greater.

Likewise depending on RAF (or other) land based fighters may involve practical problems due to RAF commitments elsewhere, aircraft numbers, transit times etc.

I don't know if that answers your question - but if we (forgive me for saying "we") can not deploy, we can not win. Thus a major enabler is lost.....

The Government tried to justify the decision by claiming that future operations will be littoral in nature, as opposed to "Blue Water" operations far out at sea. Whilst this argument may have satisfied some it ignores the fact that littoral means nearer to the enemy.

On this thread I have posted links to websites that help explain the issue. The one below is another one.......

Littorals Text - a US paper

Moreover, operating close to the shore increases the threat of attack from land-based aircraft and missiles. Accordingly, the Navy must increase its anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare, and anti-mine warfare (AMW) capabilities, while also improving its amphibious assault forces and land-attack missile capabilities. Littoral operations require detection of and defense against shore-based cruise missiles as well as theater ballistic missiles defense (TMD). The Navy tested littoral operations in a 1994 war game and concluded that it "can’t effectively utilize power projection forces (aircraft carrier tactical aircraft and amphibious) until mines, subs, and tactical air and cruise missiles threats are reduced significantly."

Not the sort of thing that our politicians would want you to believe, is it?

There is a real irony in all of this. When Dennis Healy decided to scrap the conventional aircraft carriers in 1966, much of the striking power of the surface fleet was carried by carrier based aircraft, notably the Buccaneer. To make up this striking capability it was decided to buy the Exocet missile and fit it to destroyers and frigates. Indeed the Royal Navy was the first customer. The British order helped fund the development of the AM39 air launched version.

The Falklands task force suffered at the hands of Argentine airpower, including the AM39 Exocet. One of the key lessons was the importance of organic air defence with organic AEW. Also that the best way of dealing with missiles is to deal with the launch platform. The lessons were not lost on up and coming Navies (Spain, Italy, Thailand) who have been busy acquiring carriers, carrier based fighters AND BVR capability.

Yet when the issue is discussed on Newsnight a MOD Minister states that anti ship missiles are the main threat and "the Sea Harrier is no defence against them". Ignoring the above point and ignoring that since 1983 anti ship missiles (air launched or otherwise) have proliferated, have got longer ranges (beyond the range of Sea Dart), faster (less time for ships to react, harder to track and shoot down, and more damaging due to the greater kinetic energy) and smarter.

Will they ever learn?

[Impiger]

WEBF

You really are living in the past.

The MOD has reviewed all of its requirements and tested them against a set of scenarios. In not a single situation was the future (or present) carrier shown to be 'necessary'. Yes it improved flexiblity; yes it widen the choice of of options open to the commander but at absolutely no stage was it proven to be an essential requirement. They even had to invent a situation where it would be required so that they could test the other assumptions over rates of effort, logistic support etc.

So instead of trying to drum up a fictious requirement accept the future carrier for what it is: a floating option for the delivery of offensive air power in support of the air/land battle. Which complements but can never replace the shore based force.

The inescapable deduction of all the clever thinkers (including the Naval Staff) is that a carrier borne air-to-air capability is simply not required.

The SHAR capability was an embarassment during ALLIED FORCE over Kosovo - why? because there was already more than enough air defence cover and to meet the political posturing of involving the CVS we had to divert much needed AAR assets away from more important tasks (such as supporting the bomber offensive).

The SHAR has had its day and, good though it was once, its time to come to terms with the new realities and scrap early to maximise savings. The CVS of course can continue as a command ship or in the LPH role.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

When did the MOD do that?

The SDR said it was needed. If a decision that it wasn't needed was taken when was this? Until Febuary 2002 it was planned to upgrade it. Why upgrade an aircraft you don't need?

What if the assumption that we will only go to war alongside the US is wrong?

[DuckDodgers]

Impiger

Given the Naval Staff consists of a bunch of Fish Heads who have sold the FAA down the river by not fighting the NAVAL corner as a whole your comment carries little weight.

And as for ALLIED FORCE, diverting AAR assets? Come on, really, because those Tornado Gr's from Bruggen really did, well let us face it do very little to alter anything in Kosovo.

WEBF motioned

"Until Febuary 2002 it was planned to upgrade it. Why upgrade an aircraft you don't need?"

Thus is very true, even to this day certain EW trials are being conducted for SHAR (sorry chaps can't discuss here) that make it one of the (if not the) most survivable platforms in the inventory against SAM threats (again can't mention system specifics).

And Impiger let us carry your argument further, during TELIC what did the F3 community contribute? To paraphrase a certain U.S. 3 star NOTHING, ZERO, A DUCK! In fact it was motioned to get them out of PSAB as they were not a swing role aircraft (a v. popular idea in the CAOC). Finally for you, obviously a deluded indivdual who believes that the light blue can cover every inch of the globe from its land bases, GET REAL! Warfare is expeditionary, if land bases cannot be obtained then it is up to carriers and carrierborne airpower in conjunction with amphibious and airbourne forces to make anything like this possible. So how can MoD requirements conclude carriers are 'not necessary'? Are you an accountant per chance, best mates with that scottish prat of a chancellor who cannot add up?

At the end of the day a decision has been made and the first result will be seen on 31 Mar 04. If a spineless collective of senior officers (i include light blue and army, although predominantly Fish Head) cannot stand up to the least educated and least polticially astute and effective excuse for a government the UK has everseen; one willing to gamble the lives of a couple of thousand MEN and WOMEN onboard ships of the RN, then i hope they can live with the decission if this is proven in the next 8 years or more.

As for going to war without the U.S. Blair has not the balls to stand up for what is right for Britain, mainly putting thugs like Mugabe in a box once and for all and returning Zimbabwe back to its prosperous rightfulness................

Oh sorry chaps can't do that it is not PC, may be conceived a racist!! My backside......................

The SHAR was conceived to provide air defence to the fleet and have the ability to provide ground support to amphibious forces going ashore. I propose it has fulfilled both and given the tiny budget it consumes one that would have been ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY ANDMOST IMPORTANT MILITARILY viable until the advent of JSF.

[Magic Mushroom]

Mmm, some interesting comments here!

Firstly, Impinger,
As someone who flew during Allied Force, whilst the brief contribution that the SHAR force made was political, and contributed very little, I would still have rather have had an FA2 with AMRAAM on the FYROM CAPS than the Italian Tornado F3s or AIM-9L only Portugese F-16s that were sometimes there.

Duck Dodgers,
On the swing side however, it is frankly highly insulting to suggest that the Bruggen Tornado Wing achieved 'very little' during OAF. They flew some of the most demanding missions against some exceptionally well defended targets; the mission to Obrva on 1 May 99 being a fine example of obtaining good results in the face of intelligent and aggressive use of IADS, SAM and AAA. Whilst their initial use from Bruggen did obviously require AAR support, this was no more or less than the F-15Es from the UK, or the F-117s and other assets from Spangdalen. Indeed, the GR1 routing from Bruggen was partly dictated by US wishes to keep the war in the North of Serbia to themselves via the notorious 'Black' ATO, but don't get me started on that or I'll get all anti Spam again! Once the Tornado's were redeployed to Corsica in the closing week, the AAR issue was gone. Despite the distorted stats that came out after OAF regarding weapons effectiveness, the Bruggen Wing contributed much to OAF when compared to other assets.

Secondly, having flown alongside the F3s during TELIC from PSAB, it could indeed be argued that they achieved nothing. However, they flew exactly the same CAPS deep into Iraq from the outset that the USAF F-15Cs did, and they are not swing role either!!!! Are you suggesting that they F-15Cs achieved nothing?! DCA/AD can be a victim of its own success. Just because they didn't gain any kills, does not make them a failure!!!! It is just as much of a success (if not more so) when aggressive CAPs over hostile airbases ensure that the bad guys do not wish to even step inside the aircraft to challenge the strike assets. Nevertheless, OC 111 did blub like a girl when we nicked the 43/111 Op TELIC Standard!!!!

However, whilst I would question your assertion that the small FA2 budget is 'tiny' given what the fleet is capable of, I still agree that the loss of the SHARs AMRAAM capability is a huge and potentially fatal blow to RN power projection.

Regards,
M2

[Impiger]

DD

Your argument is emotional and carries little credibility. I agree the F3s did little during TELIC because the opposition turned out to be non-existant. Yes they were pulled out early; why? because they were taking up ramp space and AAR assets that were better used for other aircraft. Your ALLIED FORCE point is considerably wide of the mark - the AAR wasn't needed for the GR force who had dedicated assets to bring them down from Bruggen - it was needed to sustain the USN assets and in particular the EA6 SEAD force who were a critical enabler. The UK team at the CAOC upset the Air Commander big time insisting on releasing Tristars to refuel SHAR.

Your expeditionary point is the same as mine - the CVS lends flexibility the SHAR does not. Air Defence of the fleet can be better achieved by putting the fleet out of range; air defence (if needed) of the land component can be better achieved by land based assets.

Stop being emotional and face reality.

[DuckDodgers]

M2, granted the Bruggen Wing did fly some of the most demanding sorties of ALLIED FORCE and receieved the praise they justifiably earnt, but you yourself motion the issue of weapons effectiveness and this is what matters. Ultimately the Tornado force were deployed forward, the lsson being should this not have occurred from the onset?

But recountering impigers point of retasking AAR assets then:

Let us briefly recap light blue offensive assets in theatre and their direct support (apologise in advance for not mentioning E-3). Sixteen GR7 at Gioia del Colle by late April with three Tristar tankers if memory serves. Eight Tornado GR1s from Bruggen supported by three VC10s co-located and dedicated to this task, the former, increased to Twelve were deployed forward to Solenzara by 01 June thus allowing the VC-10s to redeploy to Italy and support the overall NATO AAR effort and not just Tornado sorties.

And to further counter Impiger, what was the number one LI fro ALLIED FORCE for the RN?

Aircraft carriers played a useful and versatile role in the operation.

M2 you asserted;

"when aggressive CAPs over hostile airbases ensure that the bad guys do not wish to even step inside the aircraft to challenge the strike assets."

This was simply not the case and these deep CAPS did not alter anything. The IZAF alert state prior to and throughout TELIC remained unchanged from OSW and ONW and coupled with the intel received in the ISRD, from varied sources, regards likely IZAF action made the F3 and F15C contribution purely a total safeguard as any prudent commander (maybe not the Blair Administration) has dedicated DCA even if the A-A threat is deemed low.

Find copies of the AODs and daily CAOC briefings and this will confirm this, bound to have them somewhere in the AWC, then again maybe not.......

To summise where i think we should go in the future, taking into account budgets, support and running costs, then SWING ROLE a/c are the future, there is little room for 100% single role OFFENSIVE a/c anymore, to deny this fact is madness.

[FEBA]

Impinger
I'm trying to think of the games that were played in order to justify the existance of a carrier force. God knows what daft senarios that were dreamt up. The real fact of the matter is that no one knows whats around the corner in real politik, if you lot did then you would have forseen the pregnant chaff and the election of George Dubbya (what's next weeks winning lottery numbers please?).
Now when it comes to defence reviews were're really not very good are we. We've been getting it wrong for some time. Take the defence staff review of trench warfare as first seen in earnest in the Russo-China war 1904-1905. This was seen by our lot as nothing to be taken seriously, the cavalry on horse back can win any war. Nine years later a network of trenches is being dug across France, the cavalry will never go to battle on horse back again. QED.
I'm trying very hard to accept the fact that Whitehall have got it right and the Hawks on the other side of the pond are all wrong.
I believe that the deterrent that a carrier force augmented with SHar (in the interim) is far cheaper than a war without it or have the MOD costed this as well.

[John Farley]

When anybody opens up with “Your argument is emotional and carries little credibility” then I am afraid that whatever the context or the rights and wrongs of the debate it just reminds me of primary school playgrounds.

Inter service rivalry is such a tragic waste of headpower and money. What the UK forces could have achieved without it.

[Magic Mushroom]

D2,
As far as I'm aware, the weapons effectiveness of the Tornado GR1 and Harrier GR7 assets involved in OAF was sound, despite some post confict statistical criticism. Certainly, I would suggest that both fleets' effectiveness stand up to scrutiny in comparison to other (non JDAM capable assets) given the extreme political, C2 and weather factors involved during the Kosovo conflict.

Yes, in an ideal world the Tornados should have been forward deployed from the outset, but ramp space throughout Europe (particularly for combat, as opposed to combat support assets (such as my own)) was at an absolute premium. That is why some F-15Es flew from the UK, and 50% of the F-117s flew from Germany. This clearly is where carriers can be useful, in augmenting land based aviation (although maritime aviation is nearly always reliant upon land based combat support assets). To reiterate however, your suggestion that the Tornados did 'very little to alter anything in Kosovo' is emotional and inaccurate.

You also state that the primary RN LI from Kosovo was that 'carriers played a useful and versatile role in the conflict'. I'd like to think that I come across as impartial in this thread. However, for the life of me, I cannot think of exactly what the single CVS allocated to the op achieved. First of all, the CVS was only around for a very short part of the conflict. When it was there, the SHARs flew very short duration DCA CAPs witin the FYROM and Albania only. Furthermore, the FA2s did not drop (or, to my knowledge even carry) bombs, nor were they used in a recce role. Likewise, the Sea King AEW and ASW were non players. From my perspective, the major OAF LI for the RN was the potential of TLAM.

If the LI referred to the USN CVNs then fine. A small number of the daily CAS pushes into Kosovo were allocated solely to the USN (indeed, the F-14s were particularly effective in the AFAC role). However, this was primarily because the USN are a nightmare to work with (eg using local time rather than Z, using their own procedures, codewords, complan, Optask LINK and ignoring the ACO/SPINS etc). Additionally, despite S-3B AAR, the USN assets relied heavily upon land based AAR and ISTAR, and barely ventured beyond Kosovo into Serbia itself. In such a context, a QE2 Class would indeed have been useful assuming a decent compliment of F-35s.

Finally, you mention the low Iraqi A-A threats from Int during TELIC. Whilst I'm not about to get into discussing Int assessments from such a recent conflict, the Iraqi's still possessed numerous serviceable MIG-23 and (most notably) MIG-25s. Both of these assets had shown themselves capable of mounting aggressive ops in the NFZs over recent months. This was particularly a concern for assets such as my own. Even the loss of a single E-3, E-8, SIGINT or tanker asset would have been a major blow to the coalition. Therefore, are you really suggesting that we didn't need DCA?!!! If you are, then come flying on one of these assets in the next punch up and see how you like it! Additionally, weren't such Int sources also talking about Iraqi WMD?!!!

I would agree that swing role is the way to go. No one is denying that fact. That is why money is now being spent on Typhoon and F-35 right now. The majority of the RAF would have loved to have had F-15Es 10+ years ago (rather than swing role Typhoons in 2007 (if we're lucky)). But the military don't make decisions on what we buy. The govt do that, always with an eye on jobs and votes.

Impinger,

AAR during OAF was NOT primarily needed to service the USN assets. Whilst the USN assets were more reliant upon AAR than some (not all) land based assets, the massive AAR effort during Kosovo was largely expended on land based assets (albeit because they formed the vast majority of assets involved) on a joint basis.

Once again, land based and maritime air power complement each other. In Kosovo the lousy weathor sometimes grounded aircraft at an immobile air base while a carrier could move and launch. Likewise, sometimes there were factors (eg RAS requirements and AAR) that precluded maritime aviation being commited. We (ie HMF) need Typhoon just as much as we need CVF with a decent compliment of F-35.

Regards,
M2

[NURSE]

MM whilst i agree with large chunks of your post i firmly believe giving up capibility today for Jam and having to rebuild that capability tomorrow is a huge mistake. The money has been spent on the Blue vixen radar updates so why not put it to use. Unfortunatley the Fleet air arm should have Pushed to replace the FRS1 with a HarrierII airframe with the wiring for AMRAAM and Blue Vixen. May be it would be better if GR9 programme was binned and the airframes converted into II+ equivilent with Blue Vixen the USMC appears to have done rather well with that programme and I'm sure alot of their experience would help keep costs down.
If the govenment deceided that in 5 years the Sentry would be replace by an a340 AEW in 5 years but to get funding the sentry was to be grounded and sold you would be here screaming about it being a wrong move.

[Impiger]

M2

When I said AAR I should have qualified it with 'RAF' AAR as the Tristars were the refueller of choice for the USN. The Adriatic towlines were a sight to behold and I often thought they were our vital ground. The havoc that the Serbs could have created by just one fast dash towards them would have been immense.

[Magic Mushroom]

Nursey,
Totally agree that once you have lost a capability, it is a long process to regain it. Likewise, as I've said before on this very thread the FAA and RAF should have colluded more effectively in the mid 1980's when the Harrier GR5/7 was being procured. Rather than upgrading a 1960's airframe to FA2 standard, both services could have achived huge economies by obtaining an AV-8B+ type asset with AMRAAM. Then the FRS1 could have been retired gracefully in the early 90's.

However, as John Farly mentions, inter-service rivalry has cost HM Forces dear over the years. Nowhere is this more evident than in the gradual erosion of the UKs maritime aviation capability. Therefore, it would have taken a brave Air Marshall or Admiral to suggest such a scheme in the mid 1980's when the cold war was still on, and budgets were more secure. The mere fact that the other service had suggested it, would probably have led to the other service blocking it. Perhaps if one good thing can come out of the constant defence cuts, it is that all 3 services must learn to better coordinate their procurement planning.

Regrettably, whilst the installation of the excellent Blue Vixen into the GR7/9 is undoubtedly technically feasible and operationally desireable, financially it is a total non-starter. Although the USMC, Spanish and Italian navies have succesfully integrated the APG-65 and (to a lesser extent) AMRAAM onto their AV-8Bs, Boeing and BAe would charge astronomical money to integrate a different radar into the GR7. Although the aerodynamic alterations would be minor, the software, system/weapons integration and radar modelling (what would the effect be for instance on the Blue Vixen radar side lobe pattern in a GR9?) would take at least 3 years and cost hundreds of millions of pounds. I would be interested in John Farley's view on the implications of a GR9/Blue Vixen/AMRAAM marriage.

Regrettably, aerospace companies are out to make money. As an example, the AWACS mission system has a tabular display fed off the INS giving the aircrafts speed, altitude, pitch, AOB and position etc. On the top of this simple readout, it says 'E-3A'. When the RAF procured the Sentry, we enquired if Boeing could change this to read 'E-3D'. Boeing bluntly stated that to even 'look at that part of the software would cost the UK £1 million!' Needless to say, the display still says 'E-3A'! Sadly, this illustrates the costs involved in even the most minor of ac mods.

I'd love to see RAF and FAA GR9s with Sea Vixen and AMRAAM capabilities on CVS. However, that decision could only have been made about 20 years ago. The money simply does not exist for such a major modification today.

Impinger,
Agreed! AS one involved in the 'organised' chaos that was the OAF AAR plot, it is a source of wonder to me that we never had a serious mid-air, let alone a Serb High Value Air Asset attack.

Regards,
M2

[WE Branch Fanatic]

All the more reason for keeping the Sea Harrier!

Incidentally what do you think the situation would be if the RN and RAF had preceded with the development of P1154?

Impinger you said

Air Defence of the fleet can be better achieved by putting the fleet out of range

So isn't that letting enemy airpower stopping us operating where we need to?

How does that sit with the Navy's phillosophy of being ready to fight and win?