Sea Jet
Suspicion breeds confidence
Fidae,
Very much appreciated, thank you.
On a different tack, some while back, we were discussing the practicalities of giving the GR9 fleet limited AMRAAM capabilities. Opinions were divided. A similar thread as been running "in another place" which has one reply which sounds feasible and credible.
Comments invited where appropriate.
AMRAAM GR9
Very much appreciated, thank you.
On a different tack, some while back, we were discussing the practicalities of giving the GR9 fleet limited AMRAAM capabilities. Opinions were divided. A similar thread as been running "in another place" which has one reply which sounds feasible and credible.
Comments invited where appropriate.
AMRAAM GR9
Last edited by Navaleye; 2nd May 2004 at 17:55.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Just found this. Good article on 899 at Leuchars.
899
It mentions an F3 pilot converting to the Shar. Isn't this a career limiting move at this point of time?
899
It mentions an F3 pilot converting to the Shar. Isn't this a career limiting move at this point of time?
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From the photo it looks like the F3 convertee is actually the previous SNOT (senior naval officer tremblers) who had been on loan to the RAF before rejoining the Dark Blue. Bad move SNOT - you know where the real fun is to be had!!
From the 801 NAS website: Poland Revisited: More Air to Air stuff
And from Navy News: 801 NAS Fights On
Sorry for the delay in posting the links.
And from Navy News: 801 NAS Fights On
Sorry for the delay in posting the links.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Were these the ex Luftwaffe 29s? What weapons were they simulating? Maybe it wasn't top of the line Russian kit just de-spec'd export versions.
Last edited by Navaleye; 12th May 2004 at 12:31.
Suspicion breeds confidence
John,
I know you are probably the only person to have flown both types. How would you compare them in the WVR scenario?
I know you are probably the only person to have flown both types. How would you compare them in the WVR scenario?
Last edited by Navaleye; 13th May 2004 at 09:49.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Navaleye
Harry Blot the USMC’s leading exponent of Harrier ACM manoeuvres always said you should not get shot down in a Harrier if you see a missile or aircraft attacking you (big if of course) because you should be able to throw a last moment tight turning decel that would make it miss. Given the 29 and 27 families ability to do hooks and cobras I think even Harry might have found them a challenge.
It seems to me that the major advantage in flying an aeroplane that has such benign high alpha characteristics as the 29 (and the 27) is not that you choose to go round doing such energy sapping stuff all the time but from the peace of mind that such carefree handing gives you. You just don’t have to worry about your jet biting you. This must give people quite an edge when it comes to concentrating outside the window.
The 29 had also got one hell of a lot of old fashioned lift so the g you could sustain at low speeds was remarkable if all you were used to was the original Harriers 200 sq ft metal wing! Even with lerx and the 230 sq ft plastic job that the RAF enjoy now (and I only flew on the B) I don’t see how if you have two equal blokes (another big if) the little guy could win unless other factors came into play –like fuel persistence etc etc.
But then history says other factors do come into play – all the time eh?
JF
Harry Blot the USMC’s leading exponent of Harrier ACM manoeuvres always said you should not get shot down in a Harrier if you see a missile or aircraft attacking you (big if of course) because you should be able to throw a last moment tight turning decel that would make it miss. Given the 29 and 27 families ability to do hooks and cobras I think even Harry might have found them a challenge.
It seems to me that the major advantage in flying an aeroplane that has such benign high alpha characteristics as the 29 (and the 27) is not that you choose to go round doing such energy sapping stuff all the time but from the peace of mind that such carefree handing gives you. You just don’t have to worry about your jet biting you. This must give people quite an edge when it comes to concentrating outside the window.
The 29 had also got one hell of a lot of old fashioned lift so the g you could sustain at low speeds was remarkable if all you were used to was the original Harriers 200 sq ft metal wing! Even with lerx and the 230 sq ft plastic job that the RAF enjoy now (and I only flew on the B) I don’t see how if you have two equal blokes (another big if) the little guy could win unless other factors came into play –like fuel persistence etc etc.
But then history says other factors do come into play – all the time eh?
JF
Some controversial points
Very soon, RN elements will be participating in a major amphibious exercise off of the American coast. See Here .
Does anyone know what aircraft Invincible will be carrying?
Doesn't it seem odd that we put all of this time, money and effort into upgrading our amphibious capabilities than decide to save a relatively small sum by scrapping the means to protect amphibious forces from air threats?
Now for the really controversial points. Some of them might be considered to be tangents.
Rumours in the media are that there is to be a reduction in frigate and destroyer numbers. Inevitably this will exacerbate the problem caused by the loss of organic air defence. The loss of the Sea Harrier means that the fleet's first layer of defence against aircraft (not including third party assets) is the Type 42 Destroyer with Sea Dart.
The Type 23 Frigate is not primarily an anti air ship, but can provide extended point defence for herself and nearby vessels with vertical lauch Sea Wolf. Apart from being more suitable for anti missile use, the vertical launch version of Sea Wolf has 32 missiles ready to go as opposed to Sea Dart's two.
Because of the need to keep Type 42s due to the loss of Sea Harrier, Type 23s may be cut. This makes little sense, and is probably a consequence of the loss of organic air defence.
My guess is that losing Sea Dart would be less of a loss (considering all our frigates now have Sea Wolf, we have more sophisticated decoys and CIWS aboard high value units and some other vessels) than the SHAR/Blue Vixen/AMRAAM combination. Doesn't Sea Dart contain lots of 60s/70s technology? And even if it is upgraded the basic limitations of range and only having two missiles on the launcher.
When I was at University one of my lecturers was a ex RN Instructor Officer who had done other things in the mob. According to him the T42 design was criticised as a ship that would have trouble defending herself, let alone anyone else. The events of 1982 may have vindicated that view....
1. AAW. Sea Dart limited, old, and obsolecent.
2. Anti Surface. Same as above, additionally was Sea Dart ever serious in the anti ship role?
3. ASW. Noisy, difficult to use own sonar 2016, vulnerable to homing torpedoes or acoustic mines due to noise, no STWS, can't operate Merlin, aviation facilities limited.
4. MIOPS - due to problems with operating boats T42s are not the preferred platform for boarding duties.
I have been told the only task which has to be a T42 is the Five Powers' deployment in the Far East. Also escorting CVS/LPH/LPD(?), although I would have thought they'd be better of with a T23 providing extended point defence with vertical Sea Wolf and the Sea Harrier providing air defence.......
As I see it, we should have kept the batch two T22s we've scrapped as targets/flogged (interesting that the Romanians want 76mm guns fitted) and considered losing more of the T42s instead of the Sea Jet. However, the need to have a certain number of frigates/destroyers may make this unrealistic. Although these numbers are under threat at the moment. Perhaps the RN should acquire less sophisticated vessels for MIOPS and the like. Unfortunately the Treasury etc would no doubt use this to justify more cutbacks.
However, the need for the fleet to have an ability to deal with enemy aircraft/missiles at a range of more than a few miles means that we may end of losing more useful, better armed, Type 22 or Type 23 Frigates.
Meanwhile, it seems as if Sub Harpoon is about to be withdrawn from service. This will make any loss of Harpoon carrying ships more serious. To add to the problem our ever decreasing number of submarines are likely to be used for firing Tomahawk, ISTAR missions or SF operations. This must surely comprimise their anti submarine and anti surface roles, thus making our frigates more important. But if we have cut them back even more....
By the way, if future operations ae going to be in shallow littoral waters then how come our new SSNs will be even larger? I still curse the Tories for getting rid of our diesel electric boats which would have been well suites to littoral things.
On the subject of Tomahawk, can the UK use it independently? Is it anything other than a political thing? Would the money spent on Tomahawk, modifying our boats, building the necessary infrastructure, and buying the missiles have been better spent on something else, the Fleet Air Arm perhaps?
Does anyone know what aircraft Invincible will be carrying?
Doesn't it seem odd that we put all of this time, money and effort into upgrading our amphibious capabilities than decide to save a relatively small sum by scrapping the means to protect amphibious forces from air threats?
Now for the really controversial points. Some of them might be considered to be tangents.
Rumours in the media are that there is to be a reduction in frigate and destroyer numbers. Inevitably this will exacerbate the problem caused by the loss of organic air defence. The loss of the Sea Harrier means that the fleet's first layer of defence against aircraft (not including third party assets) is the Type 42 Destroyer with Sea Dart.
The Type 23 Frigate is not primarily an anti air ship, but can provide extended point defence for herself and nearby vessels with vertical lauch Sea Wolf. Apart from being more suitable for anti missile use, the vertical launch version of Sea Wolf has 32 missiles ready to go as opposed to Sea Dart's two.
Because of the need to keep Type 42s due to the loss of Sea Harrier, Type 23s may be cut. This makes little sense, and is probably a consequence of the loss of organic air defence.
My guess is that losing Sea Dart would be less of a loss (considering all our frigates now have Sea Wolf, we have more sophisticated decoys and CIWS aboard high value units and some other vessels) than the SHAR/Blue Vixen/AMRAAM combination. Doesn't Sea Dart contain lots of 60s/70s technology? And even if it is upgraded the basic limitations of range and only having two missiles on the launcher.
When I was at University one of my lecturers was a ex RN Instructor Officer who had done other things in the mob. According to him the T42 design was criticised as a ship that would have trouble defending herself, let alone anyone else. The events of 1982 may have vindicated that view....
1. AAW. Sea Dart limited, old, and obsolecent.
2. Anti Surface. Same as above, additionally was Sea Dart ever serious in the anti ship role?
3. ASW. Noisy, difficult to use own sonar 2016, vulnerable to homing torpedoes or acoustic mines due to noise, no STWS, can't operate Merlin, aviation facilities limited.
4. MIOPS - due to problems with operating boats T42s are not the preferred platform for boarding duties.
I have been told the only task which has to be a T42 is the Five Powers' deployment in the Far East. Also escorting CVS/LPH/LPD(?), although I would have thought they'd be better of with a T23 providing extended point defence with vertical Sea Wolf and the Sea Harrier providing air defence.......
As I see it, we should have kept the batch two T22s we've scrapped as targets/flogged (interesting that the Romanians want 76mm guns fitted) and considered losing more of the T42s instead of the Sea Jet. However, the need to have a certain number of frigates/destroyers may make this unrealistic. Although these numbers are under threat at the moment. Perhaps the RN should acquire less sophisticated vessels for MIOPS and the like. Unfortunately the Treasury etc would no doubt use this to justify more cutbacks.
However, the need for the fleet to have an ability to deal with enemy aircraft/missiles at a range of more than a few miles means that we may end of losing more useful, better armed, Type 22 or Type 23 Frigates.
Meanwhile, it seems as if Sub Harpoon is about to be withdrawn from service. This will make any loss of Harpoon carrying ships more serious. To add to the problem our ever decreasing number of submarines are likely to be used for firing Tomahawk, ISTAR missions or SF operations. This must surely comprimise their anti submarine and anti surface roles, thus making our frigates more important. But if we have cut them back even more....
By the way, if future operations ae going to be in shallow littoral waters then how come our new SSNs will be even larger? I still curse the Tories for getting rid of our diesel electric boats which would have been well suites to littoral things.
On the subject of Tomahawk, can the UK use it independently? Is it anything other than a political thing? Would the money spent on Tomahawk, modifying our boats, building the necessary infrastructure, and buying the missiles have been better spent on something else, the Fleet Air Arm perhaps?
Tomahawk has been used on a number of occasions. When it was used there was no other alternative. It provides the UK with a capability which cannot easily be provided by allies. It is a capability that is best (perhaps only) provided by naval units.
Unlike the Shar in the years AFTER 1982.
We're moving away from the kind of Blue Water navy that needed the kind of AD to which you are so firmly wedded, and the kind of threat it countered is disappearing. You may be right that it would have been better to retain SHar than some classes of escort ship, but given the hard choice, I'd guess that the Admiralty would prefer to save ships than aircraft, and are more concerned with Sea Power than Air Power.
Unlike the Shar in the years AFTER 1982.
We're moving away from the kind of Blue Water navy that needed the kind of AD to which you are so firmly wedded, and the kind of threat it countered is disappearing. You may be right that it would have been better to retain SHar than some classes of escort ship, but given the hard choice, I'd guess that the Admiralty would prefer to save ships than aircraft, and are more concerned with Sea Power than Air Power.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Webf, all your points are valid. I would not write off all the T42s completely. Although you have more recent experience than most 
The B2 and B3 ships have a more modern ADAWS suite than the B1s, they also have the Sea Dart with ADIMP mods and should be considered more useful. However no pure semi-active system system can engage under the lobe attacks. If you can't illuminate a target you can't shoot it. That's why the Sea Harrier had the Blue Vixen/AMRRAM upgrade.
I read the that new IR fuses in the ADIMP Sea Dart had a tendancy to go off when they were pointed anywhere near the sun. The RN has not publicly advertised whether or not Sea Dart has successfully engaged a sea skimmer - although it did with Sea Wolf. I suspect it cannot. What price the Sea Harrier?
The B2 and B3 ships have a more modern ADAWS suite than the B1s, they also have the Sea Dart with ADIMP mods and should be considered more useful. However no pure semi-active system system can engage under the lobe attacks. If you can't illuminate a target you can't shoot it. That's why the Sea Harrier had the Blue Vixen/AMRRAM upgrade.
I read the that new IR fuses in the ADIMP Sea Dart had a tendancy to go off when they were pointed anywhere near the sun. The RN has not publicly advertised whether or not Sea Dart has successfully engaged a sea skimmer - although it did with Sea Wolf. I suspect it cannot. What price the Sea Harrier?
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maybe the Vanguards should be mothballed/scrapped and nuc tomahawks put aboard the SSN's that ought to save a few million that could be invested in getting the carriers the right size for the F35.
The T42/sea dart is well passed its sell by date. Is the Aster system any good? or are we buying another white elephant.
Just a pity more T22/III wern't ordered to replace the Falklands losses/ T12's.
The T42/sea dart is well passed its sell by date. Is the Aster system any good? or are we buying another white elephant.
Just a pity more T22/III wern't ordered to replace the Falklands losses/ T12's.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Nurse, The Aster 15 has been successfully test fired from the C de G and has so far met all its expectations. Bear in mind that the system fitted is not the same as the T45s will have. They will have a much more capable radar and command system. Systems integrations issues may arise here. The T45 will be amongst the most capable AAW ships afloat. Hope they get TLAM too.
My preference has always been to fight aircraft with aircraft.
My preference has always been to fight aircraft with aircraft.
Navaleye,
YOUR preference?????????????
Who are you, the Second Sea Lord?
Unless your referring to theoretical war gaming you may have noticed that there isn't actually a real air threat to surface forces these days.
This is the reason that the USN is ditching the F-14 and it's long range Phoenix capability and the S-3 with it's ASW capability for an increased strike force.
Embarked Maritime air has one role these days, and that is power projection inland. We do not face a sophisticated conventional military threat, the threat is now much more difficult to counter.
Gone are the days of fleet actions between major Surface Action groups and fighting convoys across the Atlantic.
The forces are being restructured to face suicide bombers, car bombers, dirty improvised explosive devices and the like.
This is going to be the pattern of military Ops for the next decade at least, there is NO point retaining a structured fielded force that has no relevant threat to face any more.
Jees...............
YOUR preference?????????????
Who are you, the Second Sea Lord?
Unless your referring to theoretical war gaming you may have noticed that there isn't actually a real air threat to surface forces these days.
This is the reason that the USN is ditching the F-14 and it's long range Phoenix capability and the S-3 with it's ASW capability for an increased strike force.
Embarked Maritime air has one role these days, and that is power projection inland. We do not face a sophisticated conventional military threat, the threat is now much more difficult to counter.
Gone are the days of fleet actions between major Surface Action groups and fighting convoys across the Atlantic.
The forces are being restructured to face suicide bombers, car bombers, dirty improvised explosive devices and the like.
This is going to be the pattern of military Ops for the next decade at least, there is NO point retaining a structured fielded force that has no relevant threat to face any more.
Jees...............
Suspicion breeds confidence
I think everyone in the fleet shares my sentiments from 1SL down. I also note that we are the only carrier capable fleet to be removing AMRAAM (or rimilar) at a time when every other (carrier capable) navy is adding them. But lets not go round in circles again.
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Pr00ne says
"Unless your referring to theoretical war gaming you may have noticed that there isn't actually a real air threat to surface forces these days."
Just to clear this up, are there no non-NATO airforces out there equipped with fast jets and air-surface missiles then? Perhaps my copy of Jane's is out of date.
The biggest problem the navy will face over the coming years is the perception that maritime forces will always operate in a relatively benign environment, cf Iraq. The point that's been missed is that we were able to deploy substantial forces into the Gulf only because we were able to achieve maritime supremacy, not only in the Gulf, but also along the lines of communications. Without CVF, the chances of us achieving this same superiority against a nation that hasn't been bombed back into the stone age for a period of 12 years are rather slim. I know that it is assumed that we will not go to war except as part of a coalition including the US, but CVF, or the lack thereof, will affect the fleet for the next 20-30 years, and a lot can change in that time.
"Unless your referring to theoretical war gaming you may have noticed that there isn't actually a real air threat to surface forces these days."
Just to clear this up, are there no non-NATO airforces out there equipped with fast jets and air-surface missiles then? Perhaps my copy of Jane's is out of date.
The biggest problem the navy will face over the coming years is the perception that maritime forces will always operate in a relatively benign environment, cf Iraq. The point that's been missed is that we were able to deploy substantial forces into the Gulf only because we were able to achieve maritime supremacy, not only in the Gulf, but also along the lines of communications. Without CVF, the chances of us achieving this same superiority against a nation that hasn't been bombed back into the stone age for a period of 12 years are rather slim. I know that it is assumed that we will not go to war except as part of a coalition including the US, but CVF, or the lack thereof, will affect the fleet for the next 20-30 years, and a lot can change in that time.
Vapour,
Absolutely none that present sufficient a threat to the UK to justify retention of the SHAR.
CVF and F-35 will be a very flexible concept, SHAR and CVS are not-fact!
Absolutely none that present sufficient a threat to the UK to justify retention of the SHAR.
CVF and F-35 will be a very flexible concept, SHAR and CVS are not-fact!
Suspicion breeds confidence
PrOOne, Why are the Spanish and Italians in the process of upgrading their Harriers to II+ standard and acquiring AMRAAMs? Are they not part of the same Nato/American umbrealla which makes these things un-necessary? Yes, but they also understand that you don't take the locks off your house because there hasn't been a burglary in the street for a couple of years.
Go to the library and get a book that explains what happens when ships fight aircraft. Here are some reference points: Crete, Malta, Pacific, Barents Sea, Falkands, The Gulf (Uss Stark) etc.
Go to the library and get a book that explains what happens when ships fight aircraft. Here are some reference points: Crete, Malta, Pacific, Barents Sea, Falkands, The Gulf (Uss Stark) etc.
Last edited by Navaleye; 23rd May 2004 at 01:12.
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"Unless your referring to theoretical war gaming you may have noticed that there isn't actually a real air threat to surface forces these days."
That type of talk got us into a whole lot of bother in 1982. In 1966 Healy and his Light Blue Henchmen Colluded to get rid of carriers as the RAF said they could defend the fleet from air attack anywhere in the world. The losers 16 years later were service personell (From ALL Three Services) who in whatever theatre could not depend on air support. The last 7 ships that the RN lost were down to air attack and all but one were in a Brown Water environment. SHAR was regarded as inadiquate then. Now after a massive upgrade HMG are getting rid of it all together. We now see ourselves in a situation where we are realligning our forces with focus on an amphibious assult. Ship-based SAM is only as good as the range of its radar and any radar at present cannot see though land - mass. The only Aircraft that can see far enough to give warning is the Sea King ASiC and then it's only good for giving a heads up.
Like most Pro-SHAR men I Quote the falklands. I know that the Argentinean Govt have said they will never try and take the islands by force again but we all know the value of words from a Government Minister don't we? I've also read in one of the latest defence select comittee meetings that 'The Argentinean Forces are in no fit state to take anyone on' - I wonder???
...Gonna have to stop Looking at these things after a night in the Pub - it just winds me up
That type of talk got us into a whole lot of bother in 1982. In 1966 Healy and his Light Blue Henchmen Colluded to get rid of carriers as the RAF said they could defend the fleet from air attack anywhere in the world. The losers 16 years later were service personell (From ALL Three Services) who in whatever theatre could not depend on air support. The last 7 ships that the RN lost were down to air attack and all but one were in a Brown Water environment. SHAR was regarded as inadiquate then. Now after a massive upgrade HMG are getting rid of it all together. We now see ourselves in a situation where we are realligning our forces with focus on an amphibious assult. Ship-based SAM is only as good as the range of its radar and any radar at present cannot see though land - mass. The only Aircraft that can see far enough to give warning is the Sea King ASiC and then it's only good for giving a heads up.
Like most Pro-SHAR men I Quote the falklands. I know that the Argentinean Govt have said they will never try and take the islands by force again but we all know the value of words from a Government Minister don't we? I've also read in one of the latest defence select comittee meetings that 'The Argentinean Forces are in no fit state to take anyone on' - I wonder???
...Gonna have to stop Looking at these things after a night in the Pub - it just winds me up
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World - Minutes of Evidence taken by the Commons Defence Commitee - 20th April 2004.
Q214 Mr Blunt: In paragraph 2.5 of the White Paper it says, "The most demanding expeditionary operations involving intervention against the state adversaries can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged ..." Are we saying that the United Kingdom on its own will never again be able to fight a state adversary (as we had to do over the Falklands, for example) on our own? Therefore the White Paper is based on an assumption that the United States will always be at our side.
General Sir Michael Walker: I think the assumption is that we would not see ourselves engaging in inter-state conflict on our own. I think that is a very fair assumption.
Q215 Mr Blunt: May I ask you each whether you think that is an assumption on which we should properly rely for the future of British defence.
General Sir Mike Jackson: "Never" is a very conclusive word, is it not? As CDS have said, one needs to make very careful judgments over the probabilities and it is difficult to construct the scenario, it would seem to me, where the United Kingdom would engage on inter-state conflict single-handed. We had the example in 1982, and I trust there will be no repeat performance of that, but, perhaps outside of that particular set of circumstances, it is very hard to see any circumstances in which this country's national interest would be so threatened that it would have to set out alone. It would be part of a wider piece. The assumption, it seems to me, is that it would be part of a wider piece in which the United States inevitably will be involved because it is that wider piece.
General Sir Michael Walker: If I may just add: remember the Falklands was demanding, but I would not have described it as "the most demanding". This did not use all the weapons of war and capabilities that we would use in the most demanding type of operation. There was very little armour used; there was very limited artillery. It was essentially a lighter war-fighting operation. We need to remember that war fighting can happen at any level and with any forces but the most demanding we are talking about here is the exploitation of every single capability that is necessary to prosecute the most demanding form of war. In those circumstances, I do believe it is a fair assumption.
Q216 Mr Blunt: The kernel of my concern is that we appear to be stripping out the air defence capability both of the navy and of the army in the various savings measures that are currently being taken. Of course both of those capabilities were critical in 1982. The operation in 1982, although it was light in the terms you have presented it, we would not now be able to carry out in the course of the next decade when those capabilities are not present for the United Kingdom. That means that the shop therefore appears to be being bet on this assumption, where Lord King, former Defence Secretary, said to the House of Lords that in his experience "the inconceivable usually happens". Maybe by definition we cannot conceive of the circumstances in which it might happen but experience tells us, in my judgment, that Lord King's words would appear more often than not to be correct.
General Sir Michael Walker: I cannot let you get away with the statement that we appear to be getting rid of all the air defence within the army and the navy. I do not know where you have got that from, but that is absolute nonsense.
Q217 Chairman: Tory Central Office maybe!
General Sir Michael Walker: Alan, do you want to comment about your own views?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I would make a couple of points. Within the definitions that you have given about this large scale and the whole spread of capabilities being used, I would agree that it is extremely unlikely that we would ever be involved in an operation without the United States, that inter-state type operation. "Inconceivable" is a word I probably would not ever use, because I think it is true to say that you never know what is going to happen in the future. We have found that again and again and again. But the basis of assuming that we will not be involved at the very highest levels of military capability in an inter-state operation without the US I think is a very sensible basis on which to go forward. I think where you are coming from is a similar thing to the Falklands again.
Q218 Mr Blunt: Not just the Falklands. We are a member of the Commonwealth.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if maybe I could talk on an operation of that type.
Q219 Mr Blunt: If a Commonwealth country is invaded, that brings with it obligations to the United Kingdom that the United States does not share.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if I could talk on the specifics, where you talk about air defence being stripped out and capabilities: looking to the future - and I will use the Falklands as a scenario, because one needs a scenario - we will have the capability of doing exactly what we did before. We will keep it with our CVSs, through until the CVF comes; and when the CVF comes, we will be even more capable of conducting that type of operation. The loss of the FA2s - and there has been considerable debate about that - is a loss of air defence capability in the short term, but we of course have layered air defence and we are able still to provide air defence for the carrier group. Focusing more on deep strike is the way we need to go for the future - we are certain of that, looking at the operations that have happened - and would give us an ability to conduct an operation like the Falklands with more capability than we have had in the past. So I am not concerned on that specific but I would not use the word "inconceivable" because I also agree that the one thing of which you can be absolutely certain in defence terms is that it is the thing which you have not predicted that will happen - which is why we need all of the capabilities we have in defence, in those multi-role capabilities, to be able to react to that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would echo that. I would just say that, since we are unable to predict the future and if, as you say, the unexpected usually happens, then the important thing is to be able to react to an uncertain future. The way to do that is not to focus on specific issues but to accept the need for adaptability in our military structure, in our capability and in our tactics. I think that is the issue on which we should be focusing rather than on specific sets of capability that we think might or might not be required in the future.
Q214 Mr Blunt: In paragraph 2.5 of the White Paper it says, "The most demanding expeditionary operations involving intervention against the state adversaries can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged ..." Are we saying that the United Kingdom on its own will never again be able to fight a state adversary (as we had to do over the Falklands, for example) on our own? Therefore the White Paper is based on an assumption that the United States will always be at our side.
General Sir Michael Walker: I think the assumption is that we would not see ourselves engaging in inter-state conflict on our own. I think that is a very fair assumption.
Q215 Mr Blunt: May I ask you each whether you think that is an assumption on which we should properly rely for the future of British defence.
General Sir Mike Jackson: "Never" is a very conclusive word, is it not? As CDS have said, one needs to make very careful judgments over the probabilities and it is difficult to construct the scenario, it would seem to me, where the United Kingdom would engage on inter-state conflict single-handed. We had the example in 1982, and I trust there will be no repeat performance of that, but, perhaps outside of that particular set of circumstances, it is very hard to see any circumstances in which this country's national interest would be so threatened that it would have to set out alone. It would be part of a wider piece. The assumption, it seems to me, is that it would be part of a wider piece in which the United States inevitably will be involved because it is that wider piece.
General Sir Michael Walker: If I may just add: remember the Falklands was demanding, but I would not have described it as "the most demanding". This did not use all the weapons of war and capabilities that we would use in the most demanding type of operation. There was very little armour used; there was very limited artillery. It was essentially a lighter war-fighting operation. We need to remember that war fighting can happen at any level and with any forces but the most demanding we are talking about here is the exploitation of every single capability that is necessary to prosecute the most demanding form of war. In those circumstances, I do believe it is a fair assumption.
Q216 Mr Blunt: The kernel of my concern is that we appear to be stripping out the air defence capability both of the navy and of the army in the various savings measures that are currently being taken. Of course both of those capabilities were critical in 1982. The operation in 1982, although it was light in the terms you have presented it, we would not now be able to carry out in the course of the next decade when those capabilities are not present for the United Kingdom. That means that the shop therefore appears to be being bet on this assumption, where Lord King, former Defence Secretary, said to the House of Lords that in his experience "the inconceivable usually happens". Maybe by definition we cannot conceive of the circumstances in which it might happen but experience tells us, in my judgment, that Lord King's words would appear more often than not to be correct.
General Sir Michael Walker: I cannot let you get away with the statement that we appear to be getting rid of all the air defence within the army and the navy. I do not know where you have got that from, but that is absolute nonsense.
Q217 Chairman: Tory Central Office maybe!
General Sir Michael Walker: Alan, do you want to comment about your own views?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I would make a couple of points. Within the definitions that you have given about this large scale and the whole spread of capabilities being used, I would agree that it is extremely unlikely that we would ever be involved in an operation without the United States, that inter-state type operation. "Inconceivable" is a word I probably would not ever use, because I think it is true to say that you never know what is going to happen in the future. We have found that again and again and again. But the basis of assuming that we will not be involved at the very highest levels of military capability in an inter-state operation without the US I think is a very sensible basis on which to go forward. I think where you are coming from is a similar thing to the Falklands again.
Q218 Mr Blunt: Not just the Falklands. We are a member of the Commonwealth.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if maybe I could talk on an operation of that type.
Q219 Mr Blunt: If a Commonwealth country is invaded, that brings with it obligations to the United Kingdom that the United States does not share.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if I could talk on the specifics, where you talk about air defence being stripped out and capabilities: looking to the future - and I will use the Falklands as a scenario, because one needs a scenario - we will have the capability of doing exactly what we did before. We will keep it with our CVSs, through until the CVF comes; and when the CVF comes, we will be even more capable of conducting that type of operation. The loss of the FA2s - and there has been considerable debate about that - is a loss of air defence capability in the short term, but we of course have layered air defence and we are able still to provide air defence for the carrier group. Focusing more on deep strike is the way we need to go for the future - we are certain of that, looking at the operations that have happened - and would give us an ability to conduct an operation like the Falklands with more capability than we have had in the past. So I am not concerned on that specific but I would not use the word "inconceivable" because I also agree that the one thing of which you can be absolutely certain in defence terms is that it is the thing which you have not predicted that will happen - which is why we need all of the capabilities we have in defence, in those multi-role capabilities, to be able to react to that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would echo that. I would just say that, since we are unable to predict the future and if, as you say, the unexpected usually happens, then the important thing is to be able to react to an uncertain future. The way to do that is not to focus on specific issues but to accept the need for adaptability in our military structure, in our capability and in our tactics. I think that is the issue on which we should be focusing rather than on specific sets of capability that we think might or might not be required in the future.
